Russian Pacific Fleet Nuclear Subs Get Overhead Anti-Drone Nets

The Times of India reports here and above August 10, 2026: "Russia is reportedly installing large anti-drone nets over nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines at the Rybachiy naval base in Kamchatka. Satellite imagery shows the defensive measures covering submarine berths, highlighting growing concerns over drone attacks against Moscow’s most strategically important naval assets." ---

South Korea's authoritative Military Watch: Force Index website reported on August 9, 2026 at https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/world-most-heavily-armed-submarines-antidrone-russia :

[Bolded text below are hyperlinks] The Russian Navy has begun installing extensive anti-drone netting over nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines at the Rybachiy naval base on the Kamchatka Peninsula, according to newly released commercial satellite imagery. 

[Google AI: Rybachiy is Russia's premier nuclear submarine base for the Pacific Fleet, located inside Avacha Bay on the Krasheninnikov Peninsula, directly adjacent to the closed military town of Vilyuchinsk and across the bay from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky.]

The images, obtained from Vantor, shows multiple Russian submarines at Rybachiy covered by large overhead nets, with protection extending across several submarine berths. The development represents a striking expansion of the defensive measures Russia has introduced in response to the rapid growth of Ukrainian unmanned warfare and demonstrates that concerns over drone attacks now extend to some of the most strategically important assets in the Russian Armed Forces.

The fact that such measures are being installed over ballistic missile submarines is highly significant, as these ships were designed primarily to survive by remaining undetected and operating at sea, rather than by absorbing attacks while sitting in port. Once a submarine is alongside a pier, however, its enormous size and predictable location can make it substantially more vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated unmanned systems. Rybachiy is particularly significant because it serves as the principal Pacific Fleet base for Russia’s Borei class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, which are the most heavily armed warships in the world.

Ukrainian forces have demonstrated an ability to conduct long-range attacks deep inside Russian territory and have increasingly employed unmanned surface vessels and aerial drones against Russian naval infrastructure. The June 2025 Operation Spider’s Web saw Ukrainian forces target Russian strategic bombers thousands of kilometres behind the frontlines by launching drones from deep inside Russia, further demonstrating the potential vulnerability of high-value military systems far from Ukrainian controlled territory. While thus may have influenced the decision to fortify the Rybachiy facility, the fact that U.S., Japanese or other hostile forces in the Pacific could potentially also launch drone attacks in wartime provides a further incentive to do so. 

Footage from across Russia has shown continued operations fortify high value targets against drone strikes, including the deployment of Mi-26 helicopters in Moscow to position Pantsir-SMD-E stationary air defence systems onto the rooftops of high rise buildings. The growing reach of drone attacks has increasingly threatened targets deeper into central Russia, including its industrial heartlands in the Urals region. Drone and missile attacks launched from Ukraine against strategic targets in Russia have received very considerable support from across the Western world, including funding, training, supplies, and intelligence. A Financial Times report in late July revealed that the United States and France were playing a central role in facilitating Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes against Russian infrastructure, housing and military facilities, including by providing intelligence used to identify targets and avoid Russian air defences. 

Borei class submarine  incorporate cutting edge quieting technologies, and each integrate 16 RSM-56 Bulava submarine-launched intercontinental range ballistic missiles. Each missile integrates multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads, with the design having been developed specifically to overcome modern missile defence systems through high manoeuvrability, decoys and advanced penetration aids.  Russian and Western officials have widely alluded to the importance of the Russian nuclear deterrent in deterring attacks by NATO member states, with the head of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Rob Bauer having stated in November 2024 that he was “absolutely sure if the Russians did not have nuclear weapons, we would have been in Ukraine, kicking them out.”

See map position in far east Siberia Russia's Rybachiy Naval Base at x.com image from HERE 
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Excellent Arpit Kanodia History of Indian Nuclear Weapons Political Background

Arpit Kanodia made some interesting comments on August 6, 2026:

"I think that's giving the U.S. far more credit than the historical record supports.

