Dutch SSK Selection Benefits Australia: Homage to US

From 10 comments of August 29, 30 and 31, 2023 below my article "4 New SSKs Better Than 5 Collins LOTEs: No Virginias?" I assume:

1.  Germany is not winning the Walrus Replacement selection and hasn't even decided whether it is offering a Type 212CD E (as "its low magnetic steel hull can only be welded in Germany") or an enlarged Type 214 offered as a Type 216? (which could be assembled hence welded in the Netherlands).

2.  Swedish Saab's offer of an Expeditionary Submarine C718 has probably been selected - to enter service from 2034.

3.  France has been largely quiet on the Walrus Replacement. But I assume Saab's C718 design will use many French components including large Jeumont PM motors and E drives, Sonar suites from Thales, optronic masts from Safran, Navigation systems from ECA and probably Lithium-ion LFP batteries from Saft/Total..to name a few.

The winning C718 may provide a design and pricing benchmark for Australia from the late 2020s to locally build 4 to 6 C718s. This benchmark would serve to minimise Australia's customary shipbuilding inefficiency dividend. Inefficiency that underwrites Australia's "20,000 well paid union jobs", poor work practices and rich sinecures for retired Labor and Liberal politicians, admirals and other officials. 

Homage?

This may follow a Trump 2.0 (or geriatric Biden 2.0) Administration's 2026 decision to cancel the Virginia offer. Meanwhile the US will retain Albanese's extraordinary "coals to Newcastle" $3 Billion feudal payment of homage to Biden and the already highly profitable American arms industry.

4 New SSKs Better Than 5 Collins LOTEs: No Virginias?

In response to TDUA's well argued comments of August 29, 2023.

I agree. Given the work practices of Osborne Shipyard the Life Of Type Extension (LOTE) with expensive upgrades, may cost more than A$2 Billion and 3 years for each of 5 Collins. HMAS Collins herself may be cannibalised for spare parts as many parts have been out of production for more than 15 years. 

The A$10 Billion (or more) LOTE submarine budget will also be occurring over the period of A$150 to 200 Billion being spent on the Virginia purchase, infrastructure upgrades (eg. an East Coast Base) and training of 1,000s of nuclear technicians/scientists/submariners/shipbuilders/officials in the late 2020s and 2030s. This is for up to 3 Virginias in the 2030s and maybe 2 in the 2040s. The LOTE + Virginias will form a huge distortion of Australia's defence budget, with likely reductions in non-submarine weapon systems across the Australian Defence Force. 

Also, I see the hull life (immersed contraction and expansion cycles) of each Collins as a finite limitation that might only give each Collins 8-9 years of life after their LOTEs.

Instead 4 new SSKs would be a hedge against any understandable US decision not to deliver any Virginias. This decision will likely be USN and Congress driven over concerns about improved and more numerous Chinese SSNs and SSBNs threatening the American homeland.

The efficient Netherlands has similar long range, large SSK, submarine requirements as Australia.

Better for Australia (than the LOTE) would be leveraging information (including pricing) from the Netherlands thorough Walrus Submarine Replacement Program to select 4 TKMS, Naval Group or Saab designed SSKs. This Dutch selection program that began in 2014 would makeup 10 years of lost time in Australia. Australia could demand the same pricing for 4 Osborne built SSKs as Dutch built Walrus replacements. This would work as a ceiling on excessive pricing by foreign contractors, shipbuilding unions and Australia wide suppliers generally, that gouged the Collins build and the terminated Attack-class build.

Even if those 4 SSKs (each good for 33 years) were built at Osborne this would be a better solution than 5 LOTED Collins (only good for 9 extra years). 

Australia has always had very few available Commanders and crew to man our subs. This scarcity is unlikely to change. Hence the diminished number of 4 SSKs (each with 52 crew) makes more sense than an unviable 12 SSKs (envisaged for the Attack class) or 3 to 5 Virginias (each with 135 crew).  

In any sub-choice scenario 10 Anduril GHOST SHARK XLUUVs could also complement an Australian submarine force for the ongoing intelligence gathering tasking and even, in a run-up to war, smart-mine laying.

