Kevin Andrews' speech prompts questions of evaluation process fairness

 It is difficult to find a photograph of Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews letting himself be filmed with a submarine. Here's the next best thing - reflections of what looks to be a submarine in Andrew's binoculars (Photo courtesy thevine.com).

---

The following are the portions of a speech most relevant to submarines made by Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews on March 25, 2015 at Australia's Future Submarine Summit (“Sub Summit”) Adelaide, South Australia, March 24-26, 2015, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/03/25/speech-rusi-submarine-summit-25-march-2015/ :

COMMENT

The Andrews speech and other statements made by Australian government officers and officials at the Summit appeared to confirm a growing belief the evaluation process may not be truly competitive. This is due to what appears to be an unequal match between the official competitors, which are:

- the Government of Japan (including Prime Minister Abe and the Japanese Ministry of Defence (JMD) in part drawing advice from MHI and KHI). Significantly Japan is backed by overt US Government support *

versus 

- only companies: TKMS from Germany and DCNS from France. 

European company representatives at the Summit questioned this mismatch and many wondered how the evaluation process could possibly be fair when Japan was being dealt with on a government-to-government basis while the German and French builders were on a commercial level. “It looks to me like the decision might already have been made,” said one CEO who asked to remain anonymous. “This whole process clearly favours Japan.”

* US Support for Japan's Bid

The Japan Times reported: "Vice Adm. Robert Thomas, commander of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, reportedly said Oct. 24 [2014]  in Tokyo that then-Australian Defense Minister David Johnston was very interested in Japan’s Soryu-class subs.

“I talked to him about it four years ago and I said: ‘You want to find the finest diesel-electric submarine made on the planet — it’s made at Kobe works in Japan,’ Thomas was quoted as saying by Bloomberg News."

PORTIONS OF SPEECH

Minister for Defence – Speech – RUSI Submarine Summit – 25 March 2015

25 March 2015

".....FUTURE SUBMARINES – STRATEGIC NEED

Submarines are the most complicated, sensitive and expensive Defence capability acquisition a Government can make in meeting that responsibility.

An effective submarine capability plays a critical role in Australia’s defence in conjunction with all Australian Defence Force elements.

I have previously stated – as a Government and as a nation, we have one chance to get this decision right.

Because of the previous government’s refusal for 6 years to make a decision on the replacement for the Collins class submarines, we had a looming security and capability gap arriving in about ten years.

The process that I recently announced is the best way forward to ensure that such a gap will not occur, simultaneously delivering the best possible capability to the ADF and value for money to Australian taxpayers.

Geographically we are an island continent, the world’s sixth largest country by area. This unique geography means we have special requirements for Australia’s future submarines.

Australia’s national security and our $1.6 trillion dollar economy rely on the unencumbered use of the sea.

Seventy per cent of Australia’s exported goods and services, by value, travel by sea, an export trade worth more than $220 billion in 2012-13. We are a maritime nation and we need maritime security.

By 2030, half of the world’s submarines will be in Australia’s broader strategic region. The Indo-Pacific region has some of the fastest growing economies in the world and the demand for defence technology to safeguard the region’s prosperity and security is ever increasing.

The future submarine programme represent a $50 billion investment in Australia’s safety and security – the largest Defence procurement in Australia’s history – with up to two thirds of this investment being spent in Australia during the lifetime of the future submarine.

To the average Australian taxpayer this may seem to be a huge price to be paid for a capability that may never be used in anger.

But that cost also needs to be measured against the major investment that would need to be made by any adversary to counter the effect of our submarines.

The complexity of Australia’s strategic environment means our defence planning has to cater for a range of possible contingencies, but particularly focussed on maintaining stability in our region and ensuring that conflict doesn’t have the chance to start. So submarines remain a logical and necessary investment in Australia’s wider defence capability.

And for this reason, Australia’s future submarine must give us a significant capability edge in our region as well as meet our needs in respect of geography and strategic outlook.

We need submarines capable of operations at long range over extended periods because they defend our interests far from our shores. The range and endurance must be similar to that of the Collins class submarine.

They are an essential part of our national security capability.

