I publish on subs, other naval, nuclear weapons & broad political issues. Advised Aus, US, France. Aussie sub changes are slow: talk since 2009 rather than actual new subs. The Collins LOTE 2028-2040 might help Australia's sub availability temporarily. XLUUVs also handy. POTUS 2031 may cancel AUKUS Virginia offer due to USN advice it needs all operational SSNs to 2040s to mainly face China. Gessler, Karthik & Shawn C are excellent contributors.
The AUKUS Review announced June 11, 2025 is
likely to produce an ambiguous finding leaning on Australia to increase its non-refundable
AUKUS payments (currently A$5 Billion) to the US. The 30 day Review is being led
by AUKUS Virginia sceptic US Defense Under Secretary for Policy Elbridge Colby.
The overall America First objective of the Review
is to force Australia to pay more to America's military-industrial-political
complex. A secondary objective is to force an agreement (overt or secret) out
of Australia to make available any AUKUS Virginias for US objectives, like defending
Taiwan.
America is pressuring Australia to raise our
Defense Budget up from 2% to 3.5% GDP to pay more for AUKUS, more for other US
built weapons, and more for Australian weapons built under expensive US licenses.
The shortage of SSNs for the US Navy, leaving no Virginias to spare for Australia, continues. No matter how many $Billions the US Government throws at the problem, SSN production is not increasing, nor SSN availability improving. US website AOL carries
the Fox News article, of June 11, 2025, below. Within the article text see:
"The [US] Navy currently operates under 50 attack submarines, well below the long-term requirement of 66 boats, as outlined by recent Navy force structure assessments."
"Top House Democrat grills Hegseth on submarine spending plans: 'Give us the details'
Morgan Phillips
Rep. Rosa DeLauro, D-Conn., confronted Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth during a heated House Appropriations Committee hearing Tuesday over years-long lags in the nation’s shipbuilding capacity.
The top Appropriations Democrat accused the Defense Department (DOD) of failing to present a clear, transparent plan to ramp up production at a time when China’s shipbuilding capabilities are estimated to be 230 times greater than the U.S.’s. She said the Biden administration had been similarly opaque.
DeLauro zeroed in on what she characterized as a troubling shortfall between the Navy’s current production capacity and future strategic needs.
"Do you know where our submarine production currently stands and whether current production is sufficient to bridge the gap between current fleet size and projected need?" she asked.
Rep. Rosa DeLauro [different bio - photo above] confronted Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth during a heated House Appropriations Committee hearing Tuesday [June 10, 2025] over years-long lags in the nation’s shipbuilding capacity.
"There is a gap," Hegseth admitted, "but we believe we are closing it."
But DeLauro wasn’t satisfied, demanding detailed data to back up that claim.
"We do not have any information or data that can substantiate what you’re saying," she shot back. "Give us the details."
"We've had difficulty with the prior administration, and I don't mind calling them out. What is your plan for the future?"
Asked what the status is of the department’s investment in submarine programs, Hegseth boasted of a 14% increase in funding in the fiscal year 2026 budget request for the Columbia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and a "substantial increase" in the Virginia-class fast-attack submarines as well.
But the congresswoman raised concerns about reports that the Pentagon plans to shift $3.1 billion in funding for the Columbia-class submarine program from FY2026 to FY2027 and FY2028.
"This creates a serious problem for industry in the short term and hampers shipbuilders’ ability to reach an adequate production rate," DeLauro warned. "Have you been in contact with Electric Boat or Huntington Ingalls about your plans?"
Hegseth pushed back, saying top Pentagon officials were in regular communication with shipyards.
"Almost every day," he said. "We’re actively engaged… to make sure their needs are being met and their shortfalls are being addressed so we can close that gap in real time."
DeLauro pointed to a missed deadline for placing key submarine contracts authorized under the December continuing resolution. Congress had approved $5.7 billion for two Block IV and oneBlock V Virginia-class submarines, with the understanding that contracts would be in place by February 2025. The Defense Department did not finalize the contracts until April 30.
"We have made a serious investment," DeLauro said. "Now we want to know where that is going and what your plan is."
When pressed for specifics, Hegseth thanked the committee for its flexibility and acknowledged prior mismanagement under previous administrations. But DeLauro cut him off.
"I want your plan," she said. "Can we get that in writing and on paper? Because we don’t have anything today. We have zip, nada."
Hegseth promised to provide the committee with written details of the department’s submarine production plan.
"We have the details, and we will provide them," he said.
DeLauro insisted she wanted the information before the committee's markup later the same day.
