An interesting March 29, 2023 Popular Mechanics article that Russia's 6 diesel-electric Kilo submarines in its Black Sea Fleet (BSF) may be ordered to torpedo Ukrainian merchant ships and/or lay naval mines in the Black Sea. Russian subs and other units mistaking the nationality/flag of a ship in the Black Sea is possible...
Such naval mines, that can also be laid by Russian ships or aircraft, may threaten not only Ukrainian ships but ships of other nations bordering the Black Sea. Those other nations include Georgia and (a channel to) Moldova and NATO members Turkey, Rumania and Bulgaria. Also third country (flags of convenience) shipping could be sunk.
It is unclear whether destroying or damaging shipping of a NATO member by using torpedoes or naval mines would be considered an attack on NATO under Articles 4 and 5 of the NATO Treaty.
Escalation into a Russia-NATO confrontation might occur quickly even if accidental.
I thank retortPouch, whose March 28, 2023 comment inspired the article below.
With its usual efficiency Singapore ordered 2 Invincible-class submarines from Germany’s TKMS in 2013 and 2 in 2017. First of class RSS Invincible was launched in 2019 and commissioned in 2023. The second and third of class, RSS Impeccable and RSS Illustrious, were launched in Germany in December 2022.
The Invincibles are seen as high quality general purpose diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) with AIP, permitting them to sit in or slowly patrol the Strait of Malacca for long periods. They have the speed and range to intercept other SSKs, like Chinese Songs and Yuans, that are passing through that strait or in the South China Sea. See an Invincible class model below.
A Singaporean Navy crew has been training on RSS Invincible in Germany and might sail it to Singapore in time for the International Maritime Defence Exhibition (IMDEX) Asia that will take place next week, for 3 days from May 3-5, 2023 in Singapore.
RSS Invincible will replace
one of the Singapore’s aging Challenger-class subs (probably RSS Conqueror (ex HSwMS Sjölejonet). Singapore will then temporarily have a submarine fleet of 3 classes, consisting of:
- 2 x Archer-class subs (RSS
Archer and RSS Swordsman), and
- 1 x Challenger-class
Note that the Archers and
Challengers were second-hand, modernised Swedish submarines, built by what is
now Saab-Kockums. In what was a curious decision then and now, Sweden’s Kockums was sold to a foreign competitor, what is now Germany's TKMS, in 1999. TKMS had sound commercial reasons to not permit Kockums to sell new
submarines to Singapore in the 2010s. Instead TKMS won the Singaporean order in
2013 with German built Type 218SGs renamed the Invincible-class.
See numerous Submarine Matters articles on the Invincibles/218SGs here and here.
Between the efficiencies of a Singaporean customer and a German builder there has been none of the delays, hesitations and cancellations that bedevilled Australia’s home-build attempt, the 2016-2021 Shortfin Barracuda Attack-class fiasco. If Australia had bought TKMS Type 216s, built in Germany, the first may have been set to arrive in Australia in the late 2020s.
But Australia always wants to home build its submarines, except for the Virginia-class SSNs. I feel Australia's Prime Minister Albanese has settled for an overseas built nuclear propelled submarine because he wants to kill off the Virginia plan. This is because the plan is too expensive and too divisive in Albanese's generally build-subs-in-Australia and anti-nuclear Labor Party, which is generally reliant on the staunchly anti-nuclear Greens Party.
Now the Labor supporting ACTU, again rising in power and opposed to all things nuclear, has also expressed opposition to Labor's Virginia and AUKUS-SSN policies.
Thomas Nilsen
at The Barents Observer has written an
excellent article of March 25, 2023. Here are parts of it:
“U.S. surveillance jet makes first mission up to northern Finland"
"Unlike Norway, which has
self-imposed restraint on NATO activity near its border with Russia, Finland is
now opening its skies for US intelligence flights along the eastern frontier.
…This is the first time in
history that a U.S. RC-135 Rivet Joint (photo below) made a sortie inside Finnish airspace.
Finland is will “receive new
F-35 fighter jets as Finland starts replacing the current fleet of F/A-18
Hornets in 2026.”
