Early Singapore Involvement: Australia's "We Will Build an ICBM" Threat Yielded AUKUS Pillar 1

Singapore and Gilmore Space Technologies

Adam Gilmour (above) CEO, Co-Founder of Gilmour Space Technologies with ERIS Block 1, Australia's dual-use capable rocket. ERIS has the classic ICBM size and shape (eg. like a Minuteman III) especially in tonnage at launch. The shape also includes ERIS not having strap-on boosters that would impede each Eris  being placed in ICBM silos. (Photo Gilmour Space via Byron Bay's The Echo, March 1, 2024).

See SubMatt's holdings on Gilmour Space.

Historical Backgound on Singaporean Involvement

Adam Gilmour lived in Singapore for many years and initially established a presence there alongside Australia in 2012. [1, 2, 3]

Early Support: The company received an early non-equity government grant from Singapore’s National Additive Manufacturing Innovation Cluster (NAMIC) for 3D-printed rocket fuel research. [1]

See Forbes' article of October 27, 2017 "Why an Australian Space Entrepreneur Chose Tiny Singapore to Build a Rocket Factory"
[As at 2017 - Adam Gilmour an Australian entrepreneur has chosen Singapore as his base to build his own space startup and carve out a niche of his own...[Adam Gilmour's] rocket factory was located near Changi airport in Singapore,...he [Gilmour] ran an open-plan facility buzzing with activity and packed with futuristic-looking prototypes...his engineers were busy testing a new 3-D printer, which makes rocket fuel in record time. ...“We are working on low-cost small satellite launch vehicles to take satellites with masses up to 400 kilogram to orbit. This capability is matched by few other providers in the industry and we plan to be the cheapest in the market” he explained.]

Relocation: Operations and R&D moved entirely to Australia, with its headquarters and manufacturing based on the Gold Coast, Queensland. [1, 2] [2017–Present: While core manufacturing and R&D shifted firmly to Queensland, Australia (with headquarters in Yatala/Gold Coast) the company maintained strategic technological collaborations and R&D links in Singapore before Gilmour Space fully scaled as an Australian sovereign launch provider.]

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Australia has since the 2000s been revisiting nuclear weapon options. The dual use Eris 1 rocket at 23m tall and total 34 tonnes mass at liftoff is more than coincidently the size of a US Minuteman III ICBM at 18.3m and total 36 tonnes.

Australian Threat

By 2022 an Australian (Aus) bargaining threat to the US was established. Unless the US and/or UK made SSNs available to Aus, Aus could build thermonuclear warheads affixed to "Gilmour" ICBMs. China being the usual potential target. 

The US (the aging Biden regime, at least) reacted with AUKUS Pillar 1. The UK (SSN owning junior partner) wanted (or was persuaded) to join this deal. This is, in part, because UK nuclear powered submarine tech and Trident II missile availability to the UK heavily relies on the US.

SILEX makes Australia HEU Capable

The primary stage for an Australian thermonuclear weapon is a fission bomb which Australia could produce using the SILEX process yielding 95% HEU. This would be the trigger for a "secondary" Deuterium–TRITIUM fusion bomb.

Deuterium is extracted by separating heavy water (D₂O) from ordinary water and then isolating the deuterium gas. This is all within Australian scientific-industrial capabilities. Deuterium–TRITIUM fusion (D-T fusion) is a type of nuclear fusion in which one deuterium (2H) nucleus (deuteron) fuses with one tritium (3H) nucleus (triton) giving one helium-4 nucleus.

As a dual-use cover Australia could build CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors to generate large amounts of electricity (for Aus large cities). This is while simultaneously producing TRITIUM through neutron capture in CANDU reactor's  heavy-water moderator and coolant.

A major problem is the US has called Australia's nuclear bomb blackmail bluff with promised SSNs only likely to emerge mid 2040s onwards. So the US remains Australia's extended deterrence nuclear guardian. But could the likes of a Trump, Hegseth or their America First successors ever be trusted to sacrifice San Francisco to protect Sydney from "Shanghai-Beijing's" nuclear capability?

