November 17, 2026

Dr Keating's & Jon Stanford's Brilliant Submission to AUKUS Inquiry

Anonymous at 11/15/2026 10:27 AM has drawn my attention to a brilliant essay/submission (below) to the public 2026 AUKUS inquiry. 

This is Submission 158 at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sOClmL-PYBjFM61xeZgNW_Sf54S-Nfsf/view by Dr Michael Keating (a former Secretary of the Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Finance and Employment, and Industrial Relations. Now 86, he is or was (?) a visiting fellow at the Australian National University, Canberra) and Jon Stanford (formerly a Division head in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, a Partner in Deloitte Economics and a founding Director of Insight Economics).

Submission 158 deals with the flawed former Australian Prime Minister Morrison thinking behind AUKUS, former UK PM Boris Johnson’s lies about Astute class SSNs being available, and that French President Macron did offer Suffren SSNs at an attractive price to Australian PM Albanese in 2022. 

Unfortunately the hyperlinks in 158 did not work in any online copy Pete could find. Hence Pete relied on AI location to find equivalents.

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Pete Comment

158's comments about the defects in US and UK AUKUS SSN availability confirms many things I have been saying at SubMatts over the past 4 years. I would say the RAN won’t be getting SSNs from the US (exported Virginias) or UK (made in Australia) until the 2050s, if at all. 

All will depend on the spectacle of occasional short mainly PR visits of rotation force SSNs to Fleet Base West, WA - something that has already been happening for more than 20 years -  between longer US SSN visits to US bases (eg. Guam and Diego Garcia). 

Meanwhile UK RN SSNs will visit Australia rarely and briefly in the context of poor Astute-class availability. For example HMS Anson's quick 2026 visit to Australia before she was called away to the higher priority Middle East.  

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AI Summary of 158:

In their joint submission titled "A National Security Strategy for Australia," former Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet secretary Dr Michael Keating, AC, and former senior defence public servant Jon Stanford urge the Australian Government to abandon the AUKUS submarine deal and adopt a sovereign, balanced national security posture. [1, 2, 3]
Presented to the independent, crowdfunded AUKUS Public Inquiry at its final Canberra hearing on 3 September 2026, the submission argues that AUKUS locks Australia into a US strategy of containing China while eroding Australian sovereignty, increasing nuclear risks, and delivering an unaffordable, delayed submarine capability. [1, 2, 3]

Core Strategic Critiques
Keating and Stanford contend that Australia lacks a coherent, publicly debated National Security Strategy (having not updated its formal strategy since 2013), resulting in several critical vulnerabilities: [1]
  • Abandonment of Balanced Diplomacy. The authors argue that AUKUS replaces a balanced diplomatic approach between the US and China with an aggressive policy of integrated deterrence aimed at preserving US regional primacy and containing China within the first island chain. [1, 2, 3]
  • Erosion of Australian Sovereignty. They warn that Australia has surrendered substantial operational control through expanding US force posture agreements, rotational deployments at HMAS Stirling under a US commodore, and future integration of Royal Australian Navy (RAN) submarines into US-led operations. Unlike allies such as Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, Australia lacks legislative requirements forcing the US to obtain host-government approval before launching offensive operations from Australian territory. [1, 2]
  • Heightened Target Risk Without a Guarantee. By hosting US rotational nuclear-capable forces and integrating into US containment strategy, Australia becomes a prime target—potentially for nuclear strikes—in any US–China conflict over Taiwan, despite the ANZUS Treaty providing no automatic guarantee of US military defence. [1, 2, 3]
  • Capability Gaps and Force Availability. Acquiring only eight AUKUS submarines means that due to maintenance cycles, only two boats would typically be available for deployment at any given time. Combined with industrial bottlenecks, the current pathway risks a five-year capability gap. [1, 2]

Financial & Nuclear Waste Costings
Jon Stanford presented updated 31-year whole-of-life cost modelling comparing AUKUS Pillar One against alternative nuclear-powered submarine acquisitions: [1]
Metric / Program ElementAUKUS Optimal Pathway (8 Submarines)Alternative Proposal (12 French/Korean SSNs)
Base 31-Year Cost Estimate$260 billion (rising to $368 billion after Defence's 50% contingency)$180 billion
Fleet Size & Availability8 boats (~2 deployable at once)12 smaller boats (higher continuous deployment)
Reactor Fuel TypeWeapons-grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU)
End-of-Life & Waste CostsExcluded from current estimates; lacks social licence for a domestic high-level spent-fuel repositoryLower proliferation profile; commercially established LEU fuel-cycle management

Key Recommendations
To restore strategic independence and deliver a credible maritime deterrent, Keating and Stanford recommend that the Australian Government: [1, 2]
  1. Cancel AUKUS Pillar One Immediately. Exercise withdrawal mechanisms to exit the Virginia-class and SSN-AUKUS acquisition programs.
  2. Acquire 12 Alternative Nuclear Submarines. Pivot to purchasing 12 smaller, low-enriched uranium (LEU) nuclear-powered attack submarines from France (such as the Suffren-class) or South Korea to provide a larger, sovereign fleet at lower cost and avoid a 2030s capability gap.
  3. Adopt a Defence-in-Depth Posture. Prioritise defending Australia’s Primary Region of Interest and vital maritime approaches rather than forward-deploying forces under US command.
  4. Enact Sovereign Controls on US Bases. Introduce legislation—similar to Japan and the Philippines—requiring explicit Australian Government approval before the US can launch offensive military operations from Australian soil, alongside strict enforcement of nuclear-weapon storage bans.
  5. Rebalance Diplomacy and Multilateralism. Re-establish an independent national security strategy that pairs self-reliant defence ("an insurance policy") with active regional diplomacy, de-escalation of tensions with China, and support for United Nations multilateralism. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]

Broader Context & Counterarguments
  • Inquiry Findings: Keating and Stanford's submission heavily informed the AUKUS Public Inquiry's final report, Surrendering Australia – The AUKUS Deception, released on 4 November 2026, which similarly called for cancelling AUKUS submarines and recalibrating the US alliance. [1, 2, 3]
  • Strategic Pushback: Defence analysts—including commentary from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and UNSW—have disputed Keating and Stanford's proposed "Plan B". Critics argue that France would be unlikely to enter another submarine contract after the 2021 cancellation, South Korea does not yet have a mature export-ready SSN design, and abandoning AUKUS mid-stream would severely damage trust with Washington and regional partners while leaving Australia without submarines in the 2030s. [1, 2]
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[Submission 158 below]



A National Security Strategy for Australia


By


Dr Michael Keating, AC and Jon Stanford


Submission to the Commission of Inquiry into AUKUS


August 2026


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  [Page 2 below]


The authors of this submission, Dr Michael Keating, AC, and Jon Stanford, were

colleagues in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, when Dr Keating was the

Secretary.