…NATO “now can use the
airspace over mid- and northern Finland to collect information about the
Kola-base complex area.” [see map below, courtesy dreamstime]
Russia’s Kola Peninsula is
home to Putin’s fleet of ballistic missile submarines, multi-purpose submarines
with long-range cruise missiles, and supersonic bomber planes.
...Real-time monitoring
The RC-135 Rivet Joint carries monitoring sensors supporting NATO intelligence with near real-time on-scene electronic warfare signals from inside Russia. Onboard instruments can listen to military communication as well as detect Russian air defense radars and other signals. The aircraft are frequent visitors to airspace over the Black Sea, in the Baltics around Kaliningrad, and up north, over the Barents Sea.
...Finland’s NATO membership took
a significant step forward with the Turkish parliament’s foreign affairs
committee unanimously approving the Nordic country’s accession to the alliance.
For NATO, having Finland now opening its airspace for so-called ISR missions (Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) provides for a better understanding of possible changes in Russia’s military posture in the north.
...With Russia’s war in Ukraine,
the entire security landscape in Europe is now, however, dramatically changing.
“It will be interesting to see
if Finland and Sweden entry into NATO will impact Norway’s national rules and
regulations for allied flights in the High North and if a common regional approach
will emerge,” says Per Erik Solli."
SEE WHOLE ARTICLE HERE
BACKGROUND
On 5 July 2022, NATO signed the accession protocol for Sweden and Finland to join the alliance. There is no set amount of time to process NATO membership. But perhaps they will become members later this year.
Once Finland joins NATO, the 1,340-kilometre border with Russia will become a new NATO–Russia border.
Peter Lobner, in his USN nuclear submarine study recognised the low availability of US SSNs, including Virginias. On page 132 Lobner writes:
"In October 2017, the maintenance backlog was reported to have idled 15 SSNs for a total unplanned delay of 177 months (14.75 submarine years)."
So 15 of the USN's 50 SSNs are inactive, in maintenance, at any one time.
On that ratio, 1 of the 3 RAN Virginias of the 2030s will be inactive, in maintenance, probably in a US shipyard, 1,000s of kms away from Australia, at any one time.
This leaves only 2 Virginias maximum active in the RAN.
However, we can go further using the standard naval/military Rule of Thirds indicating just 1 of the 3 RAN Virginias will be available for operations on average, for something like A$120 Billion of Australian tax payers money, spent by 2040.
If future sovereignty stressing Australian Virginias were not deployed in line with US national interests (such as assisting the US Navy in defence of Taiwan) the US could assign Australian Virginias a low maintenance priority. This is in the context of the current dire maintenance situation impacting USN attack submarines (SSNs) including Virginias.
The well informed US Heritage
Foundation, March 24, 2023, reports:
Title: [US] "Navy Dry
Dock Closure Make a Bad Problem Worse"
"KEY TAKEAWAYS
1. This development will create massive problems for the [US] Navy’s submarines and aircraft carriers, the industrial base, and national defense as a whole.
2. Currently, 36% of the [US] Navy’s attack submarine fleet is either in - or waiting for - maintenance. With four dry docks offline, these numbers will likely get worse.
3. The sudden closure of [US] Navy assets in Puget Sound and Bangor [both in Washington State, USA] should awaken Congress and the White House to this overlooked, but very real naval crisis-in-the-making.
"...The seismic [geological fault line] assessment that led to the closures came as part of the [US]$21 billion [US] Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP). SIOP began in 2018 as an attempt to address the increasingly poor conditions of the [US's] centuries-old shipyards."
French Anonymous made
interesting comments on March 20, 2023. Pete has done some editing and Pete's additional comments are in [...] brackets.
These are rumours from the
Indian press but without any info from the French side..
In any case I am not sure what it means.
The design and the deployment/military uses philosophies of the French SSN are quite different from the Russian or US views. The Chinese are using an approach to LEU that sounds similar to the French one apparently, without much public data.
