Misleading advice to US Congress on Chinese Submarine Numbers?

The US Navy has used 13 Chinese MING-class (Type 33 to 35A) training submarines (based on the German Type XXI U-Boat, 1945) to boost the Chinese submarine fleet to a threatening "more than 60" which means 61.

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The US Navy and the Pentagon have always been totally truthful in their advice to Congress or that is the ideal, anyway.   

The latest example are comments of a senior US Admiral in late February 25, 2015 who said  “[China's] submarine force has grown over a tremendous rate. They now have more diesel and nuclear attack submarines than we have so they’ve passed us in total quantity - but in quality they are still not there,”  

"but in quality they are still not there” is correct.  

Admiral M's use of flowery language - particularly China is building some "fairly amazing submarines" - should put any cynical politician on guard. 

So how many submarines does China have? The answer from the Pentagon is "more than 60"

The Pentagon's Annual Report to Congress: China Report 2014 (ever after called China Report 2014) reported on Page 7 "more than 60 submarines" and on Pages 7-8 actual submarines types and quantities were identified - which were less than 60. These were: 

-  3 JIN-class (Type 094) second generation SSBN. The JL-2 SLBM's are still being tested and PLAN doctrine suggests the JL-2s are not usually carried, for security and political reasons. 

-  2 SHANG-class (Type 093) second generation SSNs are in service,

-  4 HAN-class (Type 091) "aging" first generation SSNs  . These rely on 1960s technology. China Report 2014 does not specify numbers. However only 5 were built of which at least 1 is considered decommissioned.

-   12 YUAN-class SSP (called Type 039A or Type 041) as the 039A has very little resemblance to the 039 it is commonly referred to as the Type 041. The Type 039A/041 possibly has Stirling Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) sold to China by Sweden

-  13 SONG-class SS (Type 039)

-  12 KILO-class submarines acquired from Russia in the 1990s and 2000s

The China Report 2014 only details 46 submarines. 

Question: So how is "more than 60" derived?

Answer: reach 61 Chinese submarines (presumably) by adding:

-  13 MING-class (Type 033 to 035A). These are 1950's technology that are not mentioned in China Report 2014. They are used by China for training only. These are totally obsolete, being closely based on the 70 year old Russian ROMEO-class which in turn were based on Germany's Type XXI U-Boat of World War Two. Two of them may now be going to the navy of Bangladesh. Figure of 13 here. MINGs may be equivalent to US post-war GUPPY uprades. and

-  2  XIA-class (Type 092) SSBNs. They are 1970s technology and also are not mentioned in China Report 2014. One may be active. The other is considered lost in an accident.

So "more than 60" means 61. One of those 61 (a XIA) may be permanenetly submerged and two MINGs might soon be gifted to Bangladesh - hence 58 on publically known figures - and that is a stretch. 

Meanwhile "A spokeswoman said the U.S. Navy had 71 commissioned U.S. submarines." 

It should be left to the reader to assess whether Admiral M and the China Report 2014 are accurate or misleading.

FURTHER ANALYSIS

There is a vast gulf in quality and also availability of the US’s 52 all nuclear propelled attack submarines (SSNs) verses China’s 6 SSNs and 50 diesel-electric (SSKs). The US has paid a much higher price for nuclear submarines because they are of much higher quality overall than conventionally propelled submarines.

It is hard to measure quality but such measures like generation, displacement and crew size would be indicative.

Within the US submarine service the average US attack sub would be 5th Generation nuclear Los Angeles http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles-class_submarine of:

- 6,000 tons surfaced

- combined Blue/Gold crew size 2 x 130 = 260, giving it at least twice the availability of a one crew Chinese sub.

The average Chinese attack sub is 2nd generation diesel/electric Song Class http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_039_submarine .

- probably 2,000 tons surfaced

- crew of 60.

In terms of number of US attack subs this US Navy Fact File of August 2014  http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4100&tid=100&ct=4

 indicates about 53 SSNs, including:

  3     Seawolf

41-2  Los Angeles (maybe 2 less since Aug 2014?)