Another key strategic requirement for our Future Submarines includes sensor performance and characteristics that are superior to that of the Collins class submarine.

We need the sovereign ability to maintain the future submarine over coming decades, including repairs, modifications and certifying it as safe for use.

AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY INVOLVEMENT

Now I acknowledge that – in recent times – there has been some anxiety about the future submarine programme.

This is why I announced the acquisition strategy in February – to provide a pathway for Australian industry to maximise its involvement in the program, whilst not compromising capability, cost, program schedule or risk.

The Government supports local industry and recognises how valuable it is to our nation. As Minister for Defence, I want to see a sustainable and viable industry better able to support Defence.

In 2014-15 financial year, Defence expects to spend $6.2 billion on equipment acquisition and support in Australia.

This equates to around 53 per cent of the military equipment acquisition and support expenditure this year, and is consistent with long-term averages of between 50 and 55 per cent being spent in Australia.

The Government does support local Defence industry.

When it comes to making decisions on Defence capability, the needs of the Australian Defence Force will – must – always come first.

The Government will acquire Defence capability that supports ADF requirements first and Australian industry can play a very significant role in this process.

Our sailors, soldiers or airmen and women need the right equipment and industry needs to demonstrate that they are world leaders, producing the best product at the best price.

SUBMARINES AND DEFENCE INDUSTRY

When it comes to Future Submarines, Australian industry will play an important role in delivering the best possible equipment at the best value for money.  

There will be many new high-skill jobs in Australia for the life of the Submarine program, decades into the future.

Significant work will be undertaken in Australia during the build phase. At a minimum, this includes combat system integration, design assurance and land-based testing.

There will be significant opportunities arising from the support and maintenance of the submarine for decades. In dollar terms, this often accounts for two-thirds of the investment.

All three potential international partners will require significant redesign work to be undertaken on their existing submarines. There are opportunities here for Australia.  

I want to make it clear – that maintenance can occur in Australia, even if there is an overseas build. The important consideration, and a lesson from Collins, is to ensure that maintenance and knowledge transfer are planned from the early stages of design.

As I mentioned previously, this is a busy time for Defence acquisition – and there are many exciting opportunities ahead for industry.  

Here in South Australia alone – over the next four years – subject to the outcomes of the Defence White Paper – there will be up to $4.4 billion in Defence spending for building and sustaining Defence materiel.

PROGRAMME OF ENGAGEMENT WITH DEFENCE INDUSTRY

As the competitive evaluation for the Future Submarine proceeds, Defence is engaging with a number of key industry representatives.

This includes engaging with Austrade and the Department of Industry and Science, along with engagement with State Governments, the Australian Industry Group, the Australian Industry Defence Network and the Australian Business Defence Industry Unit.

Here, in South Australia, Defence is consulting with Defence SA, the Defence Teaming Centre and, of course, ASC and other companies.

Importantly, the potential international partners that will deliver Australia’s Future Submarine fleet need to understand Australian industry’s capabilities and skill sets.

During a meeting yesterday between Defence and Department of Industry officials, State Government representatives, and defence industry groups, there was agreement to the SEA 1000 Industrial Engagement Strategy.  This included the formation of the State and Industry Association Consultative Group, comprising all attendees.

The SEA 1000 Industrial Engagement Strategy involves the members of this group working together with the common aim of providing competitive Australian companies with meaningful opportunities to demonstrate their capabilities and skills to international partners.

The strategy includes bimonthly meetings to monitor progress against planned activities that include preparation sessions for Australian industry, the development of company profiles to be provided to international partners, a schedule of interactions between the partners and state-based organisations, and visits by the partners to states across Australia to meet with company representatives and visit facilities.

These activities will commence in early April with briefings to major companies operating in Australia, and progress throughout the remainder of the year. 

The engagements between international partners and industry will be scheduled to complement the development their pre-concept designs, allowing timely judgments of how to best involve Australian capabilities and skills in their proposals.

Importantly, there is agreement on the need for a coordinated and consultative approach to the engagement, which offers international partners full visibility of how Australian industry can support the project and maximise Australian industrial involvement

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

As the Government has announced, France, Germany and Japan have emerged as potential international partners. All three countries have proven submarine design and build capabilities and are producing submarines.

