May 8, 2022

Near Mishap for Collins Sub, HMAS Sheean.


HMAS Sheean at Pearl Harbour, USA, 2014. (Photo courtesy US Navy via Wikipedia)
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Andrew Tillett for the Australian Financial Review (AFR) reported May 7, 2022:

"One of Australia’s ageing Collins class submarines flooded as it was about to embark on a deep dive, sparking fears among crew it could sink during drills off the West Australian coast last year. 

Quick thinking by HMAS Sheean’s crew averted disaster, with the submarine conducting an emergency surfacing after a back-up system designed to stop water flooding into the boat initially failed to work.

The incident has raised concerns about a lax safety culture on board, according to navy insiders, with some of the traumatised crew transferring off the boat.

The Defence Department confirmed there was a “minor flooding incident” on the submarine but denied it could have sunk.

“In accordance with standard procedures, HMAS Sheean surfaced immediately and self-propelled back to base. There was no risk of the submarine sinking and HMAS Sheean was returned to service within days,” a Defence statement said.


“Safety is the Submarine Force’s number one priority and this is well communicated at every level. The physical and mental health of our people is paramount and there are support systems in place to address any issues in the short and long term.”

HMAS Sheeanwhich entered service in 2001, sailed from Perth’s submarine base on September 21 last year to the West Australian exercise area to complete its operational work-up – the safety checks and other tasks before the submarine goes on patrol.

At 9.43pm that night, “an uncontrolled ingress of water” was reported in the motor room on the forward auxiliary seawater pump, according to a Defence Department investigation report seen by AFR Weekend.

The pump brings water into the submarine as part of its cooling system, although it has been described as a non-critical component.

The incident was initially reported as a fire after water vapour triggered a fire alarm, but the crew saw there was no smoke and started its emergency flood plan.

While the submarine surfaced within three minutes of the first alarm, the response was “complicated” after an automatic system meant to stop water flowing into the submarine during a flood failed to work.

The “shut all hull valves” system had been isolated from the main electrical system earlier that day as technicians tried to fix an electrical issue. The valves were meant to be shut but should have been checked before diving, a source said.

Because the system was isolated, it was unable to be activated automatically, although it appears in this case it was overridden locally.

The accident happened 10 metres above the submarine’s deep-diving depth. The Collins class’ exact deep-diving depth is classified, although they can dive more than 180 metres under the water.

It is unclear how much water entered the submarine but a Collins class submarine can take on no more than 15 tonnes before it starts to sink.

When HMAS Dechaineux flooded in 2003 [see an April 2021 SubMatt’s reference to that]  to that mishap] after a pipe burst, it came within 20 seconds of sinking after about 12 tonnes of water entered the boat.

The report said a single open-ended flood through the auxiliary seawater pipework with a 111 millimetre diameter was the “worst possible outcome” and at the depth HMAS Sheean was operating, water would have poured into the boat at a rate of four tonnes per second.

A source familiar with the event said the pipe that broke in HMAS Sheean was smaller than this diameter but if “the flood had occurred on a larger pipe we would have lost Sheean and all personnel on board as it occurred at deep-diving depth”.

They said some crew had transferred off the submarine because of the psychological trauma.

Another source said it was highly unusual that the emergency valve shut off would be isolated at diving depth.

Former navy commodore and Collins class project director Paul Greenfield said “these sorts of occurrences are rare” but the rapid rate the submarine surfaced suggested it was serious.

“The training is such that submariners know exactly what to do if it does occur,” he said.

Another Collins class submarine, HMAS Waller, flooded twice last year in a matter of weeks before a major electrical fire onboard." [see an August 2021 SubMatt’s article on that].

8 comments:

Anonymous said...

Thanks Pete, disturbing.

I understand that all operational sub forces have incidents and it is good that the crew reacted quickly. Nevertheless this sort of potentially catastrophic incident is surely a warning. Do we really have confidence ALL of the critical components of these submarines will keep working safely for the forty years now planned?

The RN and USN build excellent quality submarines and run them with very well trained crews. Yet they still do not plan to operate their SSNs past 32 years; 35 tops. Japan only operates their SSKs for 20 to 25 years. Do we really think we know better than them?