In his role as a department head, Michael Keating was a member of the Secretaries

Committee on National Security for eleven years, including five years as Chairman.
This 
Committee is responsible for coordinating the nation’s security strategy and for

supporting the Cabinet Committee on National Security.

After leaving the Australian Public Service, Jon Stanford took up a career in consulting,

specialising in climate change policy, energy and major resource projects, while also

working on defence issues. In 2017, he was engaged by a Sydney businessman, the late

Gary Johnson, to undertake research on submarines and deterrence strategy under his

Submarines for Australia enterprise. Two major reports on Australia’s future submarine

were produced, both launched at the National Press Club in Canberra.

For the last decade, Mike and Jon have been members of a small informal ‘think tank’,

consisting mainly of retired admirals, engineers, and shipbuilders. We have learnt a

great deal from these experts over that period, and all the ideas in this submission have

been tested with our colleagues.                                                                                                                    


------------------------------------------------------


 [Page 3 below]


Table of contents


Summary and conclusions                                           4

1. Overview                                                                     5

2. AUKUS strategy                                                         6

3. AUKUS submarines                                                  10

4. The way forward                                                       16


                                                                                                                  

------------------------------------------------------


 [Page 4 below]


Summary and conclusions


The Australians place themselves entirely at the mercy of developments in
 American policy. 
I wish our Australian partner, who made the choice of
 security – justified by the escalation 
of tensions with China – to the
detriment of sovereignty, will not discover later that it has 
sacrificed both.”

Jean-Yves Le Drian, Foreign Minister of France, September [/October] 2021


This comment made by France’s foreign minister just after AUKUS was announced was

highly prescient. Five years later under AUKUS, his gloomy prediction is being played out.

Australia has sacrificed considerable sovereignty to the US. We have allowed substantial

US forces to access ADF military bases while having no control over how those bases may

be used. If the America goes to war with China, a decision entirely outside Australia’s

control, it expects Australian forces to fight at its side. We have allowed the US to

determine which submarines Australia may acquire and how they will be deployed. It is

difficult to see how an advanced military capability can be cost-effective when it is

committed to the order of battle of a foreign power that provides no guarantee of

Australia’s security.

As a result of the AUKUS agreement, Australia’s security is under greater threat while it

has become increasingly clear that we cannot rely on the US for our defence. We are now

in a situation where, because of the AUKUS strategy of integrated deterrence in defence of

US regional primacy, Australia is more likely to be attacked, potentially with nuclear

weapons. Under AUKUS, we will acquire an inadequate number of very expensive SSNs

that are not subject to Australia’s sovereign control. The program is highly risky; if it is not

delivered, it would likely mean the end of the RAN submarine force.


The AUKUS submarines will use weapons-grade uranium fuel. As a signatory to the Non-

Proliferation Treaty, Australia lacks the capability to manage highly enriched uranium through its life cycle. When community awareness of the issue increases, it is difficult to see any government gaining the social licence to do so. The US stopped producing HEU in 1964 except for naval reactors, where production
ceased in 1992. No nation needs to use 
this exceptionally hazardous
 substance these days except to make a nuclear weapon. 
 


What then should Australia do?


In relation to sovereignty, while encouraging the US to remain engaged in the Indo-Pacific

as a balancing power, we should develop a new national security strategy designed to seek

Australia’s future security in Asia rather than from it. We should advise the US we are not

going to war with China over Taiwan. While continuing to allow US forces access to ADF

bases, we should impose conditions on how those bases may be used. We should not allow

nuclear weapons to be stored on Australian territory. We would look for continuing US

support under the alliance for the supply of weapons and ongoing access to intelligence

networks under Five Eyes.

Australia should aim to be self-reliant in our defence based on a strategy of deterrence by

denial. We should seek to replace the AUKUS submarines with 12 significantly cheaper

SSNs from France or South Korea that use low-enriched uranium, are better suited to

Australia’s requirements and whose delivery would be more reliable. We should replace

AUKUS with a new strategic partnership comprised of like-minded middle powers resident

in the Indo-Pacific committed to establishing a modus vivendi with China based on mutual

respect and observance of agreed rules and protocols. The best way Australia can ensure

our future security is to adopt a strong but non-threatening military posture, focus on soft

power to the benefit of the region and give no other country a reason to attack us.


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[Page 5 below]


                                          A National Security Strategy for Australia


1. Overview

In the emerging multipolar world, Australia can no longer, even if we ever could, rely on a

non-resident great power for our security in the Indo-Pacific. As Paul Keating said in the

last century, we must find our security within Asia and not from it. This can best be

achieved by a combination of active diplomacy and a strong, self-reliant military capability.

The focus of our diplomacy must be on fostering good relations with our Asian neighbours,

including China. But our security is also enhanced where our military capacity to retaliate

is sufficient to deter any aggression.

Over the past five years, AUKUS has become the single most important element in the

Australian government’s strategic and defence policies. As one former prime minister has

said, it has taken on the status of a cult. Despite the excessively secretive government

process in which it was conceived, it has never been subject to review or even a

parliamentary debate. Neither side of politics is willing to criticise any aspect of AUKUS.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s objectives in developing AUKUS were twofold. He wanted

to cancel the unpopular French conventional submarine program and instead acquire

nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) for the RAN. In pursuing this objective, in the

face of a more assertive China, he became persuaded of the need to enhance Australia’s

future security by aligning Australia’s strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific more closely

with that of the United States.

This was the major problem from the start. Instead of a change in national strategy driving

the acquisition of a new military capability, Morrison’s decision to acquire SSNs drove

Australia to abandon its long-standing policy of maintaining a balance between our

relationship with China and our alliance with the United States.

AUKUS is deeply flawed in both its governing strategy, and the characteristics of the

submarines Australia has contracted to acquire. Its fundamental objective was to turn the

clock back to seeking Australia’s security from Asia rather than in it. Yet the strategic

environment has changed even in the five years since AUKUS was announced in a way
that 
has made that strategy even less appropriate than it was at the time.


