June 2, 2026

Updates on India's Upcoming K-5 SLBM

On 12 September 2025, India’s DRDO had carried out a static test-firing of the second-stage solid rocket motor of the K-5 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) at the Advanced Centre for Energetic Materials (ACEM), close to the City of Nashik, in central-western India. This information was revealed in the November 2025 issue of the DRDO’s Newsletter publication (a publicly-available document). The publication provides many interesting details about the K5-S2 (Project K5-Stage 2) motor, but the most interesting is obviously the diameter of this second-stage motor: 2.4 meters!


Official publication from the DRDO Newsletter (November 2025 issue, linked above) detailing the second-stage solid rocket motor of the K-5 SLBM
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This figure (which can be extrapolated as applying to the whole missile, not just the second stage) would make the K-5’s diameter comparable to the Soviet/Russian R-39 Rif, and bigger than the diameter of most contemporary intercontinental-range SLBMs like the American UGM-133 Trident 2-D5 (2.11m), Russia’s new RSM-56 Bulava (2.0m) which directly replaced the R-39 Rif, Chinese JL-2/3 (2.0m) and even the French M51 (2.3m). The K-5 also reportedly carries forward the K-4's overall vertical length of 12.0m, which is comparable or shorter than most of the contemporary SLBMs mentioned above.

It was originally believed that the K-5 might find application on the Arihant-class SSBNs (inclusive of the larger Arihant Stretch sub-class) as a longer-ranged replacement for their currently-carried K-4s. It was also believed that the K-6 (another next-generation SLBM also in development) might be exclusively for use onboard the upcoming S-5 class of SSBNs, the first two boats of which are reportedly in construction, as covered in my previous article. But now it appears both the K-5 and K-6 would be exclusively deployed only on the future S-5 class SSBNs, as it should be impossible for the vertical missile tubes on the Arihant/Arihant Stretch-class boats (designed to carry either a single K-4 SLBM of 1.3m diameter or up to 3 x smaller K-15 SLBMs of 0.74m diameter each) to carry these larger missiles. This is because the K-5 evidently represents nearly a DOUBLING of the missile body’s diameter over the K-4.

As I speculated earlier, the lack of a prominent ‘missile hump’ on what is assumed to be a newer iteration of the S-5 SSBN’s hydrodynamic model, as opposed to the earlier one which had a very pronounced hump, might have been an indication that the intended missile armament of these boats may have undergone a significant change in configuration over a period of time in the late 2010s or early 2020s. This change in configuration may have been a result of the DRDO’s efforts to develop SLBMs that are shorter in length, at the cost of being larger in diameter, while still being able to reach the same range with the same payload capacity as before.

Typically, increasing the length of the missile in order to increase the amount of solid fuel propellent it can carry is relatively easy & straightforward. But increasing the diameter to achieve that same goal (carrying more propellent) while maintaining the same or shorter vertical length is much more challenging, as it would involve the forging of larger & larger steel and/or carbon-composite casings, a complicated industrial process that requires the commissioning of new infrastructure. Additionally, it would also require significant advancement in chemical composition of the solid-fuel propellent itself.


A conceptual, indicative illustration of what was described as a 'future SLBM', shared by then-Chairman of the DRDO, Dr. V.K. Saraswat during a presentation to the engineering students of IIT-Bombay university in 2014. Sourced via Bharat Rakshak Forum.
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Is the emergence of what is believed to be the newer iteration of the S-5 SSBN, with a thoroughly 'streamlined' missile hump, an indication that DRDO has made sufficient advances in this field of missile propulsion & construction? Until we see the first real images of an actual S-5 hull, we can only speculate.

In other news, veteran journalist Sandeep Unnithan, who I often quote as a very reliable source in the field of India’s nuclear submarines & adjacent programs, has reported that a ‘pop-up’ test of the K-5 SLBM was conducted from a submersible pontoon in March 2026. A pop-up test is basically an exercise to certify the gas-ejection mechanism that would initially launch the SLBM from the submarine's missile tube to a safe distance underwater before the first-stage solid motor is ignited.

