Poland orders three Saab A-26 Type submarines, leases HSwMS Sodermanland

My ‘chats’ with Pete in the comments section of articles on Submarine Matters often meander away from the subject topic (eg. VSL in AIP boats). By coincidence, our recent discussion on diver/UUV lockout systems and Saab is bang on topic, as Poland has just ordered three A26-type submarines from Saab. These A26s are expected to be commissioned into the Polish Navy by 2038.

 

A26 in Polish Navy service. Image: Saab
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This order, worth approximately Swedish Krona (SEK) 47 billion (USD 4.8 billion), includes Saab “establishing maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capabilities in Poland in close collaboration with Polish industry, thereby supporting strategic autonomy for Poland”. Sweden is also leasing His Swedish Majesty's Ship HSwMS Sodermanland (see Wikipedia file) to Poland from 2026 to 2032 for training, and to “rapidly reinforce” Poland’s underwater capacity. Sodermanland is a forty-year-old submarine that received an overhaul in 2014-2016 and a lifetime extension in 2022. It will allow Polish submariners to train on Swedish systems, in preparation for the A26-class.

Sweden's official announcement also indicated that Poland will participate "in Sweden’s test and experiment activities with the HMS Blekinge and HMS Skåne", Sweden's A26 boats, which would mean that Poland is a development partner of the entire program, not simply an end-user customer.

A fascinating interview, here and above. How much can a Swedish Captain tell a Polish journalist on TV? Uploaded June 26, 2026 in Poland. TV Poland (TVP) World's Maciej Mikoson (pronounced Machi Emikos) interviews Royal Swedish Navy Captain Kenth Gutensparr, Project Manager and Coordinator for the training and support in the Swedish-Polish three A26 Orka Program. They discuss Sweden’s role regarding such issues as how long it will take to train Polish submariners to operate the A26s. Captain Gutensparr paints a discrete picture of Polish and Swedish strategic capabilities in the Baltic for the next decade.

Polish crew training will start in August 2026 at the Royal Swedish Navy’s Karlskrona base.

Shawn C’s commentary

Poland’s selection of the A26 in 2025 was seen by many as a godsend for a long-running submarine development program which began in 2010. Ordered in 2015 for delivery in 2022, the first A26 boat, HSwMS Blekinge, was laid down in June 2022, and is now expected for delivery in 2031.

In 2012, I fully expected Singapore, which had bought seven used submarines from Sweden's Kockums (before it was sold to Germany's TKMS) to order the A26, as this would lead to a billion-dollar cash infusion to Kockums to enable it to build its infrastructure. Then there were allegations (reported by SubMatts) that TKMS blocked Kockums from responding to Singapore’s 2012 submarine contest. This contributed to TKMS winning an order in 2013 for what is now currently six Invincible-class (TKMS Type-218SG) submarines. 

Kockums was then bought out by Saab in 2014, which coincidentally was also the year Russia illegally occupied the Ukrainian provinces of Crimea and Donbas. Saab immediately restarted the A26 program, with Sweden placing it's order for two A26s  in 2015.

In 2024, Sweden, now a NATO member with expanded treaty commitments, still has outdated submarine yards at Karlskrona and Landskrona. Those yards have not built new submarines since the last Gotland-class boat, HSwMS Halland, was launched in 1996! So Poland’s ‘buy-in’ on the A26 should see significant Polish investment and industrial offsets, including technical staff training and technology transfer, as Polish companies become part of the A26 project supply chain. In Poland, Sweden also gains a naval partner with the facilities to build 7,000-ton modern warships, which Saab currently lacks. 

Sweden also had a follow-on plan in 2024 to replace the three Gotland boats with smaller A30 boats (see last paragraph here) in the late 2030s. But with Poland's order of three A26s, Saab Kockums will soon have a hot production yard and achieve economies of scale, so we could see follow-on orders for the A26 from Sweden.

No information on the systems and weapons fit of Poland's A26 has been revealed, though Saab did display a possible Polish model with vertical launch systems (VLS) at defence trade shows. As Pete mentioned in his article on Canada's CPSP, a VSL module would add a significant displacement to a 2,000-ton AIP submarine, impacting range, speed and endurance.