Canadian prime minister Mark Carney was right to call out a “rupture” in the global order

where the aggressive behaviour of powerful countries, including the US under Donald

Trump, has created a dangerous strategic environment for middle powers like Australia.

Trump’s embrace of Machtpolitik and his disdain for America’s alliances should have

provided a wake-up call for all America’s allies including Australia.

Yet as US allies in the Euro-Atlantic, all of whom have a security guarantee in their alliance

with the US, are moving rapidly away from reliance on America for defence, Australia’s

government continues to put its trust in the US for our security. The prime minister said

before the 2025 election he was “rock solid” in his conviction the US would come to

Australia’s defence if necessary. Was he even aware that the US deliberately avoided

including a NATO Article V security guarantee in the ANZUS treaty in 1951 and has never

been moved to do so since?

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[Page 6 below]


AUKUS needs to be redesigned as a matter of urgency. First, we need to adopt a different

strategy, built on a more independent posture designed to seek Australia’s security in Asia.

Secondly, we should cancel the AUKUS submarines and acquire a numerically larger, more

affordable sovereign SSN capability better suited to the self-reliant defence of Australia.

2. AUKUS strategy

When Scott Morrison became prime minister, Australia had a balanced relationship

between its main strategic partner, the United States, and its main economic partner,

China. Influenced by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other hawks in the Trump

administration in early 2020, Morrison reversed this long-standing policy of maintaining

good relations with China.

No doubt this fundamental policy change was facilitated by President Xi Jinping’s ill-judged

over-reaction to Morrison’s gratuitous call for an inquiry into the origins of COVID.

Australia’s relationship with China fell to its lowest point since diplomatic relations were

established in 1972. This precipitated a turnaround in public opinion in Australia. By the

time Morrison lost ofce in 2022, 63 per cent of Australians regarded China as more of a

strategic threat than an economic opportunity, compared with only 12 per cent when he

became prime minister in 2018. This major shift in Australian attitudes allowed Morrison

both to announce the acquisition of a major new defence capability and a deeper security

relationship with the US, but also to ‘wedge’ the opposition into endorsing the new strategy.

Morrison saw the AUKUS agreement as ensuring Australia’s future security by drawing

much closer to the United States. In his speech for the AUKUS announcement in

September 2021, Morrison claimed to have forged a “forever partnership” with the United

States – he used the word “forever” 13 times. He was deluded from the very start. America

doesn’t do forever relationships. In his speech in reply, President Biden never mentioned a

forever anything and no influential American has done so since.

The fact that Biden forgot the Australian prime minister’s name provides some evidence of

his level of interest in AUKUS at that stage. He made clear that the US had committed to

nothing more than to provide SSNs to Australia on a ‘best endeavours’ basis. A few days

later, Biden reportedly became furious with “that fella down under” when France,

America’s oldest ally, recalled its ambassador from Washington for the first time in a

relationship extending for well over two centuries.

Morrison’s misjudgement of US strategic policy and history can be attributed in part to the

deeply flawed nature of the process he followed in developing the radical change in policy

represented by AUKUS. He followed a process that was highly secret and bereft of the

Cabinet consultation or formal public service advice that provides the basis for the contest

of ideas that informs policy development in the Westminster system.

Instead, Morrison was informed only by a small team of close personal advisers led by

Andrew Shearer, his chief intelligence adviser from late 2020. His approach to strategic

policy was therefore informed more by the views of the security services, with their

background in working within the US-dominated Five Eyes group, than Australia’s foreign 

affairs establishment with its long experience of developing geopolitical policy in the Indo-

Pacific.


------------------------------------

[Page 7 below]


Morrison’s chief adviser on submarines was a senior RAN officer who had extensive

experience as a submariner and who believed the best option for Australia was to acquire

a British SSN. This was not the only view in the Navy. Morrison’s process took no account

of Australia’s previous expensive failures in defence procurement and the various checks

and balances that had been built into the process as a result. In setting out to deliver

Australia’s biggest ever defence acquisition, the approach followed by Morrison almost

beggars belief.

In the words of the Minister who had sacked Morrison as CEO of Tourism Australia 15

years earlier for following a similar secretive approach, “Scott is unrelenting in pursuing

his agenda”. To follow a similar process in far more complex areas of public policy where,

unlike marketing, Morrison had no demonstrated expertise, was a recipe for disaster.

Morrison’s major misjudgement in relation to Australia’s geopolitical strategy was that he

failed to understand that in seeking approval from the US administration for the acquisition

of SSNs, Australia possessed some substantial negotiating coin. For once, the US needed

us more than we needed them. After years of being a strategic backwater, Australia had

become of critical importance to the US on account of our geography. With its military

bases in Guam, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines now within range of hundreds of

advanced PLA missiles, US forces needed a new, more secure forward operations base

from which it could continue to contain China to the First Island Chain. The objective of

America’s containment strategy was to prevent China from dominating the Indo-Pacific

and thereby threatening US regional primacy by deterring them from taking Taiwan.

The major force behind AUKUS on the American side was Kurt Campbell, President Biden’s chief adviser on the Indo-Pacific. Campbell later said that from the US perspective the great benefit of AUKUS was “getting Australia on the fence and locking them in for forty years”. He also said that he was surprised that Australia (and Britain) committed to siding with the US in the Indo-Pacific in the way they did. He was conscious that the US was losing influence in the region because of the importance many nations, including Australia, placed on their economic relationship with China.

The heads of agreement on AUKUS were agreed at a meeting between Andrew Shearer and

Campbell in Washington in April 2021. This was before Australia’s Cabinet became

involved in the AUKUS process. The secretary of the Defence department, Greg Moriarty,

told the Senate in October 2021 that he found out about the meeting only after it happened.

By contrast, Campbell came to the meeting with a negotiating position that would have

been very carefully developed by the US National Security Council.

The basic deal was that the US would agree to Australia acquiring SSNs in return for a

substantial enhancement of the US Force Posture Initiative (USFPI), an existing agreement

between the US and Australia to allow US forces to rotate through ADF bases in Australia.

The key element – permitting the US to develop submarine basing facilities on Australia’s

west coast – was almost certainly agreed at this meeting. Campbell may have felt he was

pushing on an open door. He knew Shearer from when he had been a visiting Fellow at the

Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and he would have been well

aware of his support for US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. While he was at CSIS, Shearer had


--------------------------------------

[Page 8 below]


published an article advocating the provision of basing facilities for US submarines in

Western Australia.

