Russian Submarine Fire - Orel Perhaps a Write-Off?

A photo (Courtesy of Pravda) released later on April 8, 2015 indicates a much more serious fire on the Orel (Oscar II class) submarine than Russian media were prepared to reveal earlier in the day.
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UPDATE AS AT APRIL 9, 2015

A Pravda article released late April 8, 2015 provides much more information on the Orel submarine fire (and a bit of anti-US propaganda) than news articles earlier on April 8.

The Pravda article "Fire on board Orel nuclear submarine causes major damage" reported http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/08-04-2015/130224-orel_nuclear_submarine-0/ :

"The fire sparked during welding works...

 "The Orel submarine's "underwater displacement is about 25 thousand tons, and surface displacement - 22 thousand tons."

"...Cruise missiles torpedoes and all aggressive liquids - turbine oil and diesel fuel had been removed from the submarine as well. " 

[Propaganda wise] "According to Mikhailov, such fires happen very often, especially on US submarines. The Americans even took lessons from us on how to ensure the survivability of a vessel ship in a state of repair."

[What was on fire]"...the fire occurred during welding works between the outer and the pressure hull in the area of the aft compartment 9. The rubberized anti-noise insulation caught fire. The sonar coating on the submarine is at the top of the outer hull. There was a thinner layer of rubber between the outer and the pressure hull. Such things occur frequently during hot works, and it is not clear why such a fuss in connection with the ignition," the correspondent said. ...A part of the crew remained on board the submarine to prevent the fire from spreading inside the hull. Eight fire brigades of Zvezdochka Shipyard took part in the operation to extinguish the fire.

"...it was not an emergency situation." 

"However, a criminal case was filed into the fire on board the Orel nuclear sub. The case was filed in accordance with Art. 216 of the Criminal Code - "violation of safety regulations during the works that entailed major damage by negligence.""

[However] "To extinguish the fire, it was decided to flood the dock, in which the submarine was staying. 

According to most recent reports, the fire on board the Orel submarine caused the damage of more than 100 million rubles [US$1.87 million]. the fire damaged the descent and ascent systems of the submarine." See WHOLE PRAVDA ARTICLE 

COMMENT

While the Pravda report is part titled "major damage" with eight fire brigades attending, that "it was not an emergency situation" is unconvincing. Pravda does however attempt to explain where the damage occurred.

In terms of the cost of the damage Pravda says it is more 100 million rubles (US$1.87 million).

As - the Orel displaces around "22 thousand tons" (Surfaced) it is very large and would have cost a great amount for Russia to build with Russia's limited defence budget. The Russian Navy now has only 4 active Oscars. All this means time in dry dock rather than at sea (an opportunity cost) is very expensive. 

Perhaps the extra repair time may be 2 years making Orel non-operational until 2018. A damage and non-operational bill not $2 million but $200 million might be more accurate.

Another issue is the seawater time of the Orel's hull. It was launched in 1992 pointing to a 2022-2025  use-by date. The prospect of a relaunch in 2018 may now make further work on the Orel uneconomic, perhaps rendering the Orel a write-off. This is all up to the Russian Navy's accident assessors, Russia's declining national (oil dependent) budget and perhaps the pride of Putin.

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REPORTED APRIL 8, 2015 BELOW

There appears to be a tightly packed collection of shipping around the submarine on fire. Wouldn't they be at fire or at least smoke risk? Perhaps  authorities moved ships around the sub on fire to reduce the number of embarrassing photos?
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Reuters (carried in the SMH) reported April 8, 2015: "[Russian RIA] news agency reports said the fire [on the Oscar II class submarine Orel]  had started near the stern during welding work that caused insulation materials to catch fire. RIA quoted a well-informed source as saying it was proving hard to put out the blaze because of thick smoke.

"At the moment they are 'attacking' with foam to try to put out the fire but it's not having any effect. Because of this they are considering whether to fully submerge the whole dock under water," the source said."

Note commentary of this Youtube includes "authorities accused of hiding information" in the past.

