Australia's Future Sub likely to be Japan's Soryu, outsider is Germany

Australia's Collins class submarine compared with the prospect of Australia buying the Soryu. Disregard the range figures above for the Collins as they are for highly unlikely surfaced operation. (Diagram Courtesy of Fairfax Media). 

PETE's COMMENT

On September 8, 2014 Australian Prime Minister Abbott reignited jobs-industry concerns by raising doubts that Australia's long anticipated future submarines will be built locally. Instead these submarines might be built more quickly and cheaply in Japan. If built in Japan they would almost certainly be Soryu class submarines. Jay Weatherill, the Labor Premier of South Australia, is adamant that submarines should again be built in his state - following the Collins build there. The prospect of assigning the project to Japan brings up many issues including: fewer job opportunities for Australians; no cash injection for South Australia's economy; and (dealt with below) Australia being Japan's first major defence customer as well as Soryu range limitations. 

I raised many Australian submarine procurement issues in an article Future submarines: Australia's $40 billion risk of July 21, 2014 on On Line Opinion. As I indicated in that earlier OLO piece I support building the future submarines overseas rather than much more slowly and expensively re-inventing a submarine building industry in Australia. 

It is possible that Abbott has intentionally made the submarine issue a contentious diversion from other issues bedevilling the Abbott Government. Abbott appears to be successfully refocusing public attention away from his weaknesses (the Budget and Palmer's power) to issues advantageous to his new image, the national security Prime Minister who has been addressing Iraq-terrorism and Ukraine-MH17. Abbott appears to be now igniting a new public issue - Japanese built submarines saving taxpayer money versus the federal Labor, a Labor Premier and unions in South Australia.

The expectation of journalists that Japan will be chosen is also partially due to a visit of 16 Japanese submarine technicians to the Australian Submarine Corporation's (ASC) submarine and shipbuilding facility at Osborne (Adelaide, South Australia) on August 26, 2014. The reason for the visit was not explained, but may be the beginning of a study regarding ASC's ability to maintain the future submarines and/or ASC's ability to provide some components for the Soryu production line in Japan.

If the Japanese Government finalises the submarine deal this will be the first ever major arms export program for Japan. The export would be a major departure from the intent of Japan's peace constitution and a change in Japan's post-WWII ban on defence exports. As Japan has never built an immensely complex weapons system for a foreign navy the principle Soryu builders (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries) will need to develop new regulatory, political and cultural processes. Kym Bergmann, wrote in ASPI "How would [the Australian crew training for the Soryu] be managed - not a trivial matter - especially as Japan has never before exported a submarine? Even providing manuals in English for the tens of thousands, possibly hundreds of thousands, of individual pieces of equipment that make up a submarine would be a hellish job."

To give an idea of how and where Australian submarines may operate it is useful to mention places and ranges the government is unprepared to detail and that most journalists cannot get a handle on. There are major difference in the submerged range on diesel-snorkel between the Collins and the Soryu. For the Collins (figures are not on the diagram) submerged range is 17,000 km at 19 km/h. For the Soryu range it is 11,297 km at 12 km/h. Disregard the range figures in the diagram for the Collins as they are for surfaced operation, which is increasingly hazardous and unlikely given advances in the many types of anti-submarine sensors particularly Chinese satellites and UAVs. The contribution of Soryu's Stirling engine (air independent propulsion (AIP)) to range is unknown. Stirling engine range is classified and also depends on speed and amount of time (two weeks?) that a Soryu uses the Stirling. The Collins has no Stirling engine or other type of AIP.

It is assumed that an Australian Soryu would rely on its Stirling engine in areas of operation eg. loitering in/around littorals-closed waters. which amounts to a major mission capability that the Collins does not have. The Collins was built around the need for long range at comparatively high speed to transit the 3,000 km northward from the main submarine bases of HMAS Stirling, Garden Island, Rockingham, Western Australia and Sydney. The Collins would then have sufficient range to reach the presumably main operating areas up to 3,000-5,000 km to the north of Australia and then return all the way to Rockingham or Sydney. 

For an Australian Soryu - after the 3,000 km transit it could only continue north about 2,000 km without a refuelling stage. 

With its reduced range there is an increase in the likelihood that an Australian Soryu would need to be refuelled with diesel oil at:

- a northern Australian port (eg. Broome or Darwin (a port with many adverse water conditions);

- or from a submarine support ship/tender; or

- a foreign mid-point (Singapore? Guam? Diego Garcia) to perform longer range missions.

The act of such mid-point refuelling would increase an Australian Soryu's operational vulnerability to attack or disclosure of its position and intentions. Refuelling could be observed by an (especially Chinese) satellite or human agents in and around the refuelling port or on a refuelling tender. Refuelling port facilities may be very expensive to construct and maintain and strategically risky if there is reliance on foreign ports. Darwin and Broome also have a track record (in World War Two) of being much more vulnerable to air attack than ports in southern Australia (like HMAS Stirling).  

An Australian Soryu may be a poor choice if it is anticipated that it should travel similar distances to the Collins. The Soryu's range limitation may be less of a problem if Australia is altering its submarine use doctrine. For example long range would be less important if Australia has made (is making) some strategic agreement with Japan to divide mission responsibility between a Japanese northerly submarine patrol sector and Australia in the south (eg. with no Australian submarines needing to travel as far north as Taiwan). 

