Australia's Future Submarine Selection - Navantia in trouble.

From UK Daily Mail article "Too heavy: The [S-80 Isaac Peral Class], a new, Spanish-designed submarine is more than 70 tons too heavy, and officials fear if it goes out to sea, it will not be able to surface. Officials are pictured next to the engine of the vessel last November [2012]" also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navantia#Controversies

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AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE SUBMARINE SELECTION - SEA 1000

It is not taken as given that Australia's new government, which came into being in September 2013, will totally agree with submarine decisions and defence white papers released by the previous government (2008-2013). Previous attitudes and statements regarding HDW, DCNS and Navantia might not be the same. Its probably true to say the following documents illustrate the thinking of the previous government - unless reconfirmed as policy by the new government:

- Defence Capability Plan 2009: Sea Project SEA 1000  http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dcp/html/sea/Sea1000.html [now looking a bit out of date]

- Prime Minister, Minister for Defence, Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – Next stage of future submarine project announced 3 May 2012 
 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/05/03/prime-minister-minister-for-defence-minister-for-defence-materiel-joint-media-release-next-stage-of-future-submarine-project-announced/ ["...approved the release of Requests for Information to three overseas submarine designers (DCNS, HDW and Navantia),..."]

- Prime Minister, Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – 2013 Defence White Paper: The Future Submarine Program 3 May 2013 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/05/03/prime-minister-minister-for-defence-and-minister-for-defence-materiel-joint-media-release-2013-defence-white-paper-the-future-submarine-program-2/ ["The Government has now taken the important decision to suspend further investigation of the two Future Submarine options based on military-off-the-shelf designs in favour of focusing resources on progressing an ‘evolved Collins’ and new design options that are likely to best meet Australia’s future strategic and capability requirements. The Government has also taken the important decision to use the United States AN/BYG-1 combat system [see http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/msd/sea1439/index.cfm which indicates integration with US weapons] as the reference system for future design work. "]

Australia's subject to change 2013 Defence White Paper indicates a mixture of companies is more likely than with the pre 2013 options of HDW, DCNS and Navantia off-the-shelf. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Electric Boat and Thales are all likely to become/are involved. Outside of the US and Europe - the builders of Korea's projected KSS-III (using much HDW technology) and Japan's current Soryu Class propulsion system (with the Kockums Stirling AIP) might also be outside contenders. 

SEA 1000's official parameters suggest that the following are prime considerations: Australian Federal Government money for South Australia for manufacturing industry development; business; union; jobs; and electoral interests . SEA 1000's expected  in-service deadline is now apparently around 2035.

NAVANTIA

The attitude to Navantia may be different given Navantia's 2013-2014 problems with the S-80 Isaac Peral Class. The following article from the UK Daily Mail, June 6, 2013, is rather extreme in tone but still troubling: Spain's £1.75billion submarine programme is torpedoed after realising near-complete vessel is 70 tonnes too heavy because engineer put decimal point in the wrong place http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2336953/Spains-1-75bn-submarine-programme-torpedoed-realising-near-complete-vessel-70-tonnes-heavy.html : "A £1.75billion Spanish submarine project has run aground after officials realised that the vessel is more than 70 tonnes too heavy - because an engineer put a decimal point in the wrong place...A former Spanish official has described the mistake, which has led to fears that the submarine might not resurface if sent to sea, as 'fatal'....The [S-80 lead vessel] Isaac Peral, the first in a new class of diesel electric submarines, was almost complete when the problem was noticed....Spain will now pay US Navy contractor Electric Boat £9million over three years to assess the issue and carry out the work required to correct it, according to the Spanish Defence Ministry."

Navantia's solid performance in being the major contractor for Australia's under construction Hobart Class Destroyers and Canberra Class LHDs may be allowing Navantia strong influence over Australia SEA 1000 selection process. Navantia may be considered a safe vender but its lack of experience in completing a submarine itself of ever exporting a submarine itself may be significant problems. 

