B-21s May Be A Good Idea: Further Thoughts

Cleared but necessarily vague, artist's impression of a B-21.
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Since I wrote about B-21s on August 23, 2022 I've had some more thoughts.

The "Australia might be able to purchase the B-21" issue arose in mid August 2022. So, it may be no coincidence that an Air Chief Marshal (retired) Sir Angus Houston was appointed joint leader of the Australian Defence Strategic Review earlier that month. That review might produce an Interim Big Picture report by 1 November 2022 and Final Report, with recommendations, by 1 February 2023

Few performance specifications for B-21s are available, but it is assumed their specs will be equal to or greater than the B-2s, made by the same company, Northrop Grumman. 

"Initial Operating Capability [for the US Air Force] is expected to be reached by 2030." 

The major advantages of the B-21 might include:

They promise to be very stealthy. like submarines, but different.

Unlike submarines, they cannot be built in Adelaide or anywhere in Australia. So there is no twice the delay for twice the price, build in Australia, curse.

The weapons load of a B-21 is very heavy and dual nuclear-conventional warhead capable. Only minimal software changes to Australian B-21s might need to be made to make them capable of long range nuclear strike.

As a major task of the B-21s would be as a deterrent to China it is significant that the distance from Alice Springs to Beijing is around 3,950nm. The range of the B-2 with one air-refuel is 10,000nm. This is sufficient for a B-21 based in central Australia just south of Alice Springs to hit Beijing even with free fall bombs and return. In any case a more likely internal weapons load is hypersonic air to surface missiles. An example is the ARRW hypersonic missile with a range of 870+nm.

“Tipped off” by fixed and mobile underseas sensors (including LDUUVs) B-21s would be useful stealthy naval strike platforms out to a longer ranges than SSKs based in Fleet Base West (Rockingham) or East (Sydney).

But there are some risks, including:

The very costly B-21s, if bought by Australia, might come to Australia in the 2030s - the same time as the costly Virginias. 

The B-21 may not get full US funding right through the production stage, even for USAF use.

B-21s may face technical delays of the enormity experienced with F-35s.

A risk whether the US would be prepared to sell B-21s to Australia in the first place. Hurdles are many. Hurdles might include a change to a US President (in 2024-5) with a less generous outlook than Biden (of AUKUS), US Departments of State and Defense restrictions, years being held up in the US Congress and B-21 makers posing problems.

The B-21 Project and Unit price for Australia may be very high as B-21s are up there with F-22s in stealth features and maintenance costs. There is no US track record of the US selling nuclear capable heavy bombers to foreign customers – so no guidance on profit margins, etc.

Price for Australia would be highly dependent on number of B-21s built for the USAF. The B-2s for the USAF each cost around US$4 Billion (in 2022 US dollars) because numbers produced declined from 132 expected to 21 actually produced. Production expectations for the B-21 have dropped from 200 to perhaps 100 or maybe 80 and still being calculated.

Australian B-21s may less useful in having export stealth specs lower than top specs for USAF B-21s.

In a conflict with China even B-21s based in central Australia might be "taken out" on the ground in a Chinese ballistic or hypersonic missile surprise attack.

Decades of technical innovations and siting of distributed radars on Chinese bases in the Solomons, South China Sea islands, on intercept ships, UAVs and satellites might reduce the stealth invisibility of Australian B-21s. So Australian B-21s and F-35As (for that matter) might be detected and shot down in time of conflict.

Even spies on ground near a stealth aircraft base might be instrumental in detection and shooting down of stealth aircraft.

Conclusion

Anyway, despite the above, any Australian B-21s might make an impact if the current March 2023 US intention to sell 3 Virginias to Australia falls over by the early 2030s.

Is "USED" Virginias for Australia OFFICIAL US Policy?

All this talk about Australia only having the choice of "used" or "second hand" Virginias originally came from who? where? and when? 

Is "used" official US policy?

Thanks to A who cleared this up on March 17, 2023. More on this at next SubMatts article.

