September 15, 2026

No US SSNs for Australia Policy: Valid? Invalid?

Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, February 11, 2025, Congressional Research Service, https://crsreports.congress.gov RL32418, at https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL32418.pdf on page 85 reports:

["On July 1, 2024 in an article by James Curran, “Morrison’s ‘Longest Night’: Inside the Making of AUKUS,” in the Australian Financial Review, on the AUKUS Pillar 1 project, Curran stated]:

"Previous Australian attempts to acquire nuclear-powered submarines with US technology were rejected by Washington….Since [2000] Australian officials have on at least two occasions - it may well be more - sought access from Washington to the technology for nuclear-powered submarines.

It appears that towards the end of the [Australian Prime Minister John Howard era 1996-2007], senior [Australian] defence officials made one such approach to the US but were rebuffed.

Some defence analysts were privately claiming around 2011-12 that the US would in time provide the technology to Australia, a claim which, once heard by American ears, elicited the same response: “No.”

As one [Australian] defence insider who observed these events at close quarters says, “The Americans would first make the obvious point that if Australia wanted nuclear submarines, [Australia] would need to double its defence budget.” Then came the medicine. Washington would not hand over the technology, the Australians were told, because “you are friends, not family".

Pete Comment

This "no US SSNs will be delivered to Australia" policy may still hold. Australia is receiving increasingly vague signals of "Virginias may be delivered to Australia during the 2030s" from a Trump-Hegseth regime distracted by continuous Middle Eastern wars. This is rather than the US earmarking two actual "Block IV Virginias" for delivery to Australia in 2032 and 2035 the years promised under the President Biden Administration.

It should also be noted that throughout the UK's all Astute-class submarines are unavailable crises the US hasn't rectified the long term failure of the Astutes by exporting Virginia SSNs to the UK Royal Navy. The US, after all, has long considered itself a closer ally to the UK (Trident II sharing and all) than the US is to Australia.

September 12, 2026

USN sees South Korea & Japan wanting nuclear submarines differently

AI Reports September 12, 2026

The U.S. Navy’s stance on South Korea’s nuclear submarine ambitions represents a notable "speed control" effort that directly contrasts with its open, encouraging view toward Japan. While the official at Pearl Harbour welcomed a domestic debate in Tokyo, they placed strict strategic conditions on Seoul. [1, 2]
The primary differences in the U.S. position between the two countries include:
1. The "Status Symbol" vs. Strategic Need Distinction
  • For South Korea: The U.S. official explicitly warned that pursuing nuclear-powered submarines simply as a "status symbol" or for national prestige is the wrong motivation given the enormous financial cost. [1, 2]
  • For Japan: The U.S. viewed Japan's exploration of the technology as a logical and technically feasible progression, noting that conversations should take place given Tokyo's existing civil nuclear expertise.
2. Geographic Mission and Scope of Operation
  • The Peninsula Restriction: The U.S. Navy, invoking past remarks by Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle, [a former nuclear submarine commanding engineer] pointed out that nuclear submarines are unnecessary if a navy never intends to leave its adjacent waters. [1]
  • The Indo-Pacific Demand: Because conventional diesel submarines are highly effective for localized coastal defense, the U.S. stance dictates that for South Korea’s ambitions to be justified, Seoul must be willing to expand its naval footprint into the wider Indo-Pacific to help counter China, rather than focusing purely on North Korea. [1, 2]
3. Institutional Readiness and Infrastructure
The U.S. Navy subsequently clarified that effectively operating advanced undersea capabilities requires a high level of long-term preparation. The U.S. views Japan's military infrastructure and defense shifts as ready to absorb this discussion, while signaling that South Korea still needs to define clear operational requirements, train specialized personnel, and build the necessary maintenance ecosystem before moving forward rapidly. [1]

This U.S. Navy pushback comes despite a broad agreement reached during a 2025 summit between President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, where initial political approval was given for South Korea to pursue an SSN program. The U.S. military command is now actively shaping the boundaries of how that agreement will look in practice. [1, 2, 3, 4]


Japan not ruling out Nuclear Subs after US offers positive view



Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has said that Japan is keeping all options on the table when it comes to discussions of Japan acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. | JIJI
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...Japan not ruling out nuclear subs, days after U.S. offers positive view

Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi on [

Sept 11, 2026] reiterated that Japan is not ruling out acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, days after a U.S. Navy official reportedly offered a positive assessment of the move.