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Although "80 firefighters and 20 fire trucks were involved in the work to extinguish the fire" Russian authorities claim after "preliminary inspections of the “Oryol”, no important infrastructure was damaged".

COMMENT

The Russian authorities are clearly taking pains to minimise the seriousness of the fire. 

An alternate theory, to the fire starting with insulating material, is that the welding set fumes from the backup batteries alight. Even nuclear subs have batteries. Battery fumes are a more common cause of submarine fire than merely insulating material.

Pete

Submarine Steel Strength, China and Japan.

High-strength steel welding, monitoring and other functions are now highly automated including  computer dependent, particularly in well established assembly lines. (Photo courtesy Design News and Bosch Rexroth)

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This present article continues discussions first raised in Soryu Submarine Steel Details - Japan Offer to Australia of January 20, 2015 and then raised in comments on previous articles over the last week.

Japan is particularly concerned that defence exports to customers/allies might increase the chances that Japan's submarine secrets (including its hull steel characteristics, cutting and welding techniques) might pass to potential enemies. A particular threat is passage of secrets to China. Particular concerns are China's ability to reverse engineer or develop counter-actions against allied weapons like the F-35.

Regarding the specific and sensitive issue of the operational depth of submarines. This depth is not soley dependent on the steel strength estimates discussed below. There are so many other determining factors including weld strength and hull structure.

Noone knows operational or crush depth except designers and naval officers who operate the submarines. Detailed computer simulation and materials testing is required to calculate pressure distribution on submarine hulls. 

Chinese submarines appear to be rapidly improving. Chinese submarines used to be clearly inferior to US or Japanese submarines, but now, the situation is changing. Ignorance of such rapid changes  makes people too optimistic. The latest Chinese subs may be superior to Collins subs at least in hull strength. Australian and Japanese hull strengths therefore need to be improved. 

Documentary Comparisons of Chinese and Japanese Submarine Steel Strengths

Chinese submarine hulls appear to made of "980 steel" with a yield strength of 800 MPa. China's "980" and Japans NS 80 are nearly the same. Their chemical components and mechanical strengths are very similar - see http://www.mod.go.jp/trdi/data/pdf/G/G3111C.pdf , page 3, table 3, chemical composition (NS80E) 4.2.1 left column.

See the following document: Shanghai Jiaotong University, School of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering's, "High Crack Propagation of Steel 980 Welded Joiont under Spectrum Load” (Chinese), http://image02w.seesaawiki.jp/d/e/doramarine/16dc6f08dbd1d96c.pdf

Page 5, “ 2.2 Fatigue Testing indicates:

“Test material for high-strength structural steel submarine 980 steel welded joints. 980 steel (VHD402), yield strength σs> = 800MPa, China developed high strength, high toughness, can be welded with a submarine pressure hull.” See Page 5, Table 1 Chemical component (Steel and Weld for upper and lower rows respectively), Table 2 Mechanical Property (ibid).

 Using conversion site http://www.convertunits.com/from/psi/to/MPa  800 MPa = 116,030 psi = "HY-116".

Returning to G3111C.pdf

Soryu Submarine Steel Details - Japan Offer to Australia of January 20, 2015 very briefly describes  http://www.mod.go.jp/trdi/data/pdf/G/G3111C.pdf ,  Within that document see page 4, table 4.2.1 left column, which seems to indicate the Soryu has Japanese naval steel measure NS80 = 80kgf/mm2 which converts to 113,760 lbf/in2 or HY-114.

So assuming the translations and conversions are correct China's use of HY-116 steel is very similar to the Soryu's HY-114.

Soryu Submarine Steel Details - Japan Offer to Australia also discusses NS110 which may also be used in the Soryu. NS110 means 110kgf/mm2 proof stress converting to 156,414 lbf/in2 or HY-156 . HY-156 using simple linear calculations allow the Soryu an operating depth of just over 600 metres.

Conclusion

It has to be pointed out, however, that operational depth is not soley dependent on steel strength. There are so many other determining factors including weld strength and hull structure.

Noone knows a submarine's operational or crush depth except designers and naval officers who operate the submarines. Detailed computer simulation and materials testing is also required to calculate pressure distribution on submarine hulls. 

