Brazil's New Submarine Program (ProSub) and Australia - March 2015 Update

See Guanabara Bay (Baia de Guanabara) to the right of central Rio. Guanabara Bay is the home of Brazil's current submarine base. To the left of Rio is Sepetiba Bay (Baia de Sepetiba). Brazil's new submarine base-shipyard complex at Port Itaguaí, 80 km west of Rio. The creation of the new base is due to base growth, environmental and population concerns including dangers from stored ammunition and the remote possibility of nuclear reactor leakage.

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Please link with: Brazil's Future SSN -DCNS Assistance - Australian Interest? of January 5, 2014.

Brazil's Future Submarine Program (ProSub) Comparison with Australia's

Brazil's decision to build its own submarines is, of course, relevant to the submarine building aspirations of many in Australia. Australia's experience in the 1980s and 90s was similar in that it built its current submarines, the Collins, in Australia just as Brazil built its current Tupi class, in Brazil. A difference now is that Australia aims to have its new submarines built overseas while Brazil is building its Scorpenes in Brazil.

Another difference from Australian is that the fifth and last Brazilian submarine will be nuclear propelled - known as SN-BR. Going nuclear propelled is a major financial and technical risk for Brazil. A roughly comparable case is India's development of its indigenously built INS Arihant. Arihant has been developed with probably closer Russian support than France intends for Brazil. Still India has found that Arihant's reactor has been more problematic than expected with consequent delays in fully running the reactor.

India's experience is also a reminder to Australia that if Australia wanted nuclear propulsion it is probably best for Australia to buy or "lease" complete SSNs from the US rather than evolving indigenous solutions. Arihant is unlikely to be India's last developmental submarine. SN-BR may not be Brazil's last. If SN-BR is based on France's Rubis-Amethyste class SSN that may save Brazil much time and cost. Still much depends on foreign policy outlook. Brazil and India are basically non-aligned while Australia is very dependent on and aligned with the US.

A further difference between Brazil and Australia is that Brazil is pursuing a lower (conventional Scorpene) and high (SN-BR) capability strategy while Australia has restricted itself to a "medium" strategy of an unusually capable conventional submarine.

A similarity between Australia and Brazil is the need to move the submarine base. Australia moved its submarines from (HMAS Platypus) in Sydney from the 1980s to HMAS Stirling (Rockingham, Western Australia). There were several reasons for Australia's decision including the desire to host nuclear submarines of Australia's allies away from a (or the) major city. Implicitly Rockingham also offered the option of being the base for Australian nuclear submarines.

Returning to Brazil - Port Itaguaí shipyard and base is being constructed by the Sociedade de Proposito Especifico (SPE) consortium, which includes Brazil’s Odebrecht (50%), France’s DCNS (49%) and the Brazilian Navy (1% “golden share,” with veto power).

There are many question marks (?) that follow due to language differences, repetition in official sources and much old information in secondary sources. In French and Portuguese Submarine Program is reversed to Program Submarine, hence ProSub. With base-shipbuilding facilities now (fully?) established actual submarine building has commenced.

Brazil's new Conventional Submarines

Four of the five new submarines will be enlarged (75 m long, 2000 tons displacement) Scorpenes of DCNS design "CM-2000" and ProSub designation "S-Br". Brazil's Scorpenes may well have a crew of up to 45 and 18 torpedos or missiles. It is unclear whether these Scorpenes will have AIP(?). The hull of the first Scorpene (Riachuelo) was laid down at Cherbourg, France on 27 May 2010 and flown in prefabricated sections ("jumboized") by Airbus to Brazil in late 2012. Sections (including steel fabrication) for the next three Scorpenes are being made in Brazil.