While the pop-up test of the gas ejector seen alongside static test-firings of the solid rocket stages is an indication of the brisk pace of development in the K-5 SLBM program, I would estimate that the first, full-fledged test launch of this next-generation SLBM (or at least the first publicized test) could occur at some point in 2027 or later. That first launch would have to be followed by a multi-year testing program that would involve multiple follow-up launches, all of which are likely to see the involvement of the Indian Navy's Missile Range Instrumentation Ships (MRIS) like the INS Dhruv (pictured below), in order to obtain accurate information regarding downrange telemetry & splash-down patterns of the MIRVed warheads. In tests that cover the full range-envelope of these SLBMs, missile Range Safety Officers (RSOs) deployed onboard such MRIS vessels would hold the decision-making power & communications capability to destroy missiles being tested in-flight, in the event those missiles were to wander significantly off course.


The 15,000-ton MRIS vessel INS Dhruv, equipped with multiple X-band & S-band AESA radars alongside other telemetry-tracking equipment. Photographed by a civilian, sourced via Twitter/X.
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While most quotable reportage of the K-5 SLBM gives it a 5,000-km range while carrying a sizeable 2-ton MIRVed nuclear payload, it remains to be seen whether that range figure is definitive or, as in the case of the land-based Agni-5, deliberately understated as being less than 5,500 kms (thereby escaping the definition of an ICBM) for political reasons. When all is said and done, this could add a layer of ambiguity regarding the reach of India’s definitive sea-based nuclear second-strike capability.

End of article.

6 comments: Posted by

May 31, 2026

No new Virginia(s) for Australia under AUKUS

PETE COMMENT

Long suspected by myself and other independent defence commentators - cracks are becoming severe in US promises of Virginias for Australia under AUKUS. 

And then there are the tame AUKUS boosters - who are ultimately paid by the US and Australian Government...

Just announced by Australian Defence Minister Marles (notably not in the Australian Parliament but under the PR protection of loose understandings in Singapore) is that there will be no new Virginias for Australia under AUKUS, 

This announcement may amount to delayed recognition of the, to date, Secret findings, of the US Department of War's Elbridge Colby AUKUS Virginias 2025 Review. In late 2025-early 2026 the Australian public were assured by the US and a grateful Australia/Marles that new AUKUS Virginias were bundled into a "full steam ahead" prospect. Clearly Marles refused, until now, to reveal that the US had reneged (refused to meet its 2021 promise) on delivering new Virginias. 

So the original September 15, 2021 hopes were that the US would deliver to Australia a used Virginia in (say) 2032, Then, the next two were more vague - maybe a used Virginia in 2035 and a new Virginia in 2038. 

Everything is vague - just the way Trump likes it. It is unknown whether there is an actual US to Australia Treaty on delivering the Virginias. What is more certain is that Australia is gifting the US up to A$5 Billion per year in the hope the US (led by Trump's record of clarity!) will keep largely unrecorded promises. Australia needs an energetic corps of investigative reporters and effective intelligence agencies to anticipate what Virginias (USS so-and-so) the US will be delivering and when. Unfortunately most of the Australian media, thinktanks and academics are trusting, pro-US, pro-Australian Government cheerleaders who can't get their heads around realpolitik.

Today it has been announced that the third, (say) 2038 Virginia will not be new, but used. Lets now call the Virginias V1Used, V2Used and V3Used.

The vague, vacuous, 2021 AUKUS promise also mentioned the possibility of two further new Virginias - perhaps in the 2040s. Lets call them V4New and V5New. But Marles does not mention any V4New or V5New. So it is possible the US has also reneged on V4 and V5 old OR new. 

My crystal ball gazing? Australia will not receive a recently built (say) Block VI Virginia commissioned in the late 2030s? This would have been more effective and better armed, potentially with multipurpose vertical payload tubes (say) for Prompt Strike hypersonic missiles.

The Virginias (if any) Australia receives in the 2030s are likely to be Block Ils, commissioned in 2013 or earlier, already used for 20+ years, in need of costly maintenance, while being restricted to 12 vertical tubes tailored for subsonic Tomahawk missiles only. An adversary, like China, with its dense anti-missile defences, might easily shoot down slow moving Tomahawks, by the time Australia is armed with them in the 2030s.