Aus Virginia Cost + US Industrial Cost + Obligations to US Alliance

Australia's pending purchase of 3 to 5 Virginias for the 2030s comes with extra  obligations and conditions: 

-  the sale must be approved by the US Congress, noting the US lower house, the House of Representatives, is already Republican dominated. The US Navy, long opposed to the sale, may persuade Congress to block the sale on sensitive technology transfer grounds - as Congress did with the USAF F-22 stealth fighter. "The F-22 cannot be exported under US federal law to protect its stealth technology and classified features."

-  Australian must pay the odd A$30 Billion (2030s inflated) total cost of 3 Virginia's 

-  Australia must pay (say) an additional A$30 Billion required to improve the US submarine industrial base (for the benefit of the US Navy and to employ additional American submarine-building workers). 

-  the US sees the deal as an additional way of tying Australia to the US commanded alliance. 

The points above are backed by the backed up by the following: 

On March 14, 2023, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan explained to the US “Press Gaggle”

"...the delivery of three Virginia-class subs from the United States to Australia over the course of the 2030s, with the possibility of going up to five if that is needed. 

…And I would reinforce that for that Virginia-class sale to Australia, the Australians are not only paying for those boats, they are also making a proportional contribution to the U.S. submarine industrial base — to lift it so that we can accelerate the production and accelerate the ongoing maintenance of Virginia-class submarines over the course of the years ahead.

…AUKUS represents, for Australia, not just a long-term investment in nuclear-powered submarines, but a long-term investment in its alliance with the United States of America.

This is a decades-long — maybe a century-long commitment.  And it reinforces the fundamental view, we believe, in Canberra that the United States and Australia, standing shoulder to shoulder for the purposes of safeguarding peace and stability — not to provoke, not to go try to fight wars, but rather to deter conflict and to promote peace and stability — that Australia is stepping up to make that bet."

Australia buying 3-5 Virginias. Intentionally Unworkable?

Reports from various media outlets support my prediction, here and here that Australia will be buying UK designed nuclear attack submarines (now dubbed SSN-AUKUS) and will build portions of them in Adelaide, Australia.

But what I didn't predict is an Australian intention, real or politically imagined, that Australia will first buy from 3 to 5 Virginia's during the 2030s purportedly as  "submarine capability gap" fillers. I didn't predict Virginias due to all the problems and unlikelyhoods I detail below.

The $368 Billion (US or AU dollars?) over 30 years, quoted by the Govenment is a typical defence understatement. Australia operating two distinct SSN types may add A$100 Billion (especially in training, spare parts, basing and maintainence complications) to what I already calculated as a A$500 Billion Australian SSN program over 35 years (2023-2058). Those figures take into account inflation over those years, submarine operating costs and the cost of nuclear training literally thousands of technicians, engineers, scientists, teaching staff, submarine builders, emergency staff and, of course, a new generation of nuclear submariners.

Three to five Virginia SSNs, bought by Australia from US shipyards in the 2030s then Australian-UK production of Australian-UK-US designed SSN-AUKUS in the 2040s have been announced. This was by President Biden and Prime Ministers Sunak and Albanese in San Diego, US, on March 14, 2023 (Australian time).

But there are too many problems with a "quick solution" to buy Virginias.

A US Political Change of Heart?

A good intention to sell Australia Virginias in 10 or more years is a long time in AUKUS politics, where political continuity is essential, but unlikely. Biden will not be President in the 2030s.

Even before the 2030s there is uncertainty over Biden being re-elected in November 2024. Might a Republican President (at worst the alliance downgrader  Trump?) have different priorities, which might include bowing to already expressed USN pressure not to sell Virginias to Australia? 

Biden has simply made a promise he cannot possibly honour during his sitting presidential term.

The USN being a parent navy that is already reluctant to spare Virginia's for Australian use spells big problems down the line. US Navy Admirals and key US Congressmen have long said the US has too few submarines as essential priorities of the US's own sovereignty. Biden's, in re-election mode, statements on March 14, 2023 that he has conjured up 3 to 5 Virginias in 10 years time cannot re-imagine the reality that the experts of the USN already see. 