The one major exception was in the 1950s and 1960s under the Atoms for Peace framework, when Canada supplied the CIRUS reactor (with U.S.-supplied heavy water) and later CANDU-derived technology was made available for India's civilian nuclear program. Ironically, the plutonium produced in CIRUS was used for the 1974 Smiling Buddha test. 

But after the 1972 Nixon-Mao rapprochement and India's 1974 nuclear test, Washington's policy shifted dramatically. The U.S. backed the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, tightened export controls, and spent the next three decades trying to restrict India's access to nuclear technology. [Until accepted by President Obama in 2010.]

It's also worth remembering the strategic situation India faced. By the early 1980s, there were credible reports that Pakistan had cold-tested a nuclear device, and by the late 1980s its nuclear weapons program was widely understood to be nearing completion. At the same time, China had already been a nuclear power for two decades. India was facing the prospect of two nuclear-armed adversaries.

PM Rajiv Gandhi is often remembered for the IPKF debacle, but one of the most consequential decisions of his tenure was pushing forward the weaponization effort and preserving India's nuclear option. That laid much of the groundwork for what followed.

The 1990s were an especially difficult period. India was dealing with insurgencies in Kashmir and the Northeast, militancy in Punjab in the preceding years, a severe balance-of-payments crisis, and sustained U.S. pressure under the Clinton administration to cap or roll back its nuclear program and sign the CTBT. Despite all that, Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao kept the program alive while simultaneously liberalising the economy and restoring India's strategic position. Many also credit him with authorising preparations for nuclear testing in 1995, which were reportedly deferred [until 1998] after U.S. satellites detected activity.

It's entirely possible that U.S. intelligence knew a great deal about India's nuclear program [especially through HumInt] that's what intelligence agencies do. But knowing about it is very different from permitting or supporting it. With the exception of the early civilian nuclear cooperation that unintentionally benefited India's program, the historical record after the 1970s is overwhelmingly one of technology denial, sanctions, and diplomatic pressure rather than quiet approval.

As for Pakistan, the case for quiet tolerance is far more plausible - anyone who has studied A.Q. Khan's procurement network can't help but wonder how such an extensive operation was allowed to function for so long during the Cold War. [Pete Comment: A case of US strategy to balance the nuclear weapon capabilities of India, China and Pakistan.]

Why France Build's SSNs only for itself and Only Exports Diesel-Electric & AIP Subs

Partly utilising the wonders of Google AI Pete has created:

Question: Why does France only use SSNs for itself while only making diesel electric submarines for export?

Answer: Based on the sweat of millions of writers (and I don't get paid - just patriotism :) comes:

France uses nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) for its own navy because it requires global reach and continuous strategic deterrence, but it exports diesel-electric submarines because strict non-proliferation laws, high costs, and low buyer demand make nuclear exports impractical. [1, 2, 3, 4]

1 is https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/france-submarine-capabilities/

Why France Uses SSNs

Global Operations: France has overseas territories and global defense commitments. Nuclear subs can travel fast and far without ever needing to surface.

Carrier Strike Group Support: French SSNs protect the Charles de Gaulle nuclear aircraft carrier, matching its high sustained speeds. It can do at least 27 knots - see right sidebar.

Strategic Doctrine: France treats nuclear propulsion as a vital, sovereign military secret tied directly to national safety. [1, 2, 3, 4]
On top of SSNs France cannot afford diesel-electric+AIP subs for itself. In any case, there are sufficient supportive NATO allies (Germany, Italy now Sweden and eventually Norway and Poland) with AIP for shorter range sea missions - mainly against Russia.

• [Pete comment: Only SSNs can reliably defend France's SSBNs from Russian SSNs and Russian fast surface ships - particularly when French SSBNs are leaving-entering France's SSBN base at Île Longue (Long Island), Brest, Brittany, western French coast.] 

An excellent Indian In Our Defence video (here and above). Interviewee explains the differences between Diesel-Electric+AIP and Nuclear powered submarines. (Accents not too heavy for me - but please also use the "Subtitles/Closed captions" thingy second to the left on the right-lower corner of the video image).