The US has found repair and maintenance of used Virginia's to be a lengthy, expensive and problematic process. So the prospect of V1Used, V2Used and V3Used holds much higher risks for Australia.

By 2031 the US President of the day may announce Australia will not get V1Used, V2Used or V3Used, as the US Navy (already suffering a severe SSN shortage) needs all Virginias for US defence it can get. 

-----------------------------

MARLES' ANNOUNCEMENT IN PRESS ARTICLE BELOW

Stephen Dziedzic in Singapore for Australia's Government owned ABC News, on May 31, 2026 reported at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-05-31/australia-to-buy-second-hand-united-states-submarines-aukus/106742496 :

"Australia to buy three second-hand United States submarines under AUKUS shake-up

By foreign affairs reporter Stephen Dziedzic in Singapore

Topic:

A crowd of people standing on a submarine.

Australia will now buy second-hand Virginia-class submarines. (Reuters: Brian Snyder)

In short:

Richard Marles says Australia will purchase second-hand Virginia-class submarines from the United States as part of an AUKUS shift.

Australia was expected to receive at least two used and one new Virginia-class submarine, but those plans have changed.

Mr Marles says there will be "significant" savings for Australia, although it will not make a huge difference to the overall cost of the program.

4 comments: Posted by

May 30, 2026

Rise of Iran related? Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI)

As IntelNews https://intelnews.org/ the better place for this comment, now seems temporarily or permanently inactive I publish this comment below, written June 1, 2026:

Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) looks like an interesting aspect of Iran's terror network.

See https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-06-01/australia-perfect-target-for-islamist-terror-network/106694730 

based heavily on  the research Guy Fiennes a "research analyst at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, (ISD)

ISD is an independent not-for-profit that aims to safeguard democracies against extremism. Fiennes describes HAYI as a "ghost proxy" directed by a "hostile state"."

See Google AI results  which include:

"The FBI and [other] international law enforcement agencies have actively dismantled elements of HAYI’s operational and propaganda network. In May [2026], the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood Al-Saadi, a dual Iranian-Iraqi national, for terrorism-related offenses tied to his activities as a senior operative and media coordinator for HAYI. Al-Saadi was arrested and extradited to New York, where federal authorities noted he was involved in nearly 20 attacks and was actively plotting to expand HAYI's operations to the United States. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

More on HAYI see US Department of Justice/FBI or review the detailed assessment of hybrid terror threats published by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)

BACKGROUND ON HAYI FROM WIKIPEDIA AS AT JUNE 1, 2026

Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia

Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia
حركة أصحاب اليمين الإسلامية
Foundation2024; 2 years ago
Dates of operationMarch 2026 – present
Allegiance Iran (IRGC) (alleged)
Ideology
Notable attacks2026 London antisemitic attacks
Opponents

Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (Arabic: حركة أصحاب اليمين الإسلامية, lit. 'Islamic Movement of the People of the Right Hand'), commonly known as Ashab al-Yamin or HAYI, is a pro-Iranian Islamist group that has taken credit for attacks against Jewish schools, synagogues and charities in Europe, as well as American, Israeli and Iranian opposition targets, since March 2026. The group's activities have primarily focused on attacks on London's Jewish community, with additional attacks across Europe. It is believed to be a front group for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who outsource the attacks to local criminals and use the group to create plausible deniability. The attacks have been investigated by counter-terrorism police, with 37[citation needed] arrests already made, and additional police resources dedicated to preventing and responding to attacks.