The competitive evaluation process will ensure that capability, cost, schedule and key strategic considerations, along with Australian industry involvement, are carefully and methodically considered, and avoid unnecessary delays to Australia’s future Submarine program.

As part of the competitive evaluation, Defence will seek proposals from potential partners for:

• Pre-concept designs based on meeting our capability criteria;
• Options for design and build overseas, in Australia, and/or a hybrid approach;
• Rough costs and schedule for each option; and
• Positions on key commercial issues, for example intellectual property rights and the ability to use and disclose technical data.

The level of Australian industry involvement will be a fundamental consideration, as will interoperability with our alliance partner, the US.

The competitive evaluation will take at least ten months, after which time Defence will bring advice to Government for consideration.

The Government will continue to ensure that a careful, considered and methodical approach is taken in making decision on the future submarine.

The opportunity is now there for industry to engage with international partners and to demonstrate that maximum Australian involvement can deliver an affordable and quality submarine such that this vision can become a reality. 

EXPERT ADVISORY PANEL

As part of the Government’s commitment to a robust and transparent competitive evaluation, we will soon be announcing the appointments to an Expert Advisory Panel to oversee the competitive evaluation process.

This panel will oversee the conduct of the process, including ensuring its probity, managing any conflicts of interest, and ensuring that confidentiality is maintained in relation to all sensitive information received during the process.

This oversight will provide the Government and the public with confidence that the evaluation process not only is, but is seen to be, fair and defensible, and that the will robustly address all relevant factors, allowing Government to balance importance considerations, for acquisition and through life support, including capability, cost, schedule, and risk.

In closing, as you know, the first priority of government is the safety and security of its citizens.

As the newly appointed Defence Minister, I ask that we work together to bring this about." ENDS

See whole speech.

Please connect with Documents for Competitive Evaluation Process sent to (Likely) Bidders, March 26, 2015.

Pete

Some Doubt Whether Australia Will Build 12 Future Submarines

Australia's Defence Minister David Johnston - prepared to speak out on submarines.

---------

Australia's Defence Minister David Johnston is one of the principal decision makers on current and future Australian submarine issues. Like all Defence Minister's he has his own public relations style.

On February 27, 2014 Rob Taylor and Patrick Barta of the Wall Street Journal reported some comments from Minister Johnston that may prove highly significant for future tenderers for Australia's future submarine program (SEA 1000). I've bolded what I see as the most significant comments. As will be seen the issue of how many future submarines Australia will build has not yet been finalized. see  http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304071004579408282844676104 :

"Australia Australia Reviews Plan to Double Submarine Fleet"

Decision to Revisit $32 Billion Purchase Comes as Asian Neighbors Bulk Up Military Muscle

CANBERRA, Australia—Australia will review plans to double its fleet of submarines, with the new conservative government under pressure to rein in its budget even as Asian neighbors dramatically ramp up military spending.

Defense Minister David Johnston said he was unconvinced that Australia needed as many as 12 new conventional submarines currently foreseen by military planners. It comes as regional neighbors, led by China, build up their naval and air arsenals amid disputes over territorial waters, especially in North Asia.

At a cost of up to 36 billion Australian dollars (US$32.28 billion), doubling the submarine fleet would be the country's largest single military purchase.

"It's a mystery to me [where that number of 12 future submarines came from]," said Mr. Johnston, who has called for a review of military-equipment spending as part of a year long strategic planning process launched by the conservatives, who swept to power in September elections on a promise of fiscal restraint."

[Pete's comment: The first major explanation (I know of) as to how 12 future submarines are arrived at is in Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper  Defending Australia in the Asia Paciic Century: Force 2030  section 8.40, page 64: "In the case of the submarine force,the Government takes the view that our future strategic circumstances necessitate a substantially expanded submarine fleet of 12 boats in order to sustain a force at sea large enough in a crisis or conflict to be able to defend our approaches (including at considerable distance from Australia, if necessary), protect and support other ADF assets, and undertake certain strategic missions where the stealth and other operating characteristics of highly-capable advanced submarines would be crucial. Moreover, a larger submarine force would significantly increase the military planning challenges faced by any adversaries, and increase the size and capabilities of the force they would have to be prepared to commit to attack us directly, or coerce, intimidate or otherwise employ military power against us."  see http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf ]

"That is a technical issue that the current circumstances will dictate and I want [the] navy to tell me what they foresee is the way forward. It might be more than 12, it might be less. I'm not sure," he said in an interview.