- The
LEU/HEU debate has been well documented. The French system is really an
extension of their civilian PWR reducing hugely the cost, using the same
critical civilian safety regulation and relying on the civilian fuel cycle
assets and economics. The legal need to inspect an empty reactor every 10 years
(using robots) allows the French Navy to have very compact designs with the
steam generator within the reactor (a critical interface changed every 10
years, including in HEU system, anyway[??] )
[ Peter Lobner page 206 (of a large .PDF) reports regarding France’s K15 reactor used in the Barracuda SSN:
“Fuel: Much higher
uranium enrichment than in the [outgoing Rubis-class SSNs] CAS-48 reactor (which is 7%
enrichment). Some sources claim K15 uses HEU fuel at > 90% enrichment.”]
and to develop robots,
facilities (as in Civilian PWR, changed every 2/3 years) to change the fuel
quickly (2/3 weeks) and to allow easy dismantling
The USN on the contrary puts a huge premium on "sealed for life core" because they have a long positive learning curve/experience, they have still a large inventory of HEU (Nuclear weapons converted, the US stopped the production of HEU [but the US is reported to be restarting HEU enrichment at a new SILEX trial plant in Kentucky] and because most important this limits the number of USN facilities needed (equipment, people, political local sensitivities) worldwide to support the fleet as the USN cannot piggy back on the civilian (See US senate studies).
This leads to much larger US SSNs (due to the need to deploy vertical rods to slow down or stop reactor fission, the heat exchanger is outside, there is limited U235 volumetric density/loading for obvious safety reasons, making reactors typically twice the size, much higher cost and larger nuclear engineer/technician/damage control crew needed. Once you have large assets you try to use them beyond a traditional sub mission and you incorporate more and more cruise missile for instance (leading to VLS in large numbers).
- The
French deployment has the objective of having SSNs to protect French SSBNs, protect
the French surface fleet and to intercept enemy naval assets.
- This
means emphasis on very silent French SSNs with the best sonars and torpedoes. They
operate tactically in an electric mode with very large permanent magnet motors
(4 to 10 MWe range) and the associated converter/drives. This is more difficult
for larger US and UK SSNs, driven by steam turbines. The steam drives
turbogenerators while the steam turbine is used essentially for quick strategic
moves (deep and at 25+knots) in the Barracuda class SSNs.
By the way the French reactors can remain critical using natural cooling in the silent mode as reported (critical means that the neutrons level is constant, at any, very low or very high, power.). The French do not have the resources including human of having large boats
[Australia, with the smallest population and GDP in the nuclear sub world has even less human resources than France. Yet Australia is buying Virginia SSNs that require more than twice the crew (135 men) than French Barracuda SSNs (60 men).]
Barracudas don’t have redundant cruise missile systems for land attack ([which may be just 6] MdCN missiles on a Barracuda, fired via the torpedo tubes. [Just 6] is a marginal amount compared numbers of land attack missiles on French surface ships or airforce platforms. France can’t afford US style inter-services rivalries [where the US Submarine Service (using its SSNs and SSGNs) competes bureaucratically to be permitted to launch more Tomahawk land attack missiles than US destroyers or cruisers, or more than US aircraft dropping missiles/bombs. For example, in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and 2011 invasion of Libya (for Libya see US "Forces Committed")].
In the case of Brazil, Brazil has developed an intermediate reactor solution of its own, using the highest level LEU (just under 20% U235) to contain costs while refueling its future SSN after 20/25 years. It is the electric drive mode that Brazil is buying from Naval Group to use an enlarged Scorpene hull for its future SSN (no pump-jet as far as I know).
Is the Indian Navy interested in the electric propulsion that the Russian or the US have not explored as much? in the pump-jet? Does India want to move to a civilian compatible solution? Is this linked to an Indian civilian Nuclear strategy discussed with the French at the same time? [India and France propose to construct 6 French designed European Pressurised Reactors (EPRs) reactors at Jaitapur, India), where India would need to have a complete control of its fuel cycle if India is serious about civilian nuclear.
It is not clear at all [about India's submarine and civilian power reactor sector integration plans] but these are interconnected to a large extent.