The AUKUS strategy was revealed in two stages. At the AUSMIN meeting in Washington

following the AUKUS announcement, in a strategy now called “integrated deterrence”,

Australian Ministers agreed to a very significant increase in rotations of US forces through

Australian bases. Additional deployments in every military domain, including space and

cyber, have followed at regular intervals since.

Later, under the Albanese government, the development, at Australia’s expense, of basing

facilities for US Virginia-class SSNs at HMAS Stirling, near Fremantle, were announced.

This constituted the strategic element in the AUKUS Optimal Pathway.

Why the AUKUS strategy is dangerous for Australia


In a radio interview after he had left office, Scott Morrison outlined his objectives under

AUKUS. He stated that the three AUKUS partners have “an almost complete alignment of

interests” in the Indo-Pacific. He also proposed that the annexation of Taiwan by China

would give rise to a threat to Australia comparable to the fall of Singapore in World War II.

We would argue strongly against Morrison’s strategic appreciation. It is nothing short of

ludicrous to suggest that Britain’s interests in the Indo-Pacific are the same as those of the

US or Australia. Britain has no ability to project serious force into the Indo-Pacific. Indeed,

soon after AUKUS was announced, Britain’s short lived ‘tilt to Asia’ reverted to a more

realistic ‘NATO first’ policy.

Australia’s interests in the region are quite different from those of the US. Unlike America

under Trump, we have no interest in containing China’s economic growth, which has

substantial benefits for wealth creation in Australia. As former DFAT Secretary Peter

Varghese has identified, AUKUS has created “an unresolved tension at the core of

Australian strategic policy”. While Australia’s “foreign policy embraces a multipolar future

in which no country dominates, our defence policy ... is increasingly fixed around doing

what we can to ensure the retention of US strategic primacy”.

As Varghese also said, America’s strategic goal of seeking to defend ongoing US primacy in

the Indo-Pacific is not a core national interest for Australia. There is no obvious reason

why the annexation of Taiwan would give rise to a threat to Australia. The concept of a

middle power like Australia seeking to contain a superpower to its own backyard just to

allow another superpower to maintain bragging rights for a non-bankable concept like

regional primacy is absurd. Yet six weeks after AUKUS was announced, Defence Minister

Peter Dutton said if the US took action over Taiwan, it would be “inconceivable” for

Australia not to be at their side.

Morrison’s strategy under AUKUS was to create a ‘forever partnership’ with the US in

order to deter China from attacking Australia. This would be achieved by a strategy of

integrated deterrence. It might be imagined, therefore, that the objective of integrated

deterrence was to deter an attack on Australia. This was not the case. It was to deter China

from attacking Taiwan. In 2017, Australia had agreed to the Enhanced Air Cooperation

initiative, directed towards integrating US and RAAF strike fighter aircraft in combat


---------------------------------------

[Page 9 below]


missions launched from Australia. As Andrew Fowler wrote in Nuked, Morrison said he

wanted Australia’s future SSNs to be integrated with the US submarine force.

In delivering this policy in support of integrating its forces with the US in defence of

ongoing US primacy in the Indo-Pacific, Australia signed up to what was called ‘pooled

sovereignty’. If the US contributed any of its sovereignty to this pool, it was not

immediately apparent.

What does Australia’s surrender of sovereignty to the US mean in practice? As former

senior defence official Michael Pezzullo said, “Never before in peacetime has Australia

been prepared to allow foreign combat forces to be able to launch military operations from

Australian soil. ... From a US perspective, they would have a brutally realist strategic view

of Australia: it would be a key operating base for US forces in any conflict with China. This

calculation would be based on hard strategy, and not any soft sentimentalism about

‘mateship’.”

Unlike Australia, other countries in the region that take the somewhat risky step of

allowing US forces to undertake military operations from their bases, including Japan,

South Korea and the Philippines, have an insurance policy in the form of a security

guarantee included in their treaty of alliance with the US. Australia does not. These

countries also have strict protocols as to how US forces may be employed. In particular,

the host countries have the right to approve or veto military operations launched from their

bases. There is no evidence that Australia follows this course. In fact, the repeated calls

from Pezzullo, a defence insider who should know, for the government to implement such

safeguards can only suggest that we do not.


Australia’s current strategic posture, therefore, is provocative and dangerous. US.

Representative Michael McCaul, former Chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,

said Australia is now “the central base of operations” or “the beachhead” for America’s

forces to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

The main element in this is the facility at HMAS Stirling, where the US is now developing a

command centre for a new SSN squadron to be based there and Australia is building a

submarine maintenance facility. That squadron will become an integral part of the US

Indo-Pacific fleet and, if the US Navy has its way, will embark nuclear weapons from 2032.

China will understand the threat provided by this squadron, both to its sea lines of

communications (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean and to PLA forces in the South and East

China Seas. With a somewhat indiscreet reference to US intelligence sources, McCaul also

has suggested that it is the prospect of “the crown jewel, the beast of the ocean, coming

over ... that keeps Xi up at night”. If so, China’s president may not take kindly to the role

Australia is playing in giving rise to his insomnia.


Australia is exposed to an attack on our territory outside our power to influence. While

Australia retains the discretion to decide whether or not to go to war, we have no control

over US actions or over US operations launched from our bases. As the defence minister

has admitted, if there is a war between the US and China, Australia will inevitably be

involved. This is the case even if we do nor provide military support to the US in the

conflict. As has occurred recently in the Middle East, host country bases with a US


---------------------------------------

[Page 10 below]


presence are liable to attack. If escalation occurs, as is possible, Australia could be

attacked with nuclear weapons.

While the Albanese government has made no overt changes to the AUKUS strategy,

Richard Marles, commendably, has clearly stated the government will not commit to go to

war over Taiwan. Yet the Congressional Research Service has repeatedly argued that if

Australia does not commit to go to war, we should not receive SSNs from the United States.

In the event of a military reverse, a forward operating base is not a comfortable place to be.

It is usually the first place to be abandoned in a general withdrawal. The US would be

under no obligation to rally to Australia’s defence. The first stop for their forces would be

Hawaii.

3. AUKUS submarines

Morrison was correct about one thing in regard to AUKUS. Australia does have a strategic

need for nuclear submarines, and the Navy has a valid operational requirement. But he

was wrong in thinking an SSN is an SSN and that neither their design nor the ability to

exercise sovereign control over how they are used matter. Both these considerations are of

fundamental importance.