So, while so many in the ALP leadership and RAN are true AUKUS believers, they need to hedge in favour of new SSKs against the substantial chance the US won't deliver the vaunted Virginias. 

Australia Cross-Subsidising HIMARS to Ukraine

As I wrote in the "Comments" section of Kym Bergmann's fine APDR article of August 22, 2023, I would say Australia and other potential M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) customers are being asked by the US to pay hugely inflated prices to CROSS-SUBSIDISE THE HIMARS THE US IS GIFTING TO UKRAINE.

In support of this Ukraine has about 50 HIMARS systems [1] that would have fired about 15,000 HIMARS rockets since February 2022 [2].

The US would be frustrated Australia has "only" been sending Bushmasters to Ukraine and sending Australian trainers to the UK to train Ukrainian Army recruits.

In view of that raising the price of US weapons amounts to a useful UNDECLARED WAY that Australia can fund US arms being given for free to Ukraine. 

[1] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/05/politics/russia-jamming-himars-rockets-ukraine/index.html#:~:text=Ukraine%20has%20received%2018%20American,according%20to%20the%20State%20Department

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M142_HIMARS#Ukraine "As of February 2023, CNN reported that Ukraine had expended approximately 9,500 HIMARS rockets" + an estimated 5,500 additional rockets for the additional 6 months to late August 2023.

More on INS Drakon: Photos, Cutaway, etc.

Oleg7700 has been very helpful shedding light on INS Drakon a (likely) VLS test bed. Drakon will likely simultaneously serve Israel’s Nuclear Triad with its nuclear tipped Popeye Turbo missiles. I think the Popeyes will continue to be launched from Drakon’s 4 x 650mm horizontal torpedo tubes.

On August 23, 2023 Oleg7700 provided a comment. In a P.S. to Oleg7700’s August 23, 2023 comment Oleg brought to my attention that on "08/23/2023" one Ami Rokhax Dumba at IsraelDefense (in Hebrew when translate into English) draws heavily on my article including my guesswork that  “The purpose of [Drakon's] fin/sail may only be for streamlining/quiet, or to accommodate more masts/sensors or perhaps to house between 2 and 4 vertically launched missiles..."
 

H I Sutton, via NAVALNEWS has (above) provided an excellent cutaway diagram of the possible insides of Drakon. When clicking on the cutaway on the actual NAVALNEWS website the image can be massively expanded.

Rather than my estimate of 2 to 4 vertically launched missiles H I Sutton estimates 2 to 8. Possible! TKMS please advise the true number :)

Possibly INS Dakar has an enlarged AIP and battery capacity to permit it to sit longer on the seafloor, secret and silent, in the eastern Mediterranean, off Israel’s Haifa Submarine Base. This is for Drakon to be ready to rise closer to the surface to torpedo tube launch its Popeye Turbo missiles (within range of future nuclear armed Iran and Saudi Arabia) and vertically launch missiles with sufficient range to hit Pakistan (already keeper of the "Islamic Bomb”). Pakistan reputedly has a nuclear warhead sharing arrangement with its nuclear program creditor, Saudi Arabia.

On reader comments here.

SSKs and SSBs have grown in size to boost their capabilities eg. longer medium range-at-speed, longer seafloor sitting time, greater crew comfort/endurance and particulary more heavyweight torpedoes and missiles. 

I think it is generally misleading to write size is ultimately an attempt to imitate nuclear submarines. SSNs unlike SSKs, serve their highest requirement, which is surveillance/shadowing opposing SSBNs and SSNs in peacettime and then  destroying these opposing SSBNs and SSNs immediately before a nuclear war. 

There is no "sudden spike" to >3000 tons. Australia's Collins-class SSKs have weighed 3,100 tonnes (surfaced) since 1993. Japan’s 12 Soryu SSKs have  weighed 4,200 tonnes (submerged) since 2007.