Is India to build or buy SSNs in the 10,000 tonne [Russian Akula SSN tradition] or in the [French Rubis SSN or large Scorpene hull style] 3,000/4,000 tonne ranges? [or some size in between?]
PETE COMMENTS
On Chinese use of LEU reactors and any Australian compatibility to France's SSN setup will be sent to Donors next week.
Anonymous made the very interesting comments below on Mar 20, 2023. My/Pete's comments are in [ square brackets ].
Hi Pete
After reading all of your postings on AUKUS and more widely, some thoughts.
We now know that AUKUS Pillar 1 [see the lefthand column in diagram below] will fill the capability gap created by the retirements of the Collins class subs, with Virginia class SSNs in 2030s. The SSN AUKUS class will be the Collins eventual replacement mid to late 2040s or later. The proposed cost, at least A$268 Billion. Based on past projects, even the high-end figure of A$368 Billion is probably significantly lower than the final costs. [Yes new Australian defence programs usually cost twice or more of the original Government estimate]
There is a real risk that projects currently underway will make SSNs 'visible', much as the development of air power made battleships sitting ducks. [Yes so many inexpensive and more sensitive fixed seabed. tethered, and mobile UUVs, UAVs, Unmanned Surface Vehicles and ship mounted sensors can be mass produced by China, particularly for South China Sea and Taiwan Strait use. Denying even SSNs passage through those waters.]
Further, the development of XLUUVs like Ghost Shark, [and see. Australia's "Ghost Shark" Project by US company Anduril, is connected to the AUKUS "additional undersea capabilities" program . I'm hoping Ghost Shark, already capable of intelligence gathering (and soon smartmine laying) heads off the need for Autralian SSNs.]
and the RAAF's Ghost Bat (formerly Loyal Wingman) offers a glimpse into the future. The war in Ukraine highlights how low-cost, less capable autonomous vehicles in sufficient numbers can be a force multiplier. Add to the mix, the increasing application of improved AI dramatically improving capability. The next 20-30 years can be expected to produce innovative breakthrough military technologies. AUKUS Pillar 2 focuses on delivering some of these "Advanced Capabilities" [see righthand column in diagram below].
There appears to be little discussion on how to reduce Pillar 1 costs, shorten the acquisition timetable, and give greater focus to Pillar 2? For example, if we were to save $100 Billion on the SSNs acquisition costs, we could redirect say $50 Billion to Pillar 2 with the rest no longer being needed, reducing Australian DoD's demand on the budget.
Pillar 1 focuses on acquiring highly capable SSNs and in sufficient numbers to operate with a school of XLUUVs ('loyal shark-pack'?).
Assuming that France would be willing to share [with Australia] the 'crown jewels' or their Barracuda class SSN, particularly after their [Attack-class] Shortfin rebuff, could it provide strategic deterrence for significantly less cost and potentially sooner? [Macron seems willing to again build Attack class SSKs in Australia but "He said France would not supply nuclear submarines to foreign countries"]
Barracuda's manning levels are also significantly lower than the Virginia or AUKUS (based on Astute) subs, overcoming the manpower issues raised by AUKUS.
It is accepted that the Barracuda class is less capable than the Virginia class or Astute class (and therefore its planned, yet to be even designed replacement, AUKUS class). Does this really matter, if has sufficient capability to meet the strategic objective of [just conventional warhead?] deterrence?
We are paying a high price to get a premium product, later than we would like, with a promise that it will deliver the needed capability. Given the time scales involved, the uncertain political whims of future US and UK governments, and the growing geopolitical threats, should we now re-look at the Barracuda option? It could be available in the 2030s, if not earlier, with support from the French Government. [France seems to value good commercial relations with China higher than profits of selling SSNs to Australia.]
Should our Pillar 1 focus NOW
be on the acquisition of a sufficiently capable SSN and in greater numbers,
while at the same time increasing our investment in the development of a 'loyal
shark-pack'?
Food for thought?