Australia's former Labor government in 2009 released a defense planning paper that called for a dozen large, conventionally powered submarines to replace the country's existing six-boat fleet of Collins class submarines.

Although much larger than submarines operated by regional neighbors, [Japan's 4,000 ton Soryus are larger!] the Collins class submarines have been plagued by technical problems. On Thursday, a fire erupted on the submarine HMAS Waller off the West Australian coast, Australia's Defense Department said. There were no casualties. [see http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/03/fire-emergency-aboard-australian.html ]

A new fleet of larger, more powerful and longer-range submarines would counter a growing undersea presence in Asia. Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia are fielding new submarines to counter threats to some of the world's most important energy-trade routes, as well as to hedge against Chinese ambitions.

China in January sent a surface warship fleet—possibly backed by a submarine—into waters between Indonesia and Australia, demonstrating Beijing's naval reach. The move prompted some alarm in Canberra, which sent a maritime patrol aircraft to keep watch.

Southeast Asian nations typically operate submarines of about 2,000 submerged tons, while Australia envisages boats of 4,000 tons or more, possibly equipped with submarine-launched cruise missiles for land attack and capable of deploying special-forces soldiers.

Australia's submarine-replacement program, no matter how ambitious it turned out to be, wouldn't add to regional rivalries, with the close U.S. ally having long fielded a small but highly capable military that was well respected regionally, Mr. Johnston said.

"For many, many years we have owned and operated the world's largest conventionally powered submarine, so the neighborhood is well used to us having a large and unique diesel-electric submarine," he said.

Australia already has embarked on an expensive buildup of military equipment, including two 27,000-ton [Canberra Class] amphibious assault ships, new attack and transport helicopters, [Hobart Class] guided-missile destroyers, tanks and Super Hornet strike and electronic attack aircraft.

Australia has a defense budget of some A$26 billion in the fiscal year to June, or 1.6% of gross domestic product. The government plans in the next few years to buy up to 100 F-35 Lightning joint strike fighters to provide radar-evading air power, at a cost of up to A$16 billion.

But the military has come under pressure to reduce costs as the world's 12th-largest economy retreats from a mining boom, driving up joblessness and eating into government revenues. The government in December forecast budget deficits totaling A$123 billion over the next four fiscal years to June 2017, and said it would cut billions from spending.

But earlier this week the country, which two years ago agreed to rotate thousands of U.S. Marines and their aircraft through Australia's north, said it would buy A$4 billion of new Boeing Co. BA +1.88% -built P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft capable of ranging well into Asia. Those aircraft are likely to be joined later this year by a A$2.9 billion fleet of seven long-range MQ-4C Triton drones.

Mr. Johnston said he was open to the idea of Australia's far-flung Cocos islands, in the Indian Ocean southwest of Indonesia, being developed as a base for U.S. or Australian Tritons. But he said there was no proposal currently to upgrade the islands' dilapidated airstrip to expand maritime reach, as Chinese vessels increasingly patrol further from home.

China's growing assertiveness in the East China Sea and elsewhere was to be expected of any country with growing energy needs, Mr. Johnston said, including a demand for Australian oil and gas resources. China is Australia's largest trading partner.

"They are hostage to the importation of food and energy. I think they would be dilatory were they not to want to protect those sea lanes," he said. "I'm not reactive to these things that are happening in the South China Sea." ENDS

Pete

Australia's New Submarine Program - On Drawing Board

A Collins Class Submarine - new sub will probably be similar

For ABC News, March 18, 2009 Andrew Davies of the Australian Strategy Policy Institute, has written a useful commentary on Australia's program for a new and unique locally built submarine. The reasons for it are similar to India's ATV program:

"New submarine fleet a long way off
So far only a few things are clear - there will be a replacement for the Collins submarine, and it will be delivered sometime after 2020.