Navantia was involved with DCNS in building Agostas and Scorpenes some years ago but Navantia did not build them by itself. http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/scorpene/

HDW and DCNS are the firms with the greatest export experience and deepest knowledge base in conventional subs. HDW and DCNS should therefore be the front-runners in Australia S-80 future submarine selection. Inter-operability with the US is important hence its is highly desirable that these firms would be permitted by the US to incorporate the US SSN equivalent combat system and weapons fit.

The Navantia S-80 apparently incorporates the US combat system-weapons fit and is working with US company Electric Boat - which are strengths. Australia also worked or works with Electric Boat in building-maintaining the Collins. However the S-80 falls down in not being completed and not yet exported. As indicated above the S-80 has been significantly delayed due to basic design faults.  The S-80 is reportedly 70 tonnes overweight - hence suffering major balance problems - leading to a delayed in-service of 2017 - and cost overruns http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navantia#Controversies.

The 70 tonne-balance error may be an outcome of inexperience or undue haste in developing and building the S-80.

Navantia's involvement with DCNS in submarine building apparently ended in 2010. Hence pre-2010 perceptions in Australia's Defence Department about Navantia for SEA 1000 appear not as valid in 2014.

Navantia apparently has never completed a submarine by itself or exported a sub by itself. As things stand this may make Navantia a higher risk sub maker than Kockums was in the 1980s for the Collins Class sub(?)

Note that in the 1980s Kockums was chosen over the more proven HDW at the last minute - and the rest is history. Now we have never completed a sub by itself Navantia in SEA 1000 contention.

If Navantia develops a demonstrably efficient S-80 and gets some export orders for subs experience before 2025 then it might be less high risk and less expensive a choice.

COMMENTS ON THIS GENTLESEAS ARTICLE

As this post was carried over from an old link it contains no visitor Comments facility.

However by other means MHalblaub commented January 20, 2014:
The Spanish S-80 and the Japanese submarines have something in common. The AIP of both submarine types is a licensed build by DCNS or Kockums. 

I doubt that Kawasaki acquired a license to retail AIPs and France will never sell the AIP to Australia without a submarine. 

There are just two western companies which have a good record for licensed building of submarines: DCNS and HDW. Kockums failed last time.

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Pete's reply January 21, 2014:

Hi  MHalblaub 

The S-80's AIP is neither DCNS MESMA nor Kockums Stirling but a bioethanol-processor (provided by Hynergreen from Abengoa) - see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-80-class_submarine#Propulsion . Meanwhile the Soryu does indeed utilise Kockums Stirling.

I don't know if Kawasaki could export its AIP as its never exported a sub or parts to my knowledge. Agree that France DCNS is unlikely to export its MESMA alone.

I agree that DCNS and HDW have the best record for licensed building.

Navantia might need two decades or more of providing licence building and exporting different sizes of subs to catch up with DCNS and HDW. 

Its unknown whether Navantia joint ventures with Electric Boat would improve Navantia's performance. see references to Electric Boat's assistance here.

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Pete

Australian SEA 1000 future submaine - an S-80 development or HDW 216?

 A rough sketch of the Navantia S-80 submarine. This sub is still being built-developed and might be launched in 2015.

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Concerning my article of November 22, 2013, "Ongoing debate on Australia's SEA 1000 future submarine requirements." http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/ongoing-debate-on-australias-sea-1000.html MHalblaub commented:

"Hi Pete,

do you think the US are unreliable allies? That was my thought reading RAN has to shadow a fast going nuclear powered submarine (SNN) for a week. I doubt that there will be within the next 10 years any technique for a conventional submarine to maintain submerged about 20 knots for more than 24 hours. Therefore the only solution would be a SNN, to wait or to trust the US.

I am well aware that the small HDW 210mod falls short of the SEA 1000 requirements. In my eyes these requirements are the wet dreams of some Admirals.

A greater range would be useful. A bigger weapons load is nice to have. The 8+ VLS are also a nice to have but they could also be tube launched. Btw Popeyes in action: http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_07_14/Israel-hits-Syria-to-destroy-Russian-made-Yakhont-anti-ship-missiles-3943/

The British Astute-class submarines can also fire Tomahawks without an US combat system.