[Looking at the Pillar 2 column of AUKUS "Advanced Capabilities" below - they will make it more difficult for enemy nuclear propelled and conventional submarines to function. It is likely China and Russia are working on similar "Advanced Capabilities" making it increasingly difficult for Australian, UK and US submarines to function. So the less expensive future may indeed be with unmanned technologies.]
AUKUS Pillar 1 (on left, above) is Submarines, while AUKUS Pillar 2 is Advanced Capabilities. The above chart is derived from: “FACT SHEET: Implementation of the Australia–United Kingdom–United States Partnership (AUKUS)”, The White House, 5 April 2022.
---
From 8:25 into the US Defense Department video here and above (of March 15) senior US Defense official, Dr. Mara E. Karlin (more biodata here) in answer to a question gives a lucid account that:
“Australia will get these [Virginia] subs in just about a decade. That is frankly faster than I suspect a lot of folks might have expected, when this whole [AUKUS] effort was announced just 18 months ago.
Australia will be purchasing a mix of new submarines and old submarines and right now it will be three with the potential for two more if needed.
As I noted earlier the cohort of folks looked at a wide range of different options and really came down with Virginia [as against preceding Los Angeles-class SSNs] as the right approach.
And Virginia Payload Modules [VPM on the future Virginia Block Vs] will not be a part of it [so no Block Vs for Australia]. The three countries saw that [block Vs with VPMs for Australia] didn’t make sense...[true]”
Dr Karlin then answers questions on sensitive submarine Information Sharing with the UK and Australia. And that US Defense has been consulting with the State Department [especially with the State Department’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations(ITAR) program and briefing Congress on this.
10:15 including "lowering the [transfer of US sensitive defense technology] barriers to working with them and information is just a piece of it…"
PETR COMMENT
Thanks to A on March 17, for finding the video above.
So Australia is getting 3 Virginias in the early 2030s and maybe 2 later. The five will be a combination of new and old.
Dr Karlin's advice on Block Vs just happens to coincide with my estimate of March 14 particularly about Australia not getting, or wanting, Block Vs. Block Vs will likely be semi-SSGNs having a heavy warload of 40 Tomahawks. Australia really isn't after SSGN-Block V land attack missile capabilities. Australia would avoid using land attack missiles against China.
By "old" Virginias Australia may get Virginia Block Is, IIs, IIIs or IVs.
Virginia reactors having a "Nuclear core life estimated at 33 years." is a crucial measure to keep in mind. Australia getting Virginia Block Is (commissioned 2004-2008) would be a risky proposition - as they may all reactor time out by 2041, which is likely before the first SSN-AUKUS is commissioned. The first SSN-AUKUS is likely to go to the UK RN for more experienced UK first of class testers and crews to commission.
The USN would probably not value Block IIs as highly as the later Block IIIs onwards. This is because Block IIs have 12 single Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) silos tailor-made for Tomahawk subsonic cruise missiles. Block II VLS cannot take significantly larger missiles or other types of warloads.
What the USN values more highly about the Block IIIs are that instead of single VLS they have 2 x much larger diameter multipurpose Virginia Payload Tubes (VPTs). Each VPT is capable of taking 6 Tomahawks, other much larger types of missiles (eg. 1 to 5 hypersonic missiles) or alternative loads like special forces gear or XLUUVs.
So Australia is probably looking at getting 3 x Virginia Block IIs. Looking at Virginia Boats in class the first Block II was commissioned in 2008 (likely to be decommissioned "reactor timed out" too soon in 2041).
It is likely Australia wants the 3 later Block IIs which were commissioned in 2011 (USS California), 2012 (USS Mississippi) and 2013 (USS Minnesota). These would time out around 2044, 2045 and 2046 respectively. The US may charge Australia significantly less for Block IIs than Block IIIs (or later Blocks).
It may be possible to get an extra 2-3 years of use if these Block IIs experience "more frequent intentional reactor shutdowns or slowdowns" when these three subs are tied to the wharf, while the RAN is training/transitioning to use these Virginias.
Alternatively, if one of the three above is labeled "new"-ish then it may be the last Block IV, USS Utah, which will be commissioned by August 2023.
