July 31, 2023

Australian Options Limited To Speed SSN Purchases

In response to Bill Seney's good questions of July 31, 2023:

1. Limitations of UK engineering and scheduling for the SSN-AUKUS project prevent any such subs for Australia until the 2040s. The UK's only submarine builder needs to build the 4 future Dreadnought-class SSBNs before the mainly UK designed SSN-AUKUS's can be built.

Australia will need to wait for the UK submarine yard to complete the first SSN-AUKUS (that will then need about 3 years testing by the UK RN) first before tech and experience can be transferred to Australia's Osborne, Adelaide shipyard and the RAN.

Also the SSN-AUKUSs for the UK RN are a replacement and evolution of the UK's current Astute class. The UK is scheduled to only begin replacing the Astutes from the late 2030s. It is highly unlikely the UK will build SSN-AUKUS for Australia before the UK RN's requirements. The UK has a minute nuclear submarine labor force compared to the 2 US submarine build yards - so the UK has few people available to help Austalia until the late 2030s.

SSN-AUKUSs can only be built after the future, not yet fully developed, PWR3 submarine reactor, to be used for the Dreadnoughts, is available. Once used in the Dreadnoughts the PWR3 then must be sufficiently miniaturised for SSN-AUKUSs - all taking about 15 years from now.

2. On "other potential suppliers" Since 1788 Australia hasn't bought key weapons from potential enemies. Which rules out SSNs from Russia and China. India will heavily rely on Russian advisers, Russian SSN reactor designs and other tech to develop Indian SSNs by the mid-late 2030s. So security and politics aside there is no time saving, in the Indian project, for Australia's aims.

And yes Brazil, with its SSN project slipping to mid 2030s commissioning, is in no position to sell all the French non-nuclear tech to Australia. Brazil is developing its own first generation submarine reactor - a long term project.

3. "Do Australian plans include building facilities to refit SSNs?" Yes Albanese and Marles would CLAIM almost anything about the SSN hope. There might be underdeveloped "plans" but these might not be significant refit realities until well into the 2030s.

I would hazard a guess that a US submarine tender temporarally calling in at Fleet Base West might replace simple parts for a visiting US nuclear sub from that tender's existing stocks or parts flown in from the US. Submarine tender USS Frank Cable, visited in April 2022.

Australia might not have the industrial base, nuclear expertise or political-legal clearances to perform substantial maintenance on US SSNs for many years.

The US hasn't even transferred the millions of Virginia-class design blue-prints to Australia. Only a handful of Australians are cleared (by US law) to view a tiny fraction of them. Even fewer Austalians have a broad and practical understanding of SSNs. My past USN contacts haven't been too forthcoming.

So the Australian SSN Hope is just a Wing and a Prayer, this side of the 2030s.

July 30, 2023

Complex Bathymetry & Subs: South China Sea

South China Sea depths (in meters). Map courtesy Silent World Foundation.

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On July 25, 2023 Anonymous commented (with some additions by Pete):

The depth issues in the South China Sea (SCS) are not as simple as shallow and deeper parts. There is a collection of interconnected basins linked by deep valleys (or undersea canyons). Submarines can hide under water levels of differing temperature and salinity.

There is at least 100 years of bathymetric data in the SCS collected by the British, US, French, Dutch, Japanese and now Chinese navies. Most of this data is kept secret although there are some public, but crude, sea depth maps, like the one above.

There are many ways of detecting submarines the oldest being naked eye visual, acoustic/sonar and magnetic anomaly (used in the destruction of submarines as far back as 1918). Magnetic anomaly detection needs to be very close range (certainly less than a mile at most) measuring a submarine's magnetic abnormality vs background magnetism. The volcanic areas in the SCS are very different from the magnetic uniformity found in the North Sea or the Baltic.

Most submarines as well as surface warships have a reduced Magnetic signature through the process of Degaussing.

Here is also a list of ASW detection aspects that might be available to China's "SEAWEB".