History and operations

HAYI's Telegram was established in 2024 but remained dormant, and had just 200 followers in March 2026[1][2]

It emerged more publicly in early March 2026, following US-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, after which Europol warned of elevated risk of attacks in Europe targeting Jewish and US-linked sites.[2] It became known through videos posted on the Telegram channels of Iran-allied militant groups. It claims to be a Khomeneist group, in that it embraces the beliefs of Ruhollah Khomeini, the first supreme leader of Iran. Its name refers to the depiction of Judgement Day in Islam, where the people of the right hand will go to Paradise. The group's logo, with a hand holding a rifle against a globe, invokes similar logos of Iran-backed Shia militias in Lebanon and Iraq.[3] The organization claims operations by distributing "proof-of-crime" videos via Telegram channels.[4][5]

Claimed activities

See also: 2026 London antisemitic attacks and 2026 Iranian diaspora protests § Violence towards diaspora protesters

HAYI has taken credit for attacks across Europe that have targeted Jewish schools, synagogues and charities, as well as American, Israeli and Iranian opposition establishments. The attacks have generally utilized arson, explosive devices and chemicals, with the incidents taking place at night and with buildings as targets. HAYI has claimed responsibility for some incidents, while other incidents were successfully foiled by authorities. These include the following:

  • On March 9, a makeshift bomb was used to target a synagogue in Liège, Belgium, causing material damage but no injuries.[6] Prime Minister Bart De Wever described it as "an attack on our values and our society", while Interior Minister Bernard Quintin called it a "despicable antisemitic act".[7]
  • On March 13, an arson attack targeted a synagogue in Rotterdam, Netherlands. Dutch police subsequently arrested five suspects, aged 17–19, from Tilburg, whom prosecutors alleged acted with "terrorist intent".[8][9] Justice Minister David van Weel said the possibility that Iran was involved in the attack was being investigated.[9]
  • On March 14, an bomb exploded outside a Jewish school in Amsterdam, Netherlands.[6] Prime Minister Rob Jetten called the incidents "shocking and unacceptable", adding that "these cowardly acts have an impact on the entire Jewish community in the Netherlands".[10]
  • On March 15, an improvised explosive device was detonated at the Atrium office complex in Amsterdam’s Zuidas business district. The explosion targeted a branch of the Bank of New York Mellon, resulting in property damage but no fatalities.[4][11]
  • On March 23, four ambulances belonging to the Jewish charity Hatzola were destroyed by arson in Golders Green, London. CCTV footage of the incident captured three hooded individuals pouring an accelerant onto the vehicles, which led to the explosion of onboard oxygen cylinders.[12][13][14] Four people—Hamza Iqbal, 20, Rehan Khan, 19, Judex Atshatshi, 18, and an unnamed 17-year-old male—were charged with arson with intent to damage property and being reckless as to whether life would be endangered.[15]
  • On March 24, a car was set on fire in Antwerp's Jewish quarter in what Belgian authorities suspected was an antisemitic attack. Two underaged individuals were arrested in connection with the incident.[16][17][18]
  • On March 28, the French police foiled a bomb plot against a Bank of America office in Paris, France, as one suspect was attempting to light the explosive device. Four people were arrested, with the National Terrorism Prosecution Office [fr] saying it planned to charge them with criminal conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, as well as manufacturing an explosive device in connection with a terrorist enterprise.[19]
  • HAYI claimed responsibility for an attack on a synagogue in Skopje, Macedonia, on 12 April, saying it was because it was a “symbol of the historical and cultural identity of Jews of this region” and had a “deep connection with the Zionist regime.”[20][21] Security services made two arrests at the end of the month and linked it to Islamic State. [22] In May, the US Justice Department alleged that an Iraqi national they had in custody, Mohammad Al-Saadi, posted a video four days after the attack showing the site of the attack with a red target symbol and surveillance footage of the synagogue on fire, with the logo of Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya in the upper right corner of the images. [23][24]
  • On April 15, the London Metropolitan Police opened investigations into two more London incidents claimed by HAYI: an attempted arson outside a Persian-language media organization in Park Royal and a petrol bomb attack on Finchley Reform Synagogue, with arrests the following day.[2][25]
  • On April 17, HAYI claimed it was planning an attack on the Israeli Embassy in London using "dangerous substances". Discarded items—including two jars containing a powdered substance—were discovered in Kensington Gardens near the embassy building, but no attack took place and no injuries or damage were reported.[26] The items were found to not contain any harmful or hazardous substances.[27] A 39-year-old man was arrested under the Terrorism Act for the incident.[28]
  • On April 17, a bag containing bottles of fluid was lit in the doorway of a building in Hendon, London formerly occupied by the charity Jewish Futures. The bottles failed to fully ignite and only caused minor scorch marks.[29]
  • On April 19, a bottle containing an accelerant was thrown through the window of Kenton United Synagogue, London, causing damage to the synagogue's medical room. Overnight, a 17-year-old boy and 19-year-old man were arrested for the attack.[30]
  • On April 29, 2 Jewish people—one in his 70s and one in his 30s—were stabbed and injured on Golders Green Road by a British national from Somalia.[31][32] Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia claimed responsibility for the attack an hour after it happened, putting out footage of the attack 40 munites later, but investigators said the claim was likely opportunistic.[33][1][34] Tech Against Terrorism said that if the claim was genuine, it would signal "significant escalation”: “By claiming an incident involving physical casualties, HAYI is signalling willingness to associate its brand with direct violence, even if the group did not direct, enable, or have prior knowledge of the attack.”[1]