More comment on Australia's future submarine program:

My estimate for the number of future submarines specified is probably be 6 to 8 (6 first, then an option of 2 more - the number earlier set down for the Collins project) and less likely the 12 (set down in Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper section 8.39, page 64 (PDF 1.8 MB). Australia has had manpower problems in crewing even two Collins so crewing more than 8 Soryus seems unlikely.

Germany (TKMS-HDW) is probably a secondary choice. Australia may be hedging with the German alternative if the Japanese deal cannot be concluded or if a Japanese deal collapses mid project for political reasons. Germany has by far the most export experience in submarines but Germany's, like all European submarines, are much smaller than what Australia wants. Australia wants longer endurance (effectively a larger crew) and higher warload (many torpedos, missiles and mines) than can be fitted into a small design.  Germany has built the largest conventional submarine, at the nuclear missile carrying Israeli Dolphin class at 2,400 tonnes submerged, of any Western Eurpean country but the Dolphin meets far different mission requirements than the 4,200 tonne Soryu. Australia has bitter experience of the problems involved in attempting to scale up the Collins from a much smaller European submarine design. The Soryu also has a highly developed propulsion system (the Collins' main weakness) which is reputedly suited to such a large submarine. A major defence purchase from Germany also brings none of the regional strategic alliance benefits that purchase from Japan brings.

The Australian Government is expected to signal (in some way before the end of 2014) that Japan will build the submarines. Oddly the Government has not to date referred to any formal selection process e.g. a tender. Perhaps the government will announce a concrete decision in the next Defence White Paper due in 2015.

Pete

Evolved Collins Sub - Most Likely SEA 1000 Option

Would an evolved Collins, or any type of future SSK have any chance of chasing down Chinese SSNs, like the Type 093 Shang Class submarine above?

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On the long term issue of Australia's future submarine SEA 1000 project John Kerin of the The Australian Financial Review, March 6, 2014 reported

http://www.afr.com/p/evolved_collins_favourite_but_timing_o1GOoSKyLUa9Eyvw4jO8wI

"Evolved Collins favourite but timing unclear"

"An evolved Collins-class has emerged as the favoured option for Australia’s next generation of submarines amid signs the much maligned existing boats will remain in service beyond 2030.

The former Labor government’s defence white paper pared back the options to an updated Collins or a new design in its 2013 version, but all options are on the table for the Abbott government’s new white paper to be completed within 12 months.

Few sources close to defence believe it will opt for a new design given the risk of having an orphan boat class. Treasurer Joe Hockey is said to be uneasy with the mooted pricetag of $36 billion.

Defence Minister David Johnston has also cast doubt on whether Australia will double its fleet to 12, saying the number first mooted in the former prime minister’s 2009 white paper has never been justified.

The original Collins sub was a modified Swedish Kockums design and Australia would be unlikely to go without the expertise of one big European diesel submarine builder as well as rely heavily on the US Navy and its systems technology expertise.

One cause for optimism has been the amount of remediation work that has been undertaken on the Collins fleet since the release of the 2012 John Coles report by former defence minister Stephen Smith, which found the fleet was floundering but blamed most of the problems on poor maintenance practices and co-ordination between defence, the navy and submarine maintainer ASC.

Ironically, one reason behind the life extension program is that the hulls of the boats have spent so much time out of the water.

On a visit to the Techport precinct in South Australia, Senator Johnston was happy to report that the availability of the Collins-class boats was as good as it has been for a decade.

Johnston seems to have had a change of heart. When the former Labor government released its 2013 white paper, he said he wouldn’t “want to go back near Collins if it was the last thing on earth we had to do’’.

Prime Minister Tony Abbott, on the other hand, has always been more ­circumspect, saying while the Collins had its moments, it was a pretty effective piece of kit. The Australian Financial Reviewunderstands that means as many as four of the six boats would be kept in the water.

Some defence sources question the cost of keeping the boats in the water given they are ageing, even as other navies in the region update their fleets, often with cheaper off-the-shelf boats.

“There was talk before the election of the cost of keeping the Collins in the water approaching $1 billion a year and it is only going to get more expensive as they get older,’’ one defence source told the Financial Review.

“So it’s a question of how much the government is prepared to pay to keep them going,’’ the source added.

A NOSE IN FRONT

Australian Strategic Policy Institute analyst Andrew Davies said there was “still scope for a change of direction but the evolved Collins definitely has its nose in front at the moment’.

“The availability of the existing six Collins-class boats is actually ahead of the target and it appears the life extension program will see them through to at least 2030,’’ Dr Davies says.

The regional arms race includes not only the big players such as China and Japan, but also Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam.

Labor’s 2013 defence white paper retained its earlier target from the more ambitious 2009 document, to double the size of the fleet from six to 12, with the boat being larger than the Collins – 4000 tonnes as opposed to 3000 tonnes – and having greater range and endurance. The Coalition, though less enthusiastic, has eventually come around to the political reality that the new boats will be assembled in Adelaide at the government-owned ASC, given Australia has an indigenous submarine capability, and marginal seats in Adelaide would be at stake otherwise.

As with big ship projects, the work is likely to be spread across other shipyards around Australia.

A debate has raged about the appropriate approach to buying new submarines since the Australian Strategic Policy Institute report in 2009, which estimated it would cost $36 billion to design and build submarines in Australia compared with a $9 billion tag for buying smaller conventional submarines from Europe.