There has been a recent flurry of media reports about the plans for Australia's future submarine fleet. Depending on who you read, the number of subs to be built is anywhere from six to 18, and the project budget is somewhere between $12 and $35 billion.

So who is right? As it happens, the correct answer is 'none of the above' - yet. The road to a future submarine is a long one and there are many decision points to be negotiated before the final solution emerges. In fact, this project is a very good example of just how complex defence projects can be. It's easy to be critical in hindsight when projects like the Seasprite helicopters go wrong, but this is a good case study of just how hard it can be to see the right path in advance.

So far only a few things are clear; there will be a replacement for the Collins submarine, it will be built in Adelaide and delivered sometime after 2020, and nuclear subs are out of the question. Pretty much everything else is still to be settled. Even very basic questions such as how large the subs need to be, what technologies they will have and who is going to design and build them are still to be answered.

The complexities of the submarine project arise from a number of sources, but they all owe their existence to a single observation: there is no submarine on the world market that does what we want. When deciding to build the Collins class, the Australian government of the day decided that the country would be best served by having a submarine fleet that could conduct extended patrols thousands of miles from home. There is no suggestion that that requirement will be relaxed. In fact, the Prime Minister has stated that Australia's naval forces will be strengthened in order to play a role in an increasingly contested Asia-Pacific region, the countries of which will field dozens of new submarines over the next few decades.

The world's submarines fall into two broad classes - long-range and high-endurance nuclear subs and much shorter-range conventional ones. The only submarines that fall in between are our own Collins (a design now over 20 years old), Japan's fleet [Soryu and Oyashio class] (constitutionally banned from export) and a South Korean [KSS-III] design only just starting to take shape. So chances are that nothing on the world market will do the job we want. And even if it did, any submarine versus submarine engagement would look uncomfortably like an even fight if both sides were operating subs bought in the same marketplace.

Australia is almost uniquely well-placed to do better than that. We have a close alliance with the United States that gives us access to sensitive systems, weapons and technologies, and we have a hard-won national capability to build those technologies into a European-sourced submarine design. (The Collins was based on a Swedish [Kockums] design.) In other words, we can have the best of both worlds - US systems [especially Raytheon's combat system] developed for their very capable but all-nuclear fleet coupled with state-of-the-art European conventional submarine technology. The resultant boat could give us the edge we seek.

But there is a very delicate balancing act to be performed in doing that. For a start, there are technical issues to be surmounted in marrying the different design philosophies. For example, nuclear submarines have essentially no power limitations, so equipment designed for them does not take into account the power budgets that have to be managed in conventionals.

But just as importantly, the Americans and Europeans hold their submarine technologies very closely and don't want them to 'leak' (admittedly not a propitious word to use when writing about submarines) to other countries. Australia would have to manage the process very carefully to keep the potential providers confident that their secrets were safe with us. So the Australian Government will act as a trusted broker in government-to-government and navy-to-navy negotiations. Industry will be brought in progressively as the design firms up.

So where are we now? Basically, at step one. Defence has asked a number of submarine design houses for a 'concept design', essentially a high-level 'sketch' of what the future submarine might look like. That concept will be refined over the next two years, after which preliminary designs will be refined for another couple of years. Between 2013 and 2016 the detailed design will be developed, with construction not starting until (at the earliest) 2016.

Before the concept is fully developed, there can be no firm decision on the number of submarines - after all, how do we know how many we need before we know what each one can do? Similarly, costs won't be known until the design is well advanced. And, of course, we need to be convinced that the manning and support of any expanded submarine fleet could be managed.

So take any dramatic headlines in the near future about the size, shape and cost of Australia's future submarine fleet with a grain of salt.

-

Comments

-

Australia built the Collins Class and is planning a future conventionional submarine for similar reasons to the much more ambitious Indian ATV program (currently under construction). That is because they:

- provide the best technical solutions to specific national requirements

- provide greater national security through self reliance - independent of foreign suppliers

- further the national R and D bases

- maintain national naval construction-industrial bases, and

- boost national and ruling government prestige.

