My ‘chats’ with Pete in the comments section of articles on Submarine Matters often meander away from the subject topic (eg. VSL in AIP boats). By coincidence, our recent discussion on diver/UUV lockout systems and Saab is bang on topic, as Poland has just ordered three A26-type submarines from Saab. These A26s are expected to be commissioned into the Polish Navy by 2038.
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| A26 in Polish Navy service. Image: Saab --- |
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| Saab A26 model with VLS. Image: militaraktuell.at --- |
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| The A26's HMPL/MMP under development in a Saab workshop. Image: Screenshot from a segment 4 to 8 minutes into this navalnews.com video --- |
It looks like the UK cannot afford AUKUS Pillar 1 given its new NATO and new Ukraine obligations:
The UK no longer has the money to develop the SSN-AUKUS intended for Australia and, in particular will have difficulty rectifying the PWR2/PWR3 submarine reactor problems in time.
Only by the late 2040s can the UK (in a worse state than the US) develop and deliver SSN-AUKUSes. Given the increasing commitments for the UK defence budget SSN-AUKUSes may be only be evolved Astutes with evolved PWR2s renamed "PWR3".
After several evolved UK SSN classes since 1966 (ie. the Valiant - Churchill and Swiftsure classes) that ended with the Trafalgar class all using the PWR1 the Astute class. since 2010, is a "revolutionary" advance. The Astutes have a fundamentally different, much larger hull with a larger and it turns out troubled PWR2 reactor.
UK Defence Secretary Healey’s embarrassing (to Australian Defence Minister Marles, the RAN and Australian PM Albanese) June 11, 2026 resignation over UK defence money worries indicates the UK simply does not have the Defence Budget to face all of the UK’s worsening NATO/anti-Putin priorities. The removal of UK PM Sir Keir Starmer (underlines the political instabiliy of the UK in the AUKUS "sure thing" Trifecta. UK Armed Forces Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Al Carns, also resigned over budgetary shortfalls.
The UK now pursues "NATO First" as its de facto defence policy. Th UK's defence budget now has a new, additional burden, which is UK RAF nuclear strike. All this excludes actual submarines for Australia - other than extracting Australian funding for a needy Rolls Royce - submarine reactor division.
The UK's defence budget problems that are negatively impacting the UK's SSN-AUKUS project are impacted by Trump's long term distrust over NATO. Trump is believed to rely on "what to do with NATO" advice from Putin. Putin telling a gullible Trump that NATO is a separate entity from the US that exploits US financial goodwill.
Trump’s withdrawal from many NATO and Ukraine responsibilities mean non-US NATO countries, including the UK, have to spread their forces and budgets thinner. Following the US withdrawing funding support for Ukraine major NATO counties like the UK are paying for Ukraine instead, The UK defence budget is also thinning to cover new UK funding for East European NATO members threatened by a warlike Russia.
The need for Australia to have already paid A$5 Billion (so far) to UK Rolls Royce for the PWR3 indicates a severe UK money shortage for AUKUS. The PWR3 is being designed to power the UK's Dreadnought-class SSBNs and the Astute successors, the SSN-AUKUSes.
The UK is also exhibiting a technical inability to maintain the PWR3's precursor, the PWR2 - used on the Vanguard SSBNs and on the Astute SSNs - see all UK SSNs are at present again unavailable, due to repeated piping to PWR2 reactor faults.
Adding to the UK's nuclear naval budget woes is its need to complete the last Astute, HMS Achilles by 2029.
Only in 2029 will the UK be in a position to concentrate its still Astute PWR2 handicapped nuclear effort on building four much larger higher priority than SSN-AUKUS Dreadnought class SSBNs most probably from 2035 to 2050. These Dreadnoughts are intended to rely on the first operational, unproven PWR3 reactors, which may delay the 2035-2050 timetable. All this is concentrated in the large Devonshire Dock Hall in Barrow-in-Furness that was so damaged by a 14 hour fire in late 2024 that the extent of the damage and impact on nuclear submarine production has been kept secret by the UK Government to this day (meaning press are still banned from entering).
All pressurised water reactors (PWRs) for submarines use piping under immense pressure with varying degrees of success. In the case of HMS Astute's PWR2 it couldn't initially even propel the sub at a conservative 29 knots when US SSNs can travel at 35 knots. This below 29 knot pace was inadequate for Royal Navy requirements. For more speed the UK altered reactor function which probably resulted in a higher water pressure burden endangering UK reactor piping.
Please scroll half way down this Turner, Julian (29 July 2013) article here at https://www.naval-technology.com/features/feature-nuclear-submarine-successor-uk-royal-navy/?cf-view to subheading “Power surge: PWR-3 propulsion, munitions and electrical systems” indicating that in the years up to 2013 there was US assistance for then UK Successor-class/now renamed Dreadnought-class SSBN's PWR3/PWR-3. Also see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_PWR#PWR3 "PWR3 was a new system "based on a US design but using UK reactor technology".[22][23]
PWR3 submarine reactor development is also intended for SSN-AUKUS.