But the purchase of small conventional submarines was suspended after it was considered they simply were not suited to the seas Australian submarines operate in, or the roles which they undertake, which include eavesdropping on long-range patrols on large countries in north-east Asia.

An assessment by the Australian Industry Group has estimated the future submarine program could employ up to 5000 workers and 1000 Australian businesses, many of them small and medium enterprises.

However, the best signal about the Abbott government’s future intentions will be its upcoming commission of audit and just how much political skin and money it is prepared to invest in the risky project." ENDS
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Pete

Some Doubt Whether Australia Will Build 12 Future Submarines

Australia's Defence Minister David Johnston - prepared to speak out on submarines.

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Australia's Defence Minister David Johnston is one of the principal decision makers on current and future Australian submarine issues. Like all Defence Minister's he has his own public relations style.

On February 27, 2014 Rob Taylor and Patrick Barta of the Wall Street Journal reported some comments from Minister Johnston that may prove highly significant for future tenderers for Australia's future submarine program (SEA 1000). I've bolded what I see as the most significant comments. As will be seen the issue of how many future submarines Australia will build has not yet been finalized. see  http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304071004579408282844676104 :

"Australia Australia Reviews Plan to Double Submarine Fleet"

Decision to Revisit $32 Billion Purchase Comes as Asian Neighbors Bulk Up Military Muscle

CANBERRA, Australia—Australia will review plans to double its fleet of submarines, with the new conservative government under pressure to rein in its budget even as Asian neighbors dramatically ramp up military spending.

Defense Minister David Johnston said he was unconvinced that Australia needed as many as 12 new conventional submarines currently foreseen by military planners. It comes as regional neighbors, led by China, build up their naval and air arsenals amid disputes over territorial waters, especially in North Asia.

At a cost of up to 36 billion Australian dollars (US$32.28 billion), doubling the submarine fleet would be the country's largest single military purchase.

"It's a mystery to me [where that number of 12 future submarines came from]," said Mr. Johnston, who has called for a review of military-equipment spending as part of a year long strategic planning process launched by the conservatives, who swept to power in September elections on a promise of fiscal restraint."

[Pete's comment: The first major explanation (I know of) as to how 12 future submarines are arrived at is in Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper  Defending Australia in the Asia Paciic Century: Force 2030  section 8.40, page 64: "In the case of the submarine force,the Government takes the view that our future strategic circumstances necessitate a substantially expanded submarine fleet of 12 boats in order to sustain a force at sea large enough in a crisis or conflict to be able to defend our approaches (including at considerable distance from Australia, if necessary), protect and support other ADF assets, and undertake certain strategic missions where the stealth and other operating characteristics of highly-capable advanced submarines would be crucial. Moreover, a larger submarine force would significantly increase the military planning challenges faced by any adversaries, and increase the size and capabilities of the force they would have to be prepared to commit to attack us directly, or coerce, intimidate or otherwise employ military power against us."  see http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf ]

"That is a technical issue that the current circumstances will dictate and I want [the] navy to tell me what they foresee is the way forward. It might be more than 12, it might be less. I'm not sure," he said in an interview.

Australia's former Labor government in 2009 released a defense planning paper that called for a dozen large, conventionally powered submarines to replace the country's existing six-boat fleet of Collins class submarines.

Although much larger than submarines operated by regional neighbors, [Japan's 4,000 ton Soryus are larger!] the Collins class submarines have been plagued by technical problems. On Thursday, a fire erupted on the submarine HMAS Waller off the West Australian coast, Australia's Defense Department said. There were no casualties. [see http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/03/fire-emergency-aboard-australian.html ]

A new fleet of larger, more powerful and longer-range submarines would counter a growing undersea presence in Asia. Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia are fielding new submarines to counter threats to some of the world's most important energy-trade routes, as well as to hedge against Chinese ambitions.

China in January sent a surface warship fleet—possibly backed by a submarine—into waters between Indonesia and Australia, demonstrating Beijing's naval reach. The move prompted some alarm in Canberra, which sent a maritime patrol aircraft to keep watch.

Southeast Asian nations typically operate submarines of about 2,000 submerged tons, while Australia envisages boats of 4,000 tons or more, possibly equipped with submarine-launched cruise missiles for land attack and capable of deploying special-forces soldiers.

Australia's submarine-replacement program, no matter how ambitious it turned out to be, wouldn't add to regional rivalries, with the close U.S. ally having long fielded a small but highly capable military that was well respected regionally, Mr. Johnston said.

"For many, many years we have owned and operated the world's largest conventionally powered submarine, so the neighborhood is well used to us having a large and unique diesel-electric submarine," he said.

Australia already has embarked on an expensive buildup of military equipment, including two 27,000-ton [Canberra Class] amphibious assault ships, new attack and transport helicopters, [Hobart Class] guided-missile destroyers, tanks and Super Hornet strike and electronic attack aircraft.

Australia has a defense budget of some A$26 billion in the fiscal year to June, or 1.6% of gross domestic product. The government plans in the next few years to buy up to 100 F-35 Lightning joint strike fighters to provide radar-evading air power, at a cost of up to A$16 billion.

But the military has come under pressure to reduce costs as the world's 12th-largest economy retreats from a mining boom, driving up joblessness and eating into government revenues. The government in December forecast budget deficits totaling A$123 billion over the next four fiscal years to June 2017, and said it would cut billions from spending.

