Richard Marles was appointed Deputy PM and Defence Minister. Marles is leader of the
dominant Labor Right faction and has a long term interest in defence.
This
is the best possible outcome for Defence. Marles has factional power, is from
the right (so no ideological problem with SSNs) and is Deputy PM to boot, so
will have clout in cabinet to push things through. Frankly this is a relief.
“But there’s one other scenario that an
Australia-specific safeguard would have to cover. And that is in the event of
an accident where Australia would need to gain access to the reactor….”
Gessler has written interesting perspectives on the May 24, 2022, QUAD Tokyo Summit.
Regarding the part about
Chinese illegal fishing, it appears that the QUAD has begun to take some concrete steps to
tackle this problem. While the media headlines were grabbed by larger
initiatives like the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the QUAD's recently concluded summit in Tokyo included the launch of several
initiatives which seem to have not grabbed as many eyeballs:
Concerning the Indo-Pacific
Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA):
"...This initiative
will transform the ability of partners in the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia,
and the Indian Ocean Region to fully monitor the waters on their shores and, in
turn, to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific. Quad countries are committed to
contributing to the region’s maritime domain awareness—a fundamental
requirement for peace, stability, and prosperity—through an investment in IPMDA
over five years."
"...IPMDA will build
a faster, wider, and more accurate maritime picture of near-real-time
activities in partners’ waters. This common operating picture will integrate
three critical regions—the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian
Ocean Region—in the Indo-Pacific. The benefits of this picture are vast: it
will allow tracking of “dark shipping” and other tactical-level activities,
such as rendezvous at sea, as well as improve partners’ ability to respond to
climate and humanitarian events and to protect their fisheries, which are vital
to many Indo-Pacific economies."
Details regarding how
they plan to do this are contained in the Fact Sheet above.
Also, the beginnings of a
"Counter-Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)" initiative
appear to be taking root, finally:
"We are committed to
working closely with partners and the region to drive public and private
investment to bridge gaps. To achieve this, Quad will seek to extend more than 50
billion USD of infrastructure assistance and investment in the
Indo-Pacific, over the next five years."
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Gessler Comments
I'd imagine most of the 50
billion USD would be aimed at dissuading South East Asian nations from
Chinese debt-trap loans under BRI. However I would also think the Pacific Islands
would also become a priority. As it is already among the 3 critical regions (Pacific
Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean Region) identified for the IPMDA.
The job of countering
China cannot be a simple matter of building military capabilities, while that
is important, its also important to appreciate that China [has a much larger economy than] Russia. China’s
CCP is capable of bringing tremendous economic leverage to the table which can have
the effect of tilting the balance in their favour in many regions without ever
firing a shot. A multi-domain approach is necessary to counter this.
Pete Comment
QUAD members need to be conscious
that the new acronyms they’re generating may lose traction.
The QUAD should not lose its way by degenerating into a too-many-countries-covered, under too many topics, like the past APEC Talkfest.
Australia's new Foreign Minister Penny Wongof half caucasian, half Hakka (Malaysian) Chinese parentage. Penny Wong is much more articulate and senior in Australia's new Labor Government than her predecessor. the introverted Marise Payne, was in the preceding Coalition Government. Labor still supports AUKUS.
---
China’s
Foreign Minister Wang Yiand a
20 person delegation have begun visiting 10 Pacific Island nations this week.
This includes physical visits
to 7 (west to east in map below) Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu,Fiji, Tonga, Samoa and Kiribati. China is also holding Internet “visits” to the
remaining 3, the Cook Islands, Niue and the Federated States of Micronesia.
The US bases in the large, rich, island of Guamare within the much smaller, poorer, islands of the Federated States of Micronesia. So its no surprise that Micronesia's President, David Panuelo, has told leaders of the other 9 Pacific nations that he won’t endorse China’s plans.
Australia's new Foreign Minister, Penny Ying-Yen Wong - from today is conducting visits to most of those island nations over the next few weeks to try to head off China's moves. The 10 island nations have traditionally been Five Eye friendly, with Australia and New Zealand being "Deputy Sheriffs" to keep it that way.
China wants the 10 nations to sign
up to a comprehensive agreement covering police, security, communications
infrastructure and fisheries. China training police is significant because most
of the island nations do not have defence forces.
Instead it is island police forces who
provide paramilitary power in most of the nations. If China trains these police
forces it is these forces that could launch regime changes/coups against
their island leaders if those leaders pursue policies not to China’s liking.
Chinese Illegal Fishing
China’s fisheries plan has added significance
in that China’s vast naval militia fishing
fleet conducts the most illegal fishing in the region - especially tuna trawling.
Chinese infrastructure loans, which usually include generous commissions/bribes for Pacific Island
leaders, would make China’s illegal fishing legal in many Pacific waters.
Chinese infrastructure offers are
thought to include improved mobile phone networks and new internet telecommunications
generally. These new networks could more easily be monitored by China’s NSA.