“Regarding nuclear-powered submarines, we will proceed with our consideration of not ruling them out as an option,” Koizumi told a regular news conference. Tokyo is weighing acquiring such submarines in revisions to its three key security documents set to come by the year’s end.

Koizumi’s remarks came after an unidentified U.S. Navy official [at Pearl Harbor - see Trump (diplomatic as ever's) revenge on Japan], citing Tokyo’s expertise in nuclear energy technology, told Japanese and South Korean media this week that Tokyo should consider acquiring nuclear submarines.

Asked about how the vessels might fit into Japan’s security strategy, the defense chief noted the pros and cons, saying that while nuclear-powered submarines are capable of extended patrols and are said to have several times the speed of conventionally powered submarines, they are less quiet underwater, expensive and require specialized expertise for maintenance, repair and operation.

Japan currently operates a fleet of 23 diesel-electric attack submarines, but has long avoided the more expensive and politically fraught option of nuclear-powered vessels.

Calls for Tokyo to acquire nuclear boats gained steam after an expert panel recommended in September last year that Tokyo develop vessels with “next-generation” power sources and vertical launching systems for long-range missiles. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party-Japan Innovation Party bloc effectively codified this push in their October coalition agreement.

Although neither the expert panel nor the coalition deal directly mentioned nuclear-powered submarines, Koizumi and other Japanese officials have repeatedly refused to rule out any options when it comes to nuclear submarines, as Tokyo looks to boost its defense capabilities.

Koizumi added to the speculation in November, when he touched on South Korea’s deal with the U.S. to secure nuclear vessels, noting that “all the surrounding countries have nuclear submarines.”

In June, the JIP also reignited the debate when it submitted a proposal to the government that called for the swift introduction of nuclear-powered submarines, citing China’s constant naval expansion into the Pacific.

The Chinese Navy is moving toward an all-nuclear-powered submarine fleet, U.S. naval officials say, a monumental shift that will give ammunition to proponents of Japan developing its own nuclear subs.




US says South Korea doesn’t need a nuclear submarine if sub never leaves Korean area

South Korea's HANKYOREH on September 11, 2026 reported 

https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1277423.html

Seoul shouldn’t pursue nuclear submarine purely as ‘status symbol,’ says US Navy official

The official suggested South Korea needs to “find the right reason” to have a nuclear-powered submarine

A high-ranking US Navy official stressed that South Korea’s push to acquire nuclear-powered submarines must be backed by a clear strategic need to operate beyond the Korean Peninsula, rather than a desire for a mere “status symbol.”

The official also suggested that while the US’ recent scaling back of joint military exercises with South Korea does not necessarily weaken deterrence against North Korea, Pyongyang could misread those changes.

Speaking with the Hankyoreh and other foreign correspondents on Wednesday, the US Navy official said that Washington had indicated it was “happy to help” Korea acquire nuclear-powered submarines but noted that “you don’t need a nuclear submarine if you never leave the Korean area.”

“Korea’s got to find the right reason to have a nuclear submarine,” the official said. “We can’t tell you what that reason is.”

“If Korea is buying it because it’s a status symbol, then that’s the wrong reason,” the official added.

The remarks suggest that before committing the enormous sums required to field nuclear-powered submarines, Seoul should first articulate a strategic requirement, such as operations beyond the Korean Peninsula.

In a follow-up explanation after the briefing, the US Navy said the official’s point was that decisions to acquire military assets should be based on national security needs and actual operational use.

In the briefing, the Navy official referred to previous calls by US Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle for the Korean Navy to expand its operations beyond the region.

During a visit to Korea last November, Caudle said that using a Korean nuclear-powered submarine “to counter China” would be “a natural expectation.”