Saab A26 model with VLS. Image: militaraktuell.at
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Could Polish A26s come equipped with Saab's Horizontal Multi-purpose Lock (HMPL), also called the Multi-Mission Portal (MMP)? This is very likely, considering that the A26 is optimised for the constrained waters of the Baltic Sea, and Saab has a Large Uncrewed Undersea Vehicle (LUUV) that fits. The Lock/Portal's diameter might be anywhere between 1m and 1.5m.

The A26's HMPL/MMP under development in a Saab workshop. Image: Screenshot from a segment 4 to 8 minutes into this navalnews.com video
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Might Canada Choose a KSS-III Sized "DSME-3000" Without VLS?

Arising from SubMatts last future Canadian submarine article of June 19, 2026 was how much we still don't know.

Canada may be deciding next week or next month which of the two submarine types (built by TKMS and Hanwha Ocean) its going to chose. 

Even though a German/Norwegian TKMS Type 212CD has not evens been launched there is more certainty about its design (particularly it not having a Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) and its displacement being (right sidebar) 2,500 tonnes (surfaced) and 2,800 tonnes (submerged). Also (right sidebar) are two torpedo tube launched missiles under consideration - being the likely Tomahawk sized anti-ship and land attack NSM-SL,^[20] and likely Harpoon sized - for anti-ship only 3SM Tyrfing^[21][22]

It is about the other contender, the already launched South Korean KSS-III Batch-Is or Batch-IIs that there is more uncertainty. This is because Canadian officials and the military leadership have not officially stated whether Canada wants VLS in the KSS-III. 

VLS may weigh up to 800 tonnes. So VLS or no VLS is an issue impacting the KSS-III's whole design, including every buoyancy and trim calculation.

Complicating the KSS-III Batch-I or II picture are two never built "Export variants" of the KSS-III, that don't come with VLS. They are known as the DSME-2000 (2,000 tonnes) and DSME-3000 ("3,300 tonnes") (the KSS-III Batch-I is 3,305 tonnes (surfaced). In terms of length the DSME-3000 design is "83.5 meters" as is the KSS-III Batch-I.

If Canada picks a KSS-III it may be a Batch-I (with VLS) already operational or a DSME-3000 paper design - with the same dimensions, but without VLS. 

A KSS-III Batch-I or II with 6 or 10 VLS for missiles may be seen as an encumbrance given Canadian submarines' projected (?) standard mission profile of quiet surveillance. 

Comparing their structure and operation for degree of discretion relies on data that would only be available after an at sea runoff in 10 years time - data that would be, in any case, highly classified.

Comparing the DSME-3000 design's 3,300 tonnes and 83.5 metres exceeding the Type 212CD design's 2,500 tonne and 73 metres equals 800 tonnes and 10.5 metres greater. This may contribute to:

Improved speed, range and endurance of the DSME-3000; more diesel fuel; larger AIP machinery more AIP chemicals; more Lithium-ion Batteries; a greater electrical load for more powerful sensors and processing power; more food, space and comfort for a mixed gender crew; on longer patrols; and, more heavyweight torpedo tube fired shots (torpedoes, missiles, mines and UUVs and remotely operated seafloor sensor/IUSS maintenance robots).

But again, NATO alliance solidarity may trump South Korea's larger, likely more capable design. Canada might decide on the winning sub before NATO's July 7-8, 2026 NATO Summit, to be held in Ankara, Turkiye.

AUKUS Failing TWO - UK cannot deliver on the SSN-AUKUS project

It looks like the UK cannot afford AUKUS Pillar 1 given its new NATO and new Ukraine obligations:

The UK no longer has the money to develop the SSN-AUKUS intended for Australia and, in particular will have difficulty rectifying the PWR2/PWR3 submarine reactor problems in time.

Only by the late 2040s can the UK (in a worse state than the US) develop and deliver SSN-AUKUSes. Given the increasing commitments for the UK defence budget SSN-AUKUSes may be only be evolved Astutes with evolved PWR2s renamed "PWR3". 