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Why France Only Exports Diesel-Electric + Rarely AIP add-on Submarines

• Non-Proliferation Rules: Exporting naval nuclear reactors risks spreading sensitive technology that can be weaponized. [And France would get blamed as the original reactor source. Hence France claims Brazil is only developing an indigenous Brazilian submarine reactor. A fine line.]
  
  
Market Demand: Most nations only need coastal or regional defence submarines. Diesel-electric boats (like the Scorpène-class) are quieter in shallow water, much cheaper to buy, and cheaper to run. 
Buyer Constraints: Most countries lack the specialized nuclear infrastructure, legal frameworks, and trained personnel required to safely operate and refuel nuclear reactors. [1]

 Pete Comment

After France developed first generation MESMA AIP (with Pakistan the only customer) France has not fully developed second or third generation AIP at sea operationally. Part of this may be development cost, India resenting any more French AIP for Pakistan. competition too high from Sweden’s Stirling and German PEM AIP. Also France’s Scorpene customers (Chile, Malaysia, Brazil and eventually Indonesia) get more benefit from batteries. Whether India’s Kalvari Scorpenes will ever be retrofitted with AIP is an open question.  

About larger French designed subs for the terminated Australian Shortfin/Attack class and the Netherlands' continuing Orka Program - they did not want AIP. This is because their long range/high speed transit mission profiles gained/gain little or nothing from heavy liquid oxygen (LOX) AIP technology after the LOX is used up. 

Unsurprisingly there is no standard power mix solution for submarine exporters' own needs and their customers' needs. It depends on their mission needs, geography, cost and many other factors. 

Novel (non-PWR) Reactors for Submarine Problematic: SK's Molten Salt Reactor Program

Arpit Kanodia at 7/31/2026 6:41 PM made some very interesting comments regarding problematic non-PWR novel reactors:

"Reply to Shawn C [Pete will also reply to Shawn in a future article] from previous post: The marine reactor South Korea (SK) is trying is an MSR (Molten Salt Reactor). [Pete AI confirmation is HERE] I don't know what their goals are or what they are trying to achieve, but not a single land-based commercial reactor based on an MSR exists; they are all test reactors. And the (SKs) want this for marine ships and submarines? This is nothing but hubris." [Pete comment - Very true Arpit] 

[Pete's has used Google AI, yielding ]

 "Neither the US nor the Soviet Union ever used Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs) in operational submarines. However, both nations experimented with liquid-metal cooled reactors during the Cold War, which are sometimes confused with molten salt systems. 

Soviet Liquid-Metal Submarines Project 645 (K-27): The Soviet Navy built one experimental submarine powered by twin lead-bismuth eutectic (liquid metal) cooled VT-1 reactors. It suffered severe reactor problems and a core partial meltdown in 1968.

Alfa Class (Project 705 "Lira"): The Soviets later built a series of high-speed attack submarines powered by lead-bismuth liquid-metal reactors (OK-550 and BM-40A). While fast and deep-diving, their coolant systems had to be kept externally heated at all times in port to prevent the metal alloy from solidifying. [Pete: The Alfas docked in very cold Arctic ports.]

See WaldenFont's comments 6 years ago: 

"Those reactors are something else. The coolant is a molten lead alloy. Once the reactor is running, it has to keep running all the time. If it ever stopped, and the alloy cooled, the entire cooling system seizes up and can’t be started again. Maintenance had to be done in port, with the coolant rerouted through an external furnace to keep it molten."

US Liquid-Metal Submarine [a very early "Seawolf" SSN-575 - nothing to do with the 1990 onwards seawolf class]: The US Navy tested a liquid sodium-cooled reactor on this single-hull attack boat. Sodium proved hazardous and difficult to manage due to its violent reaction with water, so the Navy decommissioned the plant and rebuilt the submarine with a standard PWR." [AI portion ends]

The US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) historians' [according to Wikipedia] account of the sodium-cooled reactor experience was:

"Although makeshift repairs permitted the Seawolf to complete her initial sea trials on reduced power in February 1957, RICKOVER had already decided to abandon the sodium-cooled reactor. Early in November 1956, he informed the AEC that he would take steps toward replacing the reactor in Seawolf with a water-cooled plant similar to that in the Nautilus. 

