Israeli Publicity on Nuclear Capability of its Dolphin 2 Submarines - Yakhont, BrahMos

The upper image is a Dolphin 2 - for size comparison and to indicate the fuel cell AIP additions. Lower submarine image highlights the high number of torpedo/missile tubes - apparently ten on the Dolphin 1s and 2s - useful for rapid nuclear missile launch. (Diagram courtesy Next Navy)

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Most probably very similar to the Russian-made P-800 Oniks, Yakhont , NATO reporting name SS-N-26 "Strobile" is the Russian-Indian BrahMos (above) . The mach 2.8 end run makes Yakhont and BrahMos difficult to detect and shoot down in time. With a probable land attack capability and air-launched range longer than the notional 290km they will be a proliferating weapon to watch. (Diagram courtesy - Russian for "Military Parity" website).

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Here's the BrahMos missile showing its capabilities in land, ship and submarine launch. Its ability to hit what look like 2-4 m targets supports claims of +2/-2 m accuracy.
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In terms of relevance to Australia the ability of Germany's TKMS-HDW to tailor-make largish Dolphin 2 (2,000+ ton (surfaced)) warm water, submarines for Israel implies a capability to successfully tailor-make future submarines for Australia.

In late March 2015 much of the Israeli media (eg. a haaretz article of March 30, 2015) seem to be carrying Israeli government generated news of technical progress with the ISS Tanin nuclear capable submarine. Tanin appears to be the most complete of Israel's Dolphin 2 class SSKs. It does not appear the Tanin is anywhere near formal commissioning - so why the publicity? 

The media reports substantially carry mention of the nuclear second strike capabilities of the Dolphins. This is a subject that requires Israeli Government permission to be published.

The reason to mention second strike appears to be Syrian government acquisition and possible deployment of Russian-made P-800 Yakhont, NATO reporting codename SS-N-26 "Strobile" - a supersonic cruise missiles. What has Israel worried is not so much the usual anti-shipping role but more the Yakhont's land attack capability. 

With Syria's record of using Sarin gas on crude warheads against civilians Israel's worry about the Oniks would be considerable. Syrian use of radiological warheads might also be feasible and of course high explosive. The chances of Sunni rebels or Sunni governments acquiring Yakhonts adds an extra worry. See my May 21, 2013 article on Israeli airstrikes on Syria.

Media stories on Israeli second strike would of course have a "put pressure on Iran" intent as well.

In an added twist India and Russia are jointly developing the BrahMos version of the Yakhont. India wishes to market BrahMos to several countries in the Asia-Pacific. Meanwhile Russia has already supplied the Yakhont in Australia's region to Indonesia and Vietnam. 

Please link with Submarine Matters' Israeli Dolphin Sub, Nuclear Armed, Conventionally Propelled, February 25, 2012 which mentions possible Israeli developed nuclear warheads on submarine launched Harpoon missiles (SLCMs). Israel's current nuclear SLCM may be the socalled Popeye Turbo or perhaps an Israeli version of the (jointly developed?) Indian K-15 small ballistic missile. The Dolphin 1s and 2's extraordinarily high number of ten torpedo tubes (including 4 unusually large 650mm tubes) implies the ability to rapidly launch ten nuclear land attack missiles. 

The sequence of the Dolphin 2s being delivered by Germany then modified/completed in Israel (Haifa) is a bit puzzling. Based on "Boats" but updated:

Dolphin 1 class

• Dolphin – delivered May 1998 – commissioned 1999
• Leviathan (trans. "Leviathan" or "whale") – delivered 1999 – commissioned 2000
• Tekumah (trans. "Revival") – delivered 2000 – commissioned 2000

AIP Dolphin 2 class

• Tanin (trans. "Tannin" or "Crocodile") – delivered 23 Sept 2014 - enter service 2015, commisioning 2015 or 2016?
• Rahav (trans. "Splendour") – delivered 29 April 2013 - enter service in 2015 or 2016?
• Name not assigned yet. Ordered 21 March 2012. Enter service in 2017 or 2018?

Tanin was apparently received months after Rahav yet Rahav will be completed later. 

Much of the Israeli modification/completion would be for the electronics and loading fitout for the nuclear missiles. Publicity about Germany in 2012 being overly knowledgable and helpful to Israel regarding the nuclear missile loading fitout must have resulted in Israel taking over that whole job. Perhaps Israel's procedures are not fully developed - hence the Tanin-Rahav completion anomaly.