But earlier this week the country, which two years ago agreed to rotate thousands of U.S. Marines and their aircraft through Australia's north, said it would buy A$4 billion of new Boeing Co. BA +1.88% -built P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft capable of ranging well into Asia. Those aircraft are likely to be joined later this year by a A$2.9 billion fleet of seven long-range MQ-4C Triton drones.

Mr. Johnston said he was open to the idea of Australia's far-flung Cocos islands, in the Indian Ocean southwest of Indonesia, being developed as a base for U.S. or Australian Tritons. But he said there was no proposal currently to upgrade the islands' dilapidated airstrip to expand maritime reach, as Chinese vessels increasingly patrol further from home.

China's growing assertiveness in the East China Sea and elsewhere was to be expected of any country with growing energy needs, Mr. Johnston said, including a demand for Australian oil and gas resources. China is Australia's largest trading partner.

"They are hostage to the importation of food and energy. I think they would be dilatory were they not to want to protect those sea lanes," he said. "I'm not reactive to these things that are happening in the South China Sea." ENDS

Pete

Chinese Military and "Dual-Use" Satellites

The use of Chinese ocean reconnaissance satellites to attempt to find Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 prompted me to inquire about the capabilities of China's reconnaissance satellites. Such satellites are not specifically equipped to find crashed aircraft.  

China has steadily been developing and deploying a wide range of military-intelligence satellites and "dual-use" military-civilian use satellites. As will be indicated below the Chinese military (Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)) use satellites for:

- reconnaissance of sea (including submarines) and land "targets" including collection of all types of intelligence on China's potential or actual adversaries, 

- for anti-satellite and perhaps satellite repair purposes

- global positioning for military operations including ballistic and cruise missile guidance

- more specifically missile targeting of large US warships (see ISSSP article below) and US submarines 

- electronic (including signals) intelligence (ELINT) for military and counter-terrorism uses (the latter in support of the Ministry of State Security (MSS)).

"Dual-use" military-civilian use satellites very as to the proportion of military and civilian uses. Some satellites might be authentically dual use while other may be primarily or wholly military-intelligence use under the cover of civilian company ownership. Below are descriptions and links of some Chinese military and dual-use satellites.

Connect with a later March 23, 2014 sighting by Chinese dual-use satellite (Gaofeng-1) of possible MH370 debris http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/03/mh370-australian-and-othe-aircraft.html 

After the glove-puppet histrionics of this 2019 Youtube above it is most useful to view it 2 minutes 20 seconds in.  China fields many reconnaissance "spy" satellite systems, including Shijiuns, Shiyans, Yaogans and  Ziyuans, The BeiDou or Beidou Navigation Satellite System (above) is also very military related. I've bolded the names of satellites for easier reference.
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The Chinese satellites can utilize their  ELINT sensors, Synthetic Aperture Radars (SARs) or electro-optical (EO) imaging sensors to detect submarines (submerged, snorkeling "snorting" or surfaced) - however their capabilities are unknown. If Chinese satellites become very efficient at detecting snorting Australian submarines (from the snorkel or near surface wake) these submarines may quickly become obsolete. Snorting-obsolescence is something for Australia's SEA 1000 decision makers to consider. Link with http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2012/08/satellite-detection-of-submarines.html  

The 2049 Project in February 2014 produced the following commentary and list concerning reconnaissance satellites - http://www.project2049.net/documents/Chinas_Evolving_Reconnaissance_Strike_Capabilities_Easton.pdf

:

Satellite Platforms. To make up for its airborne platform deficiencies, the PLA has launched a large number of satellites that are capable of supporting theater missile operations with maritime reconnaissance data. These include electro-optical (EO) satellites for digital imagery in the visual and near infrared spectrum; synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites for nighttime, all-weather imagery; and electronic intelligence
(ELINT) satellites for locating and identifying ships by their electronic emissions. In 2012 alone, the PLA launched 11 new remote sensing satellites. It also launched three communications satellites and one relay satellite for beyond visual line of sight contact with ground stations. More recently, China launched its third series of naval ocean surveillance system (NOSS) satellites in September 2013.28 This underscores the key
role space-based ISR plays in supporting the PLA’s strike capabilities.29

Name Launch           Date                   Satellite Type 
Yaogan 9 (A,B,C)      Mar. 5, 2010       Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) 
Yaogan 10                 Aug. 10, 2010      Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery 
Tian Hui 1A               Aug. 24, 2010      Military mapping satellite 
Yaogan 11                 Sep. 22, 2010      Electro-optical (EO) imagery 
Shi Jian 11-03            July 6, 2011         Unknown, possible early warning satellite 
Shi Jian 11-02            July 29, 2011       Unknown, possible early warning satellite 
Hai Yang 2A              Aug. 15, 2011      Dual-use ocean monitoring satellite 
Yaogan 12                 Nov. 9, 2011        Electro-optical (EO) imagery 
Shi Yan 4                   Nov. 20, 2011      Earth terrain mapping satellite 
Yaogan 13                 Nov. 30, 2011      Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery 
Zi Yuan 1C                Dec. 22, 2011       EO or SAR imagery satellite 
Zi Yuan 3A                Jan. 9, 2012          Dual-use mapping satellite 
Feng Yun 2F              Jan. 13, 2012        Meteorological satellite 
Tian Hui 1B                May 6, 2012         Military mapping satellite 
Yaogan 14                 May 10, 2012       Electro-optical (EO) imagery 
Yaogan 15                 May 29, 2012       Electro-optical (EO) imagery 
Shi Jian 9 (A & B)     Oct. 14, 2012        Unknown military payload, possible ELINT 
Huan Jing 1C             Nov. 18, 2012       Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery 
Xin Yan 1                  Nov. 18, 2012       Unknown, possible NOSS 
Feng Niao (1 & 1A)  Nov. 18, 2012       Unknown, possible NOSS 
Yaogan 16 (A,B,C)   Nov. 25,2012        Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) 
Gao Fen 1                 Apr. 26, 2013        Electro-optical (EO) imagery 
Shi Jian 11-05           July 15, 2013         Unknown, possible early warning satellite 
Yaogan 17 (A,B,C)   Sep. 1, 2013          Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) 
Feng Yun 3C             Sep. 23, 2013        Meteorological satellite 
Kuai Zhou                 Sep. 25, 2013         Rapid reaction imagery satellite 
Yaogan 18                Oct. 29, 2013         Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery 
Yaogan 19                Nov. 20, 2013        Electro-optical (EO) imagery 
Sources: Gunter’s Space Page, Space Daily, Project 2049 Institute  