Fortunately/Unfortunately? Australia, having spent $Billions in up front deposits to the US and UK submarine industrial bases, has lost its SSN bargaining power. 

This is indicated by Australia's Defence Industry Minister, Pat Conroy's only passing threat in July 2026 where he stated the Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) rotation of US submarines through HMAS Stirling in Western Australia would conclude in 2032 unless what? Delivery of the first US SSN to the RAN in 2032 was implicit. This has led to delayed SSN transfer to Australia. This may be forcing Australia to return to nuclear weapon intentions.

Why India wants German submarines

Here and above is a great Deutsche Welle (DW) News video Uploaded 16 Jun 2026 with the commentary: 

India plans an $8Billion submarine deal with Germany for six German-designed Type 214 diesel-electric with PEM AIP submarines under Project‑75(I for India). They are to be built in India. This video examines the geopolitical stakes—rising tensions with China and Pakistan, India’s push for self-reliance, and Germany’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific. It’s more than weapons—it's about power, technology transfer, and new security ties.

A DW Update: Dear users, we owe you an apology: at 5:29 in this video we showed an incorrect graph. Sorry for the mistake! According to SIPRI estimates for 2025, defense spending is: China $336 billion, India $92.1 billion, and Pakistan $11.9 billion. See https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/f...

Click on the following to take you straight to those issues: 00:00 Invisible power: how submarines shape global geopolitics 00:21 India's $8 billion submarine deal with Germany explained 01:04 India vs China vs Pakistan: the Indo-Pacific naval arms race 02:33 What makes the Type 214 submarine a game-changer 03:19 Inside Germany's AIP technology: stealth under the sea 04:23 How a small Swedish sub "sank" a US aircraft carrier 05:28 China's navy dominance and the Pakistan submarine alliance 07:40 India's shift away from Russian weapons: a new era? 10:31 Why Germany is sharing its most guarded submarine tech 11:14 Berlin's Indo-Pacific strategy: countering China through India 14:37 Risks ahead: self-reliance, deterrence and the cost of an arms race

UK Carrier jokes: Can't even attract local escorts! No Astute thinking.

BAE is a virtual monopoly in Britain building the aircraft carriers (above) and all the submarines ie. the final Astute, SSBN-Dreadnoughts and SSN-AUKUS. 
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The lucid commentary in the video above, of BAE dealing with average 18 month-serving politicians, low profile admirals and officials, is a sad tale that applied to Britain's largest carriers ever. These 2 Queen Elizabeth-class carriers have less capability, based on poor planning and 3rd rate program management. 

The extravagant size of the carriers sucked in money, shipbuilding and ultimately crew resources at the expense of building enough smaller vessels for other UK RN roles, including escorts. Britain's 2 much smaller Audacious-class carriers built 75 years ago, could each actually deploy around 45 aircraft, rather than just plan on paper Elizabeth style. The 2 Audacious' aircraft averaged the same F-4 Phantom jet size as the F-35Bs the Elizabeth class are restricted to.  

Britain:

-  has too few crew, too little money and airwings too small to operate the 2 carriers simultaneously

-  ie. usually has too few F-35Bs to serve on even one of the 2 carriers. Frequently US Marine Corps F-35Bs are required to make up the numbers on these 2 Brit carriers.

-  finds the carriers break down too often

-  Britain's decision to only have the ski-jump/vertical takeoff F-35Bs means the F-35Bs have low fuel/range, low weapons' load with F-35Bs being the Only fixed wing types

-  in contrast US and French CATOBAR carriers (the French carrier being far smaller than Brit carriers) can operate more aircraft, with more fuel, range and weapons and can also operate fixed wing ASW aircraft, unlike Brit carriers (restricted to short range, short loiter ASW helicopters).