French strategic writers

French strategic writers are of special value as they bring original perspectives. This is because they are not beholden to US assessments that dominate the Anglosphere. Greater originality is also possible because France is not automatically led by the US in being anti-Russian or anti-Chinese.

Here is an excellent, fascinating and long (equivalent to about 8 pages) study:

François-Xavier Bonnet's Charting submarine routes in Southeast Asia

in Hérodote Volume 176, Issue 1, January 2020, pages 25 to 41, Translated and edited by Cadenza Academic Translations, Translator: Peter Collins, Editor: Faye Winsor, Senior editor: Mark Mellor.

Bonnet's study has many things to say about:

- the increasing importance of SSKs and nuclear subs in Southeast Asian and SCS waters.

- relatively low amount of publicity about ways through the Philippine islands.

- well understood by some, though secret in detail, paths for nuclear submarines though the Philippine and Indonesian archipelagos.

- US and Chinese secrecy about viable submarine paths and sensor arrays throughout the SCS especially within the so-called "Dangerous Ground" in the Spratly Islands

- China's sensor buildups on and between its new militarized reefs since the 2010s eg. Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs.

- China's evolution in SSBN development including Type 094 "Jins" with JL-2 SLBMs (that can already hit Australia). There is an expectation Type 096 "Tangs" will soon be developed with ever longer range JL-3s that from the SCS (including "Dangerous Ground") waters may have the range to hit the continental US.

Hérodote Volume 176, Issue 1, January 2020, also has another article with deep submarine relevance. This is Benoît de Tréglodé's, Vietnam’s geostrategy regarding the Spratly Islands and the surrounding ASEAN nations

Other interesting Hérodote volumes are many, including:

- Seas and Oceans, Volume 163, Issue 4, 2016 eg. Camille Morel's Threats beneath the seas: Vulnerabilities in the global cable network

- Geopolitics of the Datasphere Volume 177-178, Issue 2-3, April 2020, and

- Osint: digital investigations and fieldworks, Volume 186, Issue 3, July 2022.

July 28, 2023

Virginias For Australia Rightly in Trouble

Pete Comment

Australian PM Albanese's and Biden's PR campaign for Virginias the US Navy desperately needs, being sold instead to Australia (which has good reasons not to fight Australia's largest trading partner China) is rightly in trouble. China will be the dominant power in Australia's region sooner or later. This is while the US remains President-by-President unpredictable (a la Trump) perhaps on the way to isolationism.

The US will only sell the Virginias to Australia if there is an ironclad understanding Australia will continue to be an ever loyal follower of the US into battle.

Australia should forego the A$250 Billion preparatory and unit costs of up to 5 Virginias, if that locks Australia into following the US into a war with China. Australia later buying/building mainly UK designed SSN-AUKUSs in the 2040s has not been costed by the Australian Government, but may well be another A$250 Billion.

REPORT

Part of Matthew Knott's Sydney Morning Herald, July 28, 2023 report is:

The “‘A risk we should not take’: Republican resistance mounts to [AUKUS] nuclear submarine plan

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has declared he remains confident Australia will secure Virginia-class submarines from the United States, even as almost half of all Republican senators came out against the current plan on the grounds it would dangerously weaken the US Navy as it competes with China.

Twenty-three Republican senators, including Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell, wrote to President Joe Biden on Thursday (Australian time) saying they did not support the proposal to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia unless the US doubled its own domestic production capacity.

...While noting that the AUKUS pact had broad bipartisan support in Washington, the senators wrote: “The administration’s current plan requires the transfer of three US Virginia-class attack submarines from the existing US submarine fleet without a clear plan for replacing these submarines.

“This plan, if implemented without change, would unacceptably weaken the US fleet even as China seeks to expand its military power and influence.”

The Republican senators noted that the US said it required 66 attack-class submarines, but the number of boats in its fleet is set to decline to 46 by 2030.

“Under the current AUKUS plan to transfer US Virginia-class submarines to a partner nation before meeting the Navy’s own requirements, the number of available nuclear submarines in the US submarine fleet would be lowered further,” they wrote.

“This is a risk we cannot take.”

