About subs, military/naval, missiles, nuclear weapons & politics. New Aussie subs have been just talk since 2009. Collins LOTE 2028-2040? of partial help. UUVs help more. POTUS may cancel AUKUS Virginias in 2031 as the USN needs all SSNs to the 2040s. Australian Gov ignores US higher priority to Columbia SSBNs (one/year being commissioned 2029-2041). Meaning minimal Virginia production until 2043. Shawn C and Gessler are excellent authors.
..."Former [long term] foreign minister Alexander Downer believes that building AUKUS-class submarines in Adelaide is a “huge waste” of Australia’s defence budget.“In time the AUKUS-class submarine…will be built, we may as well just buy them off the shelf from the UK where they already have the capacity to build nuclear submarines rather than spending a 30 per cent or 40 per cent premium building them in Adelaide,” Mr Downer told News24 host Chris Kenny.
[Downer added] “Give South Australia some
compensatory money, but honestly, it’s just a huge waste of the defence budget
to be building the submarines here in Australia. “We don’t build F-35s in
Australia for good reason. “When it comes to defence, focus on defence, don’t
focus on votes in Adelaide suburbs.”
Japan’s new Type 25 hypersonic missile family are changing the operational picture in the region from the 25SSM hypersonic cruise missile to the 25HGP hypersonic glide variant.
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Comments by wispywood2344 from Japan on August 29, 2026 and September 1, 2026, August prompted me to conclude Japan is rapidly maturing hypersonic weapons.
I then researched this subject using AI Google analysis on September 3, 2026. Using and presenting AI effectively and critically takes experience:
Japan has begun deploying its first stand-off hypervelocity weapons while actively developing advanced hypersonic glide and cruise missile technologies.
Key Weapon Systems
Type-25 HVGP (Block 1)[aka 25HGP ]: Japan deployed this hypervelocity gliding projectile for island defense, featuring a range of several hundred kilometers. [1, 2]
HVGP Block 2: An advanced variant with an extended range targeting roughly 2,000 kilometers, scheduled for deployment in the 2030s. [1]
Scramjet Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) [aka 25SSM ] : Japan is researching scramjet-powered engines for future compact, high-speed cruise missiles, including potential underwater launch applications. [1]
Strategic & Technological Developments
Underwater Launch Plans: Japan's FY2027 defense budget request includes unpriced funding to research submarine- or modular unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV)-launched long-range strike and hypersonic capabilities. [1, 2]
Testing in Australia: Japan and Australia announced a [new hyperlink bilateral agreement ] allowing the Japan Self-Defense Forces to test [see 5(d)] long-range stand-off and hypersonic missiles on Australian military ranges over the coming decade. [1, 2]
Space-Based Tracking: Japan is developing low Earth orbit (LEO) infrared sensor payloads (such as pathfinder experiments aboard JAXA's HTVX1 spacecraft) to continuously detect and track manoeuvring hypersonic threats. [1]
The specific strategic implications for regional security
1. Complicating PLA Operations in the First Island Chain
Targeting Amphibious Fleets: Japan’s hypersonic weapons are optimised for anti-ship strikes. This directly threatens China’s People's Liberation Army (PLA) surface combatants and amphibious assault groups. [1, 2]
Disrupting Taiwan Conflict Planning: In a potential Taiwan Strait conflict, Japan could hold PLA naval forces at risk from a distance, restricting their freedom of movement within the critical First Island Chain and the Miyako Strait. [1, 2]
Mitigating Airbase Vulnerability: Japan faces a severe shortage of hardened aircraft shelters, making its air forces vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes. Deploying mobile, ground-launched HVGPs to areas like Kyūshū, alongside stealthy underwater-launched hypersonic variants from submarines or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), ensures a highly survivable strike capability that China cannot easily suppress. [1, 2, 4, 5, 6]
2. Shifting the Interconnected Threat Dynamics (China, Russia, North Korea)
Breaking the "Shield Only" Posture: For decades, regional adversaries operated under the assumption that Japan would act only as a "shield" while the United States acted as the "spear". Japan’s ability to conduct independent, high-speed, precision strikes against launch sites or command nodes fundamentally alters adversary risk calculations. [1, 2]
Countering Coordinated Pressure: Tokyo views the military activities of China, Russia, and North Korea as an interconnected security challenge (such as joint Sino-Russian strategic bomber patrols and North Korean missile tests). Hypersonic weapons provide a flexible, rapid-response option to counter multi-front intimidation. [1]
3. Escalation Risks and Compressed Decision Windows
Incentives for Pre-emption: Because hypersonic missiles travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5 and follow unpredictable, maneuvering flight paths, they leave adversaries with virtually zero reaction time. This compresses the decision-making windows for all regional actors, which analysts warn could increase the risk of miscalculation or spark pre-emptive strikes during a crisis.
Intelligence Dependency: For the immediate future, Japan remains heavily reliant on US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) for mid-flight targeting coordination in access-denied areas. This deepens bilateral operational integration but anchors Japan firmly within the US-led alliance's escalatory ladder. [1, 2, 3, 4]
The Australia-Japan Defense Axis: Japan’s decision to test its long-range stand-off and hypersonic missiles at remote military ranges in Australia marks an unprecedented expansion of security ties. This shifts their relationship from diplomatic alignment into an integrated, practical defense partnership.