No.     Name            Laid down               Launched      Commissioned   Based

S40     Riachuelo       27 May 2010              maybe 2018      maybe 2019             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

S41     Humaitá         1 Sept 2013                 maybe 2020      maybe 2021             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

S42     Tonelero         maybe 2015                maybe 2021      maybe 2022             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

S43     Angostura       maybe 2017                maybe 2022      maybe 2023             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

Brazilian Nuclear Submarine (SN-BR)

Due to non-proliferation and broader political sensitivities DCNS and Brazil claim that DCNS will not actually help Brazil place the reactor in SN-BR. This claim may be somewhat disputed due to the reactor being of partly French design and SN-BR perhaps being based on the French Barracuda SSN. Training of some Brazilian crew on French SSNs is likely - on Rubis-Amethyste SSNs and/or Barracudas.

No.        Name                  Laid down          Launched         Commissioned    Based 

SN10    Álvaro Alberto     maybe 2023        maybe 2030       maybe 2035         Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

Brazil has medium-long term plans for 5-6 further SSNs if Álvaro Alberto is successful.  

There currently appears to be expectations that SN-BR will be around 100m long and 9m wide. This coincides with France's Barracuda SSN dimensions of: 99.5m long and beam: 8.8m. The Barracuda , when launched around 2018-19 will be 4,765 tons (surfaced) and 5,300 tons (submerged). Therefore the future SN-BR may have a similar displacement when launched around 2030. The broader Brazilian nuclear submarine program involves Brazil's aim to fully enrich and shaping uranium for placement in the submarine reactor.

In 1979 the Brazilian military government of the day created a secret program to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle outside international safeguards. Under the Brazilian navy’s special projects commission (COPESP), the program initially focused on developing a small light-water reactor for submarine propulsion and an indigenous uranium-enrichment capability using gas centrifuges. COPESP began construction of a pilot enrichment plant at the Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó (São Paulo state) in 1987. At the inauguration of the plant, authorities said the facility would produce low-enriched uranium (5 percent enrichment) for existing power and research reactors and for nuclear submarine reactors. [Pete's Comment - 5% enriched Uranium seems very low energy intensity for a submarine reactor. 5% may have been a notional figure to satisfy non-proliferation regulators if the program was exposed.]

Under the 1991 Brazilian-Argentine peaceful use of nuclear energy "Guadalajara" Agreement. Article III states that “none of the provisions of the present Agreement shall limit the right of the Parties to use nuclear energy for the propulsion of any type of vehicle, including submarines, since propulsion is a peaceful application of nuclear energy."

From around 2010 the currently proposed(?) reactor is known as  2131-R Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). France assisted in the reactor design, but the reactor itself will be built in Brazil (?). An earlier NTI article (first paragraph) talked of  land-based test reactor RENAP-11 (of 11 MW), which may not yet have been developed. The submarine reactor itself may be of 48 MW noting that the French Rubis-Amethyste class SSN used a PWR reactor known as the K48 with an output of 48 MW. The Rubis weighs 2,400 tons (surfaced). At the upper end of the French scale the Barracuda SSN of 5,000 tons will have a 150 MW reactor. 150 MW would be very ambitious for a first generation indigenous submarine - noting India's INS Arihant publically relies on a 83 MW reactor.

Brazil has probably gone beyond the following description. Currently, Brazil mines and perhaps buys some uranium, converts it into yellowcake. The yellowcake is shipped from Brazil to Canada for enrichment using the hexafluoride gas method. The gas (?) is then shipped to Europe for enrichment by the US-UK-Dutch-German Urenco Group.

In December 2014 it was reported "A demonstration plant was built at the Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó (São Paulo state), which remains a naval facility to provide fuel enriched [by hexafluoride gas cascade] to less than 20% for the submarine program. Currently enrichment here is reported to be to 5% U-235." "less than 20%" enriched is stated because more than 20% enriched is considered Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) which is considered a heightened nuclear proliferation concern. Brazil and France do not want to push things by venturing into political pressures from non-nuclear neighbours or from legal nuclear weapon states like Russia and the US.

Artist's impression of Brazil's new Submarine Program (ProSub) Base and Shipbuilding facility at Port Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay. Brazil's decision to build its own submarines of French-DCNS designs is, of course relevant, to the submarine building aspirations of many in Australia. 