Professor S. Chandrashekar and Professor Soma Perumal of International Strategic & Security Studies Programme (ISSSP), National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) Bangalore, India, have written China’s Constellation of Yaogan Satellites & the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile – An Update (December 2013) http://isssp.in/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Yaogan-and-ASBM-December-2013-Update.pdf

The Executive Summary (pp. ii-iii) is very informative – indicating the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile of some of  China’s reconnaissance satellites. By their estimated resolutions the anti-submarine potential of the imaging satellites can be very roughly estimated. Executive Summary reads: 

"With the recent launch of the Yaogan 19 satellite China has in place an advanced space capability to identify, locate and track an Aircraft Carrier Group (ACG) on the high seas. This space capability is an important component of an Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) System that China has set up.

[see a list of all Yaogan satellites http://www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=36 then, within that site, click on hyperlinks for each Yaogan satellite to get an animation of the real-time flight of each satellite - eg.  YAOGAN 17A http://www.n2yo.com/satellite/?s=39239 listed as an “intelligence gathering” satellite.]

The current 19 satellite constellation consists of ELINT [Electronic Intelligence] satellites, satellites carrying Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) sensors as well as satellites carrying optical imaging sensors.

Based on the orbit characteristics, their local time of equatorial crossing and other related parameters, these satellites can be grouped into different categories that perform the various functions for identifying, locating and tracking the ACG.

Yaogan 9 (Yaogan 9A, 9B, 9C), Yaogan (16A, 16B, 16C) and Yaogan 17 (17A, 17B, 17C) are the three clusters that are equipped with ELINT sensors that provide broad area surveillance over the Oceans. With a coverage radius of about 3500 Km, they provide the first coarse fix for identifying and locating an ACG in the Pacific Ocean.

Yaogan 13, Yaogan 10, Yaogan 18 and Yaogan 14 are the satellites carrying a SAR sensor. resolution of 1 to 3 m , they provide all weather as well as day and night imaging capabilities over the regions of interest.[perhaps able to detect a submarine's snorkel, periscope, wake and of course, surfaced shape]

Yaogan 11, Yaogan 4, Yaogan 2 and Yaogan 7 constitute the high resolution optical satellites in the current constellation. The sensors they carry may have resolutions of between 1 to 3 m. [perhaps able to detect a submarine's snorkel, periscope and of course, surfaced shape]

Yaogan 19 and Yaogan 15 optical imaging satellites with medium resolution (5 to 10 m) capabilities. [perhaps able to detect a submarine's surfaced shape]

The Yaogan 12 which replaced the Yaogan 5 has the orbital characteristics of a SAR mission. Yaogan 18 SAR satellite. Having two satellites spaced so close to each other makes it unlikely that it is a SAR mission. Most probably this is a high resolution optical imaging satellite that complements the broad area coverage provided by the 1200 km orbit of the Yaogan 15 and Yaogan 19 satellites.

This seems to be an important component of a larger Chinese Access and Area Denial Strategy focused around a conflict over Taiwan..." see WHOLE PAPER 

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Notes on satellites other than the Yaogan series are  http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Scfam-reconnaissance.html#2014 :

-  SY-7 / Shi Yan 7, launched July 19, 2013 Orbit 666 km x 673 km x 98.1 with an anti-satellite and/or satellite maintenance mission: Shiyan-7 has a system for testing a manipulator arm to capture other space objects http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Spacecrafts-2013.html#SY-7 About Chinese anti-satellite efforts generally see http://www.dailytech.com/Govt+Report+Warns+of+Chinese+Plans+to+Cripple+US+Space+Defenses/article23314.htm

-  ZY-3 / Zi Yuan III launched January 9, 2012 Orbit: 498 km x 506 km x 97.5° Ziyuan III is probably a 2,650-kg military photo surveillance satellite. It is reported that it is carrying an electro-optical imaging payload comprising three pointing forward, down and aft. The ground-facing camera has a resolution of 2.5 metres. The spacecraft also features an infrared spectrometer. According to Chinese press, Ziyuan II is a high-resolution remote-sensing satellite for civilian use” http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Spacecrafts-2012.html#Ziyuan-III