Roger Wicker, the top Republican on the Senate armed services committee, previously vowed to block the submarine transfer unless the Biden administration funded a massive increase in the US domestic production capacity.

The letter shows these concerns are widely held among Senate Republicans.

The senators say in their letter the US would have to produce up to 2.5 [Virginia] submarines a year – up from 1.2 boats currently – to make up for the sale of up to three submarines to Australia and avoid shrinking the US Navy’s operational capacity..."

MUCH MORE IN THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD REPORT

July 26, 2023

The Sensor Saturated South China Sea

The sensor sturated South China Sea (Map courtesy Wikipedia)
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Ghalib Kabir on July 24, 2023, made some interesting comments on the increasing difficulty of submarines operating in the generally shallow South China Sea (SCS).

It is suspected that China is laying undersea sensors of increasing quality and quantity. These are criss-crosing the SCS from and between the Chinese mainland and around Taiwan, China's Hainan Island province and between China's new SCS militarised islands (in the Paracel and Spratley island groups). Also China has increasing number of mobile sensors and weapons platforms, including increasing numbers of SSNs and Yuan SSKs to weaponise the sensor networks.

This sensor saturation of the SCS means Australia's current Collins will need to avoid their regular SCS mission area. Also even Australia's Virginias (if the RAN ever receives them) may not be able to specialise in SCS missions.

Ghalib Kabir comments:

The 209s, Scorpenes, any future 218s, 212 derivatives etc will face a simple fact in the SCS.

The SCS is a shallow sea and the Chinese have bugged the damned sea floor with sensors already.

Here is a helpful extract from good ol' USN on the SCS,

"Nearly half its seabed is continental shelf in water depths less than [650 feet/200m] a single deep basin with several depths to more than [5,000m] makes up only 16 percent of the South China Sea."

See The South China Sea: Complex and Changing by Captain Lawson W. Brigham, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), Published at U.S. NAVAL INSITUTE January 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/1/1,439

[Down to 200m depths only] very quiet subs could have a chance. 200m in 70-80% of the SCS makes it prime territory for using expendable UUVs and [surfaced] USVs. The PLAN will face the same problem Autralian or other nations subs will face...shallow seas...ocean floor sensors can "ping" [active sonar pulses and perhaps LED or laser pulses] and get the readings of even Li-AIP subs crawling at 2 knots at 150m.

If war breaks out no Taigei/Soryu/U212 is going to survive for long against the giant dragnet the PLAN will activate no holds barred. On the other hand, the Yuans...even the so called 'ultra quiet' Type 039Ds might not be invincible....

Lastly.... I think any RAN Virginia would have to be an SSGN that can fire hypersonic missiles if need be....[at Chinese ships and islands in the SCS]

We have discussed this since 2015...if the fat falls into the fire...then the Quad will need a mix of USVs, UUVs, XLUUVs, Manned special mission midget subs, AIP-Li SSKs and SSGNs along with surface fleet and Naval Air arm with P-8 MPAs, E-2D AEWs, MH-60R ASW, "Growler" EA-18Gs, F-35s and Sea Guardian [Reaper variant] MQ-9s capable of EW, LRSTOW [missiles with lightweight torpedoes?] launch....plus the ability to knock out Chinese Yaogan reconnaissance satellites and other Chinese military satellites to blind the PLAN and PLAAF.

We either go all in or risk a solid pasting in the first island and second island chains.

This Tom Clancyesque fleet scenario is no more a joke...China can deploy 50 Type-54 frigates with 40 VLS each, 30 plus Type 052Ds with 80 VLS each and 15-20 Type 055 cruisers with 128-144 VLS each...plus 70 Chinese SSNs and SSKs with a combined missile capability 400-500 VLS equivalent....

As China's population ages and economically feels the pinch...trust them to find an outlet by picking a quarrel just as they did with India in 1959-60 in the middle of the great leap forward disaster..."

July 25, 2023

RSS Impeccable sub in Singapore: Interesting Military History

Shawn C has advised:

On July 8, 2023 David Boey reported on his blog the arrival of RSS Impeccable the first Invincible-class submarine to enter Singapore waters. This was on heavy lift ship Rolldock Storm.