Current Brazilian Submarines

Brazil's currently has five TKMS Type 209s commissioned 1989-2006 and designated the Tupi Class. Four were built in Brazil. It is unclear whether the first of class, BNS Tupi (commissioned 1989) is still active(?). They are based at Guanabara Bay, Rio Base Naval Almirante Castro e Silva (see first NTI paragraph).

Value to Brazil of Submarines

Brazil’s submarines are seen as a key part of the country’s national defence strategy which includes protection of Brazil’s offshore energy reserves, protecting the Amazon's fresh water and countering great power nuclear submarine supremacy (including that of the US). Nuclear submarine supremacy became a major issue when Britain's SSNs totally dominated (Brazil's neighbour) Argentina's Navy in the 1982 Falklands War. SN-BR can more effectively monitor (remaining submerged longer) and neutralize naval forces - as it can patrol a wider area more quickly.
The nuclear submarine project, because of the dual-use nature of its reactor development and uranium enrichment, has been touted as holding the promise of enhancing both civilian and military exports.
Nuclear propulsion also contributes to Brazil's great power aspirations - short of actually building nuclear weapons.

Sources 

The following sources are useful although there is much repetition and it is unclear what is old and what is current information. Therefore there are many question marks (?).  Comments from Brazilian readers are welcome to fill in the blanks :) 

The website http://www.defesanet.com.br/prosub/ contains a wealth of updates on ProSub.  

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-france-in-deal-for-ssks-ssn-05217/  

For the World Nuclear Association's report, updated March 2015, see “Nuclear Power in Brazil” http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Brazil/

Drawn from USNI http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-06/why-does-brazil-need-nuclear-submarines

Pete

Mystery of the Major Explosion near a US Carrier - Solved

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Another view.

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I asked commenters whether this remarkable, undoctored photo was a near miss on a US Nimitz class carrier by one of China's DF-21D anti-ship "carrier killer" ballistic missiles?

The mystery is solved. China is blameless as no missile was fired and none missed.

In the comments section:

Vigilis advised: "Normally the first ship in a class, in this case [USS Nimitz (CVN-68)], would be shock tested prior to deployment. However, Nimitz was never tested and the testing fell to [USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)].

This was in mostly in accord with the link provided by Anonymous http://breakingdefense.com/2014/01/top-tester-tells-navy-to-test-carrier-destroyer-defenses-with-real-missiles-explosions/ . 

I mainly used the last few paragraphs of the link to reflect possible reasons why USS Theodore Roosevelt was shock tested and not USS Nimitz. Reasons include:

-  shock testing takes time and money -  particularly time. If the US Navy has tested the Nimitz itself, it would take months more to enter service at a time when the carrier fleet was too small, mainly conventionally propelled and too old to perform all its roles.

-  testing the Nimitz carried more technical risk because it was first of class. On the other hand testing the Roosevelt, which had a longer technical track record built on years of experience with the Nimitz, involved lower technical risk and more clarity in the test results. So shock testing is placed on the second of class or even later.

-  another major reason to shock test the Roosevelt first and not the Nimitz first was that unlike the  Nimitz the Roosevelt and all succeeding Nimitz class carriers were built using modular construction. So the Roosevelt was probably more typical of the whole Nimitz class than the Nimitz itself.

“Daffy D” indicates hands on experience in commenting:

“...The ship Teddy Roosevelt is undergoing Shock Trials. I think it was 1987. How do I know? Because I used to be part of a team that did such trials. My job: set up the mitigations and get the environmental clearances. Cheers”

Anonymous (of March 7, 2015 at 11:08 PM) provided a RT ("Russia Today") article which gave useful coverage of the carrier Roosevelt's embarrassing exercise "sinking" by a French SSN.