Might this photo of INS Drakon above, at TKMS Kiel, imply Drakon is so “fat” that it might contain 3 continuously inhabited decks rather than the usual 2 in Type 214s? Is the differing angle, at Kiel, of Drakon, in the photo below, sufficient to explain the difference in "fatness"? Or has one or both been "touched up" or distorted due to Israeli security concerns? 

Major US CRS Report: No Virginias for Australia?

Andrew Tillett, for the Australian Financial Review (AFR) has written an excellent article AUKUS subs deal ‘could worsen US shortfall, blunt China deterrence of August 21, 2023. The AFR article is marked “Exclusive” see "Comments" below this SubMatts article. 

The AFR article is heavily based on Congressional Research Service report Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress of August 15, 2023, numbered RL32418, which raises such major issues as: 

Page 49 “…A November 17, 2022, press report stated (emphasis added) The U.S. Navy has nearly twice as many submarines sidelined for maintenance than it should, and those boats in maintenance ultimately require three times more unplanned work than they should, the program executive officer for attacks subs has said. [Page 50] Of the 50 attack subs, Rucker said 18 are in maintenance or waiting for their turn. Industry best practice would call for just 20% to be tied up in repairs, or 10 boats instead of 18.”

Page 50 “…This drive to zero delay days comes in the context of an undersized attack submarine force that’s kept busy. Navy and Pentagon leadership repeatedly call the submarine force among America’s top advantages over adversaries like China and Russia; yet the U.S. has 50 attack submarines and four related “large payload submarines,” compared to a requirement for a combined 66 to 72 attack [SSNs] and large payload subs [were called "SSGNs"].

Page 17  Selling three Virginia-class boats to Australia by FY2035, and not replacing them through the construction of additional Virginia-class boats by FY2035, would reduce the projected number of SSNs in FY2035 to 47 boats, which would increase the percentage in the number of [Page 18] to about 29%.”

Page 18 continues “,,,A potential alternative to the proposed sale of Virginia-class SSNs to Australia would be a U.S.- Australian military division of labor under which U.S. SSNs would perform both U.S. and Australian SSN missions while Australia invested in military forces for performing other military missions for both Australia and the United States.”

Page 21 “…What would be the impact of a three- to five-boat reduction [for transfer to Australia] in the size of the U.S. SSN force on the ability of the U.S. SSN force to perform day-to-day and wartime SSN missions of interest to the United States, particularly in the context of the Navy’s 66-boat SSN force-level goal…?

Page 22 “…Regarding the net impact on deterrence and warfighting capability of transferring three to five Virginia-class SSNs to Australia rather than keeping them in U.S. Navy service, supporters of transferring them might argue that the deterrent value of introducing SSNs to Australia’s navy would be greater than the deterrent value of keeping those SSNs in U.S. Navy service because a newly created force of Australian SSNs would present China with a second allied decisionmaking center (along with the United States) for SSN operations in the Indo-Pacific, which would enhance deterrence of potential Chinese aggression by complicating Chinese military planning…. 

Page 22 continues "...Skeptics of transferring Virginia-class SSNs from the United States to Australia might argue that it could weaken deterrence of potential Chinese aggression if China were to find reason to believe, correctly or not, that Australia might use the transferred Virginia-class boats less effectively than the U.S. Navy would use them if the boats were retained in U.S. Navy service, or that Australia might not involve its military, including its Virginia-class boats, in U.S.-China crises or conflicts that Australia viewed as not engaging important Australian interests…” [See my August 18, 2023 article on this].

Page 23 “…Skeptics could argue that notwithstanding Australia’s capability for, and commitment to, protecting U.S. submarine and U.S. naval nuclear propulsion technology, sharing this [Page 24] technology with another country would increase the number of potential entry points that China, Russia, or some other country could attempt to penetrate to gain access to that technology."

Pete Comment: I support the skeptics' arguments. How about you?

Australia's AUKUS SSNs Best for NUCLEAR WAR FIGHTING

The Australian Labor Party's (ALP) National Conference today is discussing the issue of Labor maintaining the preceding Morrison Government's AUKUS nuclear powered submarine proposal.