The Singapore Armed Forces appeared to implement extensive security measures to screen the RSS Impeccable from the wrong viewers. Steel modules and containers were used to cover the hull and fin/sail of the 70m long submarine.

[Pete Comment: Tight security could be because Impeccable has some of the "diamond hull" radar and sonar reflection characteristics that TKMS and its customers see as a major stealth advance in the latest TKMS subs. Also anechoic coating and hull sonars might be worth keeping secret for as long as possible. Meanwhile Impeccable's fin/sail has already been caught on Singapore Ministry of Defence camera as it entered Singapore Harbour (below).

What might be an intentionally fuzzy photo. Impeccable enters "RSS Singapura" better known as Changi Naval Base. (Singapore Mindef picture via Naval News).

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First of class RSS Invincible itself is being used as a Singapore crew training vessel in Kiel, Germany. This may be until sister boats RSS Illustrious and Inimitable have been completed and delivered to Singapore.

A Singapore Mindef News Release reports Impeccable had its official "welcome home" ceremony on July 20, 2023.]

Shawn reckons one of the two remaining Challenger class submarines, RSS Conqueror or RSS Chieftain, will retire by the end of this year, as they are both over 55 years old. They were originally launched in the 1960s in their previous Swedish Sjöormen-class lives.

Some Singapore Military History

Speaking more generally Shawn advises when Singapore became an independent republic in August 1965 Singapore had to create its own defence structure and culture. Singapore approached much larger countries, Egypt and India, but those countries differed vastly in land area and population. It was Israel that had more similarities including the very high level of education and per capita GDP that Singapore planned.

Israeli defence advice was extensive. Also with Singapore's limited military age population it needed to adopt an Israeli/Swiss National Conscription/Reservist system.

Like Israel Singapore gets the most out of limited numbers of servicemen by having significant amounts of high quality equipment. That includes good French stealth frigates, submarines from Sweden and Germany; more Leopard 2 tanks than Australia has Abrams; US F-15s, F-16s, C-130s, F-35Bs (on order); and US Apache, Chinook and Seahawk helicopters, to name a few.

[Pete Comment: "Other" ties with Anglo countries and Israel are reputedly of a high level.]

July 23, 2023

SSHNs or XLUUVs are Australia's Submarine Future

In response to Grampa Jim's July 23, 2023 post:

I think the extreme Australian and US investment in making Virginias for Australia a reality would make Australia more of an essential ally for the US.

ie. Australia would be more the essential ally in peacetime, conventional wartime and even in a nuclear war. This might work to overide isolationist trends in US politics.

Also emerging hypersonic missile technology could make Australian Virginias small but critical platforms that could carry nuclear tipped hypersonic missiles to deter China. Submarines are the best means of nuclear deterrence. I would call these Australian subs "Submarines Hypersonic Missile Nuclear propelled (SSHNs)."

Conventional subs like Japan's Taigeis (and indeed the Collins) are of declining value in Australia's Indonesian Archipelago Straits and South China Sea critical mission areas. This is because China's fixed and mobile anti-submarine acoustic sensors are becoming more effective in detecting when conventional subs run their diesels in those areas.

Also such conventional subs are too slow to combat the more capable Chinese navy, air and rocket forces.

I think if Australia is unwillling to turn to submarine nuclear weapons then after the Collins life extension (LOTEs) keep Collins going through to the late 2030s, XLUUVs or XL-AUVs are Australia's submarine future. These XLUUVs include the RAN's Anduril GHOST SHARK project.

July 20, 2023

US Republican Analyst: Not Enough Virginias for AUKUS

John Noonan is an American republican national security commentator and analyst. He is a former policy advisor to Republican politicians and a former USAF ICBM launch officer.

In the following excerpt from his National Review article “Biden’s Vaunted Submarine Deal Needs Meat on Its Bones” of July 19, 2023, Noonan strongly doubts the US will have enough Virginias available for Australia. Noonan also takes it as given Australia will be drawn into any war against China.