The RT article article carried an excellent Youtube http://youtu.be/ogmVzCqkTAI of the effects of a shock-trial on those aboard the destroyer USS Winston S. Churchill. The effects indicated why a ship chosen for a shock-trial takes months to recover.

Thanks All

Regards

Pete

Misleading advice to US Congress on Chinese Submarine Numbers?

The US Navy has used 13 Chinese MING-class (Type 33 to 35A) training submarines (based on the German Type XXI U-Boat, 1945) to boost the Chinese submarine fleet to a threatening "more than 60" which means 61.

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The US Navy and the Pentagon have always been totally truthful in their advice to Congress or that is the ideal, anyway.   

The latest example are comments of a senior US Admiral in late February 25, 2015 who said  “[China's] submarine force has grown over a tremendous rate. They now have more diesel and nuclear attack submarines than we have so they’ve passed us in total quantity - but in quality they are still not there,”  

"but in quality they are still not there” is correct.  

Admiral M's use of flowery language - particularly China is building some "fairly amazing submarines" - should put any cynical politician on guard. 

So how many submarines does China have? The answer from the Pentagon is "more than 60"

The Pentagon's Annual Report to Congress: China Report 2014 (ever after called China Report 2014) reported on Page 7 "more than 60 submarines" and on Pages 7-8 actual submarines types and quantities were identified - which were less than 60. These were: 

-  3 JIN-class (Type 094) second generation SSBN. The JL-2 SLBM's are still being tested and PLAN doctrine suggests the JL-2s are not usually carried, for security and political reasons. 

-  2 SHANG-class (Type 093) second generation SSNs are in service,

-  4 HAN-class (Type 091) "aging" first generation SSNs  . These rely on 1960s technology. China Report 2014 does not specify numbers. However only 5 were built of which at least 1 is considered decommissioned.

-   12 YUAN-class SSP (called Type 039A or Type 041) as the 039A has very little resemblance to the 039 it is commonly referred to as the Type 041. The Type 039A/041 possibly has Stirling Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) sold to China by Sweden

-  13 SONG-class SS (Type 039)

-  12 KILO-class submarines acquired from Russia in the 1990s and 2000s

The China Report 2014 only details 46 submarines. 

Question: So how is "more than 60" derived?

Answer: reach 61 Chinese submarines (presumably) by adding:

-  13 MING-class (Type 033 to 035A). These are 1950's technology that are not mentioned in China Report 2014. They are used by China for training only. These are totally obsolete, being closely based on the 70 year old Russian ROMEO-class which in turn were based on Germany's Type XXI U-Boat of World War Two. Two of them may now be going to the navy of Bangladesh. Figure of 13 here. MINGs may be equivalent to US post-war GUPPY uprades. and

-  2  XIA-class (Type 092) SSBNs. They are 1970s technology and also are not mentioned in China Report 2014. One may be active. The other is considered lost in an accident.

So "more than 60" means 61. One of those 61 (a XIA) may be permanenetly submerged and two MINGs might soon be gifted to Bangladesh - hence 58 on publically known figures - and that is a stretch. 

Meanwhile "A spokeswoman said the U.S. Navy had 71 commissioned U.S. submarines." 

It should be left to the reader to assess whether Admiral M and the China Report 2014 are accurate or misleading.

FURTHER ANALYSIS

There is a vast gulf in quality and also availability of the US’s 52 all nuclear propelled attack submarines (SSNs) verses China’s 6 SSNs and 50 diesel-electric (SSKs). The US has paid a much higher price for nuclear submarines because they are of much higher quality overall than conventionally propelled submarines.

It is hard to measure quality but such measures like generation, displacement and crew size would be indicative.

Within the US submarine service the average US attack sub would be 5th Generation nuclear Los Angeles http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles-class_submarine of:

- 6,000 tons surfaced

- combined Blue/Gold crew size 2 x 130 = 260, giving it at least twice the availability of a one crew Chinese sub.

The average Chinese attack sub is 2nd generation diesel/electric Song Class http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_039_submarine .

- probably 2,000 tons surfaced

- crew of 60.