-  ZY-1 02C / Zi Yuan I-02C launched December 22, 2011 Orbit: 770 km Mission: Ziyuan I-02C is probably a high-resolution military photo surveillance satellite. http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Spacecrafts-2011.html#ZiyuanI-02C

-  SJ-6/4A / Shi Jian 6/4A and SJ-6/4B / Shi Jiun 6/4B  both launched October 6, 2010 588 km x 604 km x 97.8° Mission: Officially, the Shijian VI-04 group are designed to probe space environment But Shijian satellites are believed to have some kind of military surveillance role. They may also test technology demonstration and space research experiments. http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Spacecrafts-2010.html#SJ-6/4A

-  The Beidou Navigation Satellite System is very Chinese military related. It consists of a limited test system that has been operating since 2000, and a full-scale global navigation system currently under construction. The full-scale global navigation system, officially called the BeiDou Satellite Navigation System (BDS) and also known as COMPASS or BeiDou-2, will be a global satellite navigation system consisting of 35 satellites. It became operational in China in December 2011, with 10 satellites in use, and began offering services to customers in the Asia-Pacific region in December 2012. It is planned to begin serving global customers upon its completion in 2020.
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Pete

Balanced article on Aus Future Sub - "evolved Collins"

Plan of the current Collins submarine. What will an evolved Collins look like?

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Might an evolved Collins look like this? With a VLS cruise or ballistic land attack capability.

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I've bolded some interesting parts of Australian David Wroe's article in The [Melbourne] Age, October 19, 2013, page 17. He wrote http://newsstore.fairfax.com.au/apps/viewDocument.ac;jsessionid=F30A70117F5FF6C3877A4684855752C8?sy=afr&pb=all_ffx&dt=selectRange&dr=1month&so=relevance&sf=text&sf=headline&rc=10&rm=200&sp=brs&cls=3105&clsPage=1&docID=AGE1310191FEJ46QP3QT

"Defence all at sea on new submarines"

Submarines are the stealthy killers in maritime warfare. They are the queens on the chessboard, the strategic game-changers. Any country has to think long and hard about messing with another country that has an advanced submarine fleet. You can't be sure there isn't one sitting quietly off your own coast or waiting in hiding to sink your ships.

That Australia needs a fleet of reliable submarines is beyond doubt to our military planners. [Former Prime Minister] Kevin Rudd's 2009 defence white paper promised to build a dozen of these killers to replace the trouble-plagued Collins-class fleet of six. The paper vowed the new fleet would have "greater range, longer endurance on patrol, and expanded capabilities compared to the current Collins class".

But four years on, Defence boffins are still wrestling with the complex task of figuring out just what kind of submarine we want - and what we can afford. Time is not their friend; the Collins class is due to start being retired in just over a decade [2025], giving rise to fears of a "capability gap" in which we have too few subs - or none at all - while the new fleet is still being built.

It will be a further 18 months [2015] before the new government decides which of the two leading design options [HDW, DCNS, Navantia?] to go with, during which Australians can expect to hear much more furious argument. There is much at stake, not least an estimated $36 billion of taxpayers' money, thousands of jobs in Adelaide and Australia's current technological superiority in a rapidly changing region where Asian countries are investing heavily in their militaries.

The popular thinking in defence circles is that the new fleet should be very much Australia's own submarines, its sovereign asset. In the grandest iteration, this is nothing less than a nation-building project.

"It's going to be hard. Things will go wrong," said Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt, the outgoing head of the future submarine program. "But it's right up there with our biggest ever national undertakings, along with the Olympics, the Harbour Bridge and the Snowy scheme."

The quickest and cheapest option would be to buy an off-the-shelf European design, which would be small but modern and reliable. But this has been effectively ruled out on strategic grounds. Most experts say Australia needs a long-range submarine that could, say, patrol the South China Sea in the event of territorial disputes there or to protect shipping lanes. That means a big submarine with a big crew that can range far and wide and stay at sea for months.

The rule of thumb, says Moffitt, is that a submarine can stay at sea for about a day for each crew member on board. The Collins has a crew of 60 and can easily go to Hawaii and back. The European off-the-shelf designs accommodate crews of just 27 to 30.

"What we know with absolute confidence is that the performance of those submarines for our application ... falls dramatically short of even what Collins does. They don't have the endurance," Moffitt said.

James Brown, says our neighbours to the north are making strides in acquiring submarine fleets - not just big players such as China and Japan but also Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam.

"In 20 years' time there are going to be a lot more submarines in the region. We have to respond to that in some way and that means having a decent submarine fleet of our own."

They are also an effective deterrent to protect Australia itself, he says. If Australia were threatened, it could use its long-range submarines to launch land-attack cruise missiles at the aggressor's homeland. Then there are intelligence missions - submarines are good for sitting quietly and listening, but only if they have the range and endurance to travel far and wide.

Or as Andrew Davies, a leading submarine scholar at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, puts it, submarines are what you use when you want to take the war up to the enemy. Nazi Germany couldn't match the British and US navies on the surface, but the legendary German U-boat took the fight right up to the east coast of the US.

"Submarines are not crocodiles you leave in the moat," he says.

Having ruled out a nuclear design, Australia will return to some form of conventional submarine that, like the Collins, uses diesel engines to charge batteries which in turn power motors for propulsion.

That leaves two options: a totally fresh design, or a so-called "evolved Collins", which takes the existing fleet, irons out its flaws and modernises parts that would otherwise become obsolete.