China’s new ambitious plans for
these island nations will be on the way to dual-use air and sea ports that
could gradually morph into Chinese air and naval bases. This would fundamentally free China from the present situation in which its air and naval forces can be hemmed in within the first island chain in time of war.
- the USN's Guantanamo Bay Naval Base maintained by force in an ever reluctant Cuba. This Base was permanently leased to the US under the unequal Treaty of 1903 which followed the US invasion of (then Spanish) Cuba way back in 1898. Under such duress it is no surprise that the CIA reports China is Cuba's largest export destination.
Yet it is US conventional and nuclear military power that has protected Australia in the past and present.
[1] "Firstly, if you are
living in China, then you be cleared by CCP to post comments here (and somewhat
blame CCP to again make a good image in Australian minds, after disastrous
policies) after seeing the multi-national nature of this blog."
I have nothing to do with
the government, Arpit. If you view China as a country where the government
micromanages every single person, you are bound to see China as evil and alien
entity. And call me thin-skinned but I also find it insulting since it plays
into that stereotype that describes the Chinese people as robots. I would
advise you to visit China for a few days after the border opens again to
foreigners. Your views would probably change.
+++++++++++++++++++
[2] "If you think these
are not patronizing, then I must say, CCP indoctrinated you well. The fall of
the CCP is guaranteed, the policies they adopted is unsustainable, and Xi
Jinping is nothing but Brezhnev 2.0 and but far more stupider. "
Yes, those are the
scenarios the PLA prepares for, Taiwan contingency being the most prominent by
a huge margin. And CCP is not going to fall anytime soon. Ethnic fault lines
that destroyed the USSR don't exist in China, and 70 years of success makes the
CCP hugely popular in China. This "CCP will fall soon" was an empty
hope by Western governments throughout the last 70 years. And I would say it
benefited China.
- Taiwan rejected the
extremely lopsided reunification offer of Deng Xiaoping. Read about it. The PRC
offered even editing the flag and the name of the country. Taiwan was going to
keep its military and foreign affairs. [??] All PRC wanted was an official
declaration of sovereignty of the PRC in Taiwan. De facto independence would
continue and they would get a permanent representative in the mainland's gov.
They didn't accept. They didn't declare independence during those years while
they can either. KMT was probably hoping for the CCP's collapse so then they
could return to the mainland politics.
- Clinton and [Presidents George W? or George H W?] Bush tried
to influence China through trade. The ultimate goal was obviously adding China
to the US-led global order. The US was probably also hoping for the
Westernization of China, which would allow substantial US political and
cultural influence on China. They thought it would happen inevitably since the CCP
had to lose grip. Didn't happen. Chinese people didn't Westernize and the CCP
was popular among the public. I think the US would be a lot more forceful
against China during the 1990s and 2000s if it knew China wouldn't become a
deputy sheriff in the US-led order.
CCP's collapse is an
empty hope. It is here to stay.
++++++++++++++++++++++++
[3] "For J-20 don't make
me laugh, in 4-5 years Pentagon leaked out exaggerated reports, for lobbies and
think tanks to pressurize on US Govt. And gullible Chinese believe it? Right
now, several aspects of J-20 is not even 4th gen, leave alone 5th gen. And
there is nothing OpSec in J-20 that Ruskies don't know about."
You can laugh as much as
you can. The J-20 is 5th gen. I could go on and write and write a jingoistic
breakdown here but I won't.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
[4] "The Chinese are
investing with Russians because they are even far behind the Russians in these
technologies. "
It is not that simple.
Russia has experience in enacting early warning systems that monitor a massive
area and that can work synchronously with their extremely varied nuclear
arsenal. Israel has no such experience. Their country is tiny and their nuclear
arsenal is very small. And as I said Russian and Chinese systems will work
together for maximum geographical coverage. If we are talking about just radars
China is ahead of everyone except the USA. For example where is the Israeli
equivalent of JY-27A or SLC-7 [longe range early warning radars]?
Or where is Type 346's [naval AESA radars - see 346B variant]equivalent? The same goes for satellites too. Where is the equivalent of GF-11
and GF-13[Chinese reconnaissance satellites] in Israel, Russia or India?
It's been a very interesting 24 hours in Australian politics.
1. The Australian Labor Party, led by Anthony Albanese, has wonthe May 21, 2022,Federal Election. The current Morrison Coalition government has already
conceded defeat.
On ongoing vote counting Labor has won 73 seats in the more
important House of Representatives. 76 seats are needed for Labor to govern
outright. Labor may well achieve that 76 magic number.
The most pro-Labor and powerful "minor party" crossbench grouping are the anti-nuclear Greens
with 3 seats (so far).
If Labor needs to form an alliance with the Greens to govern then
things could get interesting. This is concerning Labor's current pro AUKUS nuclear
submarine policy, contained here "We will also support new arrangements, such as AUKUS".
If the Greens tried to block pro-nuclear submarine legislation in the
House of Representatives, and/or in the Senate, then it is likely Coalition
members would cross the floor to reinforce Labor's vote into an absolute
majority. However such a Coalition action is not guaranteed.