The problem of too little US submarine manufacturing capacity even for US Navy needs won't be allayed by the bizarre concept that Australia could fund, or send non-nuclear trained workers, for a new US production line for nuclear submarines. That would be akin to sending proverbial "coals to Newcastle" or car-workers to Japan. Short of a wartime escalation, the US and Australia simply have too few managers and workers to quickly produce an excess 3 to 5 Virginias. Sending nuclear novice Australian submariners to the USN for training might also be more of a hindrance than a help - given the USN always has too few training slots aboard its submarines.  

If Australia buys 3 completed submarines from the US this won't assist Adelaide in developing Australia deep maintenance facilities for a fleet as small as 3 Australian Virginias. The US instead already has a long backlog of nuclear subs that need deep maintenance and/or repairs. Australian Virginias are likely to languish at the back of the queue behind USN Virginias, Los Angeles and Seawolf SSNs and Ohio class SSBNs that need major work as essential components of the US's own sovereignty. 

Analysts have already reported it would take 15 years to train a whole Australian nuclear submarine crew including senior engineers and executive officers/commanders. Also a Virginia needs a vastly larger crew of 135 compared to a likely 100 in SSN-AUKUS (previously known as SSN(R)s) and only 58 in our present Collins subs. Even if we bought Virginia's in 2033 we could not majority crew them with Australians until 2038. This all points to years of reliance on US officers and crewman - something the USN wouldn't be happy about unless the USN remained de facto owners of "Australia's" Virginias.

The claim that it is a new policy that US Virginias annually visit Western Australia is misleading. US Virginia or Los Angeles SSNs or larger US SSGNs have been visiting Western Australia on average annually since 2005. 

Another concern is the irrationality of Australia operating US and UK designed SSNs simultaneously. It may well be that after Australia buys 5 Virginias it would make more sense to buy 3 additional Virginias to make up the complete and final fleet of 8. 

The alternative of building 3 UK SSN-AUKUS in Adelaide, to make up the 8, just doesn't make financial, training or operational sense. 

Early Virginias are an Intentionally Unworkable Non-Solution

In September 2021 the then Morrison Goverment promised all 8 nuclear subs would be built in Adelaide. South Australia and the Australia wide shipbuilding industry (consisiting of hundreds of Australian companies) accepted that promise with enthusiasm. But Albanese has reneged on that "will be built in Australia" promise as the Virginias will be US built.

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Flashback: Australian workers will miss out while Australia funds US workers to build the subs in the US. The Guardian reported September 25, 2022:

"The South Australian premier, Peter Malinauskas, has criticised a proposal for Australia to buy nuclear submarines directly from the US, saying it would “not be acceptable” for his state to miss out on promised submarine manufacturing jobs."

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Albanese has come up with a solution that USN and the Australian submarine building industry won't accept. "Build our submarines in Australia", from the Collins onwards, in the late 1970s, has been the essential requirement for our Australia-wide shipbuilding interests. 

Australian industry and South Australian State Government resistance to Australia buying already built Virginias from US shipyards will be such that Albanese can then honestly claim "Oh well! Then we'll need to wait for the UK designed SSN-AUKUS. They will be built in the 2040s." 

Therefore Australia's only real option is to wait until the UK, following its Dreadnought-class SSBN build (which will dominate UK resources until the late 2030s) is ready to build SSN-AUKUS in the UK and in Australia. For that we are talking much mid-2030s design work, then one or two SSN-AUKUS laid down in the the UK in about 2039 and maybe the first Australian one laid down in Adelaide in 2042. Commissioning of that first Australian SSN-AUKUS may be 2047. 

These are time spans so distant that the Albanese government cannot be held to account during the current Parliament and even the next. The Albanese government will be long gone before about 2035 when Australia will need to start tooling up for SSN-AUKUS production. 

In Sept 2022 SA Premier Opposed Virginia Deal

In a case of "back to the future" Sarah Martin, writing for The Guardian, on September 25, 2022, was spot on. I wonder what Albanese has promised South Australian Premier, Peter Malinauskas to keep Malinauskas pretty quiet?

