Indian Possible Interest in Buying-Building Japan's Soryu Submarine - Australia

Two Prime Ministers - Japan's Abe and India's Modi. Are their countries close enough for a Soryu deal?

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The Indian press reported on January 29, 2015 that India, under submarine purchasing-building Project-75I (I for India), may wish to select six Japanese Soryu submarines for building in India. The Rs 50,000 crore project price converts to $US8,133,990,000 that is $US8.13 Billion (where one crore is 10,000,000 Indian Rupees and one Rupee is worth 0.016 US Dollars).

See reference on Submarine Matters to:
-  the slow pace of the Project-75I selection way back to 2008 and 2011
-  then an article of August 2014 (which also mentions the already building 6 Scorpene "Project-75" no "I")
-  see also the 2014 reference to the DRDO fuel cell which has complicated Project-75

If a legitimate tender process is held other contenders to sell a large conventional submarine are:
-  Germany (TKMS-HDW)
-  Russia (Rosoboronexport)
-  Spain (Navantia)
-  Sweden (Saab-Kockums), and 
-  France (DCNS). 

COMMENT

Several problems already seem evident in the possibility of Japan selling Soryus to India:

1. India's "build in India" intention may clash with Japan's (to date) insistence that any Soryus it markets should be built in Japan. 

There may be a solution that may allay many of Japan's concerns. If Japan is interested it can contact me by email - see email on my profile...

2.  Japan would be mindful of India's closeness to Japan's strategic opponent, Russia. Japan is very sensitive to the security of its submarine technology secrets. Therefore Japan would not want the secrets of any Soryu that is sold to India to be passed on to one of Japan's opponents. India has been close to Russia on a defence sales, weapons' development and on secondment of personnel, levels for decades. India and Russia are particularly close on submarine high technology matters - including INS Chakra, the Akula II SSN that Russia has long leased to India. 

3.  India may perhaps have a problematic reputation as a weapons system buyer from Western firms. France is unfortunate enough to be involved in both the major examples. 

a. The first example is in-building Project-75 (no I) where France (DCNS) has been assisting India to build 6 Scorpenes for the last decade (see Project 75 and third paragraph of this Indian article ). India has expressed displeasure with alleged French caused delays. Over the years India has increasingly wanted AIP in those Scorpenes - India sees AIP as important - in part to surpass the three AIP equipped DCNS Agosta 90Bs submarines operated by Pakistan. But India may not wish to pay the higher price adjustment that DCNS would want to charge (AIP being an expensive upgrade). India has countered with a project by DRDO to develop a fuel cell AIP. India may also be using the usual strategy of great powers (sellers and buyers) - which is delay for political and commercial leverage. 

b. Secondly, under the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition - on 31 January 2012 it was announced that Dassault Rafale won that competition. The MMRCA competition may be worth around US$30 Billion. However on 10 January 2015, India hinted it would not sign the Rafale deal with Dassault but instead perhaps buy more Su-30MKIs or Su-35s from Russia. India may also be attempting to leverage a better result from Russia on the joint India-Russia PAK- FA stealth fighter-bomber project - also known as the T-50. 

4.  If India insists on AIP this may cause problems for Japan. In Japan's first 5 Soryus Japan included Stirling engine AIP from Sweden. It is unlikely that Japan would receive Swedish permission to sell Soryus with Stirling AIP to India. Sweden, after all, would prefer to sell its own Saab-Kockums  submarines, with Stirling technology, to India. If Japan accepted an offer from India-DRDO to build an indigenous fuel cell AIP (see above) this may be a problem or opportunity because Japan may be in a strong technological position to jointly or unilaterally develop an AIP.  

Broader Implications - Australia and Canada

If there is a prospect of "build Soryus in India" - even whether or not it happens - this may have implications for any Japanese Soryu sale to Australia. Perhaps "build Soryus in part or whole in Australia" might be more possible?

If India is serious about buying 6 very large conventional submarines - built in India - with AIP - then Germany's HDW 216 and France's SMX Ocean may both be stronger contenders than Japan's (build in Japan - maybe no AIP) Soryu. This may increase the production runs and drive down development costs for the 216 and/or SMX making them more attractive to Australia. Canada has also been grouped with India and Australia as a country with a relatively large budget in need of large, long range, replacement submarines.

