AUKUS Failing TWO - UK cannot deliver on the SSN-AUKUS project

It looks like the UK cannot afford AUKUS Pillar 1 given its new NATO and new Ukraine obligations:

The UK no longer has the money to develop the SSN-AUKUS intended for Australia and, in particular will have difficulty rectifying the PWR2/PWR3 submarine reactor problems in time.

Only by the late 2040s can the UK (in a worse state than the US) develop and deliver SSN-AUKUSes. Given the increasing commitments for the UK defence budget SSN-AUKUSes may be only be evolved Astutes with evolved PWR2s renamed "PWR3". 

After several evolved UK SSN classes since 1966 (ie. the Valiant - Churchill and Swiftsure classes) that ended with the Trafalgar class all using the PWR1 the Astute class. since 2010, is a "revolutionary" advance. The Astutes have a fundamentally different, much larger hull with a larger and it turns out troubled PWR2 reactor. 

UK Defence Secretary Healey’s embarrassing (to Australian Defence Minister Marles, the RAN and Australian PM Albanese) June 11, 2026 resignation over UK defence money worries indicates the UK simply does not have the Defence Budget to face all of the UK’s worsening NATO/anti-Putin priorities. The removal of UK PM Sir Keir Starmer (underlines the political instabiliy of the UK in the AUKUS "sure thing" Trifecta. UK Armed Forces Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Al Carns, also resigned over budgetary shortfalls. 

The UK now pursues "NATO First" as its de facto defence policy. Th UK's defence budget now has a new, additional burden, which is UK RAF nuclear strike. All this excludes actual submarines for Australia - other than extracting Australian funding for a needy Rolls Royce - submarine reactor division. 

The UK's defence budget problems that are negatively impacting the UK's SSN-AUKUS project are impacted by Trump's long term distrust over NATO. Trump is believed to rely on "what to do with NATO" advice from Putin. Putin telling a gullible Trump that NATO is a separate entity from the US that exploits US financial goodwill. 

Trump’s withdrawal from many NATO and Ukraine responsibilities mean non-US NATO countries, including the UK, have to spread their forces and budgets thinner. Following the US withdrawing funding support for Ukraine major NATO counties like the UK are paying for Ukraine instead, The UK defence budget is also thinning to cover new UK funding for East European NATO members threatened by a warlike Russia. 

The need for Australia to have already paid A$5 Billion (so far) to UK Rolls Royce for the PWR3 indicates a severe UK money shortage for AUKUS. The PWR3 is being designed to power the UK's Dreadnought-class SSBNs and the Astute successors, the SSN-AUKUSes. 

The UK is also exhibiting a technical inability to maintain the PWR3's precursor, the PWR2 - used on the Vanguard SSBNs and on the Astute SSNs - see all UK SSNs are at present again unavailable, due to repeated piping to PWR2 reactor faults.

Adding to the UK's nuclear naval budget woes is its need to complete the last Astute, HMS Achilles by 2029. 

Only in 2029 will the UK be in a position to concentrate its still Astute PWR2 handicapped nuclear effort on building four much larger higher priority than SSN-AUKUS Dreadnought class SSBNs most probably from 2035 to 2050. These Dreadnoughts are intended to rely on the first operational, unproven PWR3 reactors, which may delay the 2035-2050 timetable. All this is concentrated in the large Devonshire Dock Hall in Barrow-in-Furness that was so damaged by a 14 hour fire in late 2024 that the extent of the damage and impact on nuclear  submarine production has been kept secret by the UK Government to this day (meaning press are still banned from entering). 

All pressurised water reactors (PWRs) for submarines use piping under immense pressure with varying degrees of success. In the case of HMS Astute's PWR2 it couldn't initially even propel the sub at a conservative 29 knots when US SSNs can travel at 35 knots. This below 29 knot pace was inadequate for Royal Navy requirements. For more speed the UK altered reactor function which probably resulted in a higher water pressure burden endangering UK reactor piping.