All the other nations that deploy SSNs are nuclear weapons powers meaning, for example,

that they have the capability to pursue a strategy of deterrence by punishment. Australia is

a middle power and a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the defence of

Australia, we can only pursue a strategy of deterrence by denial. Our requirement is for an

SSN optimised for delivering that strategy.

Perhaps the most important consideration, and one that is little understood, is that

submarines provide an offensive capability. Some may then question how an offensive

capability, like a submarine provides, can contribute to a strategy of deterrence by denial.


Our response to this question is that any strategy of deterrence needs an offensive

capability in order to inflict some pain in response to aggression. A defensive, circling the

wagons approach in our own backyard is unlikely to deter anybody. On the other hand, the

threat of a submarine appearing unexpectedly inside the adversary’s fence line, sinking

ships and submarines would give rise to significant concern. A middle power’s limited

capability to project military force may not keep anybody up at night, as McCaul suggests,

but it may at least give them some pause for thought.


The role of RAN submarines was set out by Rear Admiral Peter Briggs in 2014:

“Our submarine force must be capable of operating and surviving north of the

archipelago, throughout the South China Sea, able to observe, report and if necessary,

strike. ... This is the high payoff area, where their impact is greatest and unique

amongst ADF assets. To be able to exploit the initiative gained from their stealth,

Australia’s submarines must be able to covertly reach sensitive areas throughout our

region with sufficient mobility, endurance and payload for the long duration missions

involved, frequently in or through demanding tropical waters. ... Without being specific

about the scenario, it’s therefore likely that Australia will wish to be capable of

maintaining a deterrent submarine presence at very long ranges, say 3,500 nm.”

The primary mission of RAN submarines in wartime is anti-submarine warfare (ASW), with

a secondary objective of attacking an adversary’s surface fleet. In peacetime, they have an


-------------------------------------------

[Page 11 below]


important role in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations (ISR). The long

transits involved in RAN subsea operations identified by Briggs are necessary to undertake

the ASW role simply because the most prospective place to search for an adversary’s

submarines is around their base. The main base for China’s submarines, for example, is at

Hainan Island in the South China Sea, approximately 3,500 nautical miles from HMAS

Stirling.


Morrison would have been aware that the most significant mission for Australia’s Collins-

class submarines is in combined operations with the US Submarine Force to detect and trail PLA Navy submarines. This role was formalised in 2018 under a Theatre ASW agreement between the US Navy and the RAN. While shrouded in a veil of secrecy, these operations probably constitute Australia’s most important contribution to the alliance and, because of the ISR component, to the Five Eyes.


The problem is that conventional submarines are not well suited for this role, at least in the

Indo-Pacific because of the distances involved. One comparison suggests that to undertake

an operation 5,000 kms from base (and Hainan is further than that) a Collins class

submarine would spend a total of 28 days in transit leaving only 27 days on patrol in a 

standard 55-day operation. This suggests a productivity rate of 49 percent. With a six-

submarine fleet, Australia can only deploy one submarine ‘up threat’ to our north for half 

the time.


When it reaches the patrol area, a conventional submarine is hampered by its slow speed,

lack of mobility and exposure to detection when it needs to recharge its batteries and

approaches the surface to run its diesel generators and ‘snort’. These disadvantages are

becoming increasingly pronounced, The PLA Navy is increasing its deployment of SSNs,

which are too fast for conventional submarines to pursue. China’s ASW capabilities are

improving. The ongoing installation of seabed sensors and the considerable improvement

in PLA radar and sonar capabilities make submarines more prone to detection. If detected,

conventional submarines lack the speed to escape.


An SSN is a different proposition. On a 60-day operation 5,000 kms from base it would

spend 10 days in transit there and back and 50 days on patrol, with a productivity rate of 83

per cent compared to 49 per cent for a conventional submarine. This measure of

productivity, however, takes no account of the fact that when on patrol, an SSN’s greater

speed and mobility make it a far more effective deterrent. Its much higher submerged

speed and effectively unlimited dived endurance also give it a much better prospect of

escaping if detected. In short, not only is an SSN much more effective than a conventional

submarine, it is also more survivable. Any parent seeing a son or daughter joining the

Navy’s submarine service would want them to serve in a nuclear-powered boat.


The contribution RAN submarines make to the alliance would have allowed Morrison to

make a strong argument to the US in favour of the need for Australia to acquire an SSN

capability. It would have been further strengthened if he would guarantee that the

submarines would be dedicated to serving in combined operations with the US Navy. As

noted above, Morrison wanted to integrate Australia’s future SSNs with the US Navy’s

submarine force.


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This could have been a decisive argument because, as a result of the retirement of the Los

Angeles-class SSNs and the rapid growth of the PLA Navy’s undersea capability, the US

Navy was short of submarines. As its force commander wrote in 2018:

“The demands on the United States Submarine Force and supporting organizations

continue to grow at an unprecedented rate. The threat continues to evolve and

expand rapidly in at least three world regions, each posing substantially different

operational demands for both high-end warfighting and peacetime operations. As a

result of decisions made many years ago, the number of submarines has begun a

long-sustained reduction that will increase these demands on each ship and crew.”

This seems likely to be the course of action Morrison pursued. It explains why he made his

first egregious mistake. He ignored the possibility of acquiring France’s Suffren-class SSN,

then entering service with the Marine National, which was the reference design for the

Attack-class that he was preparing to cancel.

Turnbull had already discussed with President Macron the possibility of switching from

the Attack-class to the Suffren at some point during the build process. The submarines had

the same hull diameter and shared a large number of components, so from an engineering

perspective such a switch could be readily accomplished. Several Attack-class boats –

possibly as many as six – would be required first to replace the Collins-class and avoid a

capability gap while managing the transition to SSNs. This approach would require no

termination of the contract with Naval Group and, providing the Attack-class proceeded on

schedule – as Defence confirmed it was in the month before the AUKUS announcement – it

would involve no capability gap. With an imported reactor, it was a submarine well within

ASC’s capacity to build in Adelaide.

It would be difficult to find a platform better suited to the needs and capabilities of the RAN

than the Suffren. Its crew size was similar to that of Collins. It was a state-of-the-art

submarine in terms of stealth and lethality. It would not come with strings attached and

would deliver a sovereign capability. It was an affordable, mature, in-production design. In

a region wary of nuclear proliferation, it had the advantage of using low-enriched uranium

fuel (LEU). Australia had a small but well-established capability, based at Lucas Heights,

adjacent to Morrison’s electorate of Cook, to manage an LEU-based reactor through its life

cycle, including undertaking regular refuelling.