The leaks in the Seawolf steam plant were an important factor in the decision but even more persuasive were the inherent limitations in sodium-cooled systems. In Rickover's words they were "expensive to build, complex to operate, susceptible to prolonged shutdown as a result of even minor malfunctions, and difficult and time-consuming to repair."[6]

The S2G reactor was replaced with a pressurized water reactor similar to Nautilus and designated S2Wa, the replacement process lasting from 12 December 1958 to 30 September 1960.[7]"

[Arpit continues] 

"This was the same thing tried by India in the 1980s. In 1980, DRDO proposed a [pressurised HEAVY water reactor] PHWR reactor for submarines, which [Indian] Naval Headquarters refused to sanction, and rightly so, it was madness."

SubMatts will resume with Arpit's very interesting comments on the dangers and complexities (adding up to extreme costs) of refuelling submarine reactors later in August.

Submarine Reactors from Rickover to Gorshkov and Beyond

My responses to parts of the late 2026 comment string include.

Even the US may have been unable to build a submarine reactor without the political connections, budgeting and engineering brilliance of Admiral Rickover. This Wikipedia entry has seemingly intentionally deleted almost all of Rickover's huge contribution to nuclear power - giving "Mamie Eisenhower" equal opportunity billing. Rickover successfully project micro-managed construction, land and at-sea testing of submarine and surface ship reactors and dictated the regulatory environments for them. He did the same for the land based civilian reactor sector and most things radioactive safety.

Britain totally relied on the US for submarine reactor development from 1959. Britain then refused to admit it benefitted from continuing US assistance and inspiration for PWR1. British nationalistic pride, Rolls Royce commercial objectives and US military industrial reluctance may have amounted to insufficient US assistance for PWR2. This partly explains PWR2's technical shortcomings. I admit I talk too often about PWR2 - yet it has largely incapacitated the 10s of $Billions UK Astute class, while also limiting the UK Vanguard class. Whether the UK can garner sufficient US assistance for PWR3 and PWR3+/4 remains an Anglophone anxiety.

Russia had/has a large enough industrial base, inventive talent, Admiral Gorshkov, set of national priorities (eg. nuclear weapon strategy) and skilled espionage to largely parallel develop submarine reactors. 

China, France and India benefitted from similar strengths as Russia.

Arpit is right in questioning whether middle power, South Korea, can develop submarine reactors like the great-sometimes super powers above. China, a superior innovator and manufacturer to SK, has taken decades longer than China hoped to develop quiet, efficient, submarine reactors. 

Also SK suffers from poor geography. However good the nuclear submarines SK builds they are hemmed in by the Japanese island chain and close proximity to NK and more especially to Chinese and Russian fixed undersea sensors, SSNs, SSKs and other nearby ASW platforms. 

SK and China may be strongly opposed to Japanese naval/military resurgence in the shape of Japanese developed nuclear submarines.

It is only the US that has the benign vast ocean space geography to fully benefit from the speed and other characteristics of nuclear submarines. The US advantage includes "owning" the Western Hemisphere for thousands kms until it gets to adversaries - Bering Strait excepted.

There is much more in the late July 2026 comment string that I'll respond to in future weeks.

SSN Proliferation & Australia Fears English Reactor Disease

Jun's, on July 19, 2026's comments and links of July 19, 2026 spawned a wide variety of interesting topics and issues. South Korea (SK's) bid for US help not only relates to SSN construction (KSS-N) but an SK desire to build SSBNs (SK-SSBNs) to deter nuclear armed North Korea.

SK's program is also a trigger "justifying" Japan building its own Mutsu-class nuclear  submarines. AUKUS (from good US, UK etc intelligence) can be seen as anticipating the above - justifying Australia's wants - AUKUS Pillar 1.

Australia is relying on UK and US assistance, at great cost. SK is relying on US assistance and international legal permission to use reactors for military/naval purposes. SK would also have liaised with France for 40+ years due to France's long experience with lower proliferation sensitivity-safer-cheaper LEU submarine reactors.

Of major value is Jun’s provision of an unofficial translation of Seong-Chang CHEONG's, Vice President, Sejong Institute's softpower@sejong.org Strategy and Roadmap for ROK-France Cooperation on Nuclear-Powered Submarines: EU-Based Naval Integration and a Mutually Beneficial Partnership Model at SEJONG FOCUS, February 10, 2026 at https://sejong.org/web/boad/1/egofiledn.php?conf_seq=22&bd_seq=12692&file_seq=41163

The Strategy and Roadmap is important for what it says and eventually says. Particularly on page 4: 

"France is precisely the only Western nation to have accumulated more than 40 years of experience in all three of these areas [including LEU reactors] since the commissioning of its first Rubis-class attack submarine in 1983. France has designed, built, and operated a total of 17 nuclear-powered vessels: 6 Rubis-class SSNs, 6 Suffren-class SSNs (including those under construction), 4 Triomphant-class SSBNs, and the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle…” 

The above statement is so far incorrect, as it omits the not usual 4 SSBNs but 6 French Redoutable-class SSBNs that each used up to 90% HEU reactors. 

Only further down on page 4 of Strategy and Roadmap is France's use of HEU remembered: 

"France also has a history of using highly enriched uranium (HEU) in its early nuclear submarine development. However, it has now fully transitioned to LEU. The early variants of the Le Redoutable-class SSBNs, France’s first independently developed strategic nuclear submarines in the 1970s, were equipped with reactors using weapons-grade HEU. In the 1960s, while enrichment capabilities were limited, highly enriched fuel was essential to increase the power output of compact submarine reactors. Weapons-grade uranium produced at the Pierrelatte military enrichment facility was used for this purpose."

Some Background and Issues on France's Wise Choice to Stick with LEU

Noting Submarine Matter's articles France’s Future SSBN “SNLE 3G” Starts Production of March 28, 2024; France's New K22 reactor for Carrier & 3G SSBN of December 27, 2023; and French LEU Reactor & SSN Implications of March 24, 2023: 

The USN, and partly the UK RN, rely on the US' massive HEU naval reactor industrial base to develop new submarine reactor technology and to create the 94+% HEU fuel.

If HEU submarine reactors and piping go drastically wrong - as with the UK's deeply flawed PWR2 reactors - HEU problems seem much harder and more expensive to rectify than regularly fixed LEU reactors.

Perhaps the engineering and potentially toxic health problems of accessing the PWR2's HEU assembly is the the problem that has "beached" all of the UK RN's Astute SSNs simultaneously and, I suspect, HMS Vanguard SSBN (withdrawn under inspection and maintenance for 10 years 2012 to 2022).

If the UK's future HEU PWR3 and/or PWR3+/PWR4 reactors fail to resolve the UK's PWR2 reactor technical disaster one hopes it doesn't impact Australia's SSN-AUKUS program. This is a hugely expensive issue people worry about in Canberra.

To avoid the English reactor disease should Australia plead with the US to sell us (at even greater expense) not 3, not 5, but all 8 SSNs Australia is seeking under AUKUS? Unlike the UK the US apparently makes reliable reactors.

I think the UK and US would prevent Australia turning to French LEU technology. One reason is the RAN officers/crew and shipyard workers currently receiving Top Secret nuclear training in the US and UK would not be trusted by the US and UK NOT to pass this Anglosphere SSN and reactor knowledge onto France.

Also how many countries can we throw Australian taxpayer's money at in our SSN quest? Not only to the US and UK, but to France and maybe even to South Korea's (world's most efficient) submarine building sector?