After several evolved UK SSN classes since 1966 (ie. the Valiant - Churchill and Swiftsure classes) that ended with the Trafalgar class all using the PWR1 the Astute class. since 2010, is a "revolutionary" advance. The Astutes have a fundamentally different, much larger hull with a larger and it turns out troubled PWR2 reactor. 

UK Defence Secretary Healey’s embarrassing (to Australian Defence Minister Marles, the RAN and Australian PM Albanese) June 11, 2026 resignation over UK defence money worries indicates the UK simply does not have the Defence Budget to face all of the UK’s worsening NATO/anti-Putin priorities. The removal of UK PM Sir Keir Starmer (underlines the political instabiliy of the UK in the AUKUS "sure thing" Trifecta. UK Armed Forces Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Al Carns, also resigned over budgetary shortfalls. 

The UK now pursues "NATO First" as its de facto defence policy. Th UK's defence budget now has a new, additional burden, which is UK RAF nuclear strike. All this excludes actual submarines for Australia - other than extracting Australian funding for a needy Rolls Royce - submarine reactor division. 

The UK's defence budget problems that are negatively impacting the UK's SSN-AUKUS project are impacted by Trump's long term distrust over NATO. Trump is believed to rely on "what to do with NATO" advice from Putin. Putin telling a gullible Trump that NATO is a separate entity from the US that exploits US financial goodwill. 

Trump’s withdrawal from many NATO and Ukraine responsibilities mean non-US NATO countries, including the UK, have to spread their forces and budgets thinner. Following the US withdrawing funding support for Ukraine major NATO counties like the UK are paying for Ukraine instead, The UK defence budget is also thinning to cover new UK funding for East European NATO members threatened by a warlike Russia. 

The need for Australia to have already paid A$5 Billion (so far) to UK Rolls Royce for the PWR3 indicates a severe UK money shortage for AUKUS. The PWR3 is being designed to power the UK's Dreadnought-class SSBNs and the Astute successors, the SSN-AUKUSes. 

The UK is also exhibiting a technical inability to maintain the PWR3's precursor, the PWR2 - used on the Vanguard SSBNs and on the Astute SSNs - see all UK SSNs are at present again unavailable, due to repeated piping to PWR2 reactor faults.

Adding to the UK's nuclear naval budget woes is its need to complete the last Astute, HMS Achilles by 2029. 

Only in 2029 will the UK be in a position to concentrate its still Astute PWR2 handicapped nuclear effort on building four much larger higher priority than SSN-AUKUS Dreadnought class SSBNs most probably from 2035 to 2050. These Dreadnoughts are intended to rely on the first operational, unproven PWR3 reactors, which may delay the 2035-2050 timetable. All this is concentrated in the large Devonshire Dock Hall in Barrow-in-Furness that was so damaged by a 14 hour fire in late 2024 that the extent of the damage and impact on nuclear  submarine production has been kept secret by the UK Government to this day (meaning press are still banned from entering). 

All pressurised water reactors (PWRs) for submarines use piping under immense pressure with varying degrees of success. In the case of HMS Astute's PWR2 it couldn't initially even propel the sub at a conservative 29 knots when US SSNs can travel at 35 knots. This below 29 knot pace was inadequate for Royal Navy requirements. For more speed the UK altered reactor function which probably resulted in a higher water pressure burden endangering UK reactor piping.

Please scroll half way down this Turner, Julian (29 July 2013) article here at https://www.naval-technology.com/features/feature-nuclear-submarine-successor-uk-royal-navy/?cf-view to subheading “Power surge: PWR-3 propulsion, munitions and electrical systems” indicating that in the years up to 2013 there was US assistance for then UK Successor-class/now renamed Dreadnought-class SSBN's PWR3/PWR-3. Also see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_PWR#PWR3  "PWR3 was a new system "based on a US design but using UK reactor technology".^[22][23] 

PWR3 submarine reactor development is also intended for SSN-AUKUS.