11     Virginias (including North Dakota commissioned Oct 2014)
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53 Attack submarines nuclear (SSN)

14 Ohio SSBN
  4 Ohio SSGN
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71 Total US Submarines

This is verses a total of 61 Total Chinese submarines - of which 56 or 57 may be attack subs.

A small number of Chinese submariners would have gained experience on the two 2nd Generation Shang class SSNs.

Some USN submariners may have gained experience on SSKs of US allies.

A good comment on the pattern of US Navy-Pentagon fear mongering is here.

Pete

Chinese SLBMs and DF-21D carrier killers, 2013

The area in yellow is the maximum claimed range of 3,000 km for the DF-21D anti-ship (and ASW?) "carrier killer" ballistic missile. A shorter claimed range of 1,450 km may be for a heavy warheads - see my final comments below. The outer perimeter of the yellow zone may be from launch points from coastal China, particularly Hainan Island. The physics of the DF-21D may mean it can't hit a target that is less than 100 km from launch point - see http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20131213000003&cid=1101

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This diagram of the DF-21D Guidance System includes remote radar on land, aircraft, drones, sea and satellite and sensors on the warhead itself. I maintain that the same sensor platforms and undersea sensors placed by China would also provide nuclear and conventional warhead DF-21Ds with an anti-submarine capability.

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China's JL-2 (CSSNX-14) SLBM. Though it is China's main SLBM it was still under development in 2013. 

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After terrorism and Iran and Pakistan's nuclear status US civilian and military intelligence are most interested in the growth in capabilities of China’s military forces. This is because China’s forces might pass US forces in size as China’s economy grows larger than the US economy. China’s transition to becoming No.1 in military and economic size may occur in the late 2020s or early 2030s. Whether China will be No.1 in military capability during that period is also dependent on the quality of China’s military personnel and technology. The degree of politically imposed limitations will also influence capability as the red bolded section of the report below reveals.
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Below are excerpts from Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Chinese nuclear forces, 2013, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2013, Vol. 69, No. 6, pp. 79-85, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/6/79.full.pdf They include some interesting comments regarding Chinese SSBNs, SLBMs, Chinese area or sea denial DF-21D missiles that perform some of the anti-surface ship and ASW functions of submarines. The red bolded section provides comments on the high degree of Communist Party Central Military Commission caution and political control concerning China's nuclear forces. This degree of control may handicap the capability of these forces during threats and actual nuclear war.

SSBNs and SLBMs

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The authors report:

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[p. 82] China has two types of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) developed for two types of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines: the JL-1 and JL-2. Neither missile is operational.

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The 1,700-km-range, two-stage JL-1 (CSS-NX-3) SLBM developed for a single old Xia-class (Type 092) submarine first entered service in 1986 and is not considered operational. The Xia is based at the North Fleet Base near Qingdao in the Shandong province. The submarine underwent a lengthy shipyard overhaul in 2005-2006 but appears to have stayed in port since then. The Xia/JL-1 weapon system is expected to be retired soon.

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Development of the new JL-2 (CSSNX-14) SLBM for the second-generation Jin-class (Type 094) submarine is nearing completion. After several setbacks, China appears to have overcome

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[p. 83] technical difficulties and successfully test-launched the JL-2 in 2012-2013. The US intelligence community expects the JL-2 may reach initial operational capability in 2013 or 2014. [Endnote 5. The Pentagon predicts initial operational capability in 2013 (Defense Department, 2013), while the Defense Intelligence Agency (2013) predicts initial operational capability in 2014.]

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The JL-2 is a modified version of the DF-31. Equipped with a single warhead and, possibly, penetration aids, the JL-2 has never been flight-tested to its full range but is estimated to have a range of 7,000-plus km. Such a range is sufficient to target Alaska, Guam, Russia, and India from waters near China but unless the submarine sails significantly eastward, not the continental United States.

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Three Jin-class submarines are in service (without missiles), and the US intelligence community speculates that China may build a total of five before proceeding to develop a third-generation (Type 096) over the next decade.

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With 12 missile-launch tