February 4, 2025

No French SSNs for Australia Possible: Part One.

Even if France wanted to part or completely build Suffren SSNs for Australia nuclear labour shortages in France would prevent this. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suffren-class_submarine. In any case France opposes supplying SSNs to Australia - the subject of Part Two. 

The same type of labour shortage problem impacting the US nuclear submarine  industry is effecting France's nuclear submarine industry. 

France is suffering a national shortage of skilled workers in its heavy industries. Within this the nuclear submarine sector is experiencing a shortage of skilled workers and probably designers.

The skilled labour shortage contributed to a 5 year delay in the Suffren-class SSN program. Suffren’s (laid down 2007) twice delayed entry into service slipped from late 2017 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suffren-class_submarine#Development to 2022 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suffren-class_submarine#Boats. This is worse than the UK Astute's record (laid down 2001, commissioned 2010 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astute-class_submarine#Boats_in_the_class ). 

France’s limited nuclear sub construction force also need to complete 3 more Suffrens out to 2029/30 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suffren-class_submarine#Boats

The labour shortage will cause delays in France’s future new SSBN program which will make construction of subsequent Suffren SSNs, after 2030, impossible.

France's only submarine builder, Naval Group (NG), winning the Netherland’s Walrus replacement project in March 2024 is also significant. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orka-class_submarine#Winning_bid This is for four newly designed diesel-electric submarines. This new project is putting added pressure on the limited NG designer and skilled sub-building  workforce. https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2024/03/orka-class-specifications-table-dutch.html

The first of France’s four new (ie. 3rd generation) SSBNs (known as SNLE 3Gis expected to join the fleet from 2035. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SNLE_3GWork began on the first SNLE 3G (no boat name yet) on March 20. 2024 https://www.meretmarine.com/fr/defense/cherbourg-naval-group-decoupe-la-premiere-tole-du-prochain-snle-francais

The final three SNLE 3Gs will be completed at five year intervals in 2040, 2045 and 2050. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SNLE_3G#Design_and_operation

NG may then be able to concentrate on new SSN production, from 2050, which is likely to be much later than the UK commissioning the first SSN-AUKUS.

A SIGNIFICANT ARTICLE

See “Europe's Nuclear Revival Lacks a Key Ingredient: Skilled Workers” of July 3, 2024, at https://www.energyconnects.com/news/renewables/2024/july/europe-s-nuclear-revival-lacks-a-key-ingredient-skilled-workers/ :

“…Atomic power producers in France, the UK and Sweden are having trouble finding the hundreds of thousands of welders, engineers and planners needed for reactors they’re building now and ones they’re eyeing for mid-century…

[There is] a labor shortage so dire some French companies hire back retirees…

France finds itself lacking talent after [reactor builder Électricité de France] EDF ended a decades-long building spree in the early 2000s, turning the industry into a dead-end career path. The workforce of about 220,000 is now aging out while potential replacements look elsewhere…

That’s a recipe for lengthy construction delays and massive cost overruns — failings the industry already is notorious for…

In the port of Cherbourg, where French nuclear submarines are built, [large French engineering firm] Probent frequently offers retired welders and metal workers jobs in the shipyard…”

January 28, 2025

Germany's Submarine Launched Anti-Aircraft Missile Under Development

Svetlana Shcherbak for Ukraine based Defense Express has written an excellent article on what is possibly? the world’s first anti-aircraft missile that can be launched from a fully submerged submarine. The article is dated January 26, 2025 and is at https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/30_years_of_idas_development_germanys_underwater_anti_aircraft_missile_to_counter_russian_helicopters_was_it_worth_it-13319.html.

Pete Comment

The submarine launched variant of the in service since 2005 
IRIS-T missile has been a long time in (mainly German) development. This may be due to years perfecting the submarine variant's necessary fiber optic cable link. This link must be able to survive the missile’s surfaced sudden acceleration and the blast of the rocket motor. Hence the submarine variant missile’s velocity and rocket blast have been reduced by the developers.

The marginal nature of IDAS as a weapon of last resort, in very shallow water, might mean a limited Baltic market (Germany, maybe Norway, with Sweden as a less likely adopter).

ARTICLE

"30 Years of IDAS Development: Germany’s Underwater Anti-Aircraft Missile to Counter Russian Helicopters – Was It Worth It?

 1813  0
Interactive Defence and Attack System for Submarines (IDAS)
Interactive Defence and Attack System for Submarines (IDAS)

Germany has entered the final stage of developing the IDAS submarine-launched surface-to-air missile, a project initiated in the 2000s to defend against Russian anti-submarine helicopters [and rotary wing drones large enough to carry lightweight torpedoes].

The German company [tkMS, on January 24 2025, announced] the signing of a contract with the Bundeswehr’s Procurement Department (BAAINBw) to complete the development and qualification of the Interactive Defence and Attack System for Submarines (IDAS). This unique missile is designed to engage aerial targets while the submarine remains submerged.