It is also implicit from the article that the multi-billion dollars in Australian taxpayers' money that the Albanese Government is donating to the US submarine industrial base, is wasted.

The except is:

“…every silver lining has a cloud. And that is the sad state of American shipbuilding. The Navy says we need 66 attack submarines. We have 49, a number will soon drop to 46. Worse, while the Navy claims 66 total hulls is the target, reality dictates that this is a floor not a ceiling. When I worked these issues in the Senate, I always found it odd that the goal of 66 attacks subs stayed static as the number of Chinese battle-force ships rose and rose and rose. The real number is no doubt closer to 80-85 hulls with room for growth. In 1989, we had 97 boats with 19 under construction, in maintenance, or being reactivated. So we’re low. Far too low. Australia is a good ally that can act as America’s right arm in a war with Beijing. But it is a valid question if now is the time for America to be shedding even more submarine hulls.

This hard-nosed reality was made clear by Senator Roger Wicker of Mississippi, the head Republican on the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee, in the WSJ:

Nearly 40% of U.S. attack submarines cannot be deployed because of maintenance delays. For example, the USS Connecticut had an accident in the South China Sea in 2021 and likely won’t be operational until 2026.

The U.S. submarine industrial base is producing an average of 1.2 Virginia-class attack submarines a year, short of the two our Navy needs. There are many reasons for this underperformance. For years, the U.S. government purchased only one submarine annually—hardly enough to maintain a strong industrial base.

By comparison, during the 1980s we bought four times as many. The effort to ramp up production to a rate of two attack submarines a year has been plagued with workforce and supply-chain challenges.

To keep the commitment made under Aukus, and not reduce our own fleet, the U.S. would have to produce between 2.3 and 2.5 attack submarines a year.

The Navy has suggested that we could fill the long-term gap by shifting skilled workers on the Columbia submarine program to the Virginia or SSN(X) attack subs when it wraps in 2045. But that is not a solution. We will need more than twelve Columbias, those are the fat-hulled subs pregnant with nuclear ballistic missiles, as China expands its nuclear forces. You cannot grow a master shipbuilder with a one-off dump of supplemental funds into a presidential budget request, as some have suggested. Nor can you order a yard to do 30 percent more things on existing or inflation-adjusted budgets and expect new subs to pop out like a rabbit from a magician’s hat.

The threat from China’s fleet is serious, so we want the Royal Australian Navy armed to the gills. They are so integrated with us they may as well be part of the U.S. Navy. But this is a problem too common with the Biden administration. A good idea made worse by rosy estimates and suspect planning. The next presidential budget dump in late winter [February 2024] will signal to Australia and Britain if they are serious or not. If the White House asks Congress for real money, with a real multi-year intent behind a real effort to unscrew our production and maintenance woes, they might just make their one foreign-policy victory a reality.”

July 18, 2023

Nuclear Waste Dumps on AUKUS Nuclear Sub Program

Pete Comment

Australian governments have searched for a suitable permanent Low to Intermediate level nuclear waste dump site for 43 years (since 1980) if not longer. The many false starts with lack of success over thos 43 years is a definite measure of the unpopularity of most nuclear ideas in Australia. This includes the continued rejection by Australians of nuclear power/electricity reactors. Australia has only operated small nuclear medicine/experimental reactors and/or other small nuclear equipment since the 1950s.

In a blow to the Australian Government's current hope to establish a future Low to Intermediate level nuclear waste dump near Kimba, South Australia, a court decision (see Article below) quashed it today.

It is quite likely the Australian Government intended to upgrade "Kimba" waste dump by the 2050s to take High Level nuclear waste from Australia's future decommissioned AUKUS nuclear submarines.

Australia's Spent Nuclear Fuel/Nuclear Waste Obligations

Australia is Party to the UN Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (“The Convention”).

The Convention applies to many things, including spent fuel resulting from the operation of civilian and military (including submarine) nuclear reactors and to radioactive waste resulting from civilian and defence programs.

Australia’s obligations as a Party to The Convention are many, including “appropriate siting, design and construction of waste storage and disposal facilities”.