If Labor gets to the 76 seats majority by itself, then the possibility of Greens blocking the nuclear submarines policy is moot.
2. Labor's view of relations with China, and
Russia/Ukraine is the same as the Coalition's which is the same as the US/NATO
policies. So Labor has a policy that China should abide be the internationalterritorial laws (including China NOT invading Taiwan) and Russia
should get out of Ukraine. Australia is supporting and enacting NATO's economic sanctions against Russia and Australia has been sending weapons to Ukraine's army.
On the issue of any country blockading China's sea trade from the Indian Ocean and then to the Pacific and China...and blockading the Chinese made goods that flow back into the Indian Ocean and to all other oceans and seas...
I think that would have such adverse knock-on effects to world trade generally that no country would use such a blockade strategy.
China's sea trade is critically important to World economic health, particularly China's major trading partners which happen to include the USA,
South American countries, most European countries and most countries in Asia.
That includes India itself, Japan, the Koreas, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and Australia as well as most major economies I haven't mentioned.
Also OPEC values China's demand for oil highly. An unhappy OPEC, especially Saudi Arabia, would also have adverse international trade and financial impacts.
In this intensively globalised world curtailing China's trade would rapidly impact, even close, stock exchanges, currency markets, metals and primary products markets, US debt bonds and every other economic balance.
China has a very large economy - so it cannot be marginalized like much smaller economies, for example:
- Japan's economy prior to 1941 and even that led to the Pacific War - the Soviet Union's comparitively small economy during the Cold War, or
Ultimately operated by the US-Canadian IUSSPacific-Indian Ocean, Naval Ocean Processing Facility, Whidbey Island, Washington State, is the following. Above is the track of an IUSS undersea array from Japan, through Southeast Asia, to India. Many customer countries, such as Australia, would use the array's data to keep an eye on interesting submarines, like China's.
For submarine operations and for IUSS acoustic sensors a great many temperature, salinity, wave motion, seafloor geography and baseline acoustic measures are required to feed supercomputer records of US Naval Intelligence in conjunction with the NSA. Such an amount of data permits 3D modelling.
America's Five Eye partners all do their bit to collect data using sensors on submarines, ships, wave-gliders, AUVs and floats. Floats and AUVs might be assigned certain depths from the surface down to 2,000 meters. After several months the floats or AUVs come to the surface to radio the vast amount of data they have collected or rendevous to be "captured" by friendly ships.
The environmental including acoustic records held on board submarines are tailored to their missions and are constantly updatable. They assist submarines to move discretely and improve the efficiency of IUSS undersea sensors, frequently assisting ASW operations.
IMOS uses passive acoustic hydrophone equipment to monitors natural and "man-made noise sources". Such sources include submarines, surface ships and even maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters flying over hydrophones.
Hydrophone arrays are strung together physically-electrically (or within acoustic communications range) and are connected to shore stations. For Australia data is then fed constantly by landline, radio or satellite to major naval bases like Fleet Base West (near Perth) and East (in Sydney). All feeds would also go to Defence HQ Canberra.
Feeds may be transmitted almost instantly to subs, ships and aircraft pursuing targets or land processed to improve the "picture". Feeds may also go to Five Eye allies and Quads (India and Japan).
The RAN and Australian Defence Science and Technology (DST) Group would not be the largest "Operational Partners" of IMOS unless there were concrete military advantages.
As Australia's submarines operate out of Fleet Base West, just sould of Perth, eastern Indian Ocean littoral and deeper oceanic conditions are of major interest.
One could assume from the float track immediately above that an IUSS array from Fleet Base West to Australia's Cocos-Keeling or Christmas islands may be a good idea.
Moving west an array from one of those islands to the US/UK base at Diego Garcia might be a useful Five Eye project. India might also be a customer for that feed data.
From Diego Garcia an array might be well placed to terminate at the US Naval Base at Djibouti. See map below.
Separately an array from Fleet Base West to the seabed north of Antarctica might be a useful way to intercept Chinese SSNs and future SSBNs which may travel the more discrete east to west route south of Australia through the Southern Ocean.
The following is a continuing project that I’ll incrementally add to.
The US Navy Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) website https://www.csp.navy.mil/cus/intermittently disappears – so below is a (hopefully) lasting public
record.
Only in the US does a highly sensitive IUSS have a public website shopfront. The website can be read from the Antarctica to Northern
Fleet, Russia. Replacing the well known Cold War North Atlantic US, UK and BTW CanadianSOSUS system is the IUSS which is much more diverse in sensors and allies.
IUSS exists in the highly
classified distributed Intranet of the US Navy. All major navies, like Russia’s
and China’s, have their own IUSS. Smaller Western navies, or navies well
disposed to the US, have varying degrees of access to the mainly US paid for
and managed IUSS. The IUSS has as many mobile nodes as the fixed nodes that are
easier to picture.
Those mobile nodes with weapons, icluding land
based anti-ship missiles and fixed and/or mines weaponize the IUSS network.