-  Brits can only afford/crew 2 British destroyer or frigate escorts per carrier group

-  hence must rely on 2 or 3 foreign escorts to make up the numbers in a carrier group

-  frequently finds all Britain's Astute SSNs are under medium-longish term unscheduled repair

 
-  hence a British carrier group must rely on an essential US or French navy SSN to defend the group 

The list goes on of British missteps and poor decisions as documented in the video above.

Britain (BAE) had severe problems building the Astutes on time and on budget with ongoing reactor piping defects that render most, sometimes all of Britain's Astute SSN force in mid to lengthy term unscheduled docking. Britain also needs its small and problematic submarine building workforce to truly begin and complete its huge Dreadnought-class SSBN program. In the early 2000s Britain relied on US companies to resolve Britain's Astute problems. But this time those US companies have their own severe problems building US Columbia-class SSBNs and of course Virginia repair problems. See the US's own chronic availability shortfalls.

Should Australia buy (or build under British/BAE management) inevitably evolved Astutes class SSNs (called SSN-AUKUS) from a Britain that has planned and built its SSNs and carriers so poorly over the last 2 decades?

USN said it needs 66 SSNs: Today only 32 SSNs fully operational/available

I AI Googled "how many SSNs does the USN say it needs and when did it say it" which yielded on August 18, 2026:

The US Navy stated it needs 66 SSNs, a requirement formally established in its 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) released in December 2016. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

Context and Shortfalls

The Goal: The 2016 assessment upgraded the Navy's overall fleet target to 355 ships, which explicitly codified the requirement for 66 attack submarines to counter rising global threats from near-peer adversaries like China and Russia. [1, 2]
Current Reality: The active SSN fleet sits at roughly 49 to 53 fast-attack submarines, falling well short of the long-stated target. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Projected Trough: Due to aging Los Angeles-class boats retiring faster than new Virginia-class submarines can be built, the active SSN inventory is projected to dip to a low of around 46 or 47 boats by 2030 before slowly recovering over subsequent decades. [1, 2, 3, 4]

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I AI Googled "how many US SSN submarines are operational and of these how many being repaired" which yielded on August 18, 2026:

"The US Navy maintains an active total inventory of 49 to 50 SSNs, but a severe shipyard maintenance backlog significantly impacts their availability: [1, 2, 3]

• Operational (Available for Duty): Approximately 31 to 32 submarines are fully operational or available for training and deployment.
Undergoing or Awaiting Repair: Approximately 18 submarines (roughly 37% to 40% of the entire SSN fleet) are currently inactive, undergoing maintenance, or sidelined waiting for dry dock space in overcapacity shipyards. [1, 2, 3, 4]

Fleet Breakdown by Class

The total U.S. attack submarine force consists of three active classes: [1, 2]

Virginia-class: 26 operational/active hulls
Los Angeles-class: Approximately 21 hulls (following recent drawdowns and retirements like the USS San Juan in mid-2026)
Seawolf-class: 3 hulls [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

The Maintenance Backlog Crisis

The U.S. Navy's official readiness target is to have no more than 20% of its fast-attack force sidelined for maintenance at any given time. However, compounding factors have doubled that target rate. Workforce shortages, supply chain delays, and the prioritizing of high-priority ballistic-missile submarine programs (Columbia-class) have left many SSN units stuck in long-term maintenance overruns or sitting completely idle. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]

Pete Comment

This has clear negative consequences for Australia's hope the US would deliver 3 Virginias to Australia in the 2030s under AUKUS Pillar 1.

Under the AUKUS agreement, the U.S. president [of the day, probably in 2031] must formally certify that transferring nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to Australia will not degrade U.S. undersea capabilities or violate sufficiency requirements. [1, 2]

Germany's Evolving Covert Action Response to Russia: Policy Preparations

This concerns IntelNews article: Germany set to enact most sweeping intelligence reforms since World War II of August 13, 2026 by Joseph Fitsanakis at https://intelnews.org/2026/08/13/01-3449/

My comments are:

"After WW2 West Germany undertook painful soul searching driven by guilt about the activities and memory of the Abwehr (military-foreign intelligence) and more particularly the Gestapo and SS security services during the years of Nazi Germany.