Organization and structure

Western security services[2] believe HAI may be a front group for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who outsource attacks to local 'thugs-for-hire' and use the group to create plausible deniability. In that regard, HAYI can be seen as an astroturfed brand rather than a grassroots organization.[3][35] According to the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), four channels—"two linked to Iraqi militias including Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which maintains ties to the IRGC's Quds Force, and two pro-Iranian content aggregators with links to sanctioned pro-Russian networks"—anchor every dissemination cycle.[2] The establishment of HAYI sits within a larger pattern of Iranian state-sponsored terrorism and hybrid warfare.[3]

The individuals who carried out the attacks are described as potentially amateurs, disaffected teenagers and petty criminals, who have been recruited to conduct the acts for small fees.[3][35][36] Arrests in London have largely been of minors, and in France have been three minors and one adult, all recruited via social media.[2] A researcher at the ICCT said "There is a controller, a multilayered system, a cell leader who is supposed to carry something out but is being guided. He is on the phone with someone—we still don't know who—and receives materials almost ready for the attack".[2] Despite the possibility that some of these perpatrators may not be acting based on the ideology of the IRGC, they still face severe prosecution under the National Security Act, according to terrorism expert Roger Macmillan.[37]

The Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism noted that the group's name shares nomenclature with an Iraqi militia previously designated as a terrorist organization by the United States. Israeli officials suggested that the timing of the group's activation may be linked to reports of the death of a high-ranking pro-Iranian militia leader in Iraq, raising the possibility that the European attacks were intended as retaliation.[11][38]

Authenticity

Analysis by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) and Tech Against Terrorism suggested that HAYI may be an "astroturfed" brand rather than an organic grassroots cell.[5][39] According to the ICCT, the group's primary Telegram account was created in 2023 but remained dormant until the 2026 attacks, with claim videos often appearing there only after being disseminated by pro-Iranian channels. A second account, created on March 21, 2021, published a claim for the London attack before other channels, though it contained inconsistencies such as a misspelled Arabic name likely resulting from an incorrect English translation.[5]

Experts have highlighted several "unsophisticated" errors that deviate from standard Islamist rhetoric. The group's Arabic logo misspells the word "Islamic" (al-Islamia), and its imagery features a Soviet SVD Dragunov sniper rifle instead of the AK-47 motifs standard among Iran-backed proxies.[5][36][2]

In a series of messages with CBS News, the administrator of the HAYI Telegram channel, writing in American-inflected English, justified the attacks using Christian and Jewish philosophical references while omitting the Islamic nasheeds (chants) and theology typical of jihadist media. Analysts also noted a total absence of Persian in the group's communications, despite its alleged alignment with Tehran. Shortly after being questioned by journalists about the group's structure and funding, the Telegram administrator deleted their account.[35]

According to The Wall Street Journal, European authorities suspect that HAYI is a fictitious group created by Iran to take credit for attacks orchestrated by Iranian intelligence, giving them plausible deniability and confusing investigators.[40] Security sources speaking to The Guardian cautioned against a "rush to tie Iran" to the incidents, leaving open the possibility of localized attacks with no link to any organized group.[41] No definitive tie to Iran has been established, and analysts suggest the group carries "hints of amateurism" that argue against direct execution by professional Iranian intelligence operatives.[36] Dutch Justice Minister David van Weel stated that the teenagers arrested in Rotterdam were "most likely recruited", supporting the theory that an actor may be outsourcing sabotage to local criminals or "disaffected teenagers" to maintain "operational ambiguity".[5][8]