It is a measure of IUSS’ distributed
nature that it formally exists under Commander, Submarine Force, US Pacific
Fleet. Yet its more immediate “Commander,
Undersea Surveillance" https://www.csp.navy.mil/cus/, is
based on the Atlantic facing US East coast at Bullpup Street Virginia
Beach, Virginia, USA.
I’ll run through the publicly available details of
the IUSS.
To support antisubmarine
warfare command and tactical forces by detecting, classifying, and providing
timely reporting of information on submarines and other contacts of interest;
to provide command of Naval Ocean Processing Facilities (NOPFs), to include
direct tactical control of associated Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System
(SURTASS) ships; to gather long term acoustic, oceanographic, and hydrographic
information.
Additional Information:
The Integrated Undersea
Surveillance System mission is multi-faceted, encompassing not only the operations
of detection, localization and tracking of submarines and the collection of
acoustic and hydrographic information, but also the maintenance of processing
and communications equipment necessary to carry out the operational mission.
Since the inception of the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) in 1954, personnel
stationed at Naval Facilities, Naval Ocean Processing Centers, Joint Sites,
training commands and on the COMUNDERSEASURV Headquarters Staffs in the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, have pursued the Undersea Warfare mission.
[Data
certified UNCLASSIFIED by DoD/DoN and IUSS Authorities]”
“… In reflecting on the
early years of SOSUS, what is most striking is how much was accomplished in
remarkably short time. Certainly a major factor was serendipitous confluence of
events – the discovery that low-frequency sounds could travel great distances
in the ocean, the realization that submarines radiate identifiable
low-frequency energy, and the pioneering work at Bell Laboratories on visual
speech analysis.
Ease of contracting was also an important element. The Navy’s
resolve to conduct undersea surveillance was crucial. The commitment of WECo
and Bell Laboratories and their decision to assign some of their best people to
the project were of considerable consequence.
[Data certified
UNCLASSIFIED by DoD/DoN and IUSS Authorities]”
IUSS Commands [Typically larger Naval Bases host IUSS main oceanic "Command" bases (below) and US or allied (including Five Eye) Naval Bases host more minor regional IUSS bases that are off-shore of the continental US]
Naval Ocean Processing
Facility (NOPF) Dam Neck (DN) proudly boasts its mission, “To
provide timely and accurate acoustic cueing to operating and supporting forces,
and to conduct continuous maritime surveillance for homeland security
24/7/365.”
NOPF DN was commissioned
in September 1979 and is a tenant command of Commander, Undersea Surveillance,
a unit of Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. As one of the few remaining
Integrated Undersea Surveillance (IUSS) facilities,
NOPF Dam Neck has become
the premier Undersea Surveillance Site, conducting operations throughout the
Atlantic Ocean, North Atlantic, and Norwegian Sea. In May 2009, NOPF Dam Neck
officially became a Joint Combined Command welcoming the United Kingdom
Detachment and an increased area of responsibility. This expansion also made
NOPF DN the largest contingent of United Kingdom personnel in the United
States. It is comprised of approximately 300 Enlisted, 20 Officers, and 7
civilians from the US Navy, UK Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. Together,
they are the cornerstone of the IUSS community.
Naval Ocean Processing Facility
Whidbey Island, Washington State USA
The mission of NOPF is to
provide timely and accurate acoustic cueing to operating and supporting forces,
and conduct continuous maritime surveillance for Homeland Security.
NOPF is divided into two
major divisions that operate in the same facility- The shore side and the sea
side (Sea Component West). The sea side consists of STG's that rotate out to
the five SURTASS ships that operate under NOPF. The shore side has various
rates that all support the operations watch floor in completing it's mission.
NOPF has approximately
325 enlisted personnel, 25 officers, a detachment of 30 Canadian forces
personnel and 15 civilians. This is an excellent duty station which is
located right off the water and near a beautiful cliff-side park. The parking
is readily available and the building is the nicest on base. Leadership .
Welcome to Naval Ocean
Processing Facility Whidbey Island (NOPFWI). With your posting, you are about
to join an exclusive bi-national team responsible for providing timely and
accurate acoustic cueing to operating and supporting forces throughout the
Pacific, and conduct continuous maritime surveillance for Homeland Security. I
am pleased to extend a warm welcome to you on behalf of the Canadian
Contingent.
NOPFWI is the pride of
the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System; the workplace is modern and
comfortable, and the equipment is state of the art. You can be assured that
your tour in this new environment will be professionally challenging and
personally rewarding.
As you may well be aware,
the US Pacific Northwest is a beautiful part of the world in which to live. Oak
Harbor is a pleasant community with most of the conveniences you should need.
Vancouver and Seattle, each with their own attractions, are only two hours
away. All this should combine to make your stay in the United States a full and
enjoyable time.