Perhaps most importantly, among the SSNs produced by western powers, Suffren was the

most suitable platform for a middle power without nuclear weapons to deploy in the

delivery of a strategy of deterrence by denial.

Morrison seemed not to understand any of this. Surely a proper Cabinet process would

have led the government at least to evaluate the French option. Instead, Morrison made the

decision to send his team to London to acquire a British submarine. This didn’t seem such

a bad idea at the time. The British Astute-class was an in-production, mature design of SSN

that although significantly bigger than Suffren may have met the RAN’s needs. And Britain

was keen to sell SSNs; its submarine enterprise had been underfunded for decades and

was ‘down on its uppers’.

In fact, turning to the British was Morrison’s second disastrous mistake. Morrison got on

well with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. But if Morrison could be deceptive,

Johnson was in an entirely different class. He became the only British PM to be forced to


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[Page 13 below]


resign for misleading Parliament. Johnson later said in his memoirs that his main interest

in AUKUS was in doing down the French, who had caused him endless problems over

Brexit. As he later told a British newspaper, he took great pleasure in exacting “delicious

revenge” on Emmanuel Macron, who “went predictably "tonto" [ballistic] in Paris”.

Johnson sold Australia the harbour bridge. As shown in Hansard, six weeks after the

AUKUS announcement, the government still believed Astute was available. The reality was that it was not available to Australia and never had been. Production of its PWR2 reactor had been discontinued on safety grounds. Only seven Astutes would be built, all for the Royal Navy. Britain needed to start producing its next class of ballistic missile [Dreadnought-class] submarines in their only submarine shipyard as a matter of urgency. Had Morrison not been obsessed with secrecy, a customary process of due diligence would surely have discovered this. Ironically, the French would almost certainly have known. [through HumInt and SigInt]


Problems with the AUKUS submarine acquisition

Following Morrison’s disastrous submarine acquisition process, the so-called optimal

pathway for Australia to acquire submarines was announced in March 2023 under the

Albanese government. Australia would acquire a new British design, SSN AUKUS, as its long-term submarine solution. In order to avoid a capability gap as a result of the non-

availability of the Astute-class, in an unprecedented move the US would sell between three and five Virginia-class submarines to Australia in a mixture of new and used platforms.

The exact number would depend on when SSN AUKUS became available.


In signing up to the Optimal Pathway, the Albanese government compounded Morrison’s

folly and committed the third disastrous mistake in the submarine acquisition process. As

Fowler records, soon after Morrison lost office, the French swallowed their pride and made

an unsolicited offer to supply the Suffren-class to Australia. As shown in Section 4, the

price was extraordinarily attractive. Albanese knocked the offer back.


We can only speculate why this occurred. The most likely reason is that when Albanese

was wedged by Morrison into accepting the decision to acquire SSNs, he accepted the

strategic commitments underpinning it, including integrated deterrence and pooled

sovereignty. Andrew Shearer remained in place as chief intelligence adviser to the prime

minister. As British defence secretary Ben Wallace said in a joint media conference with

Richard Marles, the French “would understand” that Australia would want to procure its

SSNs “from one or more of its Five Eyes partners”. The French would not understand this

at all, and nor should they be expected to.


We have ended up with an acquisition outcome for a vital and eye-wateringly costly

defence capability that is so deeply flawed it should be unacceptable to any sovereign

state. The problems, in no particular order, are as follows.


First, Australia had no choice as to which submarines it would acquire. We were told what

platforms we would purchase, how much we would pay and when, and the terms and

conditions surrounding them. While arguably Astute may have been an acceptable

solution, SSN AUKUS is not. Reportedly a submarine of 11,000 tonnes, twice the size of

Suffren, it would offer a major land-attack capability with 12 vertical launch cells.

Bombarding a great power’s homeland with a few conventional warheads is not an


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[Page 14 below]


appropriate use of force for a middle power with a strategy of denial. In addition, both the

Virginia and SSN AUKUS require crews of over 100, compared with Suffren’s 65.


Second, delivery of the Virginias seems very unlikely. Under legislation, the US president

could not sell them to Australia if to do so would “degrade” US undersea capability. In

order to satisfy this criterion, SSN production would need to increase from 1.2 to 2.33

submarines a year. Over three years after the announcement of the optimal Pathway, the

dial has not moved one iota in that direction. It is now impossible to see how the condition

can be met.


Third, eight SSNs of two different pedigrees, reflecting very different design philosophies,

will be difficult to operate and sustain with Australia’s limited capacity. Training of

submariners and maintenance crews will be more problematic while managing two

different supply chains of components from different parts of the world will create

substantial difficulties.


Fourth, eight SSNs is an insufficient number to constitute a credible force. As shown in Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt’s submission to the Inquiry, an evolving mixed fleet of Collins-

class, Virginia and SSN AUKUS will provide, and then only if everything goes according to plan, an average of 2.3 submarines available for deployment at any time. If anything

untoward occurs as it surely will, including late delivery of any platform or extended

maintenance events, the number drops below two. A force this size will not provide a

credible deterrent.


Fifth, despite the government’s repeated assurances, the submarines will not provide a

sovereign capability. Sovereignty can be interpreted in different ways, and it is true RAN

submarines will be Australian flagged and will operate under Australian command. They

will also be under Australian operational control to the extent their missions will require

government approval and will be subject to Australian approved rules of engagement. But

most importantly, they will not be under Australian strategic control. As Kurt Campbell

said, “when submarines are provided from the United States to Australia, it’s not like

they’re lost. They will just be deployed by the closest possible allied force.” If the US goes to war and Australia does not, it would be extremely difficult to disengage RAN submarines

from the combined fleet.


Sixth, as demonstrated in Section 4, the cost of the submarines is extremely high. This will

also be reflected in a high opportunity cost and the possibility that it will cause an

undesirable distortion in the ADF force structure. This high cost becomes difficult to justify

when the SSN force is unable to provide either a credible deterrent or a sovereign capability available to be deployed at the discretion of the Australian government. Smaller, cheaper SSNs would represent better value for money and would allow us to buy the larger number that the defence of Australia requires.