Anonymous and Pete

More evidence Australia's Soryu Choice based on US-Australia-Japan Alliance Considerations

General Martin Dempsey (on right) Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin (at left), Australian Chief of the Defence Force, meet at RAN base HMAS Watson in Sydney, February, 23, 2015. 

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The following Reuters article confirms that non-tender factors such as the US preferences and what are assumed to be “common values” between Australia and Japan will heavily influence Australia's future submarine choice. Retired Vice Admiral Yoji Koda’s advocacy of most Soryus being built in Australia may amount to little compared to the views of Prime Ministers Abe and Abbott, MHI and KHI.

The article is a good summary of the key issues in Australia’s “competitive” evaluation process. I’ve included and bolded important sections. The article is by Matt Siegel, Reuters, April 1, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/02/australia-submarines-usa-idUSL3N0WX17A20150402:

“Washington's regional ambitions centre stage in Australian submarine tender

“…The qualitative difference between the [Japanese, German and French] submarines on offer was negligible, Rex Patrick, a former advisor to the previous defence minister and a submarine expert, told Reuters.

"All these guys build a good submarine. It will be factors other than capability which determines who wins," he said, partly referring to Washington's geo-strategic goals in Asia.

“…Japan had been the frontrunner to replace Australia's ageing Collins-class submarines with an off-the-shelf version of its 4,000-tonne Soryu-class vessel after Prime Minister Tony Abbott agreed to cooperate on military technology with Abe [in June 2014].

“…U.S. officials insist they are not pressing Australia to buy any particular submarine but say they see benefits from the interoperability of the Japanese option.

During a visit to Australia in February, General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the decision was one Australia would have to make on its own "for any number of domestic and international reasons".

But Dempsey also cited "interoperability" among allies as a key factor, although experts at the conference noted that submarines built by Germany and France, both NATO members, can communicate with U.S. vessels.

Still, Washington's view is that the Japanese submarine is technically superior to any European-made vessel, and will allow for the integration of more U.S. technology, a senior U.S. military source told Reuters.

"If they want to do it right, it is a Japanese hull and propulsion plant, with a U.S. combat system and ISR package," he said, using an acronym for the various types of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sensors like sonar and radar used on U.S. submarines.

‘…One notable Japanese participant at the [Sub Summit], retired Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, told Reuters that Japanese-Australian cooperation on the submarine deal would ensure countries in the Asia-Pacific with common values such as democracy also shared a common defence capability.

"The key point is not exporting our equipment on an industrial basis, but to be more strategic," added Koda, who also said Tokyo should be flexible and build most of the vessels in Australia, which would make the deal politically more palatable for Abbott.

Until now, sources had said Japan was reluctant to engage in a tender partly to avoid getting embroiled in a bidding war.

Japanese industry is also seen as wary of undertaking significant construction in Australia because of concerns about its sensitive submarine technology, including its stealthy propulsion system and advanced welding techniques. (Additional reporting by David Alexander in WASHINGTON and Tim Kelly in TOKYO; Editing by Dean Yates).” See WHOLE Reuters article.

COMMENT

The article confirms the alliance and US preference points I made when reporting on the "Sub Summit" Adelaide, late March 2014 and much earlier in Australia - the future junior ally of Japan, February 2, 2015.

Pete

Chinese Type 093A or 093G SSN armed with YJ-18 Carrier Killer Missiles

What may be 3 Chinese Type 093A/093G SSN or SSGN submarines. An obviously blurry photo of a clarity far below military satellite standards. Nothing as clear as "reading a car's number plate". 

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What may be a Chinese 093A/093G SSN or SSGN submarine with a vertical launch system with two types of missile [?] and pump jet propulsion.

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Probably one of China's older model Type 093 "Shang" class SSNs.

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Depiction of a Klub-Sizzler submarine launched missile which may be similar to China's YJ-18 anti-ship missile.