The U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding capacity has been on the decline since the Cold War. In the 1980s, the U.S. aimed for a 600-ship fleet; today, it struggles to maintain 300 operational vessels.
The [US] Navy currently operates under 50 attack submarines, well below the long-term requirement of 66 boats, as outlined by recent Navy force structure assessments.
Shipyards like Electric Boat (General Dynamics) in Connecticut and Huntington Ingalls Industries in Virginia and Mississippi are the primary builders of nuclear submarines—but both are operating near maximum capacity and face major workforce and supply chain challenges.
Shipbuilders report significant difficulties in hiring, training and retaining welders, pipefitters, engineers and designers. Shipbuilding’s highly specialized supply chain was hit especially hard by the Covid-19 pandemic and has been slow to recover.
Judging by public sources and Fleet Base West's Indian Ocean positioning
Australia's SSKs rarely visit NZ or South West Pacific islands. Further north of the Sydney base may be more likely.
Due to differing SSK vs SSN electrical fitouts, differing balance/buoyancies and in fact
far differing internal arrangements retrofitting even a small reactor into an
operational SSK has never occurred, to my knowledge. I think a French Navy non-operational, Daphne-class SSK was used as a reactor testbed (?) in the 1960s-1970s prior to the launch of the first Rubis class SSN in 1979. https://www.lynceans.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Part-4_UK-France-Others-60-yrs-of-marine-nuc-power.pdfpage 56 onwards, may provide clues.
Retrofitting an intentionally small, hence low power, small modular reactor
(SMR) makes little sense particularly relying on an SMR with molten salt
coolant.
The US experimented with an earlier USS Seawolf (SSN-575) (built in the 1950s)
being the only US submarine built with a sodium-cooled reactor. That Seawolf's
S2G reactor was a liquid metal (sodium) cooled, beryllium-moderated nuclear
reactor. The Seawolf's sodium-cooled reactor faced challenges, including leaks
in the steam generators and performance issues. Its was later replaced with a
standard PWR. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Seawolf_(SSN-575)#Comparison_to_Nautilus
The USSR also attempted molten salt in its Alfa-class SSNs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfa-class_submarine#Propulsionwith negative results. In emergency shut
downs molten salt reactors freeze - preventing restarts - requiring reactor
replacements. Pier side heating was essential.
I regrettably reckon there is little SSK to SSN retrofit or alternative reactor
coolant flexibility. Otherwise someone would have tried retrofitting SSK to
SSN.
To hedge against the likely non-delivery in the 2030s of Virginias under AUKUS and the only temporary fix of the LOTE of Collins conventional subs (SSKs), some suggest weekly:
"Why doesn't Australia buy interim submarines, that are off the shelf, to bridge the submarine availability gap until Virginias or SSN-AUKUS's arrive in the 2040s (or don't arrive at all)?"
Increasingly the suggested SSKs are South Korea's KSS-III or Japan's Taigei.
Logic, productivity and efficiency since the
beginning of Collins, through to today, have been usurped by South Australian
state, more Australia wide, RAN and Federal Government
financial-POLITICAL-electoral priorities.
Basically ASC, the unions, South Australian
Government and supply chain companies from all over Australia, require the LOTE then possible new SSK building to only be at Osborne, not overseas.
Reasons
Australia's SSK building tradition always involves the highest possible infusions of Federal Government funds into South Australia.
Without the car factories it used to have, South Australia relies on warship and
submarine building federal money. All these industrial-political realities
double the building time for triple the money of a sub built overseas.
What do Federal governments (be they Labor and/or
Coalition) get out of this? They buy critical Federal Election votes from electoral swing state South Australia. A textbook example being then Prime Minister Turnbull
winning the July 2, 2016 Election by rushing the selection, on April 26, 2016, of the Attack class
submarine to be built at Osborne. Turnbull won enough federal seats in South
Australia to win that Election.If Australia had waited it may have been able to bargain Barracuda-Suffren SSNs out of France.
"Off the shelf" in terms of stocks of completed subs sitting at foreign warehouses, or a design meeting the needs of all customers, simply don't exist. As with the Collins the
RAN has special high speed, very long range, long endurance, very large SSK requirements. South Korean,
Japanese and German built subs (in response to their customer requirements)
have different speed-range qualities that do not match the RAN's genuine need
for long transit range missions at speed.
Singapore's Type 218 Invincibles were not off the
shelf but tailor made to Singapore's requirements using a mixture of Type 214
and Type 212CD characteristics. Every submarine customer requires some tailoring.