The problem for Royal Australian Navy will be the gap between Collins-class retirement and entry into service of SEA 1000 submarines. Australia can throw a lot of money after the Collins-class to keep them running until 2030. Today the price for one HDW Type 210 is about the costs Australia needs to maintain Collins-class for one year. The maintenance costs for Collins-class will awfully rise in the future.

My advice would be to order as soon as possible 6 Type 210mod/A 26 to fill this gap. 5 submarines should be built in Australia. That will give Australia time and knowledge to design a proper submarine. This interim solution would also save a lot of money and add capabilities.

Australia should not try to reinvent wheels that already exist in far better quality. E.g. engines, AIP, combat system, … That will lead to a troubled and outdated son of Collins – just like the father.

Regards,
MHalblaub
(I tried two times to log me in …)

AIP: Direct Methanol Fuel Cell: http://www.sfc-defense.com/products

November 22, 2013"

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Pete's Comments

My response is that I think the US are reliable allies that provide Australia with security benefits in peacetime and would be an essential ally if Australia faced an enemy too big for Australia to handle alone.

You are right that no non-nuclear propulsion would allow an Australian submarine to shadow a fast moving SSN for a week. And yes the only options are for an Australian SSN or reliance on US SSNs to do fast moving shadowing.

It is true the SEA 1000 requirements are very ambitious. They would require a unique, new, very large diesel-electric submarine (SSK) or an SSN.

The value of a VLS is its flexibility eg. for: a divers wet-dry chamber; a hatch for a mini "piggyback" sub; and to fire cruise or small ballistic missiles. For missile firing the main value of a VLS is the low indiscretion factor - meaning the sub can fire all (say) 8 missiles very quickly - reducing that chance that the sub will be detected while firing. Using horizontal tubes probably involves "slow time" reloads of missiles or of follow-up torpedos.

Regarding http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_07_14/Israel-hits-Syria-to-destroy-Russian-made-Yakhont-anti-ship-missiles-3943/ its quite possible Popeyes were not used. The target was in range of Israel's Harpoon SLCMs. It would therefore have been unnecessary for Israel to use its (perhaps) 1,500 km range Popeye SLCMs and there would have been a risk a malfunctioning Popeye would crash and then its technical secrets might be revealed. If the Popeye SLCMs have a 1,500 km range (see http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/israel-submarine-capabilities/) its more likely they would be used for targets deep inland like Tehran or even Riyadh.

Yes its true the British Astute class SSN is a possibility. However any purchase of a French or UK SSN has the disadvantage that their maintenance-repair bases are around 20,000 km away in Northern Europe or effectively further if the Suez Canal is blocked in wartime. Meanwhile the US provides some SSN maintenance facilities much closer in Diego Garcia, Guam and certainly Pearl Harbour.

The Royal Australian Navy would be very aware that an "interim" sub choice might become permanent. The fixed costs of any sub choice are high - therefore making interim highly uneconomic as would running two different sub types simultaneously.

In any case the HDW 210 is basically the smallest of the HDW range (with the even smaller HDW 206 being phased out). This makes the HDW 210 the least likely HDW Australia might buy. The bigger the better in terms of range and endurance - making a very large version of the HDW 212-214 basically a HDW 800 Dolphin+ the most likely buy from HDW.

An HDW Dolphin+ is on the way to an even larger (but technically and financially high risk)  HDW 216 in response to SEA 1000 requirements. It needs to be remembered though that the US (Lockheed Martin) may well not make its highly developed combat system available to HDW. Against this HDW is probably the world's most experienced and productive builder of conventional diesel-electric subs.

In contrast I understand Lockheed Martin is placing its combat system into the Spanish Navantia S-80. It is significant that Australia might have confidence in dealing with Navantia in submarine development because I believe Australia has a positive relationship with Navantia in the current Canberra LHD and Hobart AWD projects. Against this Navantia has never independently built and then launched an operational submarine. Navantia has also had no independent experience building subs for export or assisting a customer to build a sub

Possibly I'm overrating the importance of the Lockheed Martin SUBICs combat system in the SEA 1000 submarine selection - see http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/193/SEA-1000-COMBAT-SYSTEMS-SELECTION-FOR-SEA-1000 .