Please scroll half way down this Turner, Julian (29 July 2013) article here at https://www.naval-technology.com/features/feature-nuclear-submarine-successor-uk-royal-navy/?cf-view to subheading “Power surge: PWR-3 propulsion, munitions and electrical systems” indicating that in the years up to 2013 there was US assistance for then UK Successor-class/now renamed Dreadnought-class SSBN's PWR3/PWR-3. Also see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_PWR#PWR3  "PWR3 was a new system "based on a US design but using UK reactor technology".^[22][23] 

PWR3 submarine reactor development is also intended for SSN-AUKUS.

The UK may be receiving less US technical/monetary support for PWR3 reactor development because Trump and Hegseth now see the PWR3 as an undeserving  NATO project.

Unless Australia funds (say) 80% of SSN-AUKUS and PWR3 costs the UK, at best,  may only be able to provide Astute/PRW2 variants to go into “SSN-AUKUS” in the late early-mid 2050s.

Only after the PWR3s tailored for the Dreadnoughts have proven themselves might the UK Government decide which type of reactor should be developed for the SSN-AUKUS, after 2050. The reactor might be a Dreadnought sized PWR3; more typically a miniaturised PWR3 (dubbed the PWR3+); less desirably a PWR2; or more reliable (haven proven reliable on four classes of UK SSNs) even a return to a PWR1. The PWR1s, being much smaller could power a smaller, cheaper, SSN more suitable for the Australian Navy's needs and budget (though seemingly retrograde for some careers and bonuses in Rolls-Royce, for 60 years the monopoly builder of ALL UK submarine reactors).

Australia gets what the US and UK deign to give us, after the needs of a proudly  America First USN and a hobbled NATO First UK RN are met.

SK's Hanwha Ocean More Likely to Win Canadian Sub Competition - AI

This is an AI Overview gathered June 19, 2026 - Perhaps announced by the Canadian Government in 30 days:

"South Korea's Hanwha Ocean is widely considered to have a strong edge over Germany's Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) in Canada's $43 billion Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), primarily due to its proven technology, faster delivery schedule, and massive economic offset packages. [1, 2]

The competition hinges on several key advantages and trade-offs offered by both manufacturers: [1, 2]

1. South Korea (Hanwha Ocean)

Hanwha is pitching a variant of its KSS-III (Dosan Ahn Changho-class) submarine, which is already in active service with the South Korean Navy. [1, 2]

• Delivery Speed: This is Hanwha’s greatest advantage. Because the KSS-III is already operational, they promise to deliver the first submarines by 2035—exactly when the Royal Canadian Navy's aging Victoria-class fleet begins retiring. [1, 2]
• Proven Performance: Instead of relying on a new developmental platform, Hanwha offers a large, heavy (3,600-ton) proven design with lithium-battery power and long submerged endurance required for Arctic patrols. [1, 2, 3]
• Industrial Benefits: Hanwha has proposed billions in local investments. This includes using Canadian steel for production and a CA$3.1 billion initiative ("Project Beaver") for hydrogen-powered infrastructure, aiming to create roughly 22,500 jobs annually. [1, 2, 3]

2. Germany (TKMS)

Germany is putting forward the Type 212CD, a next-generation submarine being co-developed for the German and Norwegian navies. [1]

• Design & Innovation: The Type 212CD emphasizes cutting-edge European NATO technology, but it is still a new development, making it more of a "first-of-class" risk compared to the Korean design. [1, 2] 
• Delivery Bottlenecks: TKMS's production facilities in Germany are currently strained with existing orders, meaning they can only offer a best-case estimate of one vessel by 2035, with the rest rolling out considerably later. [1, 2]
• Industrial & Strategic Offers: TKMS offers deep NATO integration and has partnered with Canadian shipyards (like Seaspan). Crucially, they are also dangling extensive intellectual property (IP) transfers so Canada can maintain the vessels independently over their life cycle. [1, 2, 3]

Observers view the competition as a classic trade-off between Korean readiness and scale vs. German innovation and technology transfer. While TKMS has traditional ties to NATO, Hanwha's ability to meet critical 2035 delivery windows and its aggressive industrial job-creation packages have given it strong momentum in the final stages of the procurement process. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]" End of AI.

Peter Comment

If NATO member Canada sees (defence against Russia) NATO solidarity as uppermost then NATO Germany's TKMS may win.

I think the winner of the competition odds are SK 45% and Germany 55%.

