Australian government sends ASC confusing instructions

Adelaide's Independent News (IN)Daily, April 14, 2015 reported on the confusing instructions the Federal Government has been sending government owned Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC). The relevant parts of the article http://indaily.com.au/news/2015/04/14/asc-agnostic-on-subs-contract/

 are:

"ASC “agnostic” on subs contract

TOM RICHARDSON 

ADELAIDE | The Defence Department has issued an edict to Government-owned shipbuilder ASC that it must deal “fairly and equally” with all prospective international contractors for the lucrative future submarines project.

The missive, revealed today by SA Senator Nick Xenophon during a Senate committee hearing in Adelaide, belies the Abbott Government’s public rhetoric that the Osborne-based shipbuilder should pick an international partner with which to put forward a joint bid.

Defence Minister Kevin Andrews announced in February that the contract would be determined by a “competitive evaluation process”, saying “for the best opportunity to maximise their involvement in the program (ASC) needs to work with an international partner”.

Just last week, SA-based Liberal heavyweight Christopher Pyne urged Xenophon to “assist ASC in putting together a competitive bid for the new submarine project as part of a joint venture with another submarine builder”.

Xenophon today quizzed ASC representatives to the Senate inquiry into the future submarine project whether such a joint venture was actually allowed, “given your instruction from defence”.

“You can’t act on that on the basis that you’ve received quite reasonable instructions from defence to deal with prospective international bidders in an even-handed manner,” asserted Xenophon.

ASC’s chief operating officer Martin Edwards said the company’s “role at the moment is to help those potential partners understand the skills capability and where we can assist, particularly because we’ve had many decades of shipbuilding in Australia”.

He said a potential design partner would not be known until the evaluation process was completed.

“From as ASC perspective, we’re agnostic in relation to whether it’s Japan or Germany or France – we’ll work with any one of those,” Edwards said." See WHOLE ARTICLE.

COMMENT

It appears that as the German (TKMS) and French (DCNS) competitors have much greater experience than Japan in participating in major defence consortiums the Australian Government does not want to put Japan at the disadvantage of facing actual competition. Put another way the Government does not want ASC to choose an international partner on that partner's merits. The Government wants Japan's special position in the so-called "competitive" evaluation maintained.

Of course the Australia Government's hands are tied. The US has already selected Japan to win the "competitive evaluation process" and what the US says goes.

Pete

Pace of India's nuclear submarine program, Arihant, Chakra.

Perhaps a minimally doctored August 2014 photo of INS Arihant. It shares similarities with Russia's latest, minimally humped, Borei class SSBN and the preceding very humped, sail planed, Russian Delta SSBN.

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Minimally humped, Borei class SSBN 

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A very humped Delta II class SSBN with sail planes like Arihant.

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MISSION

On April 5, 2015 I was tasked by "lachit" to assess India's nuclear submarine state of play:

"India needs to get her nuclear subs SSBN & SSN & SSGN up running pronto. Can you guess which subs will ultimately take over the role of SSGN? I would surely like to know your personal opinion on the capabilities of Arihant sub. Thanks

On April 8, 2015 (and in the same thread) Biswajit Pattanaik augmented my tasking with the preamble:

@"lachit" my bet will be on S2/ARIHANT,S3 &S4 SSBNs that they will be converted into SSGNs. This will happen when in the future the better & the bigger SSBNs i.e. S5,S6 & S7 comes into service.

Hi Pete,

Just want to add something about Future Indian SSNs. According to me either Indian Navy could go with a Barracuda based SSN or even a Scorpene based SSN just like the Brazilians Sn-BR SSN. What's your take on this?"

RESPONSE

To which I respond:

You entrust me with grave responsibilities :) My personal response, is:

I've followed INS Arihant's publically available information since it was launched in June 2009. At the launch ceremony (then) Prime Minister Singh thanked the Russians implicitly for their ongoing assistance on the submarine reactors on "S-1" and S-2.

S-1 is the half submarine reactor test rig at Kalpakkam (India's southeast coast, just south of Chennai)

S-2 is INS Arihant itself (undergoing trials - may never be operational).
S-3 is INS Aridhaman (under construction at the Shipbuilding Centre Visakhapatnam (India's east coast)) probable launch perhaps late 2015 or in 2016 - will be the defacto first of class SSBN initially with K-15s.
S-4 no name yet (under construction Shipbuilding Centre Vadodara prior to launch perhaps in 2017)

Arihant was/is only intended as a technology demonstrator (particularly for the reactor) a bit like the USS Nautilus rather than a serious first of class. Unlike the Nautilus there has been no list of Arihant's nuclear sub achievements eg. long submerged range or endurance. This makes me suspicious that Arihant has had major problems with its reactor functioning - the major new piece of technology. The need for security - away from prying Pak or Chinese craft - may be another reason for avoiding long semi-public sea voyages.