Between what I call the Osborne
"inefficiency" curse and necessary RAN tailoring any "Interim - Off the Shelf" SSK built at Osborne would take 15 years from 2026 = first sub commissioned in 2041, for
triple the price than if it were built overseas (eg. in South Korea, the most efficient Western SSK builder).
As I mentioned in my previous article, the biennial IMDEX 2025, held at Singapore's Changi Naval Base, had announcements and news on systems related to the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN).
New Mine-Countermeasure Capabilities
Image: DSO National Laboratories: MCM USV with K-Ster expendable mine disposal system. ---
First up, Singapore's Bedok-class MCM (a variant of the Swedish Landsort-class) will be replaced by a mine countermeasure suite from 2027 that includes Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV). The four ships of the Bedok class first entered service in 1995.
The RSN has operated USVs since 2005, deploying an IAI Protector USV to the Gulf of Aden for force protection. Singapore’s DSO National Laboratories and ST Engineering then began the Venus USV development program with autonomous Collision Detection Collision Avoidance (CDCA) to navigate Singapore’s crowded littoral conditions. From the initial 9 metre Venus 9, DSO and ST Engineering developed the 16.9 metre MARSEC USV for both maritime security and mine countermeasures.
Thales announced at IMDEX 2025 that the RSN has purchased the Thales Pathfinder mine warfare system, which features a Towed Synthetic Aperture Sonar (T-SAS), while Exail also disclosed recently that Singapore has purchased multiple robotic Mine Identification and Disposal Systems (MIDS) including the K-STER expendable underwater drone, SEASCAN mine identification Remotely Piloted Vehicle (ROV), and the UMISOFT command and control (C2) suite.
Fleetwide adoption of STRALES
Image: EUNAVFOR Operation ASPIDES: Italian ship (ITS) Virginio Fasan engaging UAV with OTO 76mm/62 STRALES gun on April 29 2024, in the Red Sea. ---
Since IMDEX 2023, we’ve known that the MRCV weapons fit will include MBDA VL MICA NG and ASTER 30 B1 NT SAMs, ST/IAI Blue Spear ASMs and the LeonardoOTO 76mm/62 Super Rapid STRALES.
But during a recent written reply to questions from Janes Defence, Singapore’s Chief of Navy Rear Admiral Sean Wat confirmed that the RSN will adopt STRALES throughout its fleet, as the system has “proven to be effective against moving air and surface targets” - likely a reference to the STRALES-equipped Italian Navy FREMM frigate ITS Virginio Fasan, which shot down a hostile UAV on the 29th of April 2024 during a merchant escort operation in the Red Sea.
STRALES is an upgrade kit that enables the OTO 76/62 naval gun to fire the DART (Driven Ammunition Reduced Time of flight) guided munition, allowing the gun to engage fast and small airborne/surface targets rapidly out to 15km.
The RSN first adopted the OTO Melara 76/62 SR gun in 1990 with the Victory-class missile corvettes, and it is currently the standard main gun for all RSN surface combatants, except the Bedok-class MCMs. As STRALES is available as an upgrade kit to in-service guns, I expect the Formidable-class frigates to upgrade to STRALES as they are now undergoing their Mid-Life Update (MLU), and the Independence-class LMV when they undergo scheduled maintenance.
Type 218SG Follow-On Order Signed
Image: MINDEF Singapore: RSS Invincible. ---
I have previously speculated that Singapore would order a third tranche (5th and 6th) Invincible-class (Type 218SG) submarines from thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), and this confirmed at IMDEX 2025 with a contract signing ceremony.
TKMS now has a full order book of around €16 billion, with up to 20 submarines on order - 12 to 15 Type 212CD for the German and Royal Norwegian Navies, 3 Dakar-class boats for the Israeli Navy, and 2 Invincible-class boats for Singapore, which are scheduled for delivery from 2034.
No details of this contract were revealed, but as this order comes 12 years after the initial contract for the first two boats, we can expect some modifications to the design specifications, such as the inclusion of a VLS module.
With the first 4 Invincible-class submarines entering RSN service by 2028, this would expand Singapore's operational submarine fleet to 6, alongside the 2 Archer-class boats, though the 'from 2034' delivery date of the third tranche is slightly concerning, as this means that the Archers will need to serve 22 years in the RSN, in addition to the 25 years they served in the Royal Swedish Navy as HSwMS Vastergotland and HSwMS Halsingland.