Intersting to note that the RN has opted to drop back to only five operational SSNs rather than keep old worn out boats in service.
https://www.navylookout.com/hms-talent-retired-royal-navy-down-to-just-5-attack-submarines/

Pete said...

Hi Anonymous [at May 8, 2022, 9:31:00 PM]

Indeed the risks of operating subs past their use by dates have quite recently impacted:

- the Argentine Navy with 34 year old ARA San Juan http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2017/11/argentinian-submarine-san-juan-likely.html

and

- the Indonesian Navy's with 41 year old KRI Nanggala https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2021/04/indonesian-submarine-nanggala-likely.html

REST IN PEACE

Electricals are often the hardest thing to fix because they are in all parts of a sub. Much harder to replace than, say, diesel engines or batteries.

How Collins subs will operate in 15 years time, 2037 (to usher in AUKUS SSNs), is unpredictable and risky.

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine#Submarines_in_class for Collins' vintages.

Pete

Anonymous said...

Hi Pete
It is possible to use safely submarine up to 35/40 years if the following common sense rules are applied

-Use the sub extensively for operation 100 to 250 days/Y . Not only for training including fire /incident exercises but that is the way you build learning curve and experience .Staying idle, with the loss of people practice is a receipe for problems

- Every 10 years the subs have to undergo a massive dismantling/checks /upgrade /replacement that last typically 2 years (100000 parts typically exchanged). This is a key part of sub know how and these programms are confidential

- It is important to stick to a given sub design school/philosophy over many decades to build up and accumulate maintenance/training learning curve and experience. Most of the subsystems evolves very slowly contrarily to the weapon system or propulsion. These more "mundane" systems are as critical for safety.(Flushing the toilets with sea water at 250 meters, if done that way, means having 300+ PSI in the piping!)

Anonymous said...

Pete

There is another article on AUKUS progress at the ASPI website today. This is based on an interview with Jonathon Mead and seems relatively realistic to me. It talks about ways to build up the human capability in the RAN, Defence, industry and Australia generally.

Leasing subs is sensibly avoided. Joint crewing of subs based in Australia is raised, and that does seem to make good sense. I will leave you to tease out the finer details.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-considering-next-generation-us-and-uk-designs-for-nuclear-submarines/

Pete said...

Thanks Anonymous

By 2040, when Australia first SSN may have been commissioned, all Australian will feel proud

that our YOUNGEST Collins will be 45 years old and oldest, 50 years. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine#Submarines_in_class

While Baltic subs last longer in cold, low salinity conditions - submarines in the warmer, saltier Indo-Pacific don't have those advantages.

Cheers Pete

Pete said...

Hi Anonymous [at May 10, 2022, 5:19:00 PM]

Yes I noticed it.

I will leave you to tease out the finer details.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-considering-next-generation-us-and-uk-designs-for-nuclear-submarines/

Anonymous said...

Pete

I thought the following sections were quite significant from Mead’s comments:

On timing:
“ Mead is aiming for the RAN to have its first submarine by the end of the next decade, but says he’s ‘seized by the strategic need to drag that date left as much as is safely possible’.”

“However, The Strategist understands that the navy may be offered a nuclear-powered boat to use through the 2030s—once Australia’s nuclear stewardship has been certified.”

“ US and British delegations visited South Australia to examine a Collins-class submarine in deep maintenance, and Mead will take a big team to UK shipyards soon to map out a pathway to Australia’s new submarines”

If their mapping out of a build pathway involves UK shipyards then we can only be building a UK SSN design.“

“ Mead insists there’ll be no design changes in the new submarine once it’s chosen. ‘Weapons systems may go from one country into another country’s submarine. That’s part of this trilateral contribution. Once that’s done, though, there’ll be no unique Australian design changes.“

This section also refers to changing the combat system. That will only be needed if we build the Astute or its successor.

Pete said...

Thanks Anonymous [at May 10, 2022, 9:49:00 PM]

For summarising Admiral Mead's key points in article ASPI at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-considering-next-generation-us-and-uk-designs-for-nuclear-submarines/

I've used Admiral Mead's limited proliferation claims in my article of May 11, 2022

"Australia's post-Election Nuclear Proliferation Concerns" at

https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2022/05/australias-post-election-nuclear.html

Cheers Pete