Highly enriched uranium


Finally, alone among the world’s navies, British and American submarine reactors use

uranium enriched to the weapons-grade level of 93-97 percent. Managing highly enriched

uranium (HEU) through its life cycle represents a challenging and hazardous industrial

endeavour that would potentially pose insuperable problems for Australia.


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[Page 15 below]


While importing the reactor cores for SSN AUKUS, which will each contain enough fissile

material to produce up to 25 nuclear warheads, is permitted under what is widely

considered to be a loophole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, safeguarding them in transit

and storage raises significant security issues. Shipping them to Australia carries the risk of

interdiction, while storing them for installation in the submarines would require ASC’s

shipyard in Adelaide to become a military exclusion zone.


Both Scott Morrison and Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy have argued that the sealed

reactors that power US and UK submarines provide fewer management problems for a

country without a nuclear power industry like Australia. But any complex machinery can

break down and accidents may happen. Earthquakes offer a major safety risk, for example,

and Adelaide is the most seismically challenged capital city in Australia.


If an accident were to occur with an HEU reactor, the potential consequences would be far

more serious than for one fuelled by low-enriched uranium. For example, in the event of a

coolant failure, immediate remedial action would be required to avoid a possible nuclear

disaster with community safety at risk over a wide area. This compares to several hours for

an LEU reactor. Contrary to Morrison’s assurances about Australia having no need to

develop a nuclear industry, in order to provide effective nuclear stewardship we would

need to maintain a highly specialised industrial capability to deal with such unforeseen

events.


The major difficulty would be managing the spent fuel at the end of the submarine’s life. As

Peter Briggs writes, “under AUKUS agreements and the Australian Naval Nuclear Power

Safety Act 2024, Australia must permanently dispose of all spent HEU fuel domestically

without a return provision to the US or UK. Across eight planned submarines, this creates a

sovereign liability of over three tonnes of weapons-usable U-235 embedded in spent fuel

that requires isolation for millennia.”


To manage the storage of the unwanted weapons-grade fissile material for at least two

decades and then dispose of the waste, Australia would need to develop the specialist

capabilities and invest in facilities that only the great powers’ nuclear weapons industries

possess. This is hazardous work. Britain has not dismantled a submarine reactor for a

decade while developing costly new facilities to manage the task. Rusting hulks containing

weapons-grade spent fuel are clogging up Brirish shipyards and anchorages.


Why would the Australian government want to take on such an onerous task when it is

entirely unnecessary? Less costly submarines with LEU reactors are available that would

also provide a sovereign capability better suited to Australia’s strategic and operational

requirements.


Managing an LEU reactor through its life cycle is an entirely different proposition that lies

within Australia’s existing skill set. ANSTO’s LEU reactor at Lucas Heights in Sydney’s

leafy suburbs is regularly refuelled and managed in accordance with international

protocols. Its spent fuel is sent to France for reprocessing and the waste then returned to

Lucas Heights in vitrified form for storage until Australia’s long heralded permanent

geological repository becomes available. With support from the SSN’s parent nation,

Australia could readily provide effective stewardship of an LEU submarine reactor.


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[Page 16 below]


The conclusion from this analysis is that the combination of the Virginia-class submarines

and SSN AUKUS represents an unacceptable choice for Australia.


4.   The way forward


Future strategy


Australia’s current strategic posture is provocative and, with no security guarantee in our

alliance with the US, dangerous. Trump may not be prepared go to war over Taiwan, but

we cannot yet be sure. In the short term, we should make it clear we will not be involved in

such a conflict. In accordance with standard international practice, we should mandate

that any military operations launched from Australian bases require host government

approval. We should rigorously enforce the Treaty of Rarotonga and neither permit the

storage of nuclear weapons on Australian territory nor allow nuclear attacks to be

launched from Australian bases. We should not undertake combined operations with

forces carrying nuclear weapons.


America’s strategic goal of seeking to contain China in the interests of ongoing US primacy

in the Indo-Pacific is not a core national interest for Australia. If we abandon our defence

strategy of supporting US primacy, as we should, what would we put in its place? To be

sure we should seek our security in Asia rather than from it, but our foreign policy

assumes a multipolar world where no country dominates. This is unrealistic; in the

absence of the United States, China will dominate the Indo-Pacific for a very long time to

come.


We cannot be confident China would be a benevolent hegemon. The vision of a new

multipolar system held by both China and Russia assumes both countries would dominate

their own spheres of influence in the region where they are established as the major pole.

As Michael Wesley has pointed out, China’s leaders have taken to referring to Southeast

Asia as their ‘zhoubian’ or perimeter, akin to Russia’s ‘near abroad’, where traditionally

the people were expected to show deference and pay tribute in return for being able to

trade with China.


This has unfortunate parallels with the fourteen grievances against Australia provided

unofficially by the Chinese embassy in November 2020 in response to Morrison’s

provocation. This detailed list of almost entirely unreasonable complaints exposed a dark

underside to the relationship. An accommodating response from Australia would have

compromised our future as an independent democracy.


While not seeking a security guarantee from the US, we should maintain the alliance. There

would be significant benefit in maintaining a US presence in the Indo-Pacific as a balancing

power. Since we no longer share many values with the US under Trump in terms of the

rules-based order, the relationship would in future be based on a transactional approach.

What would we have to offer if Trump was willing to do a deal?


The US is unlikely to want to abandon the Indo-Pacific. It is the growth centre for the global

economy and there are many advantages in being engaged in the region. With our strong

endowment of mineral resources and our potential as an energy superpower, Australia

offers significant opportunities for US investors, including in the strategic minerals sector.


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[Page 17 below]


In strategic terms, because retaining US global primacy will remain a core value for the US,

the State Department and the Pentagon will very likely also want to remain engaged in the

Indo-Pacific. Even if the US abandons bases in Japan and South Korea, Australia could

offer an attractive long-term location because of our geography. Facilities such as Pine Gap

and the submarine base at Stirling would allow the US to maintain a strong intelligence

presence in the region, while other bases would allow them to deploy forces rapidly here in

the event of some crisis.


In return, Australia would become self-reliant in our own defence and no longer rely on the

US. We would want to cancel the AUKUS submarines (the advantage for the US is not

having to give up its Virginias) and would seek support for acquiring a less costly and

numerically larger force of French or Korean SSNs. We would want ongoing access to US

intelligence through Five Eyes and the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System. We would

also want to continue to acquire US weapons on a commercial basis.