What distinguishes the conventional diesel-electric submarine force that Australia has now from the proposed Virginia and SSN-AUKUS nuclear powered submarines is speed, virtually unlimited range and ability to operate in Chinese and Russian waters. 

Australia's future nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs) be they Virginias (from the 2030s) and later SSN-AUKUS (from the late 2040s) do not need to be nuclear armed to engage in their principle functions which are engaging in nuclear warfare and to support the US in its long range conflicts.

The highest functions of US and UK SSNs and later Australian SSNs (even if not nuclear armed) are/will be to:

1. destroy Chinese and Russian nuclear missile carrying submarines (SSBNs) which can cruise at around 15 knots fully submerged, and 

2. to protect US and UK SSBNs.

Only if Australian SSNs are fast and long range enough will they be able to achieve functions 1. and 2., and

3. to destroy even faster Chinese and Russian SSNs.

Australia carrying out the highest functions of its SSNs (nuclear war fighting) will invite a nuclear weapon response from China and Russia that only the US can protect us from.

Australia's greatly increased AUKUS submarine "premium" on the US nuclear deterrent "insurance policy" also involves US insistence that Australian SSNs will back up US forces in any US long range conflicts such as Taiwan, wider wars with China or Russia, or in the Middle East. 

The US has noticed that Australia's conventional submarines, including the Collins have been too slow (cruising at around 4 knots fully submerged) and short ranged to get involved in US wars in the Middle East or other largely offensive wars. Australia's conventional submarines have been and still are useful for around 90% of Australia's mainly short-medium range defensive functions.

Australia, after buying US made Virginias and mainly UK made SSN-AUKUSs for what is more likely A$500 Billion (all up purchase and use), will at last be able to join Australian soldiers, airmen and surface ship sailors in fighting US led long range wars.

Australian unions should be aware that the vast bulk of Australia's purchase price for  the Virginias is already going to US industry, with many $Billions to follow. 

More than 50% of the purchase price of UK designed SSN-AUKUSs is likely to go to UK industry. This is mainly for the rear reactor half of the submarines, which for safety and UK labour expertise, will be completely built in the UK and perhaps shipped to Australia. The front half of the SSN-AUKUSs will only be assembled in Australia, mainly using UK and US made parts, then perhaps shipped to the UK for joining up with the reactor half.

Marles, being only a part-time defence minister, is not across these issues. 

Smorgasbord of Submarine Subjects

The Submarine Matters article France's Innovative Submarine Industry eg. Scorpenes of August 11, 2023, prompted an avalanche of comments from August 11 to 15, 2023. I won't attempt to address all issues raised, but some of them.

French Naval Group's (NG) Scorpene SSKs (17 sold to 4 customers) are more equivalent to German TKMS' non-AIP Type 209s (90 sold to 15 countries). The Scorpenes and 209s are capable and less expensive than Type 214s (whose relatively expensive AIP tends to be for specialised uses like missions in the Yellow, Black, East China and Mediterranean seas). 

Whether the NG conventional Barracuda (see this Youtube with cc subtitles on and NG website), TKMS (website link Type 212CD E) or Saab (with its website link C718) are likely to win the Netherland's Walrus Replacement Competition, perhaps announced in 2027, is anybody's guess. Much depends on the Netherland's Navy and broader Dutch government's requirements, which are complex, confidential and perhaps even changeable as differing technologies mature. 

Countries with long submarine building histories and whose submarine forces are all  conventional (particularly Sweden and Germany) have some advantages in submarine and AIP design and industrial focus. This is compared to countries attempting to build conventional and nuclear subs (like India and Russia, both with no AIP) or France with an all nuclear sub navy while only building conventional subs for export. 

China is an exception building nuclear subs (own navy) and conventional subs (for own navy and export) and China has developed second generation AIP and is exporting AIP conventional subs. 

Medium sized concept submarines without a fin/sail haven't sold well in the last hundred years for reasons of sea-keeping, safety, command, navigation and security - all especially in the surfaced approaches to and from port and in emergency ascents. 