While Kockums submarine division's future is in doubt Australia developing an A26 or any other Kockums design is unlikely.

Definitely "Australia should not try to reinvent wheels" and should avoid a repeat of the Collins experience.

I also have had problems logging-in or commenting on some blogger-blogspot sites - probably some technical problem involving blogger-blogspot or even of its Google owner.

Regards

Pete

Ongoing debate on Australia's SEA 1000 future submarine requirements.



The HDW Type 210mod "Ula Class" submarine specifically built for Norwegian conditions, with a submerged displacement of 1,150 tons.



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For the latest on Australia's future submarine issue see June 11, 2014’s Australia's Future Submarine - Swedish vs German Claims http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/06/australias-future-submarine-swedish-vs.html . 



For my preceding post "Australian SEA 1000 Future Submarine, shipbuilding-budgeting issues"   http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/australian-naval-shipbuilding-and.html Anonymous has commented as follows:

"Anonymous said...

So what is the military issue behind a bigger son of Collins-class?

Range of a Collins-class submarine today is reached by even smaller submarines like Type210mod or A26. To gather intelligence a small submarine is better suited and a diesel-electric submarine is even quieter than a large Virginia-class submarine.

What about crew size? A Virginia-class submarine is manned with about 130 men. A modern Type210mod needs just 15 men (21 for 3-watch). Therefore 3 crews of Virginias 26 small submarines could be manned. For price of one Virginia class submarine Australia could get at least 4 Type210. For A$30billion Australia could buy more than 40 Type210mod.

This submarine could be built in Australia. The advantage of building a steady stream of small submarines is to include improvements in the next batch and to keep the knowledge alive how to build them.

Just 3 operational submarines are easier to track and even very fast submarines can’t be everywhere at once. Also a fast submarine is very noisy. A trip around Australia is roughly 7,000 nm. For each submarine 2,300 nm to patrol. With 26 submarines the area is less than 300 nm. With just 3 operational submarines it is very hard to lose one with a crew of over 100 men.

US combat System due to US weapons? What a nonsense! South Korea ChangBogo-class (Type 209) can fire Harpoon missiles. If Raytheon dislikes selling some Tomahawks Australia could just ask Israel about some Popeyes. Israel operates Popeyes on Dolphin-class submarines (Type 209).

Oh, more range. What about submarine tenders? Even the US Navy has a few.

Going big will result in too few submarines. Going to Virginia will add a capability already existing in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. After 6 or 12 small submarines Australia can still switch to a larger submarine type but then with better knowledge.

November 22, 2013

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On this current post I am responding with:

Hi Anonymous

The HDW 210mod and all existing SSKs (including the current sized S-80) fall far short of Australian SEA 1000 (future submarine) requirements.

The SEA 1000 submarine needs range, endurance, speed, multi-mission capabilities and weapons load far above existing SSKs.

If you compare the totality of HDW 209, 210mod ("Ula"), 212 or 214's published capabilities with Collins http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine you'll see the difference.

Note that SEA 1000 needs higher capabilities than even the Collins, especially for the added weapons load of 8+ Tomahawks in a VLS and an AIP capability (achieved by "usual" AIP, advanced batteries or nuclear).

Ideally an SEA 1000 should be operationally autonomous (from US SSNs) and hence capable of shadowing a fast moving SSN for at least a week.

The crew size of 135 for a Virginia being much larger than for SSKs (or the 60 for a future French Barracuda SSN) is indeed an issue.

Tomahawk is a requirement because Harpoon missiles are far too short in range for many land attack scenarios and because Tomahawk is US combat system compatible.

There are too many current uncertainties about the suspected Israeli SLCM Popeye. Popeye may include considerable "off the books" US, French and/or Indian content making it difficult for Israel to export.