The smart money seems to be on the evolved Collins. ASPI's Davies calls it "sort of a no-brainer". Defence Minister David Johnston was quoted in media reports this week as saying the evolved Collins was the "leading option" - though his office afterwards played down the remarks.

It might all sound strange to the average Australian taxpayer who's been reading for years about the Collins' many flaws and annual support costs thought to be about $500 million.

But experts both inside and outside Defence say that, after years of repairs and adjustments, the Collins is now a formidable submarine. The combat system and sensors have been fixed, though the propulsion system still needs work. In recent weeks, the ASC - formerly the Australian Submarine Corporation, the government company set up to build and sustain the Collins - has cut open the hull of one boat to completely remove the engine, so it can be thoroughly overhauled.

As you read this, three Collins are at sea, which meets the benchmark for 50per cent of the fleet being operational at a given time. That's a success.

Whether the government decides on an evolved Collins design or the rival option of starting with a blank sheet of paper, [nothing is "blank". Existing Collins are full of corporate knowledge/lessons and future refinement expectations] carry corporate Australia's submarine industry has learnt from the Collins mistakes, said David Gould, the Englishman recruited to head up Australia's submarine program at the Defence Materiel Organisation.

That includes how to work with other countries, whose help we will inevitably need in designing the new submarine. As a 2011 RAND Corporation report found, we don't have the depth of expertise to design submarines ourselves, meaning we will need help from a country that specialises in conventional subs - Sweden [after the HDW 218SG decision Sweden is no longer an option] Germany, Spain or France.

Last time, the commercial agreement with the Collins' Swedish designer Kockums left Australia in a weak position with a lack of clarity as to what our rights were in regard to the intellectual property and the expectations on the Swedes.

"We won't be doing that again," Gould said. "This is about sovereignty - our sovereign ability to have the submarine that does what we demand of it ... so that when we put the crew into danger, we really do understand what we're doing. We haven't delegated that understanding to someone else."

And while we won't be designing everything ourselves, we will need the expertise to oversee and integrate all the work, says Rowan Moffitt - that means a generation of naval architects, systems engineers and systems integration experts.

"That's a quarter of a century of submarine building ... in which we will have to have an education and TAFE system producing the people we need through that period," Moffitt said.

Meanwhile, the clock is ticking on two fronts. First, the Collins will almost certainly need to continue service for an average of seven years beyond its original retirement date to avoid a capability gap around 2030. Gould maintains this can be managed.

There is also the question of the industry "valley of death". Whatever design Australia chooses, the submarines will be built in Adelaide, at the ASC. The industry association, the South Australian Defence Teaming Centre, this week welcomed [Australia's Defence] minister Johnston's apparent preference for the evolved Collins on the ground that work would start sooner.

The association's chief executive, Chris Burns, said unless the industry was "cutting steel" by early next decade, the Adelaide workforce, which is currently working on the Air Warfare Destroyer project, will find itself idle and those skills will be lost.

"The average age of a welder is about 50," he said. "It's very complex, specialist work and ... our true concern is that that work and those skills will be lost if there is a large gap between the end of the AWD [in 2019
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hobart-class_destroyer#Construction ] and the start of the future submarine."

Moffitt points to an assessment by the Australian Industry Group that the future submarine program would employ about 5000 workers and 1000 Australian businesses, most of them small and medium-sized enterprises.

"It's not a one-off, stop-start project. By the time the 12th submarine is finished, it will be time to start looking for a replacement fleet. It could conceivably have no end so long as we seek to have 12 submarines in our inventory."

It nonetheless hinges on a future government being willing to commit the tens of billions of dollars necessary. That won't happen unless the Coalition starts to get defence spending back on track towards the target of 2 per cent of GDP.

With his cabinet colleagues desperate for budget savings, David Johnston will need every ounce of his strength for that fight."
-
Pete

Australia's Future Submarine Selection - Navantia in trouble.

From UK Daily Mail article "Too heavy: The [S-80 Isaac Peral Class], a new, Spanish-designed submarine is more than 70 tons too heavy, and officials fear if it goes out to sea, it will not be able to surface. Officials are pictured next to the engine of the vessel last November [2012]" also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navantia#Controversies

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AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE SUBMARINE SELECTION - SEA 1000

It is not taken as given that Australia's new government, which came into being in September 2013, will totally agree with submarine decisions and defence white papers released by the previous government (2008-2013). Previous attitudes and statements regarding HDW, DCNS and Navantia might not be the same. Its probably true to say the following documents illustrate the thinking of the previous government - unless reconfirmed as policy by the new government:

- Defence Capability Plan 2009: Sea Project SEA 1000  http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dcp/html/sea/Sea1000.html [now looking a bit out of date]

- Prime Minister, Minister for Defence, Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – Next stage of future submarine project announced 3 May 2012 
 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/05/03/prime-minister-minister-for-defence-minister-for-defence-materiel-joint-media-release-next-stage-of-future-submarine-project-announced/ ["...approved the release of Requests for Information to three overseas submarine designers (DCNS, HDW and Navantia),..."]