Full link see https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/25/sa-premier-says-buying-nuclear-submarines-directly-from-us-would-degrade-australian-shipbuilding

This article is more than 5 months old

"SA premier says buying nuclear submarines directly from US would degrade Australian shipbuilding

Proposal to fast-track submarines by having them produced by US ‘would not be acceptable’, Peter Malinauskas says

Sarah Martin

@msmarto

Sun 25 Sep 2022 16.15 AEST

The South Australian premier, Peter Malinauskas, has criticised a proposal for Australia to buy nuclear submarines directly from the US, saying it would “not be acceptable” for his state to miss out on promised submarine manufacturing jobs.

A report in the Wall Street Journal on Saturday suggested the Biden administration was considering a plan with the UK and Australia to fast-track nuclear-powered submarines for Australia by the mid-2030s by producing the first few submarines in the US.

However, given existing production constraints at US shipyards, the deal would depend on Australia making a financial commitment to expand the US’s submarine-production capacity to ensure it could also meet its domestic demands.

Malinauskas told Guardian Australia that while he understood the geopolitical need for the Australian government to expedite the process, Australian workers needed to be involved in any arrangement that included the new subs being manufactured in the US.

“Clearly a South Australian workforce needs to acquire the skills to be able to build nuclear submarines and it makes sense that those skills are acquired working with the overseas partner that is already doing so,” he said.

“We accept that the commonwealth has a substantial challenge, and is responding to what is widely accepted as the most unstable geopolitical climate the nation has found itself in for some time. We accept that is a risk that’s worthy of being addressed, but a degradation of our sovereign shipbuilding capacity is inconsistent with addressing that risk.”

When asked if it would be acceptable for the Australian government to purchase submarines from the US without training an Australian workforce as part of the deal, Malinuaskas was clear.

 “No, that would not be acceptable from the state government’s perspective, because that would represent a degradation of what has been promised, and that is that these subs are being built in Australia,” he said.

“It all depends on the pathway, and that detail really matters here – not just for the economic interests of the state, but also from our sovereign submarine-building capacity, which is such a central tenet of de-risking Australia’s security position.”

How Australia intends to fill the capability gap between its existing Collins Class fleet and the new fleet of up to 12 nuclear-powered submarines is the subject of a federal government review that is due to report by March next year.

On Sunday the defence minister, Richard Marles, said the review, being undertaken by former defence minister Stephen Smith and former Australian defence force chief Angus Houston, would consider how best to fill the capability gap that would otherwise see Australia wait until the mid-2040s for new submarines.

 “What we’ve sought from the process that’s under way with Aukus right now is not simply to answer the question as to what platform we run with – although that’s clearly critical – but how soon we can get it,” Marles told Sky News.

“To the extent that there is any capability gap, if we can bring the start date forward, what is the solution to plugging that? We obviously need to have a sense of cost, and we need to make sure that what we are doing is completely compliant with our non-proliferation obligations. And we’re confident that the body of work that’s under way now will be able to answer all those questions in the first part of next year.”

Marcus Hellyer, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said that he had little sympathy for the view of the South Australian government, and the pendulum was swinging away from the defence budget being used as “a job subsidy scheme”.

“We need to have a very clear-eyed discussion about these issues and not simply say, ‘building, assembling them here is a fantastic thing, that will be wonderful’,” Hellyer said.

“It will cost more, it will take longer, you probably won’t have the industrial benefits that people say, and it will potentially have huge opportunity cost in terms of the human resources that we could be applying to sustaining the submarines.”

“We shouldn’t default to immediately building all boats here regardless of the cost and the schedule impacts of doing that.”

In a joint statement released last week to mark one year of the Aukus pact, the leaders of Australia, the UK and the US said that the group had made significant progress towards Australia acquiring conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.

“We are steadfast in our commitment to Australia acquiring this capability at the earliest possible date,” the statement said."

ENDS

Biden-PMs Meet for AUKUS 7:30AM CBA-Time: Tues, Mar 14.

U.S. Embassy Australia [Announces] 

@USEmbAustralia 

7:30 AM AEDT [Canberra Time, Tuesday, March 14th, 2023]

the President and Prime Ministers will hold [an AUKUS Submarine] trilateral

meeting at Naval Base Point Loma, San Diego, California. 8:00 AM AEDT

the President and Prime Ministers will deliver remarks on the AUKUS Partnership.