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Ecns of China reported April 3, 2015 a new version of China's Type 093 (NATO "Shang class") SSN. The new version is variously named Type 093A or 093G. The ability of 093A/093G to mount vertically launched YJ-18 anti-ship missiles may cause the 093A/093G to be called an SSGN. There  seem to be no reliable photos of the YJ-18.

If the longer length and other differences of the Type 093A/093Gs are accurate it is possible China may eventually rename them Type 095s. The 095 is expected to feature unobservable features including an advanced reactor, lower acoustic signature and the visible VLS tubes (with VLS noted on the 093As/093Gs).

Just a note of caution that the 093A/093G reports seem to rely on 3rd or 4th hand Taiwanese sources in the information loop. The message that 093A/093Gs with their missiles are "carrier killers" of course worries the US. A message that directs more US military attention weapons-money-opportunities to Taiwan is beneficial to Taiwan. Taiwan definitly needs US help to pressure some country to help Taiwan build or acquire four new submarines.

Application of the term "carrier killer" to the YJ-18 should not imply that the YJ-18 is a new threat. There may be many similarities between the 093A/093G's YJ-18 anti-ship missile and the BrahMos, Yakhont or Klub-Sizzler. Significantly the Klub-Sizzler has already been fitted by Russia to China's 12 Russian built Kilo class submarines. Now China is taking the evolutionary (no game-changing) step of fitting Klub equivalents (YJ-18s) to faster moving and longer submerged Type 093A/093Gs.

All this missile activity is not a major departure from conventional and nuclear propelled submarines pre-existing torpedos capabilities - with torpedos being able to "kill"/destroy carriers and other major warships.

The YJ-18 may also owe some design attributes to the YJ-12 "a supersonic Chinese anti-ship missile developed in the 1990s".

Comment - while the YJ-18 sounds like an awesome weapon the hierarchical autonomy, tactics and efficiency of their human operators are very important. The human element is often mistakenly disregarded. How smoothly the YJ-18s fit into China's broader network of anti-shipping sensors is also a consideration.

The report from Ecns of China, April 3, 2015 has the string http://www.ecns.cn/military/2015/04-03/160484.shtml and is below  .

[Chinese PLA] "Navy to get 3 new nuclear subs

   

2015-04-03 09:07China DailyEditor: Si Huan

Three cutting-edge nuclear-powered attack submarines have been manufactured and will soon be commissioned by the Chinese navy, according to media reports.

China Central Television showed a satellite picture earlier this week of three submarines anchored at an unidentified port [see first picture above - very blurry], saying the vessels are China's most advanced Type-093G nuclear-powered attack submarines, just completed by a Chinese shipyard and a waiting delivery.

With a teardrop hull, the submarine is longer than its predecessor, the Type-093, and has a vertical launching system, the report said.

Another article carried by the People's Liberation Army navy's website said the Type-093G's wing-shaped cross-section [?] is designed to improve speed and mobility as well as reduce noise, and that the vertical launcher is capable of delivering the country's latest YJ-18 supersonic anti-ship missile.

China established its nuclear-powered submarine force in the early 1970s but had never shown it to the outside world until 2009, when two nuclear submarines took part in a parade marking the 60th anniversary of the PLA navy's founding.

The Type-093G is reported to be an upgraded version of Type-093, China's second-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, which entered active service several years ago.

Cui Yiliang, editor-in-chief of Modern Ships magazine, said: "Though China was comparatively late in developing advanced nuclear-powered submarines such as the Type-093G, we used a lot of the most cutting-edge technologies and equipment on our submarines, enabling them to compete with their foreign counterparts."

He noted that China has researched the vertical launching system for many years and has installed it on other submarines and surface ships.

"Judging from the vessel's design, the Type-093G should have strong anti-ship and counter-submarine capabilities," said Yin Zhuo, a senior expert with the navy. "It is also likely to be upgraded with the capability of striking land targets with cruise missiles in the near future."

He added that the navy has formed a reliable logistics system for its nuclear submarine fleet.
Liu Jiangping, a naval equipment expert in Beijing who had served in the PLA navy for decades, said the vessel's vertical launching system enables the submarine to launch long-distance strikes from underwater, increasing the vessel's survivability in war.