Regards

Pete

Australian SEA 1000 Future Submarine, shipbuilding-budgeting issues

For the latest on Sweden's Saab perhap's buying ASC see June 11, 2014’s Australia's Future Submarine - Swedish vs German Claims http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/06/australias-future-submarine-swedish-vs.html . It is unclear whether Germany or Sweden hold the strongest intellectual property rights to the Stirling AIP.

A rough sketch of what Australia may want in its SEA 1000 future submarine project. Nuclear or diesel-electric propelled, if diesel-electric then additionally AIP or very large advanced battery capacity, multi-use vertical launch system, US combat system, US weapons including Tomahawk. Probably the not yet developed HDW 216, an enlarged DCNS Scorpene and in development Spanish S-80 are front runners with the SEA 1000 program planners. US Virginia Class, UK or French nuclear attack subs are outside chances. The chance that Swedish Kockums might be chosen (again) is reduced due to the Collins experience and TKMS-HDW.



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Australia's new centre-conservative Coalition Government has made no decision on what its project SEA 1000 future submarine will consist of.

The previous centre-left Labor Government (voted out in September 2013) indicated in White Papers and other reviews that 12 future submarines would be constructed from around 2025 to around 2035. The previous Government decided these submarines would be large (up to 4,500 tonne) and hence of unique design, diesel-electric, built in Adelaide, South Australia and that they would probably use the US combat system and US conventional weapons (including the Tomahawk cruise missile). These unique large diesel-electric may effectively be Collins Mk. IIs but not built with Kockums as a major contractor unless TKMS negotiates deals in that direction. The Labor decision was made due to several considerations including:

- economic-industry development potential for the depressed South Australia economy

- popular with Labor's trade union constituency

- Federal and State level electoral considerations ie. votes in South Australia

- ideological anti-nuclear grounds, including popularity with Labor's Green Party ally and

- technical grounds (mainly that Australia possessed no nuclear propulsion support industry, that is if we needed one at all...)

Australia's new conservative Liberal-National Coalition Government has not yet made a decision on what will be in the SEA 1000 future submarine in part because:

- the new Coalition Government has only been in power for two and a half months

- the highly complex 30+ billion dollar project deserves several long reviews

- Australia does not currently have the Defence money to fund the project

- naval shipbuilding and budgeting for Australia is currently taken up by the 2 Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs) and the 3 Hobart Class (Aegis) Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs) projects under construction, and

- the issue is still unresolved under the new Government as to whether Australia may buy nuclear propelled attack submarines rather than diesel-electric

Its not necessarily set in stone that 12 subs will be built rather than 6 diesel-electric or 4 to 6 nuclear propelled. The built in Australia requirement is not a given. Industry-jobs-votes requirements in Australia may be met in other ways including offset agreements and heavy maintenance facilities constructed  in Australia including nuclear propulsion support (if needed...).

If, as is likely, 4 Virginia Class can do the job of 12 diesel-electric Collins Mk. IIs then on the crucial issue of lower overall price, a deal is possible.

A final Australian decision may take 4 years into the new Government ie 2017.

In terms of arguments favouring nuclear propelled Phil Radford a freelance writer, based in Sydney, has written the following article of May 15, 2013 in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI's) The Strategist http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-farewell-to-nuclear-submarines-for-now/

A farewell to nuclear submarines, for now

The Defence White Paper signals full-steam ahead for Australia’s most expensive defence project ever: the design and construction, in Australia, of 12 conventionally-powered submarines. With A$200m committed to funding initial designs, however, the enormity of the challenge will start to surface. Australia now has to create submarines with greater range and endurance than anything built by countries with generations of experience.

Hopefully, Canberra analysed its alternatives to the point of exhaustion. In about two years’ time, Adelaide will start to fill up with the 1,500-or-so foreign draughtsmen and engineers that RAND says Australia will have to import, just to execute the design work. And as these experienced submarine designers wrestle with the performance parameters set by government, they’ll pose one very awkward question: “Why are you asking us to design a nuclear-powered submarine without a nuclear engine?”