Or if the US is talking really new for one of the first three we need to speculate on a not yet fully designed "Improved Virginia" Block VI or even an early SSN(X) of advanced capabilities matched to very high expected cost.
Then there is the issue of a possible two additional Virginias for Australia if the mainly UK designed SSN-AUKUS (was SSN(R)) program is running late. Lots of unpredictables in this "pick the Virginia" game.
Public support for the Aukus [including Virginia] nuclear submarine acquisition [has] declined, according to the latest Guardian Essential poll.
The poll of 1,124 voters, released on [March 21, 2023], suggests Australians are at odds with the Aukus deal, with just one in five voters labelling China a “threat to be confronted” and only one quarter happy to pay the price tag of up to $368bn to acquire nuclear submarines.
...In the poll, 40% of respondents said the [AUKUS including Virginia] submarine partnership would make Australia more secure, down four points since November [2022]. Those who said the nation would be less secure rose four points to 21%, while 39% said it would not affect security.
The plan will cost between [AU]$268bn and [AU]$368bn, or 0.15% of [Australian] GDP a year on average over 50 years.
Respondents were split on the cost, with 26% saying Australia needed nuclear submarines and “it’s worth paying that amount to get them”, while 27% said they were necessary but “not worth” the price tag, 28% said Australia does not need them and 19% were unsure.
The defence minister, Richard Marles, on [March 19, 2023] said China’s rapid military buildup “shapes the strategic landscape in which we live”, telling the ABC’s Insiders that the Aukus submarines would back up Australia’s interest in protecting trade and freedom of navigation and flight in the South China Sea.
Two-thirds (67%) of respondents in the poll said Australia’s relationship with China was a “complex relationship to be managed”, up seven points since February.
The proportion who described China as a “threat to be confronted” fell by six points to 20%, while a steady 13% said the relationship was a “positive opportunity to be realised”."
PETE COMMENT
Despite the AUKUS submarine issues and costs unpopularity with the Australian public the ruling Albanese Labor Government feels forced to support the AUKUS subs policy to "prove" that it is "responsible" on National Security issues.
The Opposition Coalition is always quick to say Labor are "weak" (seemingly socialist wet) on national security and even pro-China. With the help of conservative AUKUS policies Labor hopes to be in a good position for re-election in 2025. Note 2025 is 8 whole years until Australia's first expected Virginia purchase (Trump permitting).
In response to French Anonymous’ comment of March 16, 2023.
US politicians or US officials with a US naval background, part representing the USN's position, seem wholey or mainly? absent from last weeks' Virginias to Australia issue. The US DoD, represented by Doctor Mara E. Karlin (see my article here) vaguely talks of "used" and "new" Virginias. Her impact would be greater if she had spent career time in the US Navy or at least US military.
This vagueness suggests Biden, the US DoD, USN, US State Department and Congress have not yet settled their
differences on supplying Virginias to Australia.
The US Congress (House and
Senate) can develop/pass Federal Laws to ban the export of sensitive arms technology, as it did with the ban on F-22 exports. Such laws, if any, could prevent the US State Department’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regime from exporting Virginia hardware technology to Australia.
In terms of Congress's ability to block Virginia exports it is significant that President Biden has even less influence in the new 2023-2015 118th Congress than is usual for US Presidents.
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/118th_United_States_Congress:
"In the 2022 midterm elections, the Republicans won control of the House for the first time since the 115th Congress, [the House Speaker Kevin McCarthy overall appears to be a Trump supporter. Biden is very unpopular with Republican House Representatives and with the Republican voters who appoint them.]
"while the Democrats gained one seat in the
Senate, giving them a 51–49 majority (with a caucus of 48 Democrats and three
independents)."
Vice President Kamala Harris, is Senate President, a rather tokenistic political lightweight "At 28%, Harris had the lowest approval rating of any modern VP". She may be unable to sway the Senate to support President Biden’s Virginia intention.