Please connect with India's Rising Nuclear and Conventional Submarine Force, May 21, 2015 http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/05/indias-rising-nuclear-and-conventional.html .

Pete

Australia's Future Submarine Selection - Navantia in trouble.

From UK Daily Mail article "Too heavy: The [S-80 Isaac Peral Class], a new, Spanish-designed submarine is more than 70 tons too heavy, and officials fear if it goes out to sea, it will not be able to surface. Officials are pictured next to the engine of the vessel last November [2012]" also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navantia#Controversies

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AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE SUBMARINE SELECTION - SEA 1000

It is not taken as given that Australia's new government, which came into being in September 2013, will totally agree with submarine decisions and defence white papers released by the previous government (2008-2013). Previous attitudes and statements regarding HDW, DCNS and Navantia might not be the same. Its probably true to say the following documents illustrate the thinking of the previous government - unless reconfirmed as policy by the new government:

- Defence Capability Plan 2009: Sea Project SEA 1000  http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dcp/html/sea/Sea1000.html [now looking a bit out of date]

- Prime Minister, Minister for Defence, Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – Next stage of future submarine project announced 3 May 2012 
 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/05/03/prime-minister-minister-for-defence-minister-for-defence-materiel-joint-media-release-next-stage-of-future-submarine-project-announced/ ["...approved the release of Requests for Information to three overseas submarine designers (DCNS, HDW and Navantia),..."]

- Prime Minister, Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – 2013 Defence White Paper: The Future Submarine Program 3 May 2013 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/05/03/prime-minister-minister-for-defence-and-minister-for-defence-materiel-joint-media-release-2013-defence-white-paper-the-future-submarine-program-2/ ["The Government has now taken the important decision to suspend further investigation of the two Future Submarine options based on military-off-the-shelf designs in favour of focusing resources on progressing an ‘evolved Collins’ and new design options that are likely to best meet Australia’s future strategic and capability requirements. The Government has also taken the important decision to use the United States AN/BYG-1 combat system [see http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/msd/sea1439/index.cfm which indicates integration with US weapons] as the reference system for future design work. "]

Australia's subject to change 2013 Defence White Paper indicates a mixture of companies is more likely than with the pre 2013 options of HDW, DCNS and Navantia off-the-shelf. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Electric Boat and Thales are all likely to become/are involved. Outside of the US and Europe - the builders of Korea's projected KSS-III (using much HDW technology) and Japan's current Soryu Class propulsion system (with the Kockums Stirling AIP) might also be outside contenders. 

SEA 1000's official parameters suggest that the following are prime considerations: Australian Federal Government money for South Australia for manufacturing industry development; business; union; jobs; and electoral interests . SEA 1000's expected  in-service deadline is now apparently around 2035.

NAVANTIA

The attitude to Navantia may be different given Navantia's 2013-2014 problems with the S-80 Isaac Peral Class. The following article from the UK Daily Mail, June 6, 2013, is rather extreme in tone but still troubling: Spain's £1.75billion submarine programme is torpedoed after realising near-complete vessel is 70 tonnes too heavy because engineer put decimal point in the wrong place http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2336953/Spains-1-75bn-submarine-programme-torpedoed-realising-near-complete-vessel-70-tonnes-heavy.html : "A £1.75billion Spanish submarine project has run aground after officials realised that the vessel is more than 70 tonnes too heavy - because an engineer put a decimal point in the wrong place...A former Spanish official has described the mistake, which has led to fears that the submarine might not resurface if sent to sea, as 'fatal'....The [S-80 lead vessel] Isaac Peral, the first in a new class of diesel electric submarines, was almost complete when the problem was noticed....Spain will now pay US Navy contractor Electric Boat £9million over three years to assess the issue and carry out the work required to correct it, according to the Spanish Defence Ministry."

Navantia's solid performance in being the major contractor for Australia's under construction Hobart Class Destroyers and Canberra Class LHDs may be allowing Navantia strong influence over Australia SEA 1000 selection process. Navantia may be considered a safe vender but its lack of experience in completing a submarine itself of ever exporting a submarine itself may be significant problems. 