Currently, the government has no answer. The White Paper simply says that “consideration of a nuclear powered submarine capability [… has been] ruled out”. This reticence is mistake. As Collins Mk II rises from the drawing board, the case for purchasing nuclear-powered boats will only get stronger.

First, consider the money. The projected cost of an all-new 4,000 tonne conventional boat is estimated by ASPI to be over A$3 billion, which includes all project costs. This is approximately the same as the sail-away cost of a much larger Virginia class nuclear submarine off an established production line, and could even be more than a French or British nuclear submarine which would almost certainly sail away for less than $2 billion. Defence would still have to purchase the support systems to get the boats into Australian service, but the industrial and program costs sunk into getting a first-in-class to work would be borne by someone else.

Besides being less risky to procure, these nuclear-powered vessels would be far more powerful than conventionally-powered boats. They could arrive on station faster, stay there longer, carry more weapons, and fight more aggressively. As a deterrent, they’d be many times more formidable.

The Royal Australian Navy might play a simple war game once the new design matures. They could invite a retired American submarine captain over and say : “Sir, to achieve a specific objective in the middle of the Pacific or Indian oceans you have a straight choice between having, under your command, one single nuclear-powered boat, or ‘X’ number of our Collins Mk.II?” Even at this distance, his ‘X’ is likely to be two or three. Expressed as an opportunity cost in dollars, the answer is horrendous.

The objections to going nuclear are clear; but as the challenges of Collins Mk.II become less opaque, the question will be: did the Government diligently and unemotionally address them?

If the over-riding justification for an Australia-built fleet is operational independence, then Government should look squarely at what the current fleet delivers. Only one third of the Collins fleet is generally seaworthy. Refitting them takes four to five times the work required on similar comparable European vessels. And upgrading them requires US help for the most complex elements—the sensors, combat system and weapons.

Australia could almost certainly sustain a fleet of nuclear boats to a higher level of operational availability than currently possible. Neither the US nor UK boats ever need refuelling. The core is closed for the lifetime of the submarine, so the additional nuclear engineering required for through-life support is modest. Establishing a first-class nuclear-boat maintenance facility in Australia would be expensive, but pales beside the gargantuan cost of re-launching the Australian Submarine Corporate (ASC) as a construction yard.

Alternatively, Australia could avoid the cost and political risk of building maintenance facilities here, and instead operate the boats on a similar cycle to the United States Navy’s Guam-based submarines. This would mean the submarines having only a small maintenance footprint here and returning to US West Coast for periodic refits, which is pretty much how the RAAF maintains its fleet of C-17 strategic transports.

In either case, you don’t need a construction yard to maintain a submarine. The activities are quite different. British nuclear boats never re-visit the Barrow yard where they are built.

Nor would the fact Australia’s boats were foreign-built boats necessarily diminish the country’s strategic independence. There’s a fundamental difference between depending on an ally to come to your aid (which, in extremis, Australia does now) and depending on your ally not to obstruct you from paying to defend yourself. That’s why the UK ultimately trusts US not to abuse its position as the supplier–owner of its Trident ballistic missiles, on which the UK’s independent deterrent relies.
Does the case against nuclear boats ultimately rest, then, on Australian jobs foregone? That flank, too, is exposed. Re-booting ASC will merely kick-start thousands of careers that will go nowhere once each design and construction phase is complete. Better, surely, to play the international defence procurement game, and trade jobs on submarines for offsets in industries where Australia can build competitive advantage—and careers with a future.

The stakes couldn’t be higher. Asia is rising and submarines will become Australia’s primary defence asset for many decades. For now, the government has passed on the one weapon that could deliver genuine independent strategic security. But like a pair of lethal mines, cost and capability are floating right in the path Australia’s home-grown subs. This won’t be the last we hear of Australia’s nuclear option.

Phil Radford is a freelance writer, based in Sydney. He specialises in naval strategy and defence procurement." 