IUSS Operations Support Center (IOSC)
Little Creek, Virginia USA
The IUSS Operations
Support Center (IOSC), located on Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek in
Norfolk VA, is responsible for all aspects of logistic and technical life
support for world-wide IUSS in-service assets, including eleven SURTASS
ships, [https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2012/navy/2012surtass.pdf?ver=2019-08-22-111611-643] three IUSS Fixed Sites. The IOSC
provides array support to all Navy combatant ships. Additionally, the IOSC acts
as the In-Service Engineering Agent (ISEA) for the IUSS program.
As ISEA, the IOSC manages
and directs the support of contractors world-wide, acts as the liaison to field
activities and laboratories, and provides configuration management, engineering
change, technical documentation, preventative maintenance, RM & A, and
Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations (PERA) support.
“This blog's commentary
is quite negative towards China. More than many forums I saw. Anyway. Indian
comments are usual though...
First I would like to
answer [those] who think I will be called to the police station or something. I
won't be. Criticism of the government in China is allowed. Just spend 5-10 mins
on Weibo (our Twitter). And we
are the country with the most protests. Since we don't vote for the government
that is our primary method of displaying disapproval.
The only two topics [we]
have to keep clear of are the legitimacy of the CCP rule and secessionism.
There are misconceptions
about China's relations to Russia. The Vladivostok dispute has ended. In fact,
China ended its disputes with 12 out of its 14 land neighbors, sometimes ceding
territory. So that face saving argument is moot. China's territorial claims are
inherited from the preceding Republic of China - and the PRC has shown the
willingness to compromise if needed. We are not going to ruin our relations
with Russia for a piece of land we don't even claim anymore. But we are definitely
going to aid Russia more in its incoming turbulent times to make it more Asian.
Russia only started
reciprocating China's friendly gestures after it was rejected by the West. [Russia’s]
first choice is obvious. China needs to and will treat Russia even better to
have it turn its face to the east permanently. [China] going after [Russian] lands
is just asking for pro-Westernism in Russia. That would be followed by a colour
revolution which means China would end up with a very hostile nuclear armed
state on its border. A border that is very long and otherwise problemless... I
don't know what you think of us but we are neither stupid nor evil enough to
take advantage of a supposedly weakened Russia. And that "weakened"
Russia still has enough nukes to incinerate China.
[Where Pete wrote] "If we told [China Anon] that he is ruled by a group of billionaire CCP
capitalists who continue to rule China he might quietly recognise this but
cannot reveal that he knows it."
I can. China is
capitalist. Its socialism is just a future goal that stays there to be lip
service to socialists in China and beyond. After all just the existence of
private property is enough to rule it out as a socialist country. And if you
think China is corrupt now you should have seen it during the 1990s. We used to
put cash money into folders we were submitting to the government offices,
otherwise, it would wait for months to get processed. Thankfully lower and
middle level corruption got eliminated. The upper level is still problematic.”
Pete Comment
China Anon’s comments
seem fair and reasonable, especially:
- China's self-interest in making Russia more Asian, in "But we are definitely going to aid Russia more in its incoming turbulent times to make it more Asian."
and
- Anon's last paragraph.
In view of that last
paragraph it looks like China’s internet censors can be tolerant.
But it must be said, overall, that Xi (who apparently aims at being Leader for life) and the Chinese military, remain a threat to Australia.
Now,on May 10, 2022, the
current ASIS Director-General, Paul Symon(also here) has made another major public speech. Sourced from the ASIS website it is here. Because ASIS Public Statements tend to erase from that website after about 4 years Australia's Lowy
Institute website will probably stand as the more long-term. The speech appears to be aimed most specifically at recruiting a greater diversity of ASIS employees (one subset is "Case Officers") and also potential "agents" (which in Australian parlance are the sources of Case Officers).
The Lowy Institute made a
Youtube of Symon’s May 10, 2022 speech here and above.
The Question and Answer session after 32 minutes that follows the speech has many
interesting highlights.
For example, 39:21 into the Youtube, Symon talks of Chinese officials and individuals unhappy with
China’s enforced monoculture who are interested in a relationship. [Even Submarine Matters is receiving attention from a low level Wolf Warrior Cub China Anon. While this chap seems a bit hostile, at least he's writing.]
If there are other particularly interesting parts of the Question and Answer session please tell Pete in Comments below.
Symon’s longish speech is
below. I've hyperlinked some officials and politicians and also bolded some bits that talk of commercial intelligence sites. Alas Submarine
Matters is not that commercial :)
“Foreign espionage: An
Australian perspective – 10 May 2022
PAUL
SYMON, Director-General, Australian Secret Intelligence Service:
This
speech will be more akin to a glance at the inner workings of the Australian
Secret Intelligence Service rather than a forensic stare. We will use
peripheral vision – you may, as an audience, need to occasionally read between
the lines.
Nevertheless,
let me begin with a true story. A story about a signature moment in the career
of one of my officers. Such stories are rarely heard beyond those who’ve lived
them. It is my hope that this will give you a bit more than a glance of ASIS’s
mission and some of the quiet achievers who carry out that mission.