-

I think all these factors are legitimate reasons for paying a higher cost for indigenously built submarines.

-

Australia appears to have excluded the nuclear propulsion option due to cost, reliance on the US nuclear submarine shield (under ANZUS) and US pressure on Australia to remain diesel/electric. The US earlier dissuaded Canada from considering nuclear propulsion as that would give that dependent allie a measure of independence.

-

Pete

Australia 2009 Defence White Paper - Submarine Bonanza

One of six existing Australian Collins Class (to be replaced around 2020 to 2027)

-
Australia's long awaited 2009 2009 Defence White Paper Defending Australia in the Asian Century: Force 2030 is according to the Media Release a “...complete re-examination of Defence strategy, capabilities, business processes and resources,..”. It covers a great deal of ground. I think it does it well.

About the India Ocean the White Paper says in part:
“[page 37, 4.43 The Indian Ocean will have greater strategic significance in the period to 2030. It will become an increasingly important global trading thoroughfare, particularly for energy supplies between Asia and the Middle East.

There are a number of significant inter-state and intra-state conflicts along its periphery that have the potential to draw in other powers. Over time, and in response to these factors as well as transnational security issues such as piracy, the Indian Ocean is likely to host a larger military (particularly naval) presence.

A number of major naval powers are likely to increasingly compete for strategic advantage in this crucial maritime region. Over the period to 2030, the Indian Ocean will join the Pacific Ocean in terms of its centrality to our maritime strategy and defence planning.”

The most surprising and significant decision in the White Paper is to build a class of 12 large conventional submarines, hence:

"page 64. 8.40 In the case of the submarine force,the Government takes the view that our future strategic circumstances necessitate a substantially expanded submarine fleet of 12 boats in order to sustain a force at sea large enough in a crisis or conflict to be able to defend our approaches (including at considerable distance from Australia, if necessary), protect and support other ADF assets, and undertake certain strategic missions where the stealth and other operating characteristics of highly-capable advanced submarines would be crucial. Moreover, a larger submarine force would significantly increase the military planning challenges faced by any adversaries, and increase the size and capabilities of the force they would have to be prepared to commit to attack us directly, or coerce, intimidate or otherwise employ military power against us.

[page 70] 9.3 ...12 new Future Submarines, to be assembled in South Australia. This will be a major design and construction program spanning three decades, and will be Australia's largest ever single defence project. The Future Submarine will have greater range, longer endurance on patrol, and expanded capabilities compared to the current Collins class submarine. [hence heavier] It will also be equipped with very secure real-time communications and be able to carry different mission payloads such as uninhabited underwater vehicles.

9.4 The Future Submarine will be capable of a range of tasks such as anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare; strategic strike; mine detection and mine-laying operations; intelligence collection; supporting special forces (including infiltration and exfiltration missions); and gathering battlespace data in support of operations.

-

9.5 Long transits and potentially short-notice contingencies in our primary operational environment demand high levels of mobility and endurance [hence Air Independent Propulsion] in the Future Submarine. The boats need to be able to undertake prolonged covert patrols over the full distance of our strategic approaches and in operational areas. They require low signatures across all spectrums, including at higher speeds. The Government has ruled out nuclear propulsion for these submarines.

9.6 The complex task of capability definition, design and construction must be undertaken without delay, given the long lead times and technical challenges involved. The Government has already directed that a dedicated project office be established for the Future Submarine within Defence, and will closely oversee this project.

9.7 The strategic importance of this capability is such that Australian industry involvement will need to be factored into the design, development and construction phases, and the sustainment and maintenance life cycle of these boats, which will extend well into the 2050s and possibly beyond. The Government

[p71] 9.7 continued - will give early consideration to the complex capability definition and acquisition issues involved in this substantial undertaking. The Government will also consider matters such as basing and crewing, and will seek early advice from Defence on those and other issues.

9.8 For this project to succeed, we need to engage with a number of overseas partners during the design and development phase. In particular, the Government intends to continue the very close level of Australia-US collaboration in undersea warfare capability. This will be crucial in the development and through life management of the Future Submarine.