The caused a "soft security" revisional response for decades after WW2. Some felt the intelligence and security services of West Germany and re-unified Germany (1990 on) were too defensive, toothless and publicly transparent - all reducing their operational performance. (East Germany's KGB run Stasi was clearly hard-line different).

The revised approaches outlined in the above article can be seen as redressing the "wokeness" (useful word in this context) of the post WW2 West German approaches.

Also the rising challenge of Putin's Russia (and possibly Belarus) would be driving "free" European counter-measures styled on the CIA's/US Special Forces' long established approaches - see this 6 month old video explainer at https://youtu.be/DqyhyQnL3EE?si=TscZh63xfwPwJs_G

Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The fighting has caused hundreds of thousands of military casualties and tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilian casualties. 

Russia would see its increasingly aggressive hybrid warfare against free Europe as just - this is given some countries aid Ukraine. Ukraine's large drones (long range slow missiles) are doing increasing damage. This is to Russia's energy infrastructure and weapons eg. $Billion aircraft on the ground and to Russian civilian areas, including Moscow.

France's 1st Nuclear Subs were SSBNs to hit Moscow, India & South Korea also SSBNs 1st

Uploaded May 2, 2026 - How France Built Its First Nuclear sub with little US help (except US HEU to fuel a land-based prototype of a nuclear submarine reactor in France). While the US and Soviets dominated the seas, French engineers quietly created the major arm (SSBNs) of then called Force de Frappe. ---

Generally nuclear submarine powers evolve their force from first sub - a prototype - then SSNs then SSBNs or visa versa. Only the US and Soviet Union had the money to build prototypes, SSNs AND SSBNs simultaneously. SSBNs are strategic deterrents.

Australia's SSN-AUKUSs will defend friendly SSBNs (like those of the US, India and eventually South Korea and Japan) and destroy enemy SSNs and SSBNs (like those of China, Russia and North Korea).

Both France and India built SSBNs first. Part of this is because their Bastion range (protected by surface ships and mainly maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs)) can be/were short. 

French Redoubtable-class SSBNs and see here and here (in the 1970s to early 2000s) needed to operate close to shore (mainly Bay of Biscay and later some northern European waters). This enabled them to put their relatively short range SLBMs (M1s/M2s/M20s and M4s (see below)) missiles with ranges of 2,500km to 5,000km to hit Moscow and some military-industrial Soviet/Russian/other Warsaw Pact targets including Kyiv (in Soviet Ukraine up to 1991).

"Due to the duration of the [Redoubtable-class] between 1971 and 1986, the main armament, sixteen SLBMs, varied in time, from the M1 to the M4. The M1 was a 1st generation SLBM, and was short-ranged, obliging these subs to patrol along the Norwegian coast or gulf of Genoa. The M1 was retired from service in 1975, replaced by the M2 until 1978, then the M20 with MIRVs, whereas the M4 with a new 6-MIRV warheads entered service in 1985 on FS Inflexible."

Staying close to home in the Bay of Biscay allowed the French Navy to easily protect and maintain constant communication with the SSBNs via the Île Longue nuclear submarine base near Brest.

India

Similarly Indian Arihant-class SSBNs were/are built to operate in the Bay of Bengal, protected by Indian MPAs, to put their K4 SLBMs in range of all Chinese targets up to and including Beijing. India's future SSNs may be in construction for 20 years (until the 2040s) before they are operational to defend the longer range missile SLBM S5 SSBNs.  

South Korea (SK)

SK is the only country in the world with SSBs (KSS-III Batch 1s and 2s) large enough to carry full size SLBMs. I conclude SK's first nuclear powered sub will be a prototype/testbed to acquire US nuclear sub technology. SK will then build "SSGNs" (de facto SSBNs) capable of carrying SLBMs in range of North Korean targets. These SLBMs will be notionally conventional warhead but quickly convertible to nuclear warheads.