Navantia was involved with DCNS in building Agostas and Scorpenes some years ago but Navantia did not build them by itself. http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/scorpene/

HDW and DCNS are the firms with the greatest export experience and deepest knowledge base in conventional subs. HDW and DCNS should therefore be the front-runners in Australia S-80 future submarine selection. Inter-operability with the US is important hence its is highly desirable that these firms would be permitted by the US to incorporate the US SSN equivalent combat system and weapons fit.

The Navantia S-80 apparently incorporates the US combat system-weapons fit and is working with US company Electric Boat - which are strengths. Australia also worked or works with Electric Boat in building-maintaining the Collins. However the S-80 falls down in not being completed and not yet exported. As indicated above the S-80 has been significantly delayed due to basic design faults.  The S-80 is reportedly 70 tonnes overweight - hence suffering major balance problems - leading to a delayed in-service of 2017 - and cost overruns http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navantia#Controversies.

The 70 tonne-balance error may be an outcome of inexperience or undue haste in developing and building the S-80.

Navantia's involvement with DCNS in submarine building apparently ended in 2010. Hence pre-2010 perceptions in Australia's Defence Department about Navantia for SEA 1000 appear not as valid in 2014.

Navantia apparently has never completed a submarine by itself or exported a sub by itself. As things stand this may make Navantia a higher risk sub maker than Kockums was in the 1980s for the Collins Class sub(?)

Note that in the 1980s Kockums was chosen over the more proven HDW at the last minute - and the rest is history. Now we have never completed a sub by itself Navantia in SEA 1000 contention.

If Navantia develops a demonstrably efficient S-80 and gets some export orders for subs experience before 2025 then it might be less high risk and less expensive a choice.

COMMENTS ON THIS GENTLESEAS ARTICLE

As this post was carried over from an old link it contains no visitor Comments facility.

However by other means MHalblaub commented January 20, 2014:
The Spanish S-80 and the Japanese submarines have something in common. The AIP of both submarine types is a licensed build by DCNS or Kockums. 

I doubt that Kawasaki acquired a license to retail AIPs and France will never sell the AIP to Australia without a submarine. 

There are just two western companies which have a good record for licensed building of submarines: DCNS and HDW. Kockums failed last time.

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Pete's reply January 21, 2014:

Hi  MHalblaub 

The S-80's AIP is neither DCNS MESMA nor Kockums Stirling but a bioethanol-processor (provided by Hynergreen from Abengoa) - see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-80-class_submarine#Propulsion . Meanwhile the Soryu does indeed utilise Kockums Stirling.

I don't know if Kawasaki could export its AIP as its never exported a sub or parts to my knowledge. Agree that France DCNS is unlikely to export its MESMA alone.

I agree that DCNS and HDW have the best record for licensed building.

Navantia might need two decades or more of providing licence building and exporting different sizes of subs to catch up with DCNS and HDW. 

Its unknown whether Navantia joint ventures with Electric Boat would improve Navantia's performance. see references to Electric Boat's assistance here.

-

Pete

Australian SEA 1000 future submaine - an S-80 development or HDW 216?

 A rough sketch of the Navantia S-80 submarine. This sub is still being built-developed and might be launched in 2015.

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Concerning my article of November 22, 2013, "Ongoing debate on Australia's SEA 1000 future submarine requirements." http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/ongoing-debate-on-australias-sea-1000.html MHalblaub commented:

"Hi Pete,

do you think the US are unreliable allies? That was my thought reading RAN has to shadow a fast going nuclear powered submarine (SNN) for a week. I doubt that there will be within the next 10 years any technique for a conventional submarine to maintain submerged about 20 knots for more than 24 hours. Therefore the only solution would be a SNN, to wait or to trust the US.

I am well aware that the small HDW 210mod falls short of the SEA 1000 requirements. In my eyes these requirements are the wet dreams of some Admirals.

A greater range would be useful. A bigger weapons load is nice to have. The 8+ VLS are also a nice to have but they could also be tube launched. Btw Popeyes in action: http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_07_14/Israel-hits-Syria-to-destroy-Russian-made-Yakhont-anti-ship-missiles-3943/

The British Astute-class submarines can also fire Tomahawks without an US combat system.

The problem for Royal Australian Navy will be the gap between Collins-class retirement and entry into service of SEA 1000 submarines. Australia can throw a lot of money after the Collins-class to keep them running until 2030. Today the price for one HDW Type 210 is about the costs Australia needs to maintain Collins-class for one year. The maintenance costs for Collins-class will awfully rise in the future.