The delays in Arihant seem to have increased unrealistic expectations that it could be an operational submarine design.

The distinction between SSN's and new-build SSGN's (G for guided missile) is largely historical and decidedly Russian. The distinction mainly rested on the first SSN's being only horizontal torpedo tube armed and very much orientated to torpedos and mines with few or no missiles. 

Over the last 20 years SSN-SSGN distinctions have become clouded  as horizontally launched missiles have become a major component of an SSN's armament. An even more fundamental structural change has been Vertical Launch Systems for most new build SSNs (be they Akulas, Yasens, later Los Angeles and Virginia class). Therefore new build SSGN's have been merged into "SSN" or in the case of the Yasen "multi-purpose". I think India will be building "multi-purpose SSNs" in the direction of the Chakra class (Akula II) rather than separate SSN and SSGN designations. However, Arihant may evolve into the only SSGN and specialising in missile tests, rather than being an actual new build SSGN.

Advances in missiles' range mean that even SSN fired cruise missile have (or will have) the range to hit anywhere in Pakistan while land launched Agni IIIs (with a light warhead load) can hit anywhere in China. Agni III's will be supplemented by K-4 SLBMs in around a decade. 

It would be tidy for India to have a firm build schedule for nuclear subs S3 through S7 but I think India's build schedule is still under development and heavily dependent on Russian advice - in exchange for India paying excessive amounts for Russian arms (effectively subsidization). Also India has unique geography and needs that submarine types can be iteratively evolved around. India is not the US or Russia than can afford 10 new SSBNs and 20-40 new missile armed SSNs. Multi purpose Indian designs may become a substantial component.

The initial Indian SSNs, if they stay at the Arihant class' displacement of 6,000 tons (surfaced) will be underpowered unless they have an uprated reactor (maybe 130 MW). This may take some years to achieve. The reactor in the Chakra/Akula is an obvious item to study. As the study of reactor safety takes decades I suspect that Russian advisers are on hand towards the rear of the Chakra and Arihant.

An SSBN version of the Arihant appears to have the right sized reactor if the speed specifications are accurate.

Rather than Arihant and follow on subs being influenced by French nuclear submarines (like the Barracuda) I think Russia's Delta class and Borei subs are already a strong influence. India was, and I assume still is, extraordinarily committed to two Chakra/Akula IIs. India appeared to cross subsidise Russia nuclear sub building program in the long years Chakra/Akula was being built when Russia was crying out for defence money.

Much patience is needed tracking India's nuclear sub program. Unlike the 10+% of Russian and US GDP's that resulted in rapid nuclear sub program gains in the 1950s-60s India is only spending around 2.5% GDP on defence (according to Stockholm SIPRI stats). This is not a breakout amount for rapid increases in numbers or models. India's nuclear sub program also faces competition from the probably highest priority Agni IRBM-ICBM program and from India's conventional military priorities.

The launch of INS Aridhaman, perhaps later this year, will be the next major step.

Please connect with India's Rising Nuclear and Conventional Submarine Force, May 21, 2015 http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/05/indias-rising-nuclear-and-conventional.html .

Pete

Russian Submarine Fire - Orel Perhaps a Write-Off?

A photo (Courtesy of Pravda) released later on April 8, 2015 indicates a much more serious fire on the Orel (Oscar II class) submarine than Russian media were prepared to reveal earlier in the day.
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UPDATE AS AT APRIL 9, 2015

A Pravda article released late April 8, 2015 provides much more information on the Orel submarine fire (and a bit of anti-US propaganda) than news articles earlier on April 8.

The Pravda article "Fire on board Orel nuclear submarine causes major damage" reported http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/08-04-2015/130224-orel_nuclear_submarine-0/ :

"The fire sparked during welding works...

 "The Orel submarine's "underwater displacement is about 25 thousand tons, and surface displacement - 22 thousand tons."