In seeking our security in Asia rather than from it, we should transform what is now

AUKUS into a wider strategic partnership. It is difficult to see a role for the UK in the future

when they will not, under our proposal, be supplying submarines to Australia. Britain can

no longer consistently project military power ‘east of Suez’ to any degree, and the idea that

with a fleet of seven SSNs, of which none are currently available for deployment, they can

provide even one submarine to the combined force operating out of Stirling is not credible.


Instead, other like-minded middle powers resident in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan and

South Korea among others, should be invited to join Australia in a strategic partnership.

This would not be a military alliance. It would be similar to an entente, extending to sharing

industrial supply chains and intelligence. Together, particularly through the

Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (which China should be invited

to join) and APEC, we would seek to maintain a rules-based order.


We should adopt a strong but non-aggressive strategic posture and aim to become self-

reliant in our conventional defence. If we acquire French SSNs, there could be merit in inviting France to join the partnership. We would also seek to be firm in our stance on

nuclear non-proliferation. Depending on the level of threat in the region, this might require

the US to provide extended deterrence to the partnership. While the credibility of this is

always open to doubt, it should at least give a would-be aggressor pause for thought.


Finally, and perhaps most important of all, we should continue to develop our capabilities

in the consistent and generous exercise of soft power, including foreign aid and

humanitarian relief. In particular, while maintaining a strong self-reliant defence posture is

important, we do not want to confront a situation where deterrence has failed. China is not

the only country that could threaten us in the future; we need to establish at least a modus

vivendi and hopefully a closer relationship with nations like India and our near neighbour,

Indonesia, as well. The strategic agreement with Indonesia is a good start. Our recent

diplomatic success with the South Pacific nations also shows how this can work. If China

is going to establish a zhoubian, we want to keep it as far away from Australia as possible.


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Future submarines


We have discussed the role submarines can play in a strategy of deterrence by denial. But

in order to provide a credible deterrent, we must invest in enough of them. The task of

defending a whole island continent with the third largest EEZ in the world with a

population of only twenty-seven million people is challenging to say the least. Submarines

can make an important contribution to the solution of the problem. They provide a

powerful asymmetric capability onering significant advantages to a smaller naval power.


Briggs argues persuasively that the minimum number of submarines required to sustain a

viable submarine force is 12. This is sufficient to have four available at any time for

deployment. This means affordability is clearly important. Although submarines’

contribution may be unique, other assets may provide important capabilities too. This

suggests opportunity cost is also a very significant issue.


We have already proposed that submarines provide an offensive capability. Particularly if

they are conventionally-powered, they cannot be relied on to perform well in a defensive

role. In 1944, Admiral Dönitz deployed 49 submarines – a big number by today’s standards

– to disrupt the allied landings in Normandy. They sank one ship.


How might we use submarines in an offensive capability in a denial strategy directed at

China? They would be employed north of the Indonesian archipelago to sink submarines

and warships possibly sailing south to attack Australia. Why north of the archipelago?

Because it would maximise the opportunity to interdict and sink the adversary’s fleet

before it approaches the Australian homeland. Also, as we have discussed submarines are

best detected close to their bases which, in China’s case, are a long way north of the

archipelago.


The second question is whether we need SSNs to undertake this task. There are clear

advantages in deploying SSNs for this mission. As we have seen, they are capable of

transiting to a distant area of operations at three times the speed of advance (SOA) of a

conventional boat. An initial attack by a lone SSN could be followed up by further attacks by that submarine with the possibility of adding one or two more SSNs to the pursuit. Only

SSNs are capable of pursuing a surface taskforce with a SOA of, say, 18 knots and

remaining in contact until their torpedoes are exhausted. An SSN would have plenty of

power in reserve at that speed, whereas a conventional submarine would be struggling to

sustain an SOA of half that of the taskforce.


Strategists such as Hugh White have advocated acquiring a larger number of conventional

submarines (SSKs) and having them lurk around choke points in the archipelago to

intercept an attacking task force as it passes through. The first problem is there are a lot of

choke points in the archipelago, most of them in Indonesian territorial waters. If they

choose the wrong one or the enemy makes a late change of course, SSKs lack the mobility

to deploy quickly elsewhere. If they do get lucky, they would only be able to sink a limited

number of ships before the others sped on out of range. As one US Navy ofcer said, under

most scenarios the utility of an SSK is equivalent to a smart sea mine – dangerous, but

restricted to a single location.


The other problem is that an adversary could anticipate where a conventional submarine

would be deployed in this defensive role and send its own SSNs to clear the path for a task


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force on a mission to attack Australia. All the SSN would have to do is loiter in wait for the

conventional submarine to expose itself by ‘snorting’ before attacking it.


A fleet of 24 SSKs would cost a lot more than 12 SSNs and be less effective. They would take twice as long to build, require many more submariners for their crews and their

maintenance costs would be almost double.

Finally, we must consider cost and anordability. Work done by the Parliamentary Budget

Ofce (PBO) suggests the eight AUKUS submarines, when Defence’s 50 per cent

contingency allowance is excluded, would cost $260 billion through their lives over 31

years.

In comparison, one highly qualified member of our group has calculated the cost of 12

Sunren SSNs and 24 conventional submarines. These estimates were based on acquisition

cost data from the Attack-class program and an unsolicited oner to supply Sunren made to

the Albanese government. The acquisition costs were inflated to 2025 values and then used

to estimate the submarines’ aggregate through life cost over 31 years using the same

methodology as the PBO. To be as realistic as possible, a conservative approach was

adopted.

The through life cost estimates of three options, at constant 2025 prices and with no

contingency allowance, are as follows:

• 8 AUKUS SSNs $260 billion

• 24 Attack-class SSKs $240 billion

• 12 Sunren-class SSNs $180 billion


This suggests Australia could acquire 12 smaller but highly capable SSNs propelled by

LEU fuel for 70 per cent of the cost of eight large AUKUS submarines using HEU fuel.


We recommend the government should cancel both the Virginia and SSN AUKUS

acquisitions planned for the RAN. Not only are they far too expensive with a high

opportunity cost, but they would provide an inadequate deployable capability at any time.

They are also fuelled by HEU fissile material that would present Australia with a potentially

insuperable management problem as well as a very high disposal cost that is unlikely to

have been included in the above estimates.


Instead, the government should evaluate the acquisition of 12 Suffren or 12 of the new

South Korean design if they are available.