The KSS-III (IF? it has VLS) might be a slightly better sub having more heavyweight shots overall and they are more readily available than slower firing horizontal torpedo tube launches. 

The TKMS Type 212CD has the political alliance advantage (Canada being in NATO) of being from fellow NATO country (Germany). Also the main allies the new sub will need to interoperate with are in NATO (against Russia).

Canada would have less interest in interoperating with SK against NK or China or for that matter against SK's "frenemy" Japan. 

AUKUS Failing ONE: US Virginias unavailable

It looks like both of Australia's AUKUS Pillar 1 allies US and UK (see next article AUKUS Failing TWO) will not meet their obligations because:

The US lacks the shipyard labour and supply chain efficiency to build Virginia SSNs and higher priority Columbia class SSBNs quickly enough; has a very inefficient Virginia-class maintenance process meaning too many Virginias are unavailable awaiting maintenance/repairs; and lacks the political inclination to put its Australian ally's needs for Virginias over US Navy needs.

and

It is likely Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles’ May 31, 2026 acceptance of three aging Block II or III Virginias (rather than two old and one new Virginia) was a delayed response to hitherto secret US War Department Elbridge Colby’s 2025 Review results. In 2025 Marles and Colby parroted the confected AUKUS is “full steam ahead” slogan. Colby has been long opposed to the US delivering ANY Virginias to Australia. 

In the meantime the US was only too happy to receive a A$5+ Billion AUKUS deposit from Marles.

Non-delivery of Virginias has always been on the cards until the US builds 2.33 to 3 every year. The US cannot achieve such numbers until the US has completed its higher priority run of 12 already delayed Columbia SSBNs, one per year 2031 – 2043. Then the US may be in a position to deliver to Australia one Virginia every 3 years from 2044, 2047 and 2050.

It is odd the Australian Submarine Authority (ASA) without providing any hard evidence, has been spinning that used Virginias are better than new ones. Is ASA arguing it is preferable Australia receive:

-  at worst in 2044 a mid-life updated 31 year old, commissioned 2013, Block II Virginia (like USS Minnesota), 

or 

-  at best a 24 year old Block III Virginia, commissioned in 2020 (like USS Delaware)

-  and Marles/ASA have been spinning the falsehood that old Virginias would be  better than new build commissioned in 2044 Block VI Virginia (like USS Brooklyn).

Also where in the troubled heavy (non-reactor) overhaul queue will aging Australian Virginias be placed versus the USN’s own Virginias? The 4 USN shipyards doing heavy overhaul have long queues and many problems like a shortage of skilled workers and supply chain problems. Can we expect ASC Osborne or Australian Fleet Base West to more efficiently handle heavy maintenance of old Aussie Virginias?

Remember we are also talking America First’s Trump and perhaps next from 2029 to 2032 a President J D Vance - both not known for worrying about alliance loyalties (except with Israel) or for keeping promises. There is no contract prescribing Australia will get Block IVs – only ASA-Marles spin which has been lapped up by some thinktank, mainstream media and academic cheerleaders.

IF we get a Virginia in 2032, who’s to say it won’t be Block II or at best a III and its just going into, or within, a deep maintenance cycle? We’ve already paid/been paying A$5 Billion deposits (maybe more by 2032 – there being no contract that we only have to pay A$5 Billion).

By 2032 the deposits we’ve sent to the US may be all that aging 20-30 year old Block IIs or IIIs are worth.

I think, through thought repetition, we’ve convinced ourselves our A$Billions are “gifts” but where’s the proof? Things may be worse, with the US and UK seeing these as deposits, that bind Australia to pay much, much more over the next 30+ years.

How can we be certain of anything when AUKUS Pillar One is commercial and national security in Confidence? And AUKUS may involves changeable deals – spread over several US presidencies, every 4 to 8 years, and twice+ as many UK PMships. The Brits are changing their PMs and Defence Secretaries very frequently.

I don’t see any Australians as the authorities on AUKUS. We get what the US and UK deign to give us, after the needs of the USN and then the UK RN are met.

Navigating the Deep: An Analysis of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP)

I draw your attention to a great June 9, 2026 essay, written by Bruce Allen Lubbering, for RealClear Defense, at:

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/06/09/navigating_the_deep_an_analysis_of_the_canadian_patrol_submarine_project_cpsp_1187505.html 

Please direct any comments there.