Indonesia Decides to Buy Korean Made Submarines

An HDW 209 Type 1400 (this particular sub, S31, is Tamoio part of Brazil's Tupi Class) in what looks like "Sepetiba" Rio de Janeiro's harbour. Indonesia's three new submarines will be similar. 

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The HDW family tree with HDW 209 on several branches - click to expand.

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While North Korea is undergoing a tense and hopefully predictable transition to a new "Emperor?" of the Kim Dynasty (possibly Kim Jonghe Un) South Korea has its first submarine export order. Blending reports from The Jakarta Post (December 22, 2011) (South) Korea Herald (December 21, 2011) and South Korea's Chosun Ilbo (December 21, 2011):

The Indonesian Defence Ministry and Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine Engineering (DSME) signed the contract on Tuesday December 20, 2011 for South Korea to build three submarines for the Indonesian Navy. Delivery may be in 2015-2016 with commissioning by 2018. These submarines are South Korean Improved Chang Bogo Class derivatives of the German designed HDW 209. It is inevitable that incorporated into these two submarines is technology developed for the HDW 214. HDW 214s are HDW's main current submarine for export.

The contract was signed by the Indonesian Defence Ministry's Defence Facilities Agency chief, Maj. Gen. Ediwan Prabowo, and DSME President and CEO Nam Tae-sang.

Under the contract, the two submarines built in South Korea will be in cooperation with Indonesian state-owned shipbuilder PT PAL.

Ministry spokesman Brig. Gen. Hartin Asrind told the Jakarta Post over the phone that the contract was worth US$1.07 billion.

Indonesia’s signing of a contract to procure three submarines from a South Korean company is an effort to keep pace with other countries in the region such as Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and Australia.

The Improved Chang Bogo Class will weigh approximately 1,400 tons surfaced and 1,600 tons submerged, be 61.3 meters long, will carry up to 40 crew members and have eight weapons tubes for 14 torpedoes, mines, missiles (US Harpoon and/or Indian BrahMos?) and other weaponry.

The three new submarines will replace Indonesia’s two old HDW 206 Cakra Class submarines; the KRI Cakra and KRI Nenggala (both launched in 1977). As submarines inevitably rust/corrode and expansion-contraction causes metal fatigue after 30 years the 36 year old KRI Cakra and KRI Nenggala are likely to be scrapped.

Other Submarine Forces (and Acquisitions) in Indonesia's Region

• Australia, 6 Australian built, Swedish Kockums designed Collins Class commissioned in 1996-2003 with 12 future Australian built "SEA 1000" Class subs for possible introduction 2030 onwards.

• Malaysia, 2 French built Scorpene Submarines KD Tunku Abdul Rahman Class commissioned in 2009 http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2009/09/malaysias-first-ever-submarine-scorpene.html

• Singapore, 4 Swedish built Challenger Class commissioned 1999-2001 and 2 Swedish built AIP Archer Class see http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2009/09/singapore-submarine-development.html

• Vietnam, 4 to 6 Russia built Kilo Subs to be commissioned 2015-2019 http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2009/12/tentative-vietnamese-plans-to-buy-kilo.html
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See also Indonesian-Malaysian clashes over the future Ambalat undersea oil field - one reason why both countries have bought new submarines - http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2009/06/indonesia-gets-apology-from-malaysian.html
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Pete

India's Project 75I Tender for 6 more SSK submarines one tiny step closer

Contender for Project 75I? Model of Russia's Amur Class Submarine http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amur_class_submarine  which may include 10 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells. VLS may meet the expected missile criteria for Project 75I.

The Times of India, February 17, 2011 reports:

"Tender soon for Rs 50k crore stealth submarine project http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Tender-soon-for-Rs-50k-crore-stealth-submarine-project/articleshow/7509990.cms

"NEW DELHI: India will soon float the global tender for construction of six new-generation stealth submarines with the help of a foreign collaborator, which at a cost of over Rs 50,000 crore [equals US$11.05 Billion = 500,000,000,000 x US$0.0221 as at 17/2.2011 by my estimate] will be the country's single biggest defence project till now.