French Anonymous' comment is true that “Aus does not
have that much choice” other than seeking SSNs from the US. The UK cannot
provide new Astutes because the UK has higher build 4 x Dreadnought-class SSBNs priorities until the late 2030s.
Australia has not sought SSNs
from France. Also President Macron has restricted himself to reaffirming France can still supply
Attack-class diesel-electric subs to Australia. While Macron seems to be implying whole Barracuda SSNs (reactors and all) to Australia are not up for negotiation, due to tensions with China and proliferation in the Indo-Pacific concerns. Even
more significantly France's limited submarine building workforce has 5 Barracuda SSNs for its own navy to complete, throughout the 2020s, to
replace the aging Rubis-class SSNs. Also France must complete 4 x 3rd Generation SSBNs (SNLE 3Gs) in the 2030s before it can even contemplate building SSNs for export.
On the Virginias to Australia issue Biden’s affirmative action appointments probably won’t hold sway against rising, hard-nosed USN submarine Admirals who on the whole seem to oppose Virginias for Australia. Such Admirals will have the ear of a Republican Majority House that can launch legislation to block Virginia exports to Australia.
India’s Firstpost March 17, 2023 reports, in part:
"...According to media reports,
the Indian Navy may receive approval to purchase only three nuclear submarines
during the initial stage [instead of presumably 6 x Project-75 Alpha SSNs]. The
original plan, which envisaged the procurement of six submarines in the initial
lot has been scrapped by the defence ministry due to high procurement costs.
…It was decided in 2019 that only three submarines will be developed as part of Project-“77” [presumably meant to be Project-75 Alpha] …following the initial investment of Rs 100 crores [equivalent to only US$12 million ?] for research and development, for the program did not receive any more funds and the project still awaits clearance.
Meanwhile, France has offered a major nuclear submarine deal to
India. As part of the deal, France will become a part of the Indian Navy’s
program to develop 6 nuclear submarines and has also offered to share
conventional technology from its Barracuda-class nuclear submarine program.”
[Earlier
reported by Firstpost on March 16, 2023:
“New
Delhi: The Indian Navy, which is undergoing a modernisation process, may get
yet another boost as France has offered a major nuclear submarine deal to
India.
As
part of the deal, France will become a part of India’s program to develop 6
nuclear submarines and has also offered to share conventional technology fromits Barracuda-class nuclear submarine program… France’s offer to India is
similar to a deal it had offered to Brazil earlier, which is also developing
its first nuclear submarine with French assistance.
The French offer to India includes the overhauled design based on its Barracuda-class submarine for a new submarine class. This new submarine will feature pump-jet propulsion along with a [ presumably the Indian Compact Light-Water Reactor “CLWR-B2 "gentle running" for S5 SSBN and "more stop-start" B3 for Project-75 Alpha SSN ?” variant of the 190 MW thermal(t), 30 to 35 MW electrical(e) Russian OK-650 ] 190 MWt Pressurized water reactor which is currently being developed by state-owned nuclear company BARC in consultation with Russian state-owned companies.”]
Firstpost’s March 17, 2023
report continues:
“…Work on designing an
indigenous nuclear submarine design by the Directorate of Naval Design also is
going on at the Indian Navy’s Shipbuilding Centre at Visakhapatnam.
[A] report by Indian Defence Research Wing (IDRW)
quoted officials as saying that there were disagreements [presumably between the Indian
Navy versus BARC ? ] regarding who will fund the development of a new 190MW
pressurized water reactor (PWR) by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC).
The water reactors will be
used to power the Indian Navy’s [SSN] nuclear submarine program and variant of the
same reactor was to be developed for the S5 Class of ballistic missile
submarines. [SSBNs]”.
PETE COMMENT
India's close reliance on Russia in nuclear submarine matters (including INS Chakra II /Nerpa lease 2012-2022) has raised expectations that India's Project-75 Alpha will be based on Russia's Akula-class SSN.
On March 7, 2019, India and Russia signed a US$3 billion deal for lease of another Akula-class SSN. The submarine, dubbed "Chakra III" (possibly Russian submarine Irbis or Iribis K-519) might be delivered to the Indian Navy by 2025.