No UK Astutes Available Again! Safety Fears Demand Lengthy Repairs

Article

Please read https://www.yahoo.com/news/world/articles/navy-entire-fleet-submarines-while-131000399.html of June 7, 2026, first.

Pete Comments

The UK Royal Navy (RN) is again suffering, politicly embarrassing, defensively dangerous, nuclear attack submarine (SSN) unavailability. This means all five Astute-class SSN's (HMS Astute, Ambush, Artful, Audacious and Anson) are unavailable, awaiting maintenance and repairs. The sixth (HMS Agamemnon) commissioned September 2025, is not yet ready to deploy. Last of class, HMS Achilles, is due to be commissioned sometime in 2028-29. 

Constant checking by the RN detects a fault familiar to the RN. That is weakened or frayed piping that works with each Astute's PWR2 Reactor. Hot Pressurised water/steam can stress the piping over time. Minute piping holes may cause a release of low level radioactive water. If left undetected or unrepaired this may cause the piping to burst. 

While the piping contains hot water/steam this is not as hot as the fissioning U235 in the core of the reactor. However slowdowns or interruptions to the water/steam may cause an increase in temperature within the reactor which causes or triggers an automatic emergency shutdown of reactor function (called a reactor "trip" or "Scram"). 

So it is important that piping is intact and working efficiently. For the Astute's PWR2 reactor this is essential. 

Put another way once the pipes split there can be loss of water based coolant demanding shutdown of the sub's reactor (at sea and especially in port). Any risk of release of coolant to civilian populated areas is, according to the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), negligible, nothing to worry about. Although the dangers of this piping-to-reactor-risk has been examined and debated for many years. See this semi-paywalled 2011 Guardian article https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/10/royal-navy-nuclear-submarine-reactor-flaws . Failing that see this 2014 BBC article https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-26463923 ). 

This problem was earlier observed with the UK's post-collision HMS Vanguard  nuclear missile submarine (SSBN). 

Above is the US Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine, USS San Francisco, in drydock following its collision with the seafloor northeast of Australia in 2005. 98 (most) crewmen were injured, one died. Her reactor was not damaged.

---

Nuclear sub owning governments routinely assure publics how safe nuclear sub operations are. Here is the very long list of submarine mishaps, including an explosion and nuclear submarine collisions, since the year 2000.

During the Astute-classes availability failure the RN must rely on USN or French Navy SSNs to perform the highest priority tasks of escorting UK Vanguard-class SSBNs in and out of the UK SSBN base. The base is HMNB Clyde, near Glasgow, Scotland.

The mainly UK designed submarines, known as SSN-AUKUS, that Australia will buy/build, later than we're paying for, around 2045, will be heavily based on the Astutes. The PWR3+ reactor powering SSN-AUKUSes will owe much to the troubled PWR2 design. 

Updates on India's Upcoming K-5 SLBM

On 12 September 2025, India’s DRDO had carried out a static test-firing of the second-stage solid rocket motor of the K-5 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) at the Advanced Centre for Energetic Materials (ACEM), close to the City of Nashik, in central-western India. This information was revealed in the November 2025 issue of the DRDO’s Newsletter publication (a publicly-available document). The publication provides many interesting details about the K5-S2 (Project K5-Stage 2) motor, but the most interesting is obviously the diameter of this second-stage motor: 2.4 meters!

Official publication from the DRDO Newsletter (November 2025 issue, linked above) detailing the second-stage solid rocket motor of the K-5 SLBM
-

This figure (which can be extrapolated as applying to the whole missile, not just the second stage) would make the K-5’s diameter comparable to the Soviet/Russian R-39 Rif, and bigger than the diameter of most contemporary intercontinental-range SLBMs like the American UGM-133 Trident 2-D5 (2.11m), Russia’s new RSM-56 Bulava (2.0m) which directly replaced the R-39 Rif, Chinese JL-2/3 (2.0m) and even the French M51 (2.3m). The K-5 also reportedly carries forward the K-4's overall vertical length of 12.0m, which is comparable or shorter than most of the contemporary SLBMs mentioned above.