The latest remarks strongly suggest that the US Navy thinks Korea’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines should be tied not simply to deterring North Korea around the Korean Peninsula, but to an expanded role for the South Korean Navy across the Indo-Pacific, which would include deterring China.

Asked whether Russian assistance could strengthen North Korea’s submarine technology and capabilities, the official noted that “having submarines does not mean you know how to operate them.”

“The Russians helping North Koreans is concerning,” he said, while adding that “we haven’t seen anything yet that makes us worried.”

The official’s apparent point was that the ability to effectively operate submarines can be as important as their numerical strength or capabilities.

In a follow-up explanation after the briefing, the US Navy said the official was conveying that advanced underwater warfare capabilities require specialized training, maintenance, infrastructure and operational proficiency to be used effectively.

The official also commented on the temporary diversion of US aircraft carriers from the Pacific to the Middle East conflict by stressing that deterrence is about more than numbers alone.

In the same briefing, the official was asked about how recent reductions and adjustments to ROK-US joint military exercises might impact deterrence against North Korea. “I think that the ROK military can handle the North Koreans without any trouble,” he said, while arguing that changes in troop levels or military exercises do not necessarily downgrade military capability.

But the official noted that these changes “might have an impact” on what Kim Jong-un thinks, with the implicit warning that Pyongyang could read them as a sign of diminished US strength.

In regard to challenges faced by the US in its capacity “to build ships and to maintain them,” the official described Korean shipbuilders as “some of the best in the world” and stressed the need for cooperation.

A related question that came up is whether the Trump administration’s “Bridge Strategy” — under which two ships would first be built in Korea or another foreign country while the US works to expand its production capacity — would be too slow to build up the fleet.

“Late or never, right?” the official said.

“Going the way we were, we never would do it,” he said, suggesting that under the previous approach, production capacity might never be expanded.

By Kim Won-chul, Washington correspondent

September 8, 2026

Singapore Navy: New MRCVs, OPVs, 218SG subs & Landing Craft under construction


Republic of Singapore picture of third future MRCV (Vigilance) carried by Naval News September 3, 2026
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The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) has two major new vessel classes currently under construction: the Victory class Multi-Role Combat Vessels (MRCVs) and the unnamed class of Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs).

These vessels, along with Singapore's new, eventually 6 x Invincible-class/Type 218SG submarines, will sharply increase the tonnage and capability of Singapore's Navy. 

Multi-Role Combat Vessels (MRCVs)
Singapore's ST Engineering Marine is building 6 large 8,400 tonne Victory-class MRCVs to replace the 6 aging 600 tonne, confusingly also called "Victory-class" missile corvettes.
  • Current Status: The first MRCV (Victory) was launched in late 2025, the second ship (Valour) was launched on July 23, 2026, and the keel for the third ship (Vigilance) (see artwork above) was laid down on September 3, 2026. 
  • Delivery: Scheduled for progressive delivery starting in 2028 through 2030. 
  • Design & Capabilities: Displacing roughly 8,000 to 8,400 tonnes and measuring 150 meters long, these advanced warships function as "motherships" capable of operating unmanned aerial, surface, and underwater systems. They feature high automation requiring a crew of fewer than 100 sailors. 

Singapore navy launches first of six MRCVs. Reports Channel News Asia (CNA) on October 22, 2025.
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Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs)
Singapore is also procuring a class of four new OPVs, possibly based on the German 1,900 tonne Potsdam-class patrol boat, to succeed various smaller vessels including the 500 tonne Sentinel-class maritime security and response vessels (MRSVs).
  • Current Status: Designed by German firm Fassmer and built by Western Baltic Shipyard before final outfitting.
  • Delivery: Deliveries to the RSN are planned to begin progressively from 2028.
New Landing Craft Prototypes
In August 2026, Singapore awarded a contract to Penguin Shipyard International to build two new landing craft prototypes (with the Fast Craft Utility (FCU) with an 18 tonne load perhaps displacing 45 tonnes fully loaded?) to support ship-to-shore operations and evaluate evolving defense requirements. 


Singapore orders new landing craft prototypes for its navy. See photo and details at Asian Military Review, August 26, 2026.
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Article assisted by Google AI, September 8, 2026.