Investigation and response

In the United Kingdom, by 27 April a total of 26 individuals had been arrested in the UK for planning and conducting a series of attacks, most linked to HAYI.[42] In response to the attacks, police resources were significantly stepped up in northwest London: additional uniformed and plainclothed officers have been placed in areas with Jewish populations, and extra stop and search powers have been introduced in Barnet. Additionally, armed response vehicles and Counter Terrorism Policing resources have been deployed to the area to support the increased local policing plan.[43]

On 15 May, the US justice department charged Iraq national Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood al-Saadi for his involvement in several of the incidents, tied to his alleged role as an operative for the Iran-backed Iraqi paramilitary group Kata'ib Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). They linked him to 18 European attacks (particularly the 15 March Amsterdam incident and the 12 April Skopje attack) and two in Canada, as well as planned incidents targeting synagogues in the US.[24][23]

Reactions

  •  Israel: Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli stated that the group represents a "new face" of Iranian efforts to export terrorism to European soil and called for increased security cooperation.[38][11]
  •  Netherlands: Justice Minister David van Weel confirmed an Iranian link is being "explicitly investigated," but noted that no conclusive connection has yet been proven.[8]
  •  United Kingdom: Prime Minister Keir Starmer and the Metropolitan Police characterized the 23 March London arson as a "shocking antisemitic hate crime."[12][14] On 5 May, after the knife attack, he called for a “whole of society” approach to antisemitism, and noted that one of the lines of inquiry was "whether a foreign state has been behind some of these incidents": "Our message to Iran, or to any other country that might seek to foment violence, hatred or division in society, is that it will not be tolerated."[44]