In late August last year, at 2am Kabul time, I received a secure
message from one of my officers – let’s call her Jane – who was quietly
enmeshed in the chaos at Kabul’s international airport. Jane’s message to me
was short – “The team are well. Tired yet committed, while there are still
friends to Australia outside the wire. The end is in sight and, while some of
the scenes are horrific, the joy of getting people to safety is sustaining us.”
Jane’s
particular role was to provide point-to-point secure, encrypted communications
from me and other officers in Canberra, to other countries in the Middle East,
and to the small team we had quietly inserted into Afghanistan.
Over
an exhausting week, Jane had worked alongside other Australian agencies to pull
off the largest ever emergency airlift in Australia’s history – over 4,100
people brought to safety from one of the most dangerous places in the world.
Our friends in CIA and MI6 gave us great support too.
Jane
and the ASIS team were some of the last coalition officers to leave
Afghanistan. They left only after those for whom ASIS had direct responsibility
were safe and in a third country.
We
had followed through with our pact to our sources – that we will do everything
we can to protect their identities and to care for their safety and welfare.
Jane’s flight out of Kabul brought to a close one more chapter in ASIS’s
history; once again, all of this kept secret at the time.
My
response to Jane was even shorter than her message to me: “Good work. Get some
sleep.” We are an agency of few words in a crisis. Committed to difficult
missions and concerned for the welfare of our people. In sum, we don’t just
work on the front line – we work beyond it.
This
story highlights the fact that we contribute uniquely to whole-of-government
efforts in pursuit of Australia’s national interests. Sitting behind that, we
publish critical secret intelligence reports which need to be sent to the right
people at the right time – in the Afghanistan context, that meant making sure
that no time was lost warning people of danger.
Indeed,
our work did save lives. ASIS demonstrated agility, innovation and sheer
tenacity throughout the operation.
Which
brings me to a further dimension of that story – it shows that foreign
intelligence work is a serious business that demands fine judgment, steadfast
nerves and an ability to cope with extreme pressure. Put simply, for ASIS,
people, not machines, generate our greatest impact.
The
events in Afghanistan reflect some future challenges for ASIS, being that the
world is shifting beneath our feet, sometimes faster than we can dance. To
continue our success into the future, ASIS must be able to predict changes and
address them before they become a problem. We must stay one step ahead.
Today
I’m going to address these themes – our mission, our people, our challenges –
by taking a look at where we’ve come from, where we are today, and where we
need to be tomorrow. The past, the present and the future seems an appropriate
structure for any 70th anniversary speech.
ASIS
was created on 13 May 1952. Prime Minister Menzies gave my predecessor - Alfred Deakin Brookes – unprecedented licence to build a team of quiet achievers to
act in Australia’s interests.
Our
founding mission was “to obtain and distribute secret intelligence on foreign
powers” and to “conduct special operations as may be required”. A ‘special
operation’ was broadly described as one that “uses clandestine methods –
normally unacknowledgeable – affording no proof of the instigation, or even
connivance, of the government.” ASIS’s charter, signed by Menzies and framed in
my office, makes it clear that efficiency and secrecy should be central to our
organisation. At the time, Menzies went so far as to articulate that not even
the prime minister should know the identity of our sources, or the case
officers who run them.
R G Casey, the foreign minister at the time said: “A lot of these things seem to be
rather mysterious – but in fact they are not – it is just a matter of helping
the goodies and unhelping the baddies.” Friends, while much has changed over
the last 70 years, I wish to assure you that in the nearly five years as
Director-General ASIS, we still essentially ‘help the goodies and unhelp the
baddies’.
A
lot has changed over 70 years, and we have a more nuanced view of the world.
Just as our alliances are still important to us, the last few months have
underlined that fact that our adversaries are very real, and they do much of
their work in the shadows.
While
our diplomatic colleagues in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and
other government departments, work to progress Australia’s interests by light,
ASIS metaphorically works with and in the shadows. We do not, and will not cede
this domain to our adversaries. Over 70 years, ASIS has become adept at working
in this metaphorical darkness. We lift up stones and peer behind corners to
discover the capabilities and intent of those who would wish to diminish
Australia’s interests in pursuit of their own.
We
operate without home ground advantage against adversaries who are willing to do
whatever it takes, spend whatever it takes, to harm Australia’s interests.
I
have seen the truth of it – our adversaries are spying on us. In Australia and
abroad. And worse, they are seeking to weaken our institutions and bend our
values.
I earnestly believe it is our values as an open democratic,
rule-of-law nation that sets us apart. I stand here in front of you today as a
transparent reflection of those values. ASIS should remain low profile but we
should not have no profile. Without Australians having broader understanding of
ASIS, we won’t be able to succeed in the mission entrusted to us since 1952.
Practically,
this means calibrated engagement with Australians about their secret
intelligence service. It means renewing ASIS’s social license with the public
and assuring them that what we do is bounded by Australian law and is further
bounded by the admixture of propriety, values and interests.
At
its heart, ASIS conducts business that is synonymous with risk. We are built
for this purpose. Not only in terms of our people, the way in which we train
them, our processes and capabilities; but also, in terms of the rigorous
oversight we receive.