9.9 The Government has also agreed to further incremental upgrades to the Collins class submarines throughout the next decade, including new sonars, to ensure they remain highly effective through to their retirement. The construction program for the Future Submarines will be designed to provide the Government with the option to continue building additional submarines in the 2030s and beyond, should strategic circumstances require it.

9.10 The Government is determined to respond decisively to deficiencies in the current availability of operationally ready submarines. The Navy will embark on a major reform program to improve the availability of the Collins class fleet, and will also ensure that a solid foundation is laid for the expanded future submarine force. These reforms will change how we attract, remunerate, train and manage the submarine workforce, and improve the deployment and maintenance of the submarines."

- while earlier boats may launch Tomahawks (along with Harpoons, torpedoes and mines) through conventional, horizontal torpedo tubes later boats in the new class of 12 (say number 5 onwards) might have an 8 (or so) tube vertical launch system (VLS) for Tomahawks.

- 12 new conventional submarines, mainly launched 2020 to 2035

- large conventional probably 4,000 tons surfaced, 4,500 tons submerged (hence larger than the Collins Class at 3,000 submerged). Note that this will be more modern than the closest foreign boats, the four 4,200 ton submerged Japanese AIP Soryu Class submarines (one launched this year).

- requirement for longer range means more diesel fuel so more weight. If the submarines were merely defensive then long range would be less important. New emphasis on land attack ability with Tomahawks implies range sufficient to move underwater near the Asian mainland (China, Pakistan, a nuclear Iran and maybe India (sorry ;) and possibly against a resurgent Japan. Once a launch zone near the mainland is reached, a loiter time of 3 to 4 weeks would be ideal. This is a deterrent only - so Australia wouldn't be a pushover if countries wished to take our resources by force or blockade.

- Given an opponent's satellite and other sensors ability to detect snorkelling any self-respecting conventional sub needs an Air Independent Propulsion system (AIP) allowing much longer submerged operation (weeks rather than days).

- Australia may build a development of the Collins Class design with Dutch, German (HDW), French, Spanish (watch the S-80) and/or US assistance. Language barriers, possible strategic competition would probably rule out South Korean and Japanese (add Japanese constitutional restrictions) designs.

- Lack of recent US experience in conventional propulsion or with AIP would reduce its chances of being the only foreign contracting nation. Yet the US is a "dark horse" there were many problems with the Collins on hull quieting and cavitation that the US worked out. Part of Kockums problems (I think) stemmed from enlarging a smaller Swedish design to Collins size. A noisy, hull resulted. The US has more experience with quieting measures pertaining to large ocean going hulls. Where the Paper talks about US assistance on submarines and that is likely to come in the form of intergrating weapons, sonar, command and control amounting to combat system (Raytheon is the existing contractor to the Collins for this). electromagnetic/electronic signature minimisation (stealth) and weapons fit General Dynamics Electric Boat perhaps Northrop Grumman (if it lives down "Wedgetail").

- subsonic Tomahawk missiles are stealthy and part of an EW attack, however, a much faster mach 2+ weapon (retaining 2,000+ km range) would eventually be preferable for surprise land attack, quick response and to evade anti missile defences, such as the Russian or Chinese sourced S-400 (or equivalent) SAMs.

-

Comments
-
It is likely that no Future Submarine will be launched before 2025 if competitive selection, design, production, and Collins retirement cycles are taken into account. Furthermore most Australian politicians mark time in 3 year electoral cycles so there are few certainties over ten to twenty year time spans. Given the state of the Australian economy (in recession) a reduction to just six Future Submarines by 2030 is quite possible.

After talking of 100 F-35s for the Air Force (RAAF) and the 12 submarines for the Navy the White Paper did not discuss needs for the army to the same extent. A tradeoff towards Army needs (especially in Afghanistan, East Timor, maybe the Solomons, one day PNG) may reduce the Air Force and Navy wish list. Though I still think more capable submarines for Australia are a very manpower effective way to wage medium intensity and high intensity (nuclear) warfare.

As someone who sees submarines as a key defensive and offensive weapon for a maritime country like Australia I feel satisfied (almost vindicated) that the Australian government is leaning heavily towards submarines for our defence.

Pete