Pete

Something I had published on Australia's ON LINE opinion on Friday June 20, 2014 http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=16422 indicating "The US is neither all-seeing nor all-powerful. Australia, if it wants to be active in Iraq, cannot act alone so it must follow some country’s lead. With the US inevitably pivoting to Eastern European commitments (Ukraine) and Middle Eastern commitments (ISIS) Australia needs to contribute in some way to the shifting geo-political picture." :

Iraq: the ISIS crisis

By Peter Coates - posted Friday, 20 June 2014

The bloody progression of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rebel forces to the outskirts of Baghdad continues with a wide range of outcomes possible. The rapid expansion of ISIS (also known as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)) has come as a shock. This article attempts to present some issues that have received inadequate attention in mainstream media reporting on the ISIS crisis.

Although Islamic Sunni-Shiite hatreds have existed for around 1,400 years the Sunni rebels of ISIS are an unusually violent problem. This map gives one idea of how central Iraq is in the region and of the refugee (internally displaced people (IDPs)) problem created by ISIS’ advance. This smaller map is of the ISIS advance itself.

ISIS’ presence in Syria and Iraq is probably boosting the risk of international terrorism. It is Iraq’s huge amounts of oil, however, that differentiate Iraq from Syria. Several years of frequent suicide bombings in Iraq have sparked little media attention but ISIS seizing Iraqi regional cities and oilfields has rattled surrounding countries and is driving up world oil prices.

Unlike Syria, with few Westerners, Iraq hosts a large Western foreign contractor-government employee presence due mainly to oil.The UK Daily Mail reports that the US embassy in Baghdad's Green Zone has around 5,000 personnel making it the largest US embassy in the world. This may indicate that that US embassy is part of a huge diplomatic cocktail circuit or perhaps it has other functional priorities?

A powerful presence of Western government representatives in Iraq also responds to conflicting concerns of Iraq’s Shiite and Sunni neighbours. Iran has reportedly sent as many as 2,000 men from Quds special forces units of Iran's Revolutionary Guard into Iraq to boost defences against ISIS in and around Baghdad. This indicates how close the Shiite leadership of Iraq is to the Shiite’s leading Iran. It is also significant that Iraq has not protested against Syrian airstrikes launched by Syria’s Shiite government against ISIS convoys actually within Iraq (near the town of Al Qaim).

Sunni dominated governments, including Saudi Arabia and smaller Arab Gulf states, are nervous that regionally powerful Iranian forces may combine with Iraq’s to present a large Shiite military threat. Hence ISIS is semi-openly recruiting in Saudi Arabia. Iraq’s neighbours and the international economy generally are also concerned about rapid fluctuations in world oil price and production levels caused by the ISIS crisis.

It is unclear whether US military activity concerning Iraq will mainly be an airstrike or evacuation mission (or both). Iraq’s Sunni dominated neighbours may well decide not to host any US aircraft or drones that might kill ISIS Sunni rebels. To adjust to this limitation the US military reports that a US fleet is now sitting in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf. This fleet consists of: the carrier USS George H.W. Bush (helicopters for evacuation, strike aircraft and intelligence collection); the cruiser USS Philippine Sea (able to fire at least 122 cruise missiles); and three destroyers each able to fire 90 cruise missiles. Also in the fleet is the USS Mesa Verde an amphibious warship that can carry 800 marines, helicopters and Osprey tilt rotorcraft. The Age has published an article presenting eight military options Obama might be considering.

Baghdad’s location might make a Western evacuation by helicopter or road difficult. Baghdad is a 1,200 km round trip from the US fleet in the Persian Gulf and alternatively it would be a long trip by road south to Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Baghdad is however a short road or helicopter trip to the Iranian border, hence Western talks with Iran probably include evacuation scenarios.

It was unclear whether Abbott’s comments relating to Iraq (when he met President Obama several days ago) ran too far in advance of any consultation with the Australian public, Parliament or Abbott’s own party room (see this youtube). How Australia could aid any US military or evacuation effort is a question mark. Australian assistance might be in the shape of use of one of Australia’s new E-7A Wedgetail aircraft for force communication or one of our Orions to gather intelligence. If the Iraq crisis runs into weeks or months the deployment of one of our ANZAC frigates might contribute to the US fleet effort. Some Australian army special forces might also be sent to contribute to the protection force [written before the Australian Government announced it was sending 30 SAS to Baghdad as a protection force] for the Western community in Baghdad’s Green Zone.

In the last 48 hours Iraq has formerly asked the US to launch airstrikes against ISIS. Critics from the right and left will damn the US for anything it does or doesn’t do. The US is neither all-seeing nor all-powerful. Australia, if it wants to be active in Iraq, cannot act alone so it must follow some country’s lead. With the US inevitably pivoting to Eastern European commitments (Ukraine) and Middle Eastern commitments (ISIS) Australia needs to contribute in some way to the shifting geo-political picture.

Pete