Showing posts with label submarine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label submarine. Show all posts

May 25, 2012

India's Chronic Submarine Upgrade Problems

An Indian Navy Kilo class diesel electric submarine under repair at Mazagon Docks, Mumbai.
-
Most countries bordering the Indian Ocean remain fairly silent about their submarine services, but, as indicated by the following India has openly described ongoing deficiencies:

"Kobus" at Naval Open Source Intelligence located the following article. January 13, 2009 IBN Live reported:

"New Delhi: Over-emphasis on indigenous work is hurting India's readiness for war.
As India's vital submarine arm struggles with dangerously low numbers, a top-end submarine has been taken out of the fleet for a repair programme.

The shocking part is that the repair schedule will last 10 years. Such upgrades have previously been done overseas in two years. One could compare this to a submarine being laid comatose, at least in the case of the INS Sindhukirti, a frontline Kilo class attack submarine of the Indian Navy.


It's been in dry dock at Vizag for a refit programme for close to five years now. It seems that Hindustan Shipyards, the government-owned contractor with little experience in submarine upgrades, will take at least another five years before the submarine can be put to water again.
Unavailable to the submarine-starved Navy for 10 of the 30 years of its useful life, the Sindhukirti is as good as a write off.

"How viable is a surgery which requires a healthy patient to be in a hospital bed for one-third of his life? That is the approximate analogy for the mid-life upgrade for this submarine INS Sindhukirti, the Dry Dock Queen. Four submarines are stuck in such protracted upgrades. Not surprisingly, just nobody is accountable," said our defence correspondent.

Russia took just two years each to upgrade six similar Kilo class submarines for the Indian Navy.
The government insists that it is now building national capability with inhouse upgrades.

"That kind of expertise did not exist in India before and this is for the first time that we are trying it out here. Instead of sending them to Russia all the way, this one is being offloaded to Hindustan Shipyards. There are some problems in their procurement procedures. It takes a little longer than is expected," said Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Suresh Mehta.

What this trade-off on time does to India's military readiness is anybody's guess. It took a recent [ Comptroller and Auditor General of India] CAG report to blow the lid of the Indian Navy's worst kept secret: that the vital submarine arm faces a crisis of numbers.

The shocking revelations of the report were:

- Only seven of India's 16 submarines are available for combat at any time.

- 10 of these 16 ageing submarines will be due for phase-out by 2012.
- To maintain current numbers, one submarine needs to be inducted every two years but there's been no addition since 2001.
- India's only submarine-making facility in Mumbai was kept idle for 12 years.

- The gaping hole in India's naval capability is showing."

Comment

PointSingularity86 reported earlier on this issue in his blog here .
-
Similar delays in upgrades have haunted Australia's Collins Class Submarine program and perhaps for the same reasons. While indigenous construction and upgrades promote self sufficiency and national security they inevitably involve a lengthy learning curve denotes inefficiency, high extra costs and extended "down time" for individual subs.
-
Pete

January 19, 2012

Australia 2009 Defence White Paper - Submarine Bonanza

One of six existing Australian Collins Class (to be replaced around 2020 to 2027)
-
Australia's long awaited 2009 2009 Defence White Paper Defending Australia in the Asian Century: Force 2030 is according to the Media Release a “...complete re-examination of Defence strategy, capabilities, business processes and resources,..”. It covers a great deal of ground. I think it does it well.

About the India Ocean the White Paper says in part:

“[page 37, 4.43 The Indian Ocean will have greater strategic significance in the period to 2030. It will become an increasingly important global trading thoroughfare, particularly for energy supplies between Asia and the Middle East.
There are a number of significant inter-state and intra-state conflicts along its periphery that have the potential to draw in other powers. Over time, and in response to these factors as well as transnational security issues such as piracy, the Indian Ocean is likely to host a larger military (particularly naval) presence.
A number of major naval powers are likely to increasingly compete for strategic advantage in this crucial maritime region. Over the period to 2030, the Indian Ocean will join the Pacific Ocean in terms of its centrality to our maritime strategy and defence planning.”

The most surprising and significant decision in the White Paper is to build a class of 12 large conventional submarines, hence:

"page 64. 8.40 In the case of the submarine force,the Government takes the view that our future strategic circumstances necessitate a substantially expanded submarine fleet of 12 boats in order to sustain a force at sea large enough in a crisis or conflict to be able to defend our approaches (including at considerable distance from Australia, if necessary), protect and support other ADF assets, and undertake certain strategic missions where the stealth and other operating characteristics of highly-capable advanced submarines would be crucial. Moreover, a larger submarine force would significantly increase the military planning challenges faced by any adversaries, and increase the size and capabilities of the force they would have to be prepared to commit to attack us directly, or coerce, intimidate or otherwise employ military power against us.

[page 70] 9.3 ...12 new Future Submarines, to be assembled in South Australia. This will be a major design and construction program spanning three decades, and will be Australia's largest ever single defence project. The Future Submarine will have greater range, longer endurance on patrol, and expanded capabilities compared to the current Collins class submarine. [hence heavier] It will also be equipped with very secure real-time communications and be able to carry different mission payloads such as uninhabited underwater vehicles.