This comes after the Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC), chaired by defence minister A K Antony, last year cleared this submarine programme called `Project-75India' [shortened to Project 75I or P-75I] and then subsequently issued RFIs (request for information) to five submarine manufacturers, as was first reported by TOI.

Selection of the foreign collaborator for P-75I will, of course, come after the five -- Rosoboronexport (Russia), DCNS/Armaris (France), HDW (Germany), Kockums ( Sweden) and Navantia (Spain) -- respond with their final proposals to the tender.

"The government has cleared P-75I, which is the next lot of six submarines... At the moment we are in the RFI process. I hope within this year we would be able to push off the tender,'' said Navy chief Admiral Nirmal Verma on Wednesday, on the sidelines of a seminar on submarine operations.

This naval programme will clearly overtake the Rs 42,000-crore project to procure 126 multi-role fighters for IAF, so far dubbed the "mother of all defence deals'', which is in the final selection phase now.

The six new vessels will have land-attack capabilities as well as air-independent propulsion (AIP), which substantially enhances a diesel-electric submarine's capability to stay underwater without frequently surfacing to get oxygen to recharge its batteries.

As per the approved plan, while two submarines will be imported from the foreign collaborator, the other four will be built indigenously under transfer of technology. While three will be constructed at Mazagon Docks (MDL) in Mumbai, the fourth will be built at Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL) in Visakhapatnam.

MDL is already engaged in building six French Scorpene submarines under Project-75, currently valued at Rs 23,562 crore, which incidentally is running three years behind the 2012-2017 schedule set for it earlier.

Navy is keen that P-75I gets going as soon as possible since it will be left with just over half of its present fleet of 14 ageing conventional submarines -- 10 Russian Kilo-class and four German HDW -- by 2015 or so.

Though India does not have nuclear submarines and SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) capabilities at present to complete its "nuclear triad'', it hopes to induct its first indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant by 2012. Moreover, it hopes to also induct the Akula-II class nuclear-powered submarine K-152 Nerpa on a 10-year lease from Russia this year."
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COMPARE WITH GOVERNMENT UPDATE IN FEBRUARY 2008
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Its interesting to see how slowly the wheels of Government move. Three years ago, on February 17, 2008 CNN-IBN reported http://ibnlive.in.com/news/navy-eyes-new-submarines-for-bluewater-capability/59174-3.html:

"...India has made it clear that it wants more muscle at sea and has kick-started the process of acquiring six new hunter-killer submarines and seven new frigates.Of particular significance is its decision to go in for a new line of submarines, which will for the first time give India an assured capability to attack targets on land from under the sea.

Request for information have recently been issued to the French DCNS, Spanish Navantia, Russian Rubin and German HDW.

[It appears the field has actually been expanded, as at 2011, with the addition of Kockums].

"It is a new submarine. It is not the Scorpene and it is a bigger submarine with specific features," Alain Fougeron, Executive VP, DCNS says about its new submarines.

The key differentiator from its existing fleet of 16 submarines will be a new class of missiles, which will establish India as the leading naval power in the region.

"The missile component of the Submarine weapon is very important and it should be very powerful," Andrey V Efimov, Manager, Rubin Design Bureau, says.

By considering four options India has sent a message that it wants to diversify its weapons procurement beyond traditional arms supplier Russia.

Its 30-year submarine building programme had envisaged a Russian line of Amur submarines beside the French Scorpene for which India signed up in 2005.

But now the Amur is not a certainty even though the Russians claim it is superior.

"Its capable of providing salvos for different targets," Efimov says about Amur submarines...."

COMMENTS
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Over three years there now appears to be more uncertainty over Project 75I with none of the previous Scorpene batch (under previous Project 75) yet being launched and the apparent widening of the Project 75I first from four to now five possible bidders. Selection for political reasons or taking into account other weapons projects may trump any pure performance criteria.

Does anyone wish to put forward a Project 75I  favourite? And for what reasons?

I was alerted to the above article by an Anonymous reader - whose tips and advice have proven very valuable over the years - Much Appreciated :)
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Pete