In terms of number of US attack subs this US Navy Fact File of August 2014  http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4100&tid=100&ct=4

 indicates about 53 SSNs, including:

  3     Seawolf

41-2  Los Angeles (maybe 2 less since Aug 2014?)

11     Virginias (including North Dakota commissioned Oct 2014)
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53 Attack submarines nuclear (SSN)

14 Ohio SSBN
  4 Ohio SSGN
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71 Total US Submarines

This is verses a total of 61 Total Chinese submarines - of which 56 or 57 may be attack subs.

A small number of Chinese submariners would have gained experience on the two 2nd Generation Shang class SSNs.

Some USN submariners may have gained experience on SSKs of US allies.

A good comment on the pattern of US Navy-Pentagon fear mongering is here.

Pete

Abbott's Choice of Japan Possibly Influences Defence Testimony

Australia's Senator Nick Xenophon. He comes to Senator Committe meetings well prepared with research. He then asks questions defence officers would prefer he forgot.

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As the Abbott Government has already chosen Japan's Soryu even the most senior defence officials are limited in what they can say to Australian Senate Committees. To provide full and accurate answer to Senators risks being considered disloyal to Australia's (current) Prime Minister Abbott's decision - increasingly know as the Captain's Pick. Put another way accurate information should be avoided if it potentially provides ammunition for politicians who oppose the Japan decision.

Australia has stated a preference for the US submarine AN/BYG-1 combat system (made for US weapons) and US Admiral Thomas is enthusiastic that Australia buy the Soryu. The implication from this is that the US is more likely to supply its combat system with associated US weapons if Australia chooses Japan's Soryu, 

Like many countries Australia has a number of Senate Committees that seek answers from defence civilian and armed services officers. In late February 2015 in a Senate Committee meeting Senator Nick Xenophon (from South Australia) asked questions concerning Australia's known preference in “competitive evaluation process” for a submarine that is highly compatible with, or already uses US weapons. The relevant US weapons include the Harpoon (short-medium range) cruise missile, Mark 48 heavyweight torpedo, and, in future, the Tomahawk (longer range) cruise missile.

More specifically Senator Xenophon asked Australia’s Chief of Navy and the head of the Defence Material Organisation (DMO) whether Australia's defence sector could reply to the Senate Committee's Question on Notice 171. See Committee Meeting transcript 3/4s way down. Question 171, (d)(iii) was:

"Do any German designed submarines carry US weapons (e.g. Mk 48s torpedoes [any variant] or Harpoon missiles)?" 

To this they responded that:

 “Defence is not aware of any German designed submarines that carry US weapons”.

Senator Xenophon then pointed out that a range of Wikipedia articles and official US government documents confirmed that a number of German designed submarines used or can use some US weapons, including those owned by South Korea (in Australia’s region) Greece, Turkey, Israel and Brazil.  

.. Senator Xenophon commented: "Would you understand, Mr King [Head of DMO], that I would be concerned of an error of that nature given the significance? I am concerned that, with such a fundamental error, are you not making decisions on a preferred combat system with US based weapons on the presumption that other combat systems are not compatible with US weapons, which in turn could influence the choice of submarine? You can see my point."

Most have accepted the response to Senator Xenophon as ignorance or oversight, but there is an equally likely explanation.

The head of the Navy and the head of DMO would have been aware that those who oppose "build in Japan" (such as Senator Xenophon) would have been able to use "German built submarines can use US weapons" as an argument for "build German designed submarines in South Australia". 

Naturally Abbott does not want Xenophon or the Labor opposition to be able to say "but the Navy  and DMO have already indicated that "compatibility with US weapons" is a non-argument when claiming Japan's Soryu is preferable to the German contender". 

The defence heads therefore had to rely on seeming ignorance. To provide political ammunition to Senator Xenophon would be entering into the highly political submarine selection issue, after all... 