These
are some of the foundations that have kept our organisation ‘united in purpose’
and ‘undaunted by new horizons’ over the past 70 years. This brings
me to the present…How to characterise ASIS today.
Over
many years I’ve met many truly impressive Australians. And I’m comfortable
telling you that many of the most dedicated, intelligent and loyal Australians
you could ever meet… are ASIS officers.
With
me and my deputy-director generals excluded, the law protects the identity of
ASIS officers. But because today is special I’ll tell you who they might be…
They might be one of your family members, one of your neighbours, your
classmates or former colleagues. They might be someone you know… but don’t know
completely.
Depending
on the city and the day, they might just be the person next to you on the
train…or indeed next to you in this audience.
I
can also tell you that somewhere in the world, right now, there is an ASIS
officer taking serious risks – albeit deeply considered and mitigated as far as
possible – to protect your rights and interests as an Australian.
Right
now, I know, somewhere out there, maybe far from the comforts we are enjoying
here in Bligh street, ASIS officers are working on strange streets, in bustling
cafes, or hidden from plain view.
Right
now, they are using their training and expert experience to extract secrets
that the Australian Government needs to know, and then quietly, carefully and
covertly sending these secrets home.
Again and again, Australian foreign and defence policy has been informed by our
access to such secrets – sometimes just in the nick of time.
Right
now, for every one of these officers in the field, I have other specialists
back in headquarters, working to conceive, facilitate, protect and process our
operations. They are making sure our work is bound by Australian law, proper,
ethical, valued, and always in the national interest.
My
officers and their families are not doing these things without sacrifice. There
is excitement in our work without doubt, but it comes at a cost. Right now,
there will be ASIS officers feeling the heaviness of the burden they accepted
in a career where they must not discuss their work, even to those nearest and
dearest to them. And there are sharper burdens as well. ASIS’s staff welfare
officers have fielded more than a few calls from worried partners. ASIS has
back-up plans for our back-up plans, and we work hard to ensure things almost
always work out okay. Unlike many organisations, it’s when things don’t work
out okay that ASIS truly bonds.
Intelligence
is a team pursuit. The team lifts and falls on the character, resilience and
credibility of its members. Those who thrive in ASIS tend to care more about
those beside them than in impressing those above them. It’s in these
conversations with officers where you hear raw emotions, the passion, and that
which motivates action. These characteristics I see in abundance in ASIS.
But let me share with you an uncomfortable truth.
In
the next decade, the work of these officers will become more complex and
challenging.
As we move forward, ASIS will need more officers with more diverse
skills and backgrounds supported by more integrated capabilities. We are going
to need to recruit and work with even more vigour and urgency than at any other
point in our 70-year history. We need scale, agility and contemporary solutions
to meet the new problems we will confront.
This
brings me to the future… What will ASIS’s identity and purpose be going
forward? What are the most telling features of the future espionage
environment? How should ASIS conduct espionage beyond the safety of our shores?
Why would a young person today want to join ASIS next year, in 2030 or beyond?
I have given considerable thought to these questions. I’m happy to share with
you some of our observations. Contained within them are some salutary warnings.
First, high quality intelligence is in very high demand. The need
for effective national intelligence – particularly the synthesis of quality
collection and assessment - has never been more acute.
The world is experiencing more than just a realignment in power. The global
rules-based order is being manipulated and subverted. The future will likely be
less advantageous to Australia than that we once knew.
The
world within which Australians seek prosperity, safety and sovereignty is
marked by contest. In a difficult world, diplomacy remains vital and, in
parallel, Australia must actively use intelligence to protect and advance its
interests, prudently and determinedly.
Intelligence, with its ability to be covert, deniable and discreet,
can provide government with a suite of options to reduce strategic surprise and
further national objectives abroad – within the lawful bounds of its duties,
and in tandem with diplomacy. In an increasingly complex strategic environment,
this suite of options must necessarily grow to confront the threats we face.
ASIS is ready for this.
ASIS
benefits from espionage opportunities that emerge from the suppressed dissent
within authoritarian states. When leaders abolish fixed political terms, for
example, they become responsible and accountable for everything – including the
disillusionment that emerges from within. This provides us an edge.
We
notice that in closed societies top officials will always reinforce leaders’
biases and assumptions. That, after all, is the safest career path for them.
Speaking truth to power is an enduring strength of our system.
Another
observation though is that, at the same time as our operating environment has
become more competitive and volatile, it has also become increasingly difficult
to conduct human intelligence work. While it remains a core component of
statecraft, it must adapt to meet the extraordinary challenges arising from the
interaction of a complex strategic environment, intensified
counter-intelligence efforts, and emergent and emerging technologies.
For
a service like my own there is a near-existential dimension to technology risk.
The
analogue systems and processes which spies of the past took for granted have
been relegated to history, and we now live in a fundamentally digital era where
our covert activities are increasingly discoverable.
In
this technological sandbox, authoritarian regimes are having a heyday. Those so
inclined are harnessing the booming IT economy to develop myriad forms of
surveillance, and are using them for a range of ends, including public control
and counter-espionage.