The strategic force of the PLA navy now has about four nuclear-powered Type-094 ballistic missile submarines, up to six Type-093 nuclear-powered attack submarines and about three old Type-091 nuclear-powered attack submarines, CCTV quoted foreign media reports as saying.[note the report of six 093's may be Taiwanese deception. Wikipedia (see its sidebar) based on US DoD reports reported only 2 active 093s in June 2014. Wikipedia's sidebar agrees there are 3 active 091s however ].  
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Another report, from Deagel.com, last updated February 4, 2015, goes into much more detail on the YJ-18 anti-ship missile. The similarity to BrahMos, Yakhont or Klub-Sizzler in function is obvious. The report's string is http://www.deagel.com/Anti-Ship-Missiles/YJ-18_a002884001.aspx :

"YJ-18 [Missile]

Description:

The YingJi-18 (YJ-18 or Eagle/Hawk-18) is a vertically-launched, long-range, supersonic, sea-skimming anti-ship missile designed by China to kill US Navy's Aegis-equipped destroyers or its equivalents provided to Japan, South Korea or European Navies. The YJ-18 is planned for deployment by the newest People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Type 052D class destroyers and subsequently may be incorporated into existing destroyers and submarines as part of a modernization effort. Its guidance system consists of an advanced inertial navigation, maybe backed by the Beidou Chinese GPS, plus an active radar seeker in the terminal phase. Besides, a built-in data link allows the carrier ship to update the target's location. The Aegis-killer missile existence was first reported in 2013 with an entry into service expected by 2014 or later.

The YJ-18 missile is equipped with a 300 kg high explosive (HE) warhead capable of taking out a destroyer-sized ship. The HE warhead can be replaced by an anti-radiation/electromagnetic pulse warhead that is said can take down up to 60 percent of the enemy ship's electronic systems at a range of 50 meters after detonating. After the vertical launch the missile's turbojet engine is capable of flying at a cruise speed of Mach 0.8 for about 180 kilometers after that point the warhead section separates and a solid rocket engine ignites allowing at a top speed of Mach 2.5-3 for about 40 kilometers. The missile can maneuver at 10G acceleration to avoid enemy interception by air-to-air or surface-air missiles. The missile design and performance is very similar to Russia's 3M54E [Klub-Sizzler] which may have been the template for the YJ-18."

Pete

Israeli Publicity on Nuclear Capability of its Dolphin 2 Submarines - Yakhont, BrahMos

The upper image is a Dolphin 2 - for size comparison and to indicate the fuel cell AIP additions. Lower submarine image highlights the high number of torpedo/missile tubes - apparently ten on the Dolphin 1s and 2s - useful for rapid nuclear missile launch. (Diagram courtesy Next Navy)

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Most probably very similar to the Russian-made P-800 Oniks, Yakhont , NATO reporting name SS-N-26 "Strobile" is the Russian-Indian BrahMos (above) . The mach 2.8 end run makes Yakhont and BrahMos difficult to detect and shoot down in time. With a probable land attack capability and air-launched range longer than the notional 290km they will be a proliferating weapon to watch. (Diagram courtesy - Russian for "Military Parity" website).

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Here's the BrahMos missile showing its capabilities in land, ship and submarine launch. Its ability to hit what look like 2-4 m targets supports claims of +2/-2 m accuracy.
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In terms of relevance to Australia the ability of Germany's TKMS-HDW to tailor-make largish Dolphin 2 (2,000+ ton (surfaced)) warm water, submarines for Israel implies a capability to successfully tailor-make future submarines for Australia.

In late March 2015 much of the Israeli media (eg. a haaretz article of March 30, 2015) seem to be carrying Israeli government generated news of technical progress with the ISS Tanin nuclear capable submarine. Tanin appears to be the most complete of Israel's Dolphin 2 class SSKs. It does not appear the Tanin is anywhere near formal commissioning - so why the publicity? 

The media reports substantially carry mention of the nuclear second strike capabilities of the Dolphins. This is a subject that requires Israeli Government permission to be published.