The issue of submarine customers choosing Lithium-ion or Lead-acid Batteries and AIP is very complex. The distances and mix of missions a customer expects are relevant. Also is the customer country building its own, exporting or importing subs? Economies of scale, money available and whether the customer is also developing nuclear subs all come into it.

QUADs in Exercise MALABAR 2023

https://news.usni.org/2023/08/11/quad-alliance-joins-together-for-exercise-malabar-2023-in-australia

From August 11 – 21, 2023. Hosted by Australia for the first time.

Two, as yet, unidentified submarines, are participating. One from the USN (USS North Carolina?) the other from the RAN.

France's Innovative Submarine Industry eg. Scorpenes

Above and here the Scorpene is featured, courtesy this 2 year old Naval Group video. It begins with 14 Scorpenes sold, but recently India is building 3 more, for a total of 17.

On August 4, 2023 Anonymous from France (with some editing by Pete) commented on France's innovative submarine industrial sector: 

Here is a "French" perspective on the Scorpene successes (17 exported, none built for the French Navy. France’s attack submarines are all SSNs. Probably more Scorpene sales to be confirmed.) The Scorpenes are still without AIP? How come?

A look at the overall picture and a few points (hope not to be too "cocky").

AIP is very important in some tactical/geographical situations, but is clearly not the "panacea" although with high strategic impact. (However, Japan? Australia in 2016? Brazil?). Naval Group’s effort is clearly in the direction of Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) for submarine. (Battery maker Saft is/will be a major supplier, LFP and see) for at least since 2008. LIBs will likely be introduced in the next Scorpene exports (to Romania, Indonesia, Philippines, Morocco and to India) because this is the obvious road map to the Scorpene story. Adoption of LIBs implies a complete change of the electrical and diesel subsystems, not a minor change.

Israel and South Korea need submerged SLBM platforms that can be protected in nearby bastion waters. Specifically the Dolphin and KSS-III SSBs are protected by friendly aircraft, warships and missile defences. They may rely more on AIP than LIBs.

The Scorpene is an "oceanic" type of submarine, travelling fast and deep, equipped with up to date, if not the best, sub systems

- (Thales sensors, Safran optronic masts, permanent magnet motor and drives from Jeumont, inertial navigation system (laser gyro or fiber) and combat systems...that are also on Saab Blekinges (by and large), South Korean DSME or even the TKMS (navigation in the Type 212CD) proposals, if one looks at the details.

- France’s Thales not only supplies the UK Royal Navy (Thales UK and France have been partners for 40+ years..and the technological building-blocks, components, software modules, test equipment and experience at sea etc, are unlikely to be different ). Also the USN with its latest submarine digital sonars

- the weapon range of the Scorpene is state of the art, F21 torpedoes, Exocet SM39 anti-ship missiles, MdCN cruise missiles..ITAR free are on par with the best world systems.

- Naval technology transfer to India or Brazil alleviates the limited capacity and the high labor cost in France. To achieve for instance 100% indigenous “Make in India”, it is sufficient at the beginning to have modules made in India (or Brazil), incorporated in a third party sale..

- Contrary to TKMS or Saab, Naval Group yards are booked for the next 10/15 years with France’s top priority Barracuda SSN and Third Generation SSBN nuclear orders. Naval Group needs its foreign partners in fact for Scorpene and conventional Shortfin construction.

INS Drakon follows Soviet sail launched SLBM tradition.

Submarine Autistry, on August 4, 2023, provided interesting insights on conventional submarine evolution:

“Right now, I think there are two major trends in conventional submarine design.

The first is size. For many years, there weren't really any modern diesel submarines of large size (around 3,000 tons or more) and range (>15,000 nm). The Soviet Union did have conventional submarines with an enormous radius of action [eg. Foxtrots up to 20,000nm] and eg. Tango-class. But these had to rely on the aged principles of the Type XXI submarine (with inferior submerged performance in that German wartime design) in as late as the 1970s. (The succeeding and far more modern Kilo-class was smaller with a much-reduced range [of up to 8,600nm].) But in recent years, Defense Companies have increasingly come up with designs of large, AIP-equipped subs that can cover a lot of distance (examples include Type 216, Type 212CD (E), Saab Blekinge Oceanic, Shortfin Barracuda, Navantia S-80 Plus, Japanese Soryu/Taigei and South Korean KSS-III).