The contract stipulates that development and qualification work must be completed by the end of 2029. This means that the creation of IDAS will have taken over 30 years, as initial test trials were conducted in 2003, and the first underwater launch occurred in 2008. Although the project saw active progress in the 2000s, development slowed significantly over time.

IDAS launch in 2008
IDAS launch in 2008

The new contract aims to restart active work and finally bring the project to completion, enabling Germany’s Type 212 [As and CDs] submarines to effectively counter Russian anti-submarine helicopters. Notably, IDAS is being developed by tkMS and Diehl Defence in cooperation with Norway’s Kongsberg and Nammo, as well as Turkey’s Roketsan. This international collaboration highlights the complexity of developing such an advanced anti-aircraft missile, even though it is based on a deep modification of the IRIS-T air-to-air missile.

In general, IDAS will allow submarines to engage low-altitude, slow-moving aerial targets—such as anti-submarine helicopters—at a range of up to 15 kilometers. Additionally, the system is capable of engaging surface and ground targets. However, its speed of 200 m/s is relatively low for an anti-aircraft missile. For comparison, the IRIS-T, on which it is based, reaches 1,020 m/s. Despite this, IDAS is well-suited for self-defense in shallow waters against helicopters equipped with torpedoes and sonar systems.

The IDAS missile is stored and launched from a 533-mm torpedo-sized container, allowing integration into existing submarines without major structural modifications. Each container holds four missiles, along with launch control electronics and an interface system.

Installation of the IDAS launch container on the HDW 212A U33 submarine
Installation of the IDAS launch container on the HDW 212A U33 submarine

Aerial target detection and tracking rely on the submarine’s onboard acoustic sensors. The missile has a solid-fuel engine, which activates at a safe distance from the launch platform.

Once launched, IDAS manoeuvres underwater toward its target. As it nears, it surfaces, deploys aerodynamic control surfaces, and proceeds to engage.

During its cruise phase, the missile is controlled and guided via a fiber-optic cable. In the terminal phase, it locks onto the target using an infrared seeker before striking.

IDAS operating principle
IDAS operating principle

Throughout its flight, the operator [in the submarine] can control the missile and receive live footage from its onboard camera, allowing target identification and prioritization of the most critical threats. If the fiber-optic cable is severed, the missile—depending on preset parameters—either autonomously selects and engages the most likely target or self-destructs to avoid unintended damage.

For submarines, IDAS is essentially a last-resort weapon, designed for situations where a submarine is trapped in shallow waters and unable to dive deep to evade detection. In such cases, IDAS provides a critical defense against airborne threats, ensuring that submarines are not left completely vulnerable."

January 24, 2025

Trump's New Secretary of State Begins Indo-Pacific Engagement on Day 1 - AUKUS Continuity?

As soon as Donald Trump's newly-appointed Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, took the oath of office on 21 January 2025, his first scheduled international engagement (the same day) was with the Foreign Ministers of the other three countries of the QUAD. The QUAD is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue - comprising the US, Australia, India and Japan.

A short joint QUAD statement was released following the meeting, echoing all the same talking points as established during the Biden administration's term, signalling a degree of continuity. 

The text of the joint statement included: "...strengthening a Free and Open Indo-Pacific...[and promoting]...economic opportunity..."

So the joint QUAD statement, via the US State Department, could be seen as promoting free trade which is in contradiction to the Trump Administration contemplating major tariffs against all foreign countries including QUAD members Australia, India and Japan.

L to R: QUAD Foreign Ministers Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeshi Iwaya, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Penny Wong. (Photo courtesy NDTV)
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After the joint QUAD session, Secretary Rubio held one-on-one bilateral meetings with the three Foreign Ministers. In the meeting with Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Penny Wong, the following statement was made regarding AUKUS:

"...Both discussed efforts to continue security cooperation through AUKUS and bilateral defense initiatives..."

This fell short of reaffirming the US would supply Virginia submarines to Australia under AUKUS. Also Trump's nominee for Secretary of Defense, who could be seen as having major carriage for the QUAD and especially AUKUS, has not yet been given Senate confirmation.

It is too early to decide which way the Trump administration might go with regard to initiatives like AUKUS or QUAD as President Trump is unpredictable. However, the  State Department's early engagement with the QUAD members and with Australia under AUKUS sends the message that the INDOPAC might be the primary focus area of Trump's foreign policy. All three Ministers were among the handful of foreign representatives invited to the Trump inauguration. This may indicate the Trump Administration sees the INDOPAC as more important than Europe (and within it NATO). In Europe Trump is calling for a quick end to the conflict in Ukraine by placing pressure on Putin for a peace deal.

January 21, 2025

Strava May Be Useful to the Government: 2018 Disclosures

Hopefully the US Government has sent a National Security letter to the owners of US company Strava Inc due to Strava's security and foreign intelligence value.