The UK may be receiving less US technical/monetary support for PWR3 reactor development because Trump and Hegseth now see the PWR3 as an undeserving NATO project.
Unless Australia funds (say) 80% of SSN-AUKUS and PWR3 costs the UK, at best, may only be able to provide Astute/PRW2 variants to go into “SSN-AUKUS” in the late early-mid 2050s.
Only after the PWR3s tailored for the Dreadnoughts have proven themselves might the UK Government decide which type of reactor should be developed for the SSN-AUKUS, after 2050. The reactor might be a Dreadnought sized PWR3; more typically a miniaturised PWR3 (dubbed the PWR3+); less desirably a PWR2; or more reliable (haven proven reliable on four classes of UK SSNs) even a return to a PWR1. The PWR1s, being much smaller could power a smaller, cheaper, SSN more suitable for the Australian Navy's needs and budget (though seemingly retrograde for some careers and bonuses in Rolls-Royce, for 60 years the monopoly builder of ALL UK submarine reactors).
Australia gets what the US and UK deign to give us, after the needs of a proudly America First USN and a hobbled NATO First UK RN are met.
It looks like both of Australia's AUKUS Pillar 1 allies US and UK (see next article AUKUS Failing TWO) will not meet their obligations because:
The US lacks the shipyard labour and supply chain efficiency to build Virginia SSNs and higher priority Columbia class SSBNs quickly enough; has a very inefficient Virginia-class maintenance process meaning too many Virginias are unavailable awaiting maintenance/repairs; and lacks the political inclination to put its Australian ally's needs for Virginias over US Navy needs.
and
It is likely Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles’ May 31, 2026 acceptance of three aging Block II or III Virginias (rather than two old and one new Virginia) was a delayed response to hitherto secret US War Department Elbridge Colby’s 2025 Review results. In 2025 Marles and Colby parroted the confected AUKUS is “full steam ahead” slogan. Colby has been long opposed to the US delivering ANY Virginias to Australia.
In the meantime the US was only too
happy to receive a A$5+ Billion AUKUS deposit from Marles.
Non-delivery of Virginias has
always been on the cards until the US builds 2.33 to 3 every year. The US
cannot achieve such numbers until the US has completed its higher priority run
of 12 already delayed Columbia SSBNs, one per year 2031 – 2043. Then the US may be in a position to deliver to Australia one Virginia every 3 years from 2044,
2047 and 2050.
It is odd the Australian Submarine Authority (ASA) without providing any hard evidence, has been spinning that used Virginias are better than new ones. Is ASA arguing it is preferable Australia receive:
- at worst in 2044 a mid-life updated 31 year old, commissioned 2013, Block II Virginia (like USS Minnesota),
or
- at best a 24 year old Block III Virginia, commissioned in 2020 (like USS Delaware)
- and Marles/ASA have been spinning the falsehood that old Virginias would be better than new build commissioned in 2044 Block VI Virginia (like USS Brooklyn).
Also where in the troubled heavy (non-reactor)
overhaul queue will aging Australian Virginias be placed versus the USN’s own Virginias?
The 4
USN shipyards doing heavy overhaul have long queues and many problems
like a shortage of skilled workers and supply chain problems. Can we expect ASC
Osborne or Australian Fleet Base West to more efficiently handle heavy maintenance of old Aussie Virginias?
Remember we are also talking America
First’s Trump and perhaps next from 2029 to 2032 a President J D Vance - both not known for worrying about alliance loyalties (except with Israel) or for keeping promises. There is no contract prescribing Australia will
get Block IVs – only ASA-Marles spin which has been lapped up by some
thinktank, mainstream media and academic cheerleaders.
IF we get a Virginia in 2032,
who’s to say it won’t be Block II or at best a III and its just going into, or
within, a deep maintenance cycle? We’ve already
paid/been paying A$5 Billion deposits (maybe more by 2032 – there being no contract
that we only have to pay A$5 Billion).
By 2032 the deposits we’ve sent to the US may be all that aging 20-30 year old Block IIs or IIIs are worth.
I think, through thought
repetition, we’ve convinced ourselves our A$Billions are “gifts” but where’s the proof?
Things may be worse, with the US and UK seeing these as deposits, that bind Australia to pay much, much
more over the next 30+ years.
How can we be certain of anything
when AUKUS Pillar One is commercial and national security in Confidence? And
AUKUS may involves changeable deals – spread over several US presidencies,
every 4 to 8 years, and twice+ as many UK PMships. The Brits are changing their
PMs and Defence Secretaries very frequently.
I don’t see any Australians as the authorities on AUKUS. We get what the US and UK deign to give us, after the needs of the USN and then the UK RN are met.