The second trend is VLS cells for SLBM capability, which is most certainly the purpose of [INS Drakon’s] extended sail. I can imagine Drakon [a Dolphin 2] to be used primarily as a one-off test platform for the newly developed missiles so that the technology will be ready by the time the Dakar-class ["Dolphin 3"] boats arrive. Since Israel/TKMS will follow suit after KSS-III kicked off this VLS trend, I can also imagine cooperation with South Korea for missile development, although Israel's missiles will likely be quite a bit larger than South Korea's Hyunmoo 4-4. Certainly very interesting to see such a large sail [on INS Drakon] a modern submarine when people think they will disappear entirely within this century, a charming callback to the early Soviet SSB(N)s! [particularly the Soviet Golf-class SSB that had up to 3 SLBMs in its sail.]

A Soviet era Golf-class conventional sub (SSB) fires one of its 3 ballistic missiles from its sail. Also note the hull deformity downwards below the sail, to accommodate the missiles' size. (Artwork courtesy FAS.)

---

Overall, these two trends clearly point toward an expansion of conventional submarine capabilities into areas that were thus far reserved for nuclear propelled submarines. While I can understand this striving, I'd doubt that the enlarging of conventional submarines can give them the same strategic perks that the nuclear submarine possesses by its very nature (unlimited power!!!; i.e. infinite (submerged) range, blistering speeds). I suppose the biggest benefit of conventional subs, quietness, has already come quite close to its optimum, meaning that constructors are now reorienting toward special features (e.g. “diamond” shape). Also conventional subs have broader capabilities and strategic value (range, armament), while not making the submarine much less quiet than its predecessors - but certainly much more expensive to acquire for potential contractors due to its size.” 

"The ASEAN submarine?" by Shawn Chung

India and the ASEAN countries (Map courtesy IndiaASEAN.org) ---

Pete Comment: My good friend Shawn Chung has provided the wide ranging essay below, which highlights the possibilities of Naval Group, TKMS and South Korea providing an increasingly standardized "ASEAN submarine". Shawn also comments on possibilities India might become a major submarines for export builder in the Indo-Pacific region. New types of AIP and LIBs also present new capability and marketing possibilities.

India's future submarine sales might be in conjunction with India marketing its formidable BrahMos multiple launch mode, including SLCM, supersonic cruise missile. India is also joint developing a hypersonic BrahMos-II cruise missile. Of course Hypersonic Cruise Missiles represent a revolutionary technical and strategic change that all great powers are developing and many customer countries, like Australia, might buy.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++

"The ASEAN submarine?"

By Shawn Chung 

When I did my research about the submarine programs of seven Southeast Asian countries (https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2023/05/state-of-submarine-forces-in-asean-2023.html), two recent occurrences in the submarine market could impact the future acquisition decisions of ASEAN countries, and there is a small probability that a single class of submarines will be selected by navies across South East Asia.

Naval Group Scorpene

The Scorpene class is an export model designed by Naval Group in the 1990s, with the first boat (for the Chilean navy) laid down in 1999, and is in service with the Chilean, Malaysian, Indian (Kalvari-class) and Brazilian navies, with displacement ranging from 1,565 tons to 1,900 tons. 

On the 18th of July 2023, India signed an MoU with France for three more Indian-build Scorpenes, with an Indian created AIP module (https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1703456&s=08 website "down" at present, this alternate works ), which will be retrofitted to the Kalvari class. (https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/07/india-to-procure-rafale-m-more-scorpene-submarines/)

India restarting Scorpene production could interest both Indonesia and the Philippines (who may select the class for their national submarine programs), especially if India/Naval Group were to sweeten their bids with a VLS module for the upcoming BrahMos-NG cruise missile, which is 2/3rd the size of the original 8.2m BrahMos A. The Philippines is about to commission its first BrahMos A shore-based battalion, while Indonesia is in discussion to buy the missile system. (https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/india-russia-defence-firm-eyes-200-mln-missile-deal-with-indonesia-2023-03-15/)

Malaysia also has a further requirement for two new submarines by 2035, and it would be logical, from a training and supply perspective, for the Malaysian Navy to acquire more Scorpene-class submarines, while their two Scorpene submarines have already spent 14 years in service, and are due for MLU. 