We
cannot avoid or fight this wave of digital transformation – we must drop in on
the wave and ride it. Specifically, HUMINT operators need to turn the tables by
mastering technology to meet a range of functions and requirements.
Technologies
from biotechnology, nanotechnology and quantum computing will not only be
challenges but also keys to ASIS’s success.
My
next observation goes to the challenge of ensuring intelligence reporting
effectively informs policy-making, including where that policy is being made
outside of classified systems.
Policymakers
have access to an extraordinary array of sources on which to base their
assessments, develop options, and implement decisions. It is a crowded space
for policymakers who still only have the same number of hours in their working
day. Human intelligence will need to provide the gems that reveal the heart of
key issues and problems and to do this with increasing speed and in
fit-for-purpose formats.
The
private sector is increasingly capable of providing relevant intelligence to
customers.
Within
government we need to differentiate our offerings, and evolve to incorporate
aspects of the commercial intelligence market into our business model.
In
this environment ASIS must be more forward-leaning in engaging Australian
businesses and industry as we seek to work together to dissect and solve many
of the challenges I’m outlining today.
My final observation is that the greatest challenge, but with the greatest
prospective reward, is for intelligence agencies to maximise the human capital
of our people and the collective strength of our partnerships.
Problem-solving
lies at the heart of the intelligence profession. As such all ASIS officers
must have a problem-solving mindset – one that uses imagination and curiosity,
invention and discovery, to understand and describe a problem in a way that
allows it to be solved.
Intelligence
professionals need to be constant innovators, seeking new ways of work to
improve both offence and defence. We won’t always get it right, but that is in
the nature of an agency for which every activity has its own unique attributes.
This
is also why a diverse workforce is so important to ASIS – people from different
backgrounds approach different problems in different ways, and we must harness
this diversity.
Of
course, the golden rule to problem solving is to avoid going it alone. In that
context, our alliances – of which Australia has many - create dramatic strength
in numbers.
The
Five Eyes alliance, in particular, is unparalleled. If you want to measure just
how valuable these alliances are, you only need to consider how much our
adversaries resent them.
Closed
societies engineer their own trust deficit, treating others as transactional,
rather than as genuine partners. 'Wolf warriors' misjudge the intelligence of
citizens around the globe. In that regard, I’m reminded of a quote from Reid
Hoffman, co-founder of LinkedIn, who said: “No matter how brilliant your mind
or strategy, if you’re playing a solo game you’ll always lose to a team.”
Friends, I started this speech with a true story, about the work of ASIS
officers in Afghanistan as Kabul fell. I have also shared with you some of the
core work we conduct on a daily basis – namely extracting secrets that the
Australian Government needs to know.
Now, to close this speech I’d like to share one last glimpse of
what I have seen ASIS do during my time as Director-General.
I have seen ASIS officers support other Australian government
agencies in their efforts to secure the release of Australian hostages… I have
seen ASIS officers provide unwavering support to the defence mission in various
conflict zones around the world. There, they worked tirelessly to obtain
intelligence to protect the lives of civilians and military personnel.
I
have seen ASIS officers help disrupt terrorist attacks that saved the lives of
civilians, including Australians, putting themselves in harm’s way to do so… I
have seen our officers obtain exquisite intelligence that gives government
insight on the most pressing national security issues and saves government
considerable expenditure… I have seen our officers disrupt unsafe maritime
ventures, saving the lives of men, women and children who were risking their
lives at sea… I have seen ASIS officers obtain access in the most denied of
locations, behind the lines at night if you will. And I have seen ASIS officers
staring down the hardest of targets without blinking...
All
of these experiences, of which I am privileged to share in, form a part of the
story of where the Service is today. And I am truly proud of the work we have
done.
But
as always, there is more to be done, and ASIS now must adopt considered and
comprehensive transformation. Foreign intelligence services need to modernize –
and ASIS is no exception. If they fall behind adversaries, they will, at worst,
generate rather than mitigate national risk.
Transformation
will ensure ASIS remains fit-for-purpose, and will be best able to support
Government and Australia’s interests. It is vital we remain sharp, integrated
and able to generate significant advantage and impact amidst increasing
uncertainty.
Recognising
that we are a sharp tool, not a broad brush, ASIS must be selective and
discerning in its objectives to continue making a unique contribution to
government.
Through
effective prioritisation we must ultimately end up doing select priority tasks
exceptionally well.
Friends,
the challenge is great, the risk is real, the threat is growing. I start some
days in my job apprehensive about what the future has in store for ASIS, but I
finish every day more invigorated than apprehensive.
I
am surrounded each and every day by the exceptional officers of Australia’s
Secret Intelligence Service. Our people operate where others do not, will not
or cannot; they achieve what others think to be impossible. My officers are
professional, capable and accountable individuals who typify resilience,
tenacity, and above all else - service. Every day I am reminded that
Australia’s current and future ‘quiet achievers’ – are up for and will be up
for – the tasks that await us now and into the future.
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