The UK may be receiving less US technical/monetary support for PWR3 reactor development because Trump and Hegseth now see the PWR3 as an undeserving  NATO project.

Unless Australia funds (say) 80% of SSN-AUKUS and PWR3 costs the UK, at best,  may only be able to provide Astute/PRW2 variants to go into “SSN-AUKUS” in the late early-mid 2050s.

Only after the PWR3s tailored for the Dreadnoughts have proven themselves might the UK Government decide which type of reactor should be developed for the SSN-AUKUS, after 2050. The reactor might be a Dreadnought sized PWR3; more typically a miniaturised PWR3 (dubbed the PWR3+); less desirably a PWR2; or more reliable (haven proven reliable on four classes of UK SSNs) even a return to a PWR1. The PWR1s, being much smaller could power a smaller, cheaper, SSN more suitable for the Australian Navy's needs and budget (though seemingly retrograde for some careers and bonuses in Rolls-Royce, for 60 years the monopoly builder of ALL UK submarine reactors).

Australia gets what the US and UK deign to give us, after the needs of a proudly  America First USN and a hobbled NATO First UK RN are met.

SK's Hanwha Ocean More Likely to Win Canadian Sub Competition - AI

This is an AI Overview gathered June 19, 2026 - Perhaps announced by the Canadian Government in 30 days:

"South Korea's Hanwha Ocean is widely considered to have a strong edge over Germany's Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) in Canada's $43 billion Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), primarily due to its proven technology, faster delivery schedule, and massive economic offset packages. [1, 2]

The competition hinges on several key advantages and trade-offs offered by both manufacturers: [1, 2]

1. South Korea (Hanwha Ocean)

Hanwha is pitching a variant of its KSS-III (Dosan Ahn Changho-class) submarine, which is already in active service with the South Korean Navy. [1, 2]

• Delivery Speed: This is Hanwha’s greatest advantage. Because the KSS-III is already operational, they promise to deliver the first submarines by 2035—exactly when the Royal Canadian Navy's aging Victoria-class fleet begins retiring. [1, 2]
• Proven Performance: Instead of relying on a new developmental platform, Hanwha offers a large, heavy (3,600-ton) proven design with lithium-battery power and long submerged endurance required for Arctic patrols. [1, 2, 3]
• Industrial Benefits: Hanwha has proposed billions in local investments. This includes using Canadian steel for production and a CA$3.1 billion initiative ("Project Beaver") for hydrogen-powered infrastructure, aiming to create roughly 22,500 jobs annually. [1, 2, 3]

2. Germany (TKMS)

Germany is putting forward the Type 212CD, a next-generation submarine being co-developed for the German and Norwegian navies. [1]

• Design & Innovation: The Type 212CD emphasizes cutting-edge European NATO technology, but it is still a new development, making it more of a "first-of-class" risk compared to the Korean design. [1, 2] 
• Delivery Bottlenecks: TKMS's production facilities in Germany are currently strained with existing orders, meaning they can only offer a best-case estimate of one vessel by 2035, with the rest rolling out considerably later. [1, 2]
• Industrial & Strategic Offers: TKMS offers deep NATO integration and has partnered with Canadian shipyards (like Seaspan). Crucially, they are also dangling extensive intellectual property (IP) transfers so Canada can maintain the vessels independently over their life cycle. [1, 2, 3]

Observers view the competition as a classic trade-off between Korean readiness and scale vs. German innovation and technology transfer. While TKMS has traditional ties to NATO, Hanwha's ability to meet critical 2035 delivery windows and its aggressive industrial job-creation packages have given it strong momentum in the final stages of the procurement process. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]" End of AI.

Peter Comment

If NATO member Canada sees (defence against Russia) NATO solidarity as uppermost then NATO Germany's TKMS may win.

I think the winner of the competition odds are SK 45% and Germany 55%.

The KSS-III (IF? it has VLS) might be a slightly better sub having more heavyweight shots overall and they are more readily available than slower firing horizontal torpedo tube launches. 

The TKMS Type 212CD has the political alliance advantage (Canada being in NATO) of being from fellow NATO country (Germany). Also the main allies the new sub will need to interoperate with are in NATO (against Russia).