The Scorpene class was initially offered with a MEMSA AIP system that used oxygen and ethanol combustion to generate power. In 2019 Naval Group announced a second-generation the FC2G AIP https://www.naval-group.com/en/full-speed-tomorrow module, which extracts hydrogen from diesel to combine pure oxygen within a fuel cell to generate power, increasing submerged endurance by 18 days (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TgIWbOtvr3o)

I personally find Naval Groups FC2G AIP to be overcomplicated, as it uses a three step refining process to extract hydrogen from diesel fuel, then injects the refined hydrogen into a fuel cell to generate power. Also, from Naval Group's mock-ups, liquid oxygen is stored in a large tank within the AIP hull module, which could be a safety hazard. In comparison, TKMS/Siemens' fuel cell system, which is used in the Dolphin, Dakar-class, Type-212, Type-214 and Type-218SG classes use oxygen and hydrogen stored in tanks outside the pressure hull.  https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2015-03/1425435374_superdolphincomparisondiagram.jpg

India's DRDO-designed AIP module for its Scorpenes' "generates hydrogen onboard", so it's likely the same system as FC2G, and could be the result of a technology transfer from Naval Group. ( https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/lt-drdo-sign-contract-for-aip-system-for-submarines-of-indian-navy/articleshow/101187577.cms?from=mdr )

How the new Scorpene order affects India’s convoluted Project-75I program ( https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/project-75i-what-is-it-and-how-has-it-progressed-since-1997-123071200224_1.html ) is anyone’s guess at this point in time. After almost all bidders withdrew or were disqualified in mid-2022, India rescheduled the deadline for August 2023, with the Naval Group Barracuda, Navantia’s S-80 Plus, the TKMS Type-214 or Type-218 (https://frontierindia.com/p-75i-project-germany-and-india-are-close-to-a-deal-to-build-diesel-submarines-jointly/?expand_article=1) and the Hanwha Ocean’s DSME-3000 are still in the running.

Hanwha Ocean DSME-3000

(I can’t find any designation change since they became Hanwha Ocean (HO))

https://youtu.be/0vWdhmQuLoc

South Korea's Hanwha Ocean (formerly DSME) produces the 3,600 ton KSS-III Batch 2 submarine class for the South Korean Navy, and is offering two export variants - the DSME-2000 and the lithium-ion battery equipped DSME-3000, with the DSME-3000 in India’s Project-75I contest. 

The KSS-III bears the distinction of being the first and currently only AIP submarine class with an SLBM capability - using the Hyunmoo 4-4, with a conventional warhead and a 500 km range.

At the recent MADEX 2023, Hanwha Ocean signed an agreement with Babcock Canada to develop the “perfect submarine” for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) (https://youtu.be/JGSHtCMJ-yc) while this project has only just started and an RFI has not been issued, we do know that Canada will require 12 long range conventional submarines, which need to be introduced in the early-2030s to replace the Victoria class. (https://maritime-executive.com/article/canadian-navy-makes-plans-to-replace-aging-victoria-class-subs)

Also at MADEX 2023, Janes Defense reported that Hanwha Ocean had sweetened their offer to the Phillipines Navy with an update to the 1,400ton DSME 1400-class with KSS III systems - including sensor, combat and propulsion systems (without AIP).

HO’s latest pitch to the PN could also impact Indonesia’s stalled Improved Nagapasa (DSME-1400) submarine program (https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2023/05/indonesia-state-of-submarine-forces-in.html). We know that Indonesia now intends to buy 2 AIP submarines, and Hanwha Ocean could offer a revision with the DSME-2000 or DSME-3000 design instead of the Improved Nagapasa.