"...Cruise missiles torpedoes and all aggressive liquids - turbine oil and diesel fuel had been removed from the submarine as well. " 

[Propaganda wise] "According to Mikhailov, such fires happen very often, especially on US submarines. The Americans even took lessons from us on how to ensure the survivability of a vessel ship in a state of repair."

[What was on fire]"...the fire occurred during welding works between the outer and the pressure hull in the area of the aft compartment 9. The rubberized anti-noise insulation caught fire. The sonar coating on the submarine is at the top of the outer hull. There was a thinner layer of rubber between the outer and the pressure hull. Such things occur frequently during hot works, and it is not clear why such a fuss in connection with the ignition," the correspondent said. ...A part of the crew remained on board the submarine to prevent the fire from spreading inside the hull. Eight fire brigades of Zvezdochka Shipyard took part in the operation to extinguish the fire.

"...it was not an emergency situation." 

"However, a criminal case was filed into the fire on board the Orel nuclear sub. The case was filed in accordance with Art. 216 of the Criminal Code - "violation of safety regulations during the works that entailed major damage by negligence.""

[However] "To extinguish the fire, it was decided to flood the dock, in which the submarine was staying. 

According to most recent reports, the fire on board the Orel submarine caused the damage of more than 100 million rubles [US$1.87 million]. the fire damaged the descent and ascent systems of the submarine." See WHOLE PRAVDA ARTICLE 

COMMENT

While the Pravda report is part titled "major damage" with eight fire brigades attending, that "it was not an emergency situation" is unconvincing. Pravda does however attempt to explain where the damage occurred.

In terms of the cost of the damage Pravda says it is more 100 million rubles (US$1.87 million).

As - the Orel displaces around "22 thousand tons" (Surfaced) it is very large and would have cost a great amount for Russia to build with Russia's limited defence budget. The Russian Navy now has only 4 active Oscars. All this means time in dry dock rather than at sea (an opportunity cost) is very expensive. 

Perhaps the extra repair time may be 2 years making Orel non-operational until 2018. A damage and non-operational bill not $2 million but $200 million might be more accurate.

Another issue is the seawater time of the Orel's hull. It was launched in 1992 pointing to a 2022-2025  use-by date. The prospect of a relaunch in 2018 may now make further work on the Orel uneconomic, perhaps rendering the Orel a write-off. This is all up to the Russian Navy's accident assessors, Russia's declining national (oil dependent) budget and perhaps the pride of Putin.

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REPORTED APRIL 8, 2015 BELOW

There appears to be a tightly packed collection of shipping around the submarine on fire. Wouldn't they be at fire or at least smoke risk? Perhaps  authorities moved ships around the sub on fire to reduce the number of embarrassing photos?
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Reuters (carried in the SMH) reported April 8, 2015: "[Russian RIA] news agency reports said the fire [on the Oscar II class submarine Orel]  had started near the stern during welding work that caused insulation materials to catch fire. RIA quoted a well-informed source as saying it was proving hard to put out the blaze because of thick smoke.

"At the moment they are 'attacking' with foam to try to put out the fire but it's not having any effect. Because of this they are considering whether to fully submerge the whole dock under water," the source said."

Note commentary of this Youtube includes "authorities accused of hiding information" in the past.

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Although "80 firefighters and 20 fire trucks were involved in the work to extinguish the fire" Russian authorities claim after "preliminary inspections of the “Oryol”, no important infrastructure was damaged".

COMMENT

The Russian authorities are clearly taking pains to minimise the seriousness of the fire. 

An alternate theory, to the fire starting with insulating material, is that the welding set fumes from the backup batteries alight. Even nuclear subs have batteries. Battery fumes are a more common cause of submarine fire than merely insulating material.

Pete

Submarine Steel Strength, China and Japan.

High-strength steel welding, monitoring and other functions are now highly automated including  computer dependent, particularly in well established assembly lines. (Photo courtesy Design News and Bosch Rexroth)

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This present article continues discussions first raised in Soryu Submarine Steel Details - Japan Offer to Australia of January 20, 2015 and then raised in comments on previous articles over the last week.

Japan is particularly concerned that defence exports to customers/allies might increase the chances that Japan's submarine secrets (including its hull steel characteristics, cutting and welding techniques) might pass to potential enemies. A particular threat is passage of secrets to China. Particular concerns are China's ability to reverse engineer or develop counter-actions against allied weapons like the F-35.

Regarding the specific and sensitive issue of the operational depth of submarines. This depth is not soley dependent on the steel strength estimates discussed below. There are so many other determining factors including weld strength and hull structure.