It was originally believed that the K-5 might find application on the Arihant-class SSBNs (inclusive of the larger Arihant Stretch sub-class) as a longer-ranged replacement for their currently-carried K-4s. It was also believed that the K-6 (another next-generation SLBM also in development) might be exclusively for use onboard the upcoming S-5 class of SSBNs, the first two boats of which are reportedly in construction, as covered in my previous article. But now it appears both the K-5 and K-6 would be exclusively deployed only on the future S-5 class SSBNs, as it should be impossible for the vertical missile tubes on the Arihant/Arihant Stretch-class boats (designed to carry either a single K-4 SLBM of 1.3m diameter or up to 3 x smaller K-15 SLBMs of 0.74m diameter each) to carry these larger missiles. This is because the K-5 evidently represents nearly a DOUBLING of the missile body’s diameter over the K-4.

As I speculated earlier, the lack of a prominent ‘missile hump’ on what is assumed to be a newer iteration of the S-5 SSBN’s hydrodynamic model, as opposed to the earlier one which had a very pronounced hump, might have been an indication that the intended missile armament of these boats may have undergone a significant change in configuration over a period of time in the late 2010s or early 2020s. This change in configuration may have been a result of the DRDO’s efforts to develop SLBMs that are shorter in length, at the cost of being larger in diameter, while still being able to reach the same range with the same payload capacity as before.

Typically, increasing the length of the missile in order to increase the amount of solid fuel propellent it can carry is relatively easy & straightforward. But increasing the diameter to achieve that same goal (carrying more propellent) while maintaining the same or shorter vertical length is much more challenging, as it would involve the forging of larger & larger steel and/or carbon-composite casings, a complicated industrial process that requires the commissioning of new infrastructure. Additionally, it would also require significant advancement in chemical composition of the solid-fuel propellent itself.

A conceptual, indicative illustration of what was described as a 'future SLBM', shared by then-Chairman of the DRDO, Dr. V.K. Saraswat during a presentation to the engineering students of IIT-Bombay university in 2014. Sourced via Bharat Rakshak Forum.
-

Is the emergence of what is believed to be the newer iteration of the S-5 SSBN, with a thoroughly 'streamlined' missile hump, an indication that DRDO has made sufficient advances in this field of missile propulsion & construction? Until we see the first real images of an actual S-5 hull, we can only speculate.

In other news, veteran journalist Sandeep Unnithan, who I often quote as a very reliable source in the field of India’s nuclear submarines & adjacent programs, has reported that a ‘pop-up’ test of the K-5 SLBM was conducted from a submersible pontoon in March 2026. A pop-up test is basically an exercise to certify the gas-ejection mechanism that would initially launch the SLBM from the submarine's missile tube to a safe distance underwater before the first-stage solid motor is ignited.

While the pop-up test of the gas ejector seen alongside static test-firings of the solid rocket stages is an indication of the brisk pace of development in the K-5 SLBM program, I would estimate that the first, full-fledged test launch of this next-generation SLBM (or at least the first publicized test) could occur at some point in 2027 or later. That first launch would have to be followed by a multi-year testing program that would involve multiple follow-up launches, all of which are likely to see the involvement of the Indian Navy's Missile Range Instrumentation Ships (MRIS) like the INS Dhruv (pictured below), in order to obtain accurate information regarding downrange telemetry & splash-down patterns of the MIRVed warheads. In tests that cover the full range-envelope of these SLBMs, missile Range Safety Officers (RSOs) deployed onboard such MRIS vessels would hold the decision-making power & communications capability to destroy missiles being tested in-flight, in the event those missiles were to wander significantly off course.

The 15,000-ton MRIS vessel INS Dhruv, equipped with multiple X-band & S-band AESA radars alongside other telemetry-tracking equipment. Photographed by a civilian, sourced via Twitter/X.
-

While most quotable reportage of the K-5 SLBM gives it a 5,000-km range while carrying a sizeable 2-ton MIRVed nuclear payload, it remains to be seen whether that range figure is definitive or, as in the case of the land-based Agni-5, deliberately understated as being less than 5,500 kms (thereby escaping the definition of an ICBM) for political reasons. When all is said and done, this could add a layer of ambiguity regarding the reach of India’s definitive sea-based nuclear second-strike capability.

End of article.