References

  1.  Sabbagh, Dan (29 April 2026). "Golders Green attack claim highlights rise of shadowy Iran-linked group". The Guardian. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
  2.  Kesmer, Meliha (17 April 2026). "What Is HAYI, The Shadowy Islamist Group Claiming Attacks Across Europe?". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
  3.  Dayan, Linda (26 March 2026). "The Mysterious Iran-linked Terror Group Attacking Jewish Targets in Europe". Haaretz. Retrieved 20 April 2026.
  4.  Heller, M. (16 March 2026). "Explosion near Amsterdam WTC linked to emerging group Ashab al-Yamin". The Jerusalem Post.
  5.  "Hybrid Threat Signals: Assessing Possible Iranian Involvement in Recent Attacks in Europe". International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - ICCT. Retrieved 24 March 2026.
  6.  "Dutch authorities seek 2 suspects in an explosion outside an Amsterdam Jewish school". AP News. 14 March 2026. Retrieved 20 March 2026.
  7.  "Blast outside Belgium synagogue was 'antisemitic act', mayor says". BBC News. 9 March 2026. Retrieved 20 April 2026.
  8.  "Dutch police apprehend fifth suspect for Rotterdam synagogue arson". Reuters. 19 March 2026. Retrieved 20 April 2024.
  9.  Moses, Claire (17 March 2026). "Antisemitic Attacks Bring Deeper Unease to Dutch Jews". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 20 April 2026.
  10.  "Israel warns of possibility of attacks after Amsterdam explosion targeting bank". NL Times. 16 March 2026.
  11.  "UK police probe attack on Jewish ambulances". France 24. 23 March 2026. Retrieved 24 March 2026.
  12.  Crowe, David (23 March 2026). "Iranian terror group claims arson attack on Jewish ambulances in London". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 24 March 2026.
  13.  "London police investigate attack on Jewish ambulances as hate crime". South China Morning Post. 23 March 2026. Retrieved 24 March 2026.
  14.  Lavelle, Daniel (18 April 2026). "Fourth suspect in London arson attack on Jewish ambulances remanded in custody". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 21 April 2026.
  15.  "Two minors arrested in connection with suspected antisemitic arson in Antwerp". Reuters. Retrieved 30 March 2026.
  16.  "Terror probe over car-burning in Antwerp Jewish quarter". RTÉ News. Retrieved 30 March 2026.
  17.  Dylan (24 March 2026). "Car deliberately set on fire in Antwerp's Jewish district". European Jewish Congress. Retrieved 30 March 2026.
  18.  Landler, Mark; Paris, Lizzie DeardenMark Landler reported from; London, Lizzie Dearden from (1 April 2026). "French Prosecutors Link Foiled Attack on American Bank to a Pro-Iranian Group". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 21 April 2026.
  19.  Starr, Michael (20 April 2026). "Ashab al-Yamin claimed responsibility fort Skopje, Munich attacks on Jewish sites". The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 21 May 2026.
  20.  Shapiro, Jamie (13 April 2026). "European Jewish leaders 'deeply disturbed' by Passover arson attack on North Macedonia's only synagogue". The Jewish Chronicle. Retrieved 21 May 2026.
  21.  Blackburn, Gavin (1 May 2026). "Arson attack at North Macedonia synagogue linked to IS". euronews. Retrieved 21 May 2026.
  22.  "Iraqi National Arrested and Charged with Providing Material Support to Iranian-Backed Terrorist Organizations and Directing Attacks Targeting U.S. Citizens and Interests". United States Department of Justice. 15 May 2026. Retrieved 21 May 2026.
  23.  Yang, Maya; Burke, Jason (16 May 2026). "US charges man with plotting Iran-directed attacks on Jews in London and New York". The Guardian. Retrieved 16 May 2026.
  24.  Clarke, Amy; Manning, Lucy (16 April 2026). "Police probe Islamist group's arson north London attack claims". BBC News. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
  25.  "Police investigating after 'discarded items' found near Israeli embassy in central London". ITV News. 17 April 2026. Retrieved 20 April 2026.
  26.  Badshah, Nadeem (18 April 2026). "Kensington Gardens reopens after police deem suspicious items non-hazardous". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 21 April 2026.
  27.  "Seven arrests after planned arson on Jewish community in London". BBC News. 21 April 2026. Retrieved 21 April 2026.
  28.  Brown, Kat (19 April 2026). "Six things to know after arson attacks on Jewish synagogues". The i Paper. Retrieved 20 April 2026.
  29.  "Two arrested over Kenton synagogue arson attack". BBC News. 20 April 2026. Retrieved 20 April 2026.
  30.  "Antisemitism 'a national security emergency', says government terror adviser after Golders Green attack".
  31.  "Golders Green latest: Terror attack suspect is British national born in Somalia".
  32.  Tait, Albert (29 April 2026). "Golders Green terror suspect 'had history of violence'". The Telegraph. Retrieved 29 April 2026.
  33.  Dathan, Matt (29 April 2026). "Who are Ashab al-Yamin, the group claiming the Golders Green attack?". The Times and The Sunday Times. Retrieved 5 May 2026.
  34.  Stocker, Joanne; Ott, Haley (25 March 2026). "Group claiming Europe antisemitic attacks tells CBS News it will target "U.S. and Israeli interests worldwide"". CBS News. Retrieved 28 March 2026.
  35.  Nerozzi, Timothy (24 March 2026). "The emerging terrorist group claiming attacks across Europe". Washington Examiner. Retrieved 28 March 2026.
  36.  Farrell, Jason (21 April 2026). "Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI): Terror by text?". Sky News. Retrieved 21 April 2026.
  37.  Eichner, I. (16 March 2026). "Israel identifies terror group behind recent wave of attacks on Jewish sites in Europe". Ynet News.
  38.  Lanchès, Julian (23 March 2026). "Hybrid Threat Signals: Assessing Possible Iranian Involvement in Recent Attacks in Europe". International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - ICCT. Retrieved 28 March 2026.
  39.  Pancevski, Bojan; Colchester, Max (25 March 2026). "Iran Suspected of Directing Attacks in Europe, Creating Bogus Group to Claim Responsibility". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 25 March 2026.
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  41.  "Man arrested over attacks on Jewish community in London". BBC News. 27 April 2026. Retrieved 27 April 2026.
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