Another possibility is that the Prime Minister's Office took carriage of the question, provided the wrong answer and the defence heads were forced to live with it. It has already been established that the Prime Minister's Office has taken much of the political carriage of the Soryu issue. After this office handled the Senate Committees questions the defence heads had to wear the acute embarrassment at the Senate committee meeting on the day.

So all this mean's that Abbott's Captain's pick of Japan's Soryu, for the sake of alliance with Japan and the US's advocacy of the Soryu, is influencing otherwise expert testimony on Australia's multi billion (taxpayer) dollar submarine selection.
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This is the testimony in question given to Senator Xenophon, on US weapons on German designed submarines, at the Senate Committee meeting.

Reaper (Armed) Drones for Australia?

One of the armed Reapers operated by the UK Royal Air Force, were over Afghanistan, now over Iraq and Syria.

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Approximate position of Reaper/Predator bases in region with greatest concentration now on Iraq-Syria. Note other drones are deployed: high altitude Global Hawks and high altitude, stealthy Sentinels. Map courtesy of http://dronewars.net/2014/05/07/analysis-where-are-british-reaper-drones-heading-after-afghanistan/ which also lists the drone bases.

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Several Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel are now being trained in the US to operate Reaper armed drones. This only became public in the last few days. From just a few Australians in training Australia may ramp up to a squadron sized capability of three to five Reapers over the next few years.

Reaper drones are more technically known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and by militaries as remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs).  

Australia has operated unarmed 1,150 kg Heron drones in Afghanistan for a few years in surveillance roles. Senior Australian officers have expressed interest inacquiring armed drones since at least 2012 . The Australian Army has worked closely with US armed drones in Afghanistan since 2012, if not before. The war against Islamic State in Iraq has made training remote aircrew for drones and acquisition of armed drones themselves a high priority for the RAAF. It is also a high priority for the Australian Army who will most probably be unofficially fighting on the ground before 2016.

In a Media Release of February 23, 2015 Australian Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, Darren Chester, announced: “…that the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has commenced training aircrew and support staff on [Reaper] operations in the United States.

Mr Chester said that the training program provides a cost effective method to increase the ADF’s understanding of complex [drone] operations and how this capability can be best used to protect Australian troops on future operations.

“Unmanned aerial systems are an advancing technology with a proven record of providing ‘eyes in the sky’ in the Middle East region,” Mr Chester said.

“It would be remiss of Australia not to continue to develop our knowledge of this technology to ensure we are able to gain the greatest benefit from unmanned aerial systems and the best protection for our troops on future operations.”

“For this reason, the RAAF is training personnel in USAF MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial system operations in the United States.”

[The RAAF] currently has five personnel training to be [Reaper remote pilots and weapons and sensor] operators at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, and a communication systems engineer at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada.”

The UK and the US have operated armed Reapers since 2007. The US has also operated the closely related, but much smaller, Predator since 1995. The 4,780 kg Reapers can carry 1,760 kgs of weapons including Hellfire missiles, GPS programmed bombs or laser guided bombs. When carrying a couple of weapons a Reaper can loiter for around 20 hours. Scroll a third way down  http://dronewars.net/2014/05/07/analysis-where-are-british-reaper-drones-heading-after-afghanistan/ for a useful map and list of drone air bases that can send drones over Syria and Iraq.  

Unmanned drones and manned aircraft are limited by their pilot-equipment-network mix. Australia is operating several Super Hornets in the bombing role over Iraq. Pilots of those aircraft may only have a quick glimpse or no direct view of their target before they destroy it while Reapers drones can silently loiter for hours to be sure of their target.

One role for the eagle eyed Reaper is to detect if potential enemy are digging in improved explosive devices (IEDs) in front of an advancing allied patrol. Another role is detecting the enemy setting up ambushes against that patrol. That Reaper could fire Hellfire missiles at the enemy.