MRCV model displayed at IMDEX 2025
Image: Image capture from Naval News video. ---
Janes Defence notes that Singapore’s ST Engineering had a model of the MRCV as the centrepiece of their booth, and the model highlighted the area below the flight deck where two large PALFINGER Marine PQBS-SR Slipway Systems for Launch and Recovery (LARS) of RHIBs and USVs. Janes also highlighted the model’s bulbous bow, which indicates a hull-mounted sonar.
Integrating a towed sonar array may not be possible because of the LARS, although this does not preclude an USV deployed system such as the Thales Australia BlueSentry Remote Active Sonar System (RASS).
Note that PALFINGER has not disclosed the Safe Working Load capacity of the PQBS-SR slipway system for the MRCV, but we could imply that PALFINGER stated “large” to handle the MARSEC USV, which are 16.9 metres in length and displace 30 tonnes.
Both the Independence-class LMV and the upcoming Fassmer Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) feature dual PALFINGER Marine Slipway Systems, with the LMVs able to carry vessels up to 11 metres in length.
Image: PALFINGER Marine. ---
Navalnews has also confirmed that the MRCV will be 150 metres long, with a beam of 21.04 metres and with a full load displacement of 8,400 tonnes, and have accommodations for up to 160 personnel.
The MRCVs will use Combined Diesel and Diesel (CODAD) by M.A.N. with an Integrated Full Electric Propulsion (IFEP) system with electric motors by GE Vernova. This will enable a top speed of 24 knots.
The model displayed at IMDEX 2025 showed a 4x8 VLS system behind the main gun, and a large enclosed space between the primary superstructure and the funnels/helicopter hanger, which could be the location for the Blue Spear Anti-Ship missile system. A similar ‘missile/flex deck’ on the Formidable-class enables these frigates to carry up the 24 Harpoon SSMs.
In addition to the MARSEC USV, unmanned systems for the MRCV may also include:
At IMDEX 2025, Fassmer Defence revealed its latest Offshore Patrol Vessel design, the OPV90 MK II. Fassmer has a 90m Offshore Patrol Vessel in its product catalogue for a few years, but the model of the OPV90 MK II is significantly different from the parent design, featuring a detailed weapons and equipment fit that’s not usually seen in a ‘marketing’ model - such as communication systems, OTO 76/62 STRALES main gun, Saab Sea Giraffe 1x AESA radar, secondary RCW weapons fit and an equipment bay for four 20-foot-ISO containers, plus integrated fenders for alongside operations - a feature that is also found on the RSN's Sentinal-class Maritime Security and Response Vessels (MRSV).
Fassmer confirmed to NavalNews that the OPV90 Mk II is in production, and since we know Fassmer has laid the keels for the first two of four OPVs that the RSN ordered, it's quite obvious that the OPV90 Mk II will fly the Singapore naval ensign.
IMDEX 2025 was held May 6 to May 8, 2025 and was judged a smashing success.
Regarding your second paragraph on any UK/European deterrence umbrella for Australia:
In 2024, the Federation of American Scientists estimated Russia had 5,580 nuclear warheads (facing NATO, China and possibly North Korea). Against this the US had 5,428 warheads (facing Russia, China, Iran and North Korea).
The UK and France combined only have 550 warheads, with insufficient operational redundancy (maybe 350 in patrolling SSBNs and French air/missile bases) to face even Russia alone.
They have none left to face Australia's nuclear threat - which is China. In any case could we expect them to be prepared to sacrifice London and Paris to protect Sydney?
UK and French SSN and especially new generation SSBN production commitments for their own navies mean they cannot domestically produce SSNs for Australia or oversee SSN production in Australia until the 2040s. This is why Virginias for Australia in the 2030s were such a good idea - in 2021.
Such is China's expansion in naval power in the Western Pacific that widely committed US conventional forces would now be hard pressed to defeat China.
UK/European conventional naval forces have even poorer force projection to defend Australia. With a shaky US alliance they are fully committed facing the increasing Russian threat. This all means they cannot approach even the US's declining ability to protect Australia from China's naval and military forces.
In an Indo-Pacific war against China the actions of other powers (India, Japan and South Korea) might well amount to self protection (against Chinese land, sea, air and conventional missile forces) before those powers pursue any broad strategy of banding together with Australia.
Also the rumour this year that Russia was discussing a long range aircraft base in Indonesia (in the central Indo-Pacific) presented additional strategic possibilities. One thing is certain - Russia has a powerful, fast moving, nuclear submarine force within its Pacific Fleet. This, at a minimum, gives Russia the ability to upset Australia's 99% reliance on shipping trade.