- Prime Minister, Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – 2013 Defence White Paper: The Future Submarine Program 3 May 2013 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/05/03/prime-minister-minister-for-defence-and-minister-for-defence-materiel-joint-media-release-2013-defence-white-paper-the-future-submarine-program-2/ ["The Government has now taken the important decision to suspend further investigation of the two Future Submarine options based on military-off-the-shelf designs in favour of focusing resources on progressing an ‘evolved Collins’ and new design options that are likely to best meet Australia’s future strategic and capability requirements. The Government has also taken the important decision to use the United States AN/BYG-1 combat system [see http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/msd/sea1439/index.cfm which indicates integration with US weapons] as the reference system for future design work. "]

Australia's subject to change 2013 Defence White Paper indicates a mixture of companies is more likely than with the pre 2013 options of HDW, DCNS and Navantia off-the-shelf. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Electric Boat and Thales are all likely to become/are involved. Outside of the US and Europe - the builders of Korea's projected KSS-III (using much HDW technology) and Japan's current Soryu Class propulsion system (with the Kockums Stirling AIP) might also be outside contenders. 

SEA 1000's official parameters suggest that the following are prime considerations: Australian Federal Government money for South Australia for manufacturing industry development; business; union; jobs; and electoral interests . SEA 1000's expected  in-service deadline is now apparently around 2035.

NAVANTIA

The attitude to Navantia may be different given Navantia's 2013-2014 problems with the S-80 Isaac Peral Class. The following article from the UK Daily Mail, June 6, 2013, is rather extreme in tone but still troubling: Spain's £1.75billion submarine programme is torpedoed after realising near-complete vessel is 70 tonnes too heavy because engineer put decimal point in the wrong place http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2336953/Spains-1-75bn-submarine-programme-torpedoed-realising-near-complete-vessel-70-tonnes-heavy.html : "A £1.75billion Spanish submarine project has run aground after officials realised that the vessel is more than 70 tonnes too heavy - because an engineer put a decimal point in the wrong place...A former Spanish official has described the mistake, which has led to fears that the submarine might not resurface if sent to sea, as 'fatal'....The [S-80 lead vessel] Isaac Peral, the first in a new class of diesel electric submarines, was almost complete when the problem was noticed....Spain will now pay US Navy contractor Electric Boat £9million over three years to assess the issue and carry out the work required to correct it, according to the Spanish Defence Ministry."

Navantia's solid performance in being the major contractor for Australia's under construction Hobart Class Destroyers and Canberra Class LHDs may be allowing Navantia strong influence over Australia SEA 1000 selection process. Navantia may be considered a safe vender but its lack of experience in completing a submarine itself of ever exporting a submarine itself may be significant problems. 

Navantia was involved with DCNS in building Agostas and Scorpenes some years ago but Navantia did not build them by itself. http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/scorpene/

HDW and DCNS are the firms with the greatest export experience and deepest knowledge base in conventional subs. HDW and DCNS should therefore be the front-runners in Australia S-80 future submarine selection. Inter-operability with the US is important hence its is highly desirable that these firms would be permitted by the US to incorporate the US SSN equivalent combat system and weapons fit.

The Navantia S-80 apparently incorporates the US combat system-weapons fit and is working with US company Electric Boat - which are strengths. Australia also worked or works with Electric Boat in building-maintaining the Collins. However the S-80 falls down in not being completed and not yet exported. As indicated above the S-80 has been significantly delayed due to basic design faults.  The S-80 is reportedly 70 tonnes overweight - hence suffering major balance problems - leading to a delayed in-service of 2017 - and cost overruns http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navantia#Controversies.

The 70 tonne-balance error may be an outcome of inexperience or undue haste in developing and building the S-80.

Navantia's involvement with DCNS in submarine building apparently ended in 2010. Hence pre-2010 perceptions in Australia's Defence Department about Navantia for SEA 1000 appear not as valid in 2014.

Navantia apparently has never completed a submarine by itself or exported a sub by itself. As things stand this may make Navantia a higher risk sub maker than Kockums was in the 1980s for the Collins Class sub(?)

Note that in the 1980s Kockums was chosen over the more proven HDW at the last minute - and the rest is history. Now we have never completed a sub by itself Navantia in SEA 1000 contention.

If Navantia develops a demonstrably efficient S-80 and gets some export orders for subs experience before 2025 then it might be less high risk and less expensive a choice.

COMMENTS ON THIS GENTLESEAS ARTICLE

As this post was carried over from an old link it contains no visitor Comments facility.

However by other means MHalblaub commented January 20, 2014:
The Spanish S-80 and the Japanese submarines have something in common. The AIP of both submarine types is a licensed build by DCNS or Kockums. 

I doubt that Kawasaki acquired a license to retail AIPs and France will never sell the AIP to Australia without a submarine. 

There are just two western companies which have a good record for licensed building of submarines: DCNS and HDW. Kockums failed last time.

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Pete's reply January 21, 2014:

Hi  MHalblaub 

The S-80's AIP is neither DCNS MESMA nor Kockums Stirling but a bioethanol-processor (provided by Hynergreen from Abengoa) - see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-80-class_submarine#Propulsion . Meanwhile the Soryu does indeed utilise Kockums Stirling.

I don't know if Kawasaki could export its AIP as its never exported a sub or parts to my knowledge. Agree that France DCNS is unlikely to export its MESMA alone.

I agree that DCNS and HDW have the best record for licensed building.

Navantia might need two decades or more of providing licence building and exporting different sizes of subs to catch up with DCNS and HDW. 

Its unknown whether Navantia joint ventures with Electric Boat would improve Navantia's performance. see references to Electric Boat's assistance here.

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Pete