In the international nuclear industry the onus of storing spent nuclear fuel/nuclear waste falls to countries originating the fuel/waste. This becomes complex if the US or UK provides the AUKUS HEU placed in a UK or US built AUKUS nuclear submarine reactor that is then sold second hand or new to Australia. Who, then, is responsible?

Lack of Public Consultation For The Albanese Government's Nuclear Program

The Australian public have never been permitted to vote for the Morrison Coalition or Albanese Labor Governments' AUKUS nuclear submarine program. No referendum on that. Is it therefore possible that, after Albanese has spent many $Billions of Australian taxpayers' money on these submarines, Australians will prevail upon a future Australian Government to cancel this submarine program!

Australia is just a small-medium "power". Nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), that Albanese has signed us up to buy, are extremely expensive weapons that only Great Powers have been able to afford and justify. SSNs, to date, have been restricted to nuclear weapon powers. This is due to SSNs' main high-level warfare functions being to protect friendly nuclear armed SSBNs, while tracking and perhaps destroying enemy SSBNs.

Put simply the highest goal of Australia's future SSNs would be to protect US and UK SSBNs while also tracking and perhaps destroying Chinese and perhaps Russian SSBNs. This would directly involve Australia fighting nuclear armed China and perhaps Russia, potentially with Australia as a combatant in a nuclear war.

Given this, Australian govenrments need to consult we the public on what we are signing up to in buying nuclear submarines for hundreds of billions of dollars.

ARTICLE

Australia's government owned ABC News reports July 18, 2023:

"Traditional owners win legal challenge to stop nuclear waste facility in Kimba"

Traditional owners on South Australia's Eyre Peninsula have won a legal challenge to stop the federal government building a nuclear waste facility near Kimba.

The federal government had planned to store low and intermediate level radioactive waste at the proposed facility.

Barngarla traditional owners applied for a judicial review in the Federal Court, arguing the facility would interfere with a sacred site.

They also said they were not properly consulted about the plan before it was approved in 2021.

The court this morning ruled in favour of the native title group, setting aside a federal government declaration made in 2021, and leaving the future of the project in severe doubt.

Justice Natalie Charlesworth made the decision in favour of the Barngarla people on the grounds there was apprehended bias in the decision-making process in selecting the site due to "pre-judgement"

"An artist's impression of the proposed nuclear waste storage facility near Kimba." (Supplied via ABC)
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...MUCH MORE IN THE ABC ARTICLE.

Orcas/Killer Whales Damaging Yatchs

Submarine Matters now extends to submersible animals, eg. Orcas/Killer Whales.

Why have Orcas recently been attacking yatchs?

A short video is here and below.

Longer explanations come from Popular Mechanics here dated June 30, 2023.

July 13, 2023

AUKUS Subs Main Role Related to Nuclear War

Marine Engineer, Professor Jonathan Gates authoritative 188 page UK publication:

Astute Class Nuclear Submarine: 2010 to date (Haynes Owners' Workshop Manual, 2018).

On page 159 Gates indicates the most important missions of Astute submarines (and by extension SSNs generally):

"Astute class submarines have a major role in ensuring that SSBNs are not followed in peacetime and are protected in wartime.

They are also responsible for tracking enemy SSBNs and neutralising them in times of war."

All navies that have SSNs see their SSNs' major role as protecting their own nuclear missile armed SSBNs while being prepared to destroy enemy SSBNs.

Following Australia's policy of Collins SSK interoperability with US SSNs escalating in the 2030s to Australian SSNs becoming "interchangeable" with US SSNs:

1. Where does this leave Australia? Australia's intention is to acquire a large fleet of 8 SSNs for a "small-medium" power, while having no public plans to acquire SSBNs.

Or will Australia become an ally in nuclear war fighting...

2. Might the Australian Government's insistence that "Australia's AUKUS SSNs will be conventionally armed" disguise roles of protecting US SSBNs in wartime while destroying Chinese SSBNs in wartime?