Conclusion

Since India announced it was buying three Naval Group Scorpene-class with AIP, there has been zero articles speculating on the state of the Project-75I program, though I personally think it will be canceled and replaced by 6 AIP Scorpenes. Whether India’s machinations will impact the submarine procurement programs of the Philippines and Indonesia is likely, as both countries already buying Indian arms. A Scorpene built by PT Pal in Indonesia for both navies with Indian-sourced components (and modules) is likely. This could include MLU/Production for Malaysia, and possibly for other ASEAN navies, such as Vietnam, (India just gifted Vietnam a 30 year old frigate).

South Korea is now being called the arsenal of the free world (https://thediplomat.com/2023/07/is-south-korea-ready-to-be-a-global-pivotal-arms-exporter/), offering excellent products like the T/A-50 light jet, the K9 Thunder SPH and the K21 IFV (which just won an Australian Army order). In Southeast Asia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam already use arms supplied by South Korea.

With the Hanwha Group taking control of DSME earlier this year, we are now seeing a more aggressive marketing push by Hanwha Ocean into the global submarine market.

First Photos of Israel's INS Drakon aka Dragon Dolphin 2

Above is a sideview via Oleg7700 of Israel's INS Drakon aka Dragon moved out of a shed and onto a hardstand at TKMS Kiel, Germany on August 1, 2023. 

Below is an August 2, 2023 side-rear view of INS Drakon (Courtesy Frank Behling from his on X-Twitter account via Oleg7700).

Since August 1, 2023 Oleg7700 from Israel has kindly provided links and details on the first sightings of INS Drakon aka Dragon at the TKMS shipyard in Kiel, Germany. 

Drakon is the third submarine of the Dolphin 2 class. Drakon is very different from the preceding two Dolphin 2s in having a curiously extended fin/sail. 

The purpose of the fin/sail might merely be for streamlining/quietness, or to contain more masts/sensors or perhaps to house between 2 to 4 vertically launched missiles. 

I would estimate Drakon's fin/sail height as being about 6 meters tall. When added to Drakon's beam of 7 meters, that would permit a missile 12.5 meters tall. 

Such a missile might be an enlarged version of Israel's existing Popeye Turbo nuclear tipped supersonic cruise missiles or a new Hypersonic missile. Perhaps it might turnout to be a submarine launched version (SLBM) of Israel's Jericho family of ground launched ballistic missiles.  Alternatively India is known to joint develop and test missiles with Israel, so an Israeli version of India's existing K-4 SLBM/IRBM might also be possible.

The ability of Popeye Turbo SLCMs, from eastern Mediterranean launch points, to hit Tehran has been a technical and strategic reality for over a decade. 

The value of an Israeli K-4 SLBM, with a range of 4,000 km, might include the ability to hit any city in "Islamic nuclear bomb" owning Pakistan. Saudi Arabia reportedly helped fund Pakistan's nuclear program. In turn Pakistan reportedly has a deal with Saudi Arabia to transfer Pakistani nuclear waheads to Saudi Arabia's long range ballistic missile bases at Al Sulayyil and Al-Watah. Such a transfer might be in a buildup to a Saudi war with Israel. Israel's "counter-deal" against Pakistan may be "Pakistan might be at risk of Israeli nuclear warhead impacts if Pakistan is too helpful in supplying nuclear warheads to the Saudis or in a nuclear exchange between Israel and Saudi Arabia". India, Pakistan's nuclear nemesis, might also see value in Israel being an additional country that could threaten Pakistan. 

Eighteen months ago Oleg7700 also located this possible artwork (below) of Israel's future Dakar-class Dolphin 3s to enter service around 2031. The artwork first appeared in Germany's "Kieler" nachrichten news. Comparing the above photos with the artwork below clearly shows the extended fin/sail characteristic. The artwork below also implies the Dakars will incorporate the "Diamond Hull" low sonar reflection technology that TKMS is introducing into its future Type 212CD submarines from around 2029.