Earlier INS Chakra II lease permitted Indian submariners and designers to closely study Russian Akula-class SSNs. Chakra III will deepen India's knowledge and experience of this class.
Russia has developed an Akula III which is reportedly larger and quieter than other Akulas. The Akula III has likely adopted some advanced features of the follow-on Yasen-class SSN. Possibly India will base its Project-75 Alphas on the Akula III standard.
Presumably India is inviting France to offer some Barracuda SSN hull information and the Barracuda's pump-jet technology to improve India's future SSN and S5 SSBNs. India may also aim to create competition rather than totally rely on Russia in terms of direct foreign technology transfer. The Russian Borei/Borey-class SSBN also has pump-jet technology.
But if Russia is assisting with the CLWR-B2 (and maybe a "B3") reactor then Russia is firmly embedded in Indian nuclear submarine construction. So embedded that any French technology transfer can be expected to be soaked up by Russian advisors (with GRU links) in India or via Indian agents working for Russia (all the way back to 1991).
In any case India attempting to integrate a variant or development of a Russian
OK-650 reactor with a French Barracuda hull and pump-jet, would be technically very difficult and expensive. Perhaps, then, an Indian variant of the Akula III, with a CLWR-B3 reactor, working to a Russian-French hybrid pump-jet, is possible.
Professor White, a former Deputy Secretary of the [Australian] Defence Department, said Australia was not only going to “hand over some serious dollars” to the US but also pay with “a promise” to enter any future conflict with China.
“This is a very serious transformation of the nature of our alliance with the United States,” Professor White said.
“The US don’t really care about our submarine capability — they care deeply about tying Australia into their containment strategy against China.”
Professor White said he couldn’t see why the US would sell its own submarines – of which they have fewer than they need – unless it was absolutely sure Australia’s submarines would be available to it in the event of a major conflict in Asia.
He said a war between America and China over Taiwan would be “World War III” and have a “very good chance” of being a nuclear conflict.
“Australia’s experience of war shaped by the fact that we’ve tended to be on the winning side, but there is no reason to expect America to win in a war with China over Taiwan,” Professor White warned.
Professor White suggested there was also a high chance the AUKUS deal could fall over under a future American administration and a worsening strategic environment.
Professor White said there were cheaper, quicker, less risky and less demanding ways for Australia to get the submarines it needed, labelling the AUKUS plan a waste of money that “doesn’t make sense”.
“There’s going to be no actual net increase in the number of submarines available until well into the 2040s, even if it goes to plan – which it probably won’t,” he said.
PETE COMMENT
Australia's Defence Minister Richard Marles, in the same report, unconvincingly dismissed seven decades of Australian-US defense alliance doctrine, a doctrine that would place Australia alongside the US if the US decided to fight China. This would adhere to the 1951 ANZUS Treaty triggered by a Chinese attack on even one US warship in a "Gulf of Tonkin" style exchange of fire over Taiwan.
The US always assumes Australia will support the US. This has ALWAYS seen Australian Prime Ministers in full agreement with US expectations, when going to war, in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan. the "War on Terror" and Iraq. Traces of this is even seen in Australia sending Bushmaster armoured vehicles to Ukraine now - a war in the US's European NATO region, not in Australia's.
The US routinely talks of the US and its Australian ally standing "shoulder to shoulder" fighting together in alliance - an expectation expressed many times by US Presidents, Defense Secretaries and Secretaries of State.
Lately a US specialist on AUKUS submarine issues, senior US Defense Department official Dr Mara E. Karlin days ago on March 15, 2023 expressed these US expectations of Australia. See the assumption of alliance coordination and Virginia interoperability, implicitly led by the strongest AUKUS partner and submarine supplier, the US. Dr Karlin speaks of joint Australia-US policy and strategy in the Indo-Pacific being a "shoulder to shoulder" relationship here.
Australia's current Collins submarines simply do not have the range to reach and then operate in the Taiwan Strait, but Australian Virginias will have those capabilities "shoulder to shoulder" with US Virginias.