Real time or retrospective Government use of Strava data, mixed with other government AI technology might be of US domestic security value and value collecting foreign intelligence.

These angles were, of corse, not highlighted in the latest security breaches by French submariners at the ILE LONGUE SSBN Base in Brest, Brittany, France in 2024-to January 2025 [1] [2] and [3].

The security and foreign intelligence values were more obvious in the 2018 series of disclosures [4] and [5]. For example Wired [4] noted on January 29, 2018:

"But addressing the security risks highlighted by Strava will require much more than simply updating a few policies. A world dominated by the rise of social media, the growing availability of commercial satellite and drone imagery, and increasing usage of smartphones [now miniaturized to Smartwatches] necessitates an entirely new cultural mentality."

Due to advances in very small microphones, WiFis, mobile tower and GPS tracking any watch may now be a potential security risk. This of course includes smartwatches, but also standard/"dumb" battery watches and even old fashioned non-electric watches (in which an incredibly small battery and microphone may have been secretly inserted).

Those at risk may be those with access to the most sensitive information. If targeted any watch they bring to international, Cabinet or TS level meetings may be a "bug" and/or tracker. 

But it is easy to claim "a watch might not have the transmitting power" to send information to intelligence receivers.

However, think about your cell phone. If doctored (even by transmitted spyware), along with your watch (spyware or physical insertion) your cell phone may be the receiver/booster of your watch's real time or subsequently downloaded weak signals. This can happen outside the usual public software/app parameters. 

So, if you have access to sensitive information your watch-cell phone combination might be a security risk. 

The solution? Not only should you not bring your phone to a sensitive meeting but don't bring any type of watch. Best if any type of watch you have, is regularly swept (alongside your phone) for odd electronic emission activity.

[1] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/videos/article/2025/01/13/stravaleaks-dates-of-french-nuclear-submarine-patrols-revealed-by-careless-crew-members_6737005_108.html

[2] https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/strava-fitness-app-leads-to-massive-security-breach-on-french-nuclear-submarines-7474295

[3] https://www.eurasiantimes.com/french-nuclear-submarines-stealth-mode/

[4] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracking-app-gives-away-location-of-secret-us-army-bases

[5] https://www.wired.com/story/strava-heat-map-military-bases-fitness-trackers-privacy/

January 16, 2025

Hamas-Israel Ceasefire Deal: Biden's Questionable Swan Song

President Biden has been taking the credit for the latest Hamas-Israel ceasefire deal. The deal constitutes Biden's outgoing swan song after more than a year of failed ceasefire deals.

The ceasefire is scheduled to begin on Sunday January 19, 2025. Hopefully It will last past Trump's Inauguration which occurs the next day - January 20, 2025. 

The standard advisor prediction approach is glass half empty, meaning be slightly pessimistic - rather than an optimistic fool. 

Marika Sosnowski, Postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Melbourne, Australia, advised on January 16, 2025 “Israel and Hamas have agreed to a ceasefire. It doesn’t guarantee a peaceful end to a devastating war.” See all of Marika Sosnowski’s excellent article at https://theconversation.com/israel-and-hamas-have-agreed-to-a-ceasefire-it-doesnt-guarantee-a-peaceful-end-to-a-devastating-war-247338

Marika Sosnowski is implicitly pessimistic when she notes:

“In structure and content, this ceasefire closely resembles numerous others that have been proposed over the past year, including the 7+2 day truce agreed in November 2023.”

“As US President Joe Biden said, this agreement “is the exact framework of the deal I proposed in May” [2024].

“During the first phase, there will be a temporary suspension of military operations by Israel and Hamas, as well as the withdrawal of Israeli forces east towards the border between Israel and Gaza and away from densely populated areas.”

“There will also be a temporary suspension of air activity (for military and reconnaissance purposes) in the Gaza Strip, particularly when hostages are released.”

“Over the past 12 months, Hamas has agreed to the text of a ceasefire a number of times only to have the terms altered by Israel and no agreement reached.”

“Hamas has tried to alter the ceasefire’s terms too.”

“But because of the power differential, it [Hamas] has been relatively unsuccessful in pressuring Israel to agree to its demands.”

“…But it is telling that in the past, Israel has simply arrested other Palestinians or re-arrested many of those released under similar deals.”

“…there are currently no written assurances the ceasefire will continue beyond the first phase if there is no agreement reached for the second phase.”

“For similar deals that were previously on the table, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made clear he would continue the war to destroy Hamas after the initial phase.”

The war between Hamas and Israel is of course not over. This ceasefire simply marks the start of a new phase.”

See all of Marika Sosnowski’s excellent article at https://theconversation.com/israel-and-hamas-have-agreed-to-a-ceasefire-it-doesnt-guarantee-a-peaceful-end-to-a-devastating-war-247338