My advice would be to order as soon as possible 6 Type 210mod/A 26 to fill this gap. 5 submarines should be built in Australia. That will give Australia time and knowledge to design a proper submarine. This interim solution would also save a lot of money and add capabilities.

Australia should not try to reinvent wheels that already exist in far better quality. E.g. engines, AIP, combat system, … That will lead to a troubled and outdated son of Collins – just like the father.

Regards,
MHalblaub
(I tried two times to log me in …)

AIP: Direct Methanol Fuel Cell: http://www.sfc-defense.com/products

November 22, 2013"

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Pete's Comments

My response is that I think the US are reliable allies that provide Australia with security benefits in peacetime and would be an essential ally if Australia faced an enemy too big for Australia to handle alone.

You are right that no non-nuclear propulsion would allow an Australian submarine to shadow a fast moving SSN for a week. And yes the only options are for an Australian SSN or reliance on US SSNs to do fast moving shadowing.

It is true the SEA 1000 requirements are very ambitious. They would require a unique, new, very large diesel-electric submarine (SSK) or an SSN.

The value of a VLS is its flexibility eg. for: a divers wet-dry chamber; a hatch for a mini "piggyback" sub; and to fire cruise or small ballistic missiles. For missile firing the main value of a VLS is the low indiscretion factor - meaning the sub can fire all (say) 8 missiles very quickly - reducing that chance that the sub will be detected while firing. Using horizontal tubes probably involves "slow time" reloads of missiles or of follow-up torpedos.

Regarding http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_07_14/Israel-hits-Syria-to-destroy-Russian-made-Yakhont-anti-ship-missiles-3943/ its quite possible Popeyes were not used. The target was in range of Israel's Harpoon SLCMs. It would therefore have been unnecessary for Israel to use its (perhaps) 1,500 km range Popeye SLCMs and there would have been a risk a malfunctioning Popeye would crash and then its technical secrets might be revealed. If the Popeye SLCMs have a 1,500 km range (see http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/israel-submarine-capabilities/) its more likely they would be used for targets deep inland like Tehran or even Riyadh.

Yes its true the British Astute class SSN is a possibility. However any purchase of a French or UK SSN has the disadvantage that their maintenance-repair bases are around 20,000 km away in Northern Europe or effectively further if the Suez Canal is blocked in wartime. Meanwhile the US provides some SSN maintenance facilities much closer in Diego Garcia, Guam and certainly Pearl Harbour.

The Royal Australian Navy would be very aware that an "interim" sub choice might become permanent. The fixed costs of any sub choice are high - therefore making interim highly uneconomic as would running two different sub types simultaneously.

In any case the HDW 210 is basically the smallest of the HDW range (with the even smaller HDW 206 being phased out). This makes the HDW 210 the least likely HDW Australia might buy. The bigger the better in terms of range and endurance - making a very large version of the HDW 212-214 basically a HDW 800 Dolphin+ the most likely buy from HDW.

An HDW Dolphin+ is on the way to an even larger (but technically and financially high risk)  HDW 216 in response to SEA 1000 requirements. It needs to be remembered though that the US (Lockheed Martin) may well not make its highly developed combat system available to HDW. Against this HDW is probably the world's most experienced and productive builder of conventional diesel-electric subs.

In contrast I understand Lockheed Martin is placing its combat system into the Spanish Navantia S-80. It is significant that Australia might have confidence in dealing with Navantia in submarine development because I believe Australia has a positive relationship with Navantia in the current Canberra LHD and Hobart AWD projects. Against this Navantia has never independently built and then launched an operational submarine. Navantia has also had no independent experience building subs for export or assisting a customer to build a sub

Possibly I'm overrating the importance of the Lockheed Martin SUBICs combat system in the SEA 1000 submarine selection - see http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/193/SEA-1000-COMBAT-SYSTEMS-SELECTION-FOR-SEA-1000 .

While Kockums submarine division's future is in doubt Australia developing an A26 or any other Kockums design is unlikely.

Definitely "Australia should not try to reinvent wheels" and should avoid a repeat of the Collins experience.

I also have had problems logging-in or commenting on some blogger-blogspot sites - probably some technical problem involving blogger-blogspot or even of its Google owner.

Regards

Pete