3. Will future non-nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles for Australian SSNs be gradually replaced by a new class of weapon. That is by US developed nuclear armed hypersonic missiles for Australian SSNs in the 2040s?

July 11, 2023

India May Build 3 More Kalvari-Scorpene Subs

In a report of July 10, 2023 from India's The Print, India might be buying several French designed weapon types. This might include 3 additional Kalvari-class Scorpenes, without AIP, to be assembled at Mumbai's Mazagon dockyard.

The Print report is by SNEHESH ALEX PHILIP and edited by Tony Rai. The report states in part:

"New Delhi: India and France are set to ink key agreements that would pave the way for new fighters and submarines for the Indian Navy during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to the country for the Bastille Day [July 14, 2023] parade this week, ThePrint has learnt.

On the agenda are a deal to procure 26 naval version of the Rafale fighter jets [and] three additional Scorpene submarine[s]..."

...Another key important project is the Project 75 [Kalvari-class] under which six Scorpene class submarines have been built in India with partnership with state-un Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL).

The Indian Navy is [separately pursuing Project 75I ("I" for India) for 6 SSKs with already proven, operational, AIP].

The French are out of the race for [Project 75I] because they don’t meet key tender requirements of the Indian Navy.

Sources said that the French through their India partner MDL have proposed to the government to build three more [Kalvari-class] Scorpene submarines [at MDL's existing Kalvari assembly line] with the Indian shipyard making a case for expertise gained while ensuring the vessels do not go waste.

It is understood that the Indian Navy feels that three more Scorpene class submarines can be built since the P75I programme is delayed and could take time for it to see the light of the day.

The Indian Navy is facing a submarine crisis and has fallen back on its 30 year plan which ends in 2030.

Under the ambitious 30-year plan that ends in 2030, India was to build 24 submarines — 18 conventional submarines and six nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) — as an effective deterrent against China and Pakistan.

Of the 18 conventional submarines, Indian Navy has managed only 6 so far.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh [chaired] a crucial meeting of the Defence Acquisition Council [DAC] [mentioned below].
---------------------------------

Subsequently, on July 13, 2023, the DAC granted the Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for procurement of the three additional Scorpenes to be assembled by MDL.

July 8, 2023

3 RAN Officers Graduate US Nuke Sub School

Australia's government owned ABC News, July 8, 2023 reports:
"Inside 'nuke school', the elite US training ground preparing Australian submariners for an AUKUS future"

"By North America bureau chief Jade Macmillan and Bradley McLennan in Charleston, South Carolina:

In America's deep south, a group of students has just completed one of the most rigorous academic programs in the US military.

And for the first time, there were Australians among them.

Three members of the Royal Australian Navy have graduated from the Nuclear Power School in South Carolina, more commonly known as 'nuke school'.

The training pipeline was established with the US as part of the AUKUS agreement, under which Australia will obtain its own nuclear-powered submarines.

"It's a historic event for our Navy, an historic event for our submarine force and I think it's an historic event for our nation," said Australia's Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Mark Hammond.

"Two years ago, this wasn't on the radar.

"And we've come a long way in such a short period of time but there's a lot more work to do."

Years out from Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered subs, the graduation is an early step towards making AUKUS a reality.

But there are still major hurdles ahead when it comes to the broader workforce challenges presented by the plan.

Inside 'nuke school'

The three Australians — Lieutenant Commander James Heydon, Lieutenant Commander Adam Klyne, and Lieutenant William Hall – started at the Nuclear Power School in November with the aim of eventually qualifying to operate the reactors onboard nuclear-powered submarines.

Lieutenant Commander Heydon described the course he's just graduated from as a "four-year engineering degree crammed into six months".

"Maths, physics, thermodynamics, fluid dynamics, radiological controls, to how do we safely steward and manage the nuclear plant and the nuclear by-products, are I guess aspects of what we've been learning here," he said.

"My experience [in the Australian Navy] was ship design and ship construction.

"While they were aspects here, it was very foreign. So it was … a crash course into the deep end, sink or swim, and we all swam."

A submarine at the surface with morning sun on its right flank, the ocean stretches behind it

Submarine Matters