Noone knows operational or crush depth except designers and naval officers who operate the submarines. Detailed computer simulation and materials testing is required to calculate pressure distribution on submarine hulls. 

Chinese submarines appear to be rapidly improving. Chinese submarines used to be clearly inferior to US or Japanese submarines, but now, the situation is changing. Ignorance of such rapid changes  makes people too optimistic. The latest Chinese subs may be superior to Collins subs at least in hull strength. Australian and Japanese hull strengths therefore need to be improved. 

Documentary Comparisons of Chinese and Japanese Submarine Steel Strengths

Chinese submarine hulls appear to made of "980 steel" with a yield strength of 800 MPa. China's "980" and Japans NS 80 are nearly the same. Their chemical components and mechanical strengths are very similar - see http://www.mod.go.jp/trdi/data/pdf/G/G3111C.pdf , page 3, table 3, chemical composition (NS80E) 4.2.1 left column.

See the following document: Shanghai Jiaotong University, School of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering's, "High Crack Propagation of Steel 980 Welded Joiont under Spectrum Load” (Chinese), http://image02w.seesaawiki.jp/d/e/doramarine/16dc6f08dbd1d96c.pdf

Page 5, “ 2.2 Fatigue Testing indicates:

“Test material for high-strength structural steel submarine 980 steel welded joints. 980 steel (VHD402), yield strength σs> = 800MPa, China developed high strength, high toughness, can be welded with a submarine pressure hull.” See Page 5, Table 1 Chemical component (Steel and Weld for upper and lower rows respectively), Table 2 Mechanical Property (ibid).

 Using conversion site http://www.convertunits.com/from/psi/to/MPa  800 MPa = 116,030 psi = "HY-116".

Returning to G3111C.pdf

Soryu Submarine Steel Details - Japan Offer to Australia of January 20, 2015 very briefly describes  http://www.mod.go.jp/trdi/data/pdf/G/G3111C.pdf ,  Within that document see page 4, table 4.2.1 left column, which seems to indicate the Soryu has Japanese naval steel measure NS80 = 80kgf/mm2 which converts to 113,760 lbf/in2 or HY-114.

So assuming the translations and conversions are correct China's use of HY-116 steel is very similar to the Soryu's HY-114.

Soryu Submarine Steel Details - Japan Offer to Australia also discusses NS110 which may also be used in the Soryu. NS110 means 110kgf/mm2 proof stress converting to 156,414 lbf/in2 or HY-156 . HY-156 using simple linear calculations allow the Soryu an operating depth of just over 600 metres.

Conclusion

It has to be pointed out, however, that operational depth is not soley dependent on steel strength. There are so many other determining factors including weld strength and hull structure.

Noone knows a submarine's operational or crush depth except designers and naval officers who operate the submarines. Detailed computer simulation and materials testing is also required to calculate pressure distribution on submarine hulls. 

Anonymous and Pete

More evidence Australia's Soryu Choice based on US-Australia-Japan Alliance Considerations

General Martin Dempsey (on right) Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin (at left), Australian Chief of the Defence Force, meet at RAN base HMAS Watson in Sydney, February, 23, 2015. 

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The following Reuters article confirms that non-tender factors such as the US preferences and what are assumed to be “common values” between Australia and Japan will heavily influence Australia's future submarine choice. Retired Vice Admiral Yoji Koda’s advocacy of most Soryus being built in Australia may amount to little compared to the views of Prime Ministers Abe and Abbott, MHI and KHI.

The article is a good summary of the key issues in Australia’s “competitive” evaluation process. I’ve included and bolded important sections. The article is by Matt Siegel, Reuters, April 1, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/02/australia-submarines-usa-idUSL3N0WX17A20150402:

“Washington's regional ambitions centre stage in Australian submarine tender

“…The qualitative difference between the [Japanese, German and French] submarines on offer was negligible, Rex Patrick, a former advisor to the previous defence minister and a submarine expert, told Reuters.

"All these guys build a good submarine. It will be factors other than capability which determines who wins," he said, partly referring to Washington's geo-strategic goals in Asia.

“…Japan had been the frontrunner to replace Australia's ageing Collins-class submarines with an off-the-shelf version of its 4,000-tonne Soryu-class vessel after Prime Minister Tony Abbott agreed to cooperate on military technology with Abe [in June 2014].

“…U.S. officials insist they are not pressing Australia to buy any particular submarine but say they see benefits from the interoperability of the Japanese option.