9.4 The Future Submarine will be capable of a range of tasks such as anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare; strategic strike; mine detection and mine-laying operations; intelligence collection; supporting special forces (including infiltration and exfiltration missions); and gathering battlespace data in support of operations.
-

9.5 Long transits and potentially short-notice contingencies in our primary operational environment demand high levels of mobility and endurance [hence Air Independent Propulsion] in the Future Submarine. The boats need to be able to undertake prolonged covert patrols over the full distance of our strategic approaches and in operational areas. They require low signatures across all spectrums, including at higher speeds. The Government has ruled out nuclear propulsion for these submarines.

9.6 The complex task of capability definition, design and construction must be undertaken without delay, given the long lead times and technical challenges involved. The Government has already directed that a dedicated project office be established for the Future Submarine within Defence, and will closely oversee this project.

9.7 The strategic importance of this capability is such that Australian industry involvement will need to be factored into the design, development and construction phases, and the sustainment and maintenance life cycle of these boats, which will extend well into the 2050s and possibly beyond. The Government

[p71] 9.7 continued - will give early consideration to the complex capability definition and acquisition issues involved in this substantial undertaking. The Government will also consider matters such as basing and crewing, and will seek early advice from Defence on those and other issues.

9.8 For this project to succeed, we need to engage with a number of overseas partners during the design and development phase. In particular, the Government intends to continue the very close level of Australia-US collaboration in undersea warfare capability. This will be crucial in the development and through life management of the Future Submarine.

9.9 The Government has also agreed to further incremental upgrades to the Collins class submarines throughout the next decade, including new sonars, to ensure they remain highly effective through to their retirement. The construction program for the Future Submarines will be designed to provide the Government with the option to continue building additional submarines in the 2030s and beyond, should strategic circumstances require it.

9.10 The Government is determined to respond decisively to deficiencies in the current availability of operationally ready submarines. The Navy will embark on a major reform program to improve the availability of the Collins class fleet, and will also ensure that a solid foundation is laid for the expanded future submarine force. These reforms will change how we attract, remunerate, train and manage the submarine workforce, and improve the deployment and maintenance of the submarines."

- while earlier boats may launch Tomahawks (along with Harpoons, torpedoes and mines) through conventional, horizontal torpedo tubes later boats in the new class of 12 (say number 5 onwards) might have an 8 (or so) tube vertical launch system (VLS) for Tomahawks.
- 12 new conventional submarines, mainly launched 2020 to 2035

- large conventional probably 4,000 tons surfaced, 4,500 tons submerged (hence larger than the Collins Class at 3,000 submerged). Note that this will be more modern than the closest foreign boats, the four 4,200 ton submerged Japanese AIP Soryu Class submarines (one launched this year).
- requirement for longer range means more diesel fuel so more weight. If the submarines were merely defensive then long range would be less important. New emphasis on land attack ability with Tomahawks implies range sufficient to move underwater near the Asian mainland (China, Pakistan, a nuclear Iran and maybe India (sorry ;) and possibly against a resurgent Japan. Once a launch zone near the mainland is reached, a loiter time of 3 to 4 weeks would be ideal. This is a deterrent only - so Australia wouldn't be a pushover if countries wished to take our resources by force or blockade.

- Given an opponent's satellite and other sensors ability to detect snorkelling any self-respecting conventional sub needs an Air Independent Propulsion system (AIP) allowing much longer submerged operation (weeks rather than days).
- Australia may build a development of the Collins Class design with Dutch, German (HDW), French, Spanish (watch the S-80) and/or US assistance. Language barriers, possible strategic competition would probably rule out South Korean and Japanese (add Japanese constitutional restrictions) designs.
- Lack of recent US experience in conventional propulsion or with AIP would reduce its chances of being the only foreign contracting nation. Yet the US is a "dark horse" there were many problems with the Collins on hull quieting and cavitation that the US worked out. Part of Kockums problems (I think) stemmed from enlarging a smaller Swedish design to Collins size. A noisy, hull resulted. The US has more experience with quieting measures pertaining to large ocean going hulls. Where the Paper talks about US assistance on submarines and that is likely to come in the form of intergrating weapons, sonar, command and control amounting to combat system (Raytheon is the existing contractor to the Collins for this). electromagnetic/electronic signature minimisation (stealth) and weapons fit General Dynamics Electric Boat perhaps Northrop Grumman (if it lives down "Wedgetail").


- subsonic Tomahawk missiles are stealthy and part of an EW attack, however, a much faster mach 2+ weapon (retaining 2,000+ km range) would eventually be preferable for surprise land attack, quick response and to evade anti missile defences, such as the Russian or Chinese sourced S-400 (or equivalent) SAMs.
-
Comments
-
It is likely that no Future Submarine will be launched before 2025 if competitive selection, design, production, and Collins retirement cycles are taken into account. Furthermore most Australian politicians mark time in 3 year electoral cycles so there are few certainties over ten to twenty year time spans. Given the state of the Australian economy (in recession) a reduction to just six Future Submarines by 2030 is quite possible.

After talking of 100 F-35s for the Air Force (RAAF) and the 12 submarines for the Navy the White Paper did not discuss needs for the army to the same extent. A tradeoff towards Army needs (especially in Afghanistan, East Timor, maybe the Solomons, one day PNG) may reduce the Air Force and Navy wish list. Though I still think more capable submarines for Australia are a very manpower effective way to wage medium intensity and high intensity (nuclear) warfare.

As someone who sees submarines as a key defensive and offensive weapon for a maritime country like Australia I feel satisfied (almost vindicated) that the Australian government is leaning heavily towards submarines for our defence.

Pete