Reapers have advantages over fast jets like the RAAF Super Hornets currently over Iraq including longer loiter times, many lower operating costs, no vulnerable pilots who can be killed or captured, no jet engine wear, no mid-air refuelling needed. Reapers, unlike jets, also have the ability to silently protect patrols or convoys as these ground elements slowly move.

Reapers will complement the Super Hornets rather than replace them. One advantage of Super Hornets is that they can move, during the one mission, over long distances to trouble spots in Iraq much more quickly than Reapers. A particular problem with the Super Hornets though is that they frequently spend more time in transit (4 hours all up) from their base in the United Arab Emirates then the 3 hours at work over Iraq. Super Hornets can last longer than 7 hours with mid-air refuelling, but pilots suffer significant fatigue during these long missions while one Reaper crew can handover to a fresh crew every few hours over a 20 hour Reaper mission.

The RAAF may be asking for $300 million to buy several Reapers ($20 million per Reaper plus all the training, simulators and other network costs) . Judging from the UK Royal Air Force precedent Australia may buy 3 to 5 Reapers in the next 2 to 3 years. After piloting US Reapers in training Australian pilots at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, might possibly graduate to flying US Reapers operationally. This may be prior to moving onto Australian Reapers within 2 to 3 years.

Moral issues about US use of drones over Afghanistan and Pakistan may be related to their increasing use by the US over the years, with more targets attacked. Another issue is the use of armed drones by the CIA against countries the US is officially at peace with. Use by the RAAF over Iraq in the next two or three years should hopefully be different.

Pete

Latest on India's Aircraft Carrier Projects

India's old and new aircraft carriers. Image courtesy of The Times of India, February 23, 2015

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INS Vikrant "2" on launch November 2014. Photo courtesy.

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India is gradually expanding its carrier force. India may have 2 carriers by 2019. Whether both will be fully commisioned then is a question mark. Basically India may be maintaining parity with China's slowly emerging carrier capability. Major  commissioned. 

Major milestones are:  

2016 - expected retirement of INS Viraat. It was acquired from UK 1987 – 28,000 tons displacement, 11 Sea Harriers.

2016 - INS Vikramaditya rebuilt and handed over by Russia 2013. It will be India’s only commissioned carrier for 3 - 4 years after INS Viraat is decommissioned. 45,000 tons, 24 MiG-29Ks.

2019 - INS Vikrant "2" India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-I), launched 2014, under construction 2016-17. Perhaps commissioned by 2019. 40,000 tons, 12 MiG-29Ks, 8 Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA). Construction of Vikrant has already been delayed by four years with repeated technical and budgetary issues. The "2" is sometimes informally used as Google searches simply for "INS Vikrant" often turn up the preceding INS Vikrant that was decommissioned in 1997.

2030 - INS Vishal (may be completed 2030) known as indigenous aircraft carrier-II (IAC-II), maybe nuclear propelled, 65,000 ton (displacement equal to China’s carrier Liaoning). May feature Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) being developed by the US for its new Ford class supercarriers. EMALs would allow full sized carrier aircraft, like the Super Hornet, to be launched. Vikramaditya’s and Vikrant’s ski-jumps only allow up to MiG-29 weight aircraft. If a successful design Vishal may be the first of class for 2 to 3 more 65,000 ton carriers (perhaps around 2035-2040) allowing Vikramaditya to retire.

India, like Russia, US, and even Australia often under-estimate the costs and build time of weapons systems. Politicians, bureaucrats, military officers and arms builders all can underestimate the cost-length-complexity of their projects. The main aim appears to be placating the public and Treasuries whose tax-payer dollars go into paying for weapons systems. 

Please connect with Submarine Matter's:

http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/08/launch-of-ins-vikrant-indias-first.html

http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2012/11/indias-aircraft-carriers-slowly-getting.html

also connect with other recent sources:

 http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/indias-new-aircraft-carrier-plans-may-get-a-boost/ and

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-now-puts-aircraft-carrier-plan-on-fast-track/articleshow/46336472.cms

Artist's conception of INS Vikrant "2" - indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-I)
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Pete