During a visit to Australia in February, General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the decision was one Australia would have to make on its own "for any number of domestic and international reasons".

But Dempsey also cited "interoperability" among allies as a key factor, although experts at the conference noted that submarines built by Germany and France, both NATO members, can communicate with U.S. vessels.

Still, Washington's view is that the Japanese submarine is technically superior to any European-made vessel, and will allow for the integration of more U.S. technology, a senior U.S. military source told Reuters.

"If they want to do it right, it is a Japanese hull and propulsion plant, with a U.S. combat system and ISR package," he said, using an acronym for the various types of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sensors like sonar and radar used on U.S. submarines.

‘…One notable Japanese participant at the [Sub Summit], retired Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, told Reuters that Japanese-Australian cooperation on the submarine deal would ensure countries in the Asia-Pacific with common values such as democracy also shared a common defence capability.

"The key point is not exporting our equipment on an industrial basis, but to be more strategic," added Koda, who also said Tokyo should be flexible and build most of the vessels in Australia, which would make the deal politically more palatable for Abbott.

Until now, sources had said Japan was reluctant to engage in a tender partly to avoid getting embroiled in a bidding war.

Japanese industry is also seen as wary of undertaking significant construction in Australia because of concerns about its sensitive submarine technology, including its stealthy propulsion system and advanced welding techniques. (Additional reporting by David Alexander in WASHINGTON and Tim Kelly in TOKYO; Editing by Dean Yates).” See WHOLE Reuters article.

COMMENT

The article confirms the alliance and US preference points I made when reporting on the "Sub Summit" Adelaide, late March 2014 and much earlier in Australia - the future junior ally of Japan, February 2, 2015.

Pete

Chinese Type 093A or 093G SSN armed with YJ-18 Carrier Killer Missiles

What may be 3 Chinese Type 093A/093G SSN or SSGN submarines. An obviously blurry photo of a clarity far below military satellite standards. Nothing as clear as "reading a car's number plate". 

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What may be a Chinese 093A/093G SSN or SSGN submarine with a vertical launch system with two types of missile [?] and pump jet propulsion.

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Probably one of China's older model Type 093 "Shang" class SSNs.

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Depiction of a Klub-Sizzler submarine launched missile which may be similar to China's YJ-18 anti-ship missile.

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Ecns of China reported April 3, 2015 a new version of China's Type 093 (NATO "Shang class") SSN. The new version is variously named Type 093A or 093G. The ability of 093A/093G to mount vertically launched YJ-18 anti-ship missiles may cause the 093A/093G to be called an SSGN. There  seem to be no reliable photos of the YJ-18.

If the longer length and other differences of the Type 093A/093Gs are accurate it is possible China may eventually rename them Type 095s. The 095 is expected to feature unobservable features including an advanced reactor, lower acoustic signature and the visible VLS tubes (with VLS noted on the 093As/093Gs).

Just a note of caution that the 093A/093G reports seem to rely on 3rd or 4th hand Taiwanese sources in the information loop. The message that 093A/093Gs with their missiles are "carrier killers" of course worries the US. A message that directs more US military attention weapons-money-opportunities to Taiwan is beneficial to Taiwan. Taiwan definitly needs US help to pressure some country to help Taiwan build or acquire four new submarines.

Application of the term "carrier killer" to the YJ-18 should not imply that the YJ-18 is a new threat. There may be many similarities between the 093A/093G's YJ-18 anti-ship missile and the BrahMos, Yakhont or Klub-Sizzler. Significantly the Klub-Sizzler has already been fitted by Russia to China's 12 Russian built Kilo class submarines. Now China is taking the evolutionary (no game-changing) step of fitting Klub equivalents (YJ-18s) to faster moving and longer submerged Type 093A/093Gs.

All this missile activity is not a major departure from conventional and nuclear propelled submarines pre-existing torpedos capabilities - with torpedos being able to "kill"/destroy carriers and other major warships.

The YJ-18 may also owe some design attributes to the YJ-12 "a supersonic Chinese anti-ship missile developed in the 1990s".

Comment - while the YJ-18 sounds like an awesome weapon the hierarchical autonomy, tactics and efficiency of their human operators are very important. The human element is often mistakenly disregarded. How smoothly the YJ-18s fit into China's broader network of anti-shipping sensors is also a consideration.

The report from Ecns of China, April 3, 2015 has the string http://www.ecns.cn/military/2015/04-03/160484.shtml and is below  .