The reason to mention second strike appears to be Syrian government acquisition and possible deployment of Russian-made P-800 Yakhont, NATO reporting codename SS-N-26 "Strobile" - a supersonic cruise missiles. What has Israel worried is not so much the usual anti-shipping role but more the Yakhont's land attack capability. 

With Syria's record of using Sarin gas on crude warheads against civilians Israel's worry about the Oniks would be considerable. Syrian use of radiological warheads might also be feasible and of course high explosive. The chances of Sunni rebels or Sunni governments acquiring Yakhonts adds an extra worry. See my May 21, 2013 article on Israeli airstrikes on Syria.

Media stories on Israeli second strike would of course have a "put pressure on Iran" intent as well.

In an added twist India and Russia are jointly developing the BrahMos version of the Yakhont. India wishes to market BrahMos to several countries in the Asia-Pacific. Meanwhile Russia has already supplied the Yakhont in Australia's region to Indonesia and Vietnam. 

Please link with Submarine Matters' Israeli Dolphin Sub, Nuclear Armed, Conventionally Propelled, February 25, 2012 which mentions possible Israeli developed nuclear warheads on submarine launched Harpoon missiles (SLCMs). Israel's current nuclear SLCM may be the socalled Popeye Turbo or perhaps an Israeli version of the (jointly developed?) Indian K-15 small ballistic missile. The Dolphin 1s and 2's extraordinarily high number of ten torpedo tubes (including 4 unusually large 650mm tubes) implies the ability to rapidly launch ten nuclear land attack missiles. 

The sequence of the Dolphin 2s being delivered by Germany then modified/completed in Israel (Haifa) is a bit puzzling. Based on "Boats" but updated:

Dolphin 1 class

• Dolphin – delivered May 1998 – commissioned 1999
• Leviathan (trans. "Leviathan" or "whale") – delivered 1999 – commissioned 2000
• Tekumah (trans. "Revival") – delivered 2000 – commissioned 2000

AIP Dolphin 2 class

• Tanin (trans. "Tannin" or "Crocodile") – delivered 23 Sept 2014 - enter service 2015, commisioning 2015 or 2016?
• Rahav (trans. "Splendour") – delivered 29 April 2013 - enter service in 2015 or 2016?
• Name not assigned yet. Ordered 21 March 2012. Enter service in 2017 or 2018?

Tanin was apparently received months after Rahav yet Rahav will be completed later. 

Much of the Israeli modification/completion would be for the electronics and loading fitout for the nuclear missiles. Publicity about Germany in 2012 being overly knowledgable and helpful to Israel regarding the nuclear missile loading fitout must have resulted in Israel taking over that whole job. Perhaps Israel's procedures are not fully developed - hence the Tanin-Rahav completion anomaly.

Pete

Indian Defence Minister Visiting Japan Linking Soryu and Aircraft Issues?

Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar (Photo courtesy ZeeNews)
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Interesting report in the Japan Times, March 29, 2015 India interested in buying Japan's Soryu-class submarines :

This is just prior to Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar visiting Japan including meeting with Defence Minister Nakatani.

COMMENT

Regarding "Parrikar noted that Japan had strict regulations on the export of defense technologies but that the rules are changing." in the article above. Japan should be well aware that India is close to Russia on high tech submarine issues. India has even financed Russian ship and submarine repairs/renovations. India is leasing a Russian Akula II class SSN (now INS Chakra - was Russian Nerpa). So future dangers might exist of Soryu materials, designs and specifications finding their way to Russia.

Japan might also wish to note India, like most great powers, plays hard-ball as a defence customer which sellers like France find difficult. India may already be playing hardball "Parrikar suggested that India is not likely to make a decision anytime soon on whether to purchase [ShinMaywa] US-2

 amphibious rescue aircraft used by the [Japanese] MSDF." This is noting that in 2014 there seemed to be assumptions (see footnotes 3 and 4 to Wikipedia article) in the press that the US-2 sale to India was a done deal.  

See more details of France's experience at Indian Possible Interest in Buying-Building Japan's Soryu Submarine - Australia, January 30, 2015