[new hyperlink] AUKUS Pillar II Integration: Japan's rapid domestic hypersonic advancements reinforce the momentum to formally integrate Tokyo into AUKUS Pillar II. This collaboration accelerates the co-development of advanced underwater capabilities, artificial intelligence, and next-generation hypersonic technologies among Australia, the US, the UK, and Japan. [1, 2]
ASN4G Missile: The French Directorate General of Armaments (DGA) officially commissioned MBDA to develop the ASN4G (Air-Sol Nucléaire de 4ème Génération), a scramjet-powered, air-launched nuclear cruise missile designed to fly at hypersonic speeds (expected around Mach 6–7). It is planned to enter service by roughly 2035 and be carried by the Rafale F5 fighter. [1, 2, 3]
V-MAX Demonstrator: France previously launched the V-MAX (Véhicule MAnoeuvrant eXpérimental) experimental maneuvering glider program, managed by ArianeGroup under the DGA, to master hypersonic glide vehicle technologies through flight tests. [1]
Most users on Reddit agree that the formal contract award for the ASN4G marks a major technological leap for France's airborne nuclear deterrence capability. [1]
Would you like to know more about the Rafale F5 integration or the difference between scramjet cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles?
The Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) has released "Australian Submarine Agency completes environmental
reporting baseline assessment at HMAS Stirling"
United States Navy Virginia-class submarine USS Minnesota alongside Fleet Base West at HMAS Stirling. Photographer: ABIS Connor Morrison (Image from here).
As responsible stewards of naval nuclear propulsion technology, the Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) is committed to protecting our people, the public and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation.
ASA conducted a radiological environmental monitoring baseline assessment over a 12-month period during 2024 at HMAS Stirling. This assessment establishes the environmental radiological baseline at Stirling prior to the commencement of increased Nuclear-Powered Submarine (NPS) visits by the UK and US under Submarine Rotational Force West (SRF-West).
“I am pleased to release our inaugural Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program baseline assessment for HMAS Stirling. This report is the culmination of 12 months of sampling and analysis to characterise the site (and surrounds) that will be the home of Australia’s Nuclear Powered Submarines. This baseline assessment establishes a clear, evidence-based understanding of existing levels of radioactivity in the local environment. This baseline is a reference point for future comparisons,“ Director General Australian Submarine Agency VADM Jonathan Mead said.
This baseline assessment will be used to inform the continuous Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program at HMAS Stirling. Results collected through this program will be compared on an annual basis to the levels established in the baseline.
The ASA is committed to ensuring that the NPS program meets the highest standards of environmental protection and provides transparency of results to foster confidence in the community.
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Nuclear Stewardship and Waste [much more detailed ASA website with numerous hyperlinks]
"Where will Australia store and
dispose of radioactive waste?"
"No decision has been made on a location within
Australia for the disposal of radioactive waste from
nuclear-powered submarines. Further technical work
and consultation is required to determine preferred
disposal pathways. Operational radioactive waste will
be stored on Defence sites in Australia.
Defueling Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines
is not expected to occur for decades. However, the
complexity of the task means that early planning will
be important.
As an initial step, Defence and the ASA - working
with relevant agencies including the Australian
Radioactive Waste Agency - has undertaken a review
to inform the process by which the Government will
identify locations in the current or future Defence
estate that could be suitable to store and dispose
of intermediate-level waste and high level waste,
including spent fuel. The outcomes of the review will
inform a more detailed process which will include
consultation and engagement with community and
Indigenous groups, and consideration of wider social
license and economic implications."
"What facilities will be required for
managing [Highly Enriched "Weapons Grade" Uranium (HEU)] radioactive waste [of the US, UK and later Australia]?
"The storage and disposal of radioactive waste from
Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines will require:
• Facilities and highly-trained people to remove
radioactive waste and spent fuel.
• Transport in sealed and secure containers to storage
or disposal facilities.
• Purpose-built facilities for interim storage and
permanent disposal of radioactive waste, including
spent fuel.
• Social license earned and sustained with local and
regional communities."
Yes, nuclear submarines produce spent highly enriched uranium (HEU) and generate plutonium as a byproduct inside their sealed reactor cores. [1, 2]
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Waste
Weapons-Grade Fuel: Many naval reactors use HEU (often enriched well above 20% and up to 80%) so they can run for decades without refueling. [1, 2, 3]
Spent Fuel Legacy: When a submarine is decommissioned, the remaining fuel inside the reactor is still heavily enriched. [1]
Proliferation Risk: This spent HEU is classified as high-level radioactive waste. Because it remains weapons-usable, it requires military-grade security during storage and disposal. [1, 2, 3]
Plutonium Generation
Byproduct Creation: During nuclear fission, some of the non-fissionable uranium-238 inside the fuel absorbs neutrons and transforms into plutonium. [1]
Contained in the Matrix: This plutonium is not extracted or separated into a loose waste stream. It remains permanently trapped inside the solid metal and ceramic structure of the spent fuel elements within the reactor core. [1]
Disposal: Instead of individual chemical waste, the entire reactor compartment or sealed core is removed intact during decommissioning and managed as high-level radioactive waste [in practice FOREVER]. [1, 2]