[Chinese PLA] "Navy to get 3 new nuclear subs

   

2015-04-03 09:07China DailyEditor: Si Huan

Three cutting-edge nuclear-powered attack submarines have been manufactured and will soon be commissioned by the Chinese navy, according to media reports.

China Central Television showed a satellite picture earlier this week of three submarines anchored at an unidentified port [see first picture above - very blurry], saying the vessels are China's most advanced Type-093G nuclear-powered attack submarines, just completed by a Chinese shipyard and a waiting delivery.

With a teardrop hull, the submarine is longer than its predecessor, the Type-093, and has a vertical launching system, the report said.

Another article carried by the People's Liberation Army navy's website said the Type-093G's wing-shaped cross-section [?] is designed to improve speed and mobility as well as reduce noise, and that the vertical launcher is capable of delivering the country's latest YJ-18 supersonic anti-ship missile.

China established its nuclear-powered submarine force in the early 1970s but had never shown it to the outside world until 2009, when two nuclear submarines took part in a parade marking the 60th anniversary of the PLA navy's founding.

The Type-093G is reported to be an upgraded version of Type-093, China's second-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, which entered active service several years ago.

Cui Yiliang, editor-in-chief of Modern Ships magazine, said: "Though China was comparatively late in developing advanced nuclear-powered submarines such as the Type-093G, we used a lot of the most cutting-edge technologies and equipment on our submarines, enabling them to compete with their foreign counterparts."

He noted that China has researched the vertical launching system for many years and has installed it on other submarines and surface ships.

"Judging from the vessel's design, the Type-093G should have strong anti-ship and counter-submarine capabilities," said Yin Zhuo, a senior expert with the navy. "It is also likely to be upgraded with the capability of striking land targets with cruise missiles in the near future."

He added that the navy has formed a reliable logistics system for its nuclear submarine fleet.
Liu Jiangping, a naval equipment expert in Beijing who had served in the PLA navy for decades, said the vessel's vertical launching system enables the submarine to launch long-distance strikes from underwater, increasing the vessel's survivability in war.

The strategic force of the PLA navy now has about four nuclear-powered Type-094 ballistic missile submarines, up to six Type-093 nuclear-powered attack submarines and about three old Type-091 nuclear-powered attack submarines, CCTV quoted foreign media reports as saying.[note the report of six 093's may be Taiwanese deception. Wikipedia (see its sidebar) based on US DoD reports reported only 2 active 093s in June 2014. Wikipedia's sidebar agrees there are 3 active 091s however ].  
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Another report, from Deagel.com, last updated February 4, 2015, goes into much more detail on the YJ-18 anti-ship missile. The similarity to BrahMos, Yakhont or Klub-Sizzler in function is obvious. The report's string is http://www.deagel.com/Anti-Ship-Missiles/YJ-18_a002884001.aspx :

"YJ-18 [Missile]

Description:

The YingJi-18 (YJ-18 or Eagle/Hawk-18) is a vertically-launched, long-range, supersonic, sea-skimming anti-ship missile designed by China to kill US Navy's Aegis-equipped destroyers or its equivalents provided to Japan, South Korea or European Navies. The YJ-18 is planned for deployment by the newest People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Type 052D class destroyers and subsequently may be incorporated into existing destroyers and submarines as part of a modernization effort. Its guidance system consists of an advanced inertial navigation, maybe backed by the Beidou Chinese GPS, plus an active radar seeker in the terminal phase. Besides, a built-in data link allows the carrier ship to update the target's location. The Aegis-killer missile existence was first reported in 2013 with an entry into service expected by 2014 or later.

The YJ-18 missile is equipped with a 300 kg high explosive (HE) warhead capable of taking out a destroyer-sized ship. The HE warhead can be replaced by an anti-radiation/electromagnetic pulse warhead that is said can take down up to 60 percent of the enemy ship's electronic systems at a range of 50 meters after detonating. After the vertical launch the missile's turbojet engine is capable of flying at a cruise speed of Mach 0.8 for about 180 kilometers after that point the warhead section separates and a solid rocket engine ignites allowing at a top speed of Mach 2.5-3 for about 40 kilometers. The missile can maneuver at 10G acceleration to avoid enemy interception by air-to-air or surface-air missiles. The missile design and performance is very similar to Russia's 3M54E [Klub-Sizzler] which may have been the template for the YJ-18."

Pete