Canada would have less interest in interoperating with SK against NK or China or for that matter against SK's "frenemy" Japan. 

AUKUS Failing ONE: US Virginias unavailable

It looks like both of Australia's AUKUS Pillar 1 allies US and UK (see next article AUKUS Failing TWO) will not meet their obligations because:

The US lacks the shipyard labour and supply chain efficiency to build Virginia SSNs and higher priority Columbia class SSBNs quickly enough; has a very inefficient Virginia-class maintenance process meaning too many Virginias are unavailable awaiting maintenance/repairs; and lacks the political inclination to put its Australian ally's needs for Virginias over US Navy needs.

and

It is likely Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles’ May 31, 2026 acceptance of three aging Block II or III Virginias (rather than two old and one new Virginia) was a delayed response to hitherto secret US War Department Elbridge Colby’s 2025 Review results. In 2025 Marles and Colby parroted the confected AUKUS is “full steam ahead” slogan. Colby has been long opposed to the US delivering ANY Virginias to Australia. 

In the meantime the US was only too happy to receive a A$5+ Billion AUKUS deposit from Marles.

Non-delivery of Virginias has always been on the cards until the US builds 2.33 to 3 every year. The US cannot achieve such numbers until the US has completed its higher priority run of 12 already delayed Columbia SSBNs, one per year 2031 – 2043. Then the US may be in a position to deliver to Australia one Virginia every 3 years from 2044, 2047 and 2050.

It is odd the Australian Submarine Authority (ASA) without providing any hard evidence, has been spinning that used Virginias are better than new ones. Is ASA arguing it is preferable Australia receive:

-  at worst in 2044 a mid-life updated 31 year old, commissioned 2013, Block II Virginia (like USS Minnesota), 

or 

-  at best a 24 year old Block III Virginia, commissioned in 2020 (like USS Delaware)

-  and Marles/ASA have been spinning the falsehood that old Virginias would be  better than new build commissioned in 2044 Block VI Virginia (like USS Brooklyn).

Also where in the troubled heavy (non-reactor) overhaul queue will aging Australian Virginias be placed versus the USN’s own Virginias? The 4 USN shipyards doing heavy overhaul have long queues and many problems like a shortage of skilled workers and supply chain problems. Can we expect ASC Osborne or Australian Fleet Base West to more efficiently handle heavy maintenance of old Aussie Virginias?

Remember we are also talking America First’s Trump and perhaps next from 2029 to 2032 a President J D Vance - both not known for worrying about alliance loyalties (except with Israel) or for keeping promises. There is no contract prescribing Australia will get Block IVs – only ASA-Marles spin which has been lapped up by some thinktank, mainstream media and academic cheerleaders.

IF we get a Virginia in 2032, who’s to say it won’t be Block II or at best a III and its just going into, or within, a deep maintenance cycle? We’ve already paid/been paying A$5 Billion deposits (maybe more by 2032 – there being no contract that we only have to pay A$5 Billion).

By 2032 the deposits we’ve sent to the US may be all that aging 20-30 year old Block IIs or IIIs are worth.

I think, through thought repetition, we’ve convinced ourselves our A$Billions are “gifts” but where’s the proof? Things may be worse, with the US and UK seeing these as deposits, that bind Australia to pay much, much more over the next 30+ years.

How can we be certain of anything when AUKUS Pillar One is commercial and national security in Confidence? And AUKUS may involves changeable deals – spread over several US presidencies, every 4 to 8 years, and twice+ as many UK PMships. The Brits are changing their PMs and Defence Secretaries very frequently.

I don’t see any Australians as the authorities on AUKUS. We get what the US and UK deign to give us, after the needs of the USN and then the UK RN are met.

Navigating the Deep: An Analysis of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP)

I draw your attention to a great June 9, 2026 essay, written by Bruce Allen Lubbering, for RealClear Defense, at:

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/06/09/navigating_the_deep_an_analysis_of_the_canadian_patrol_submarine_project_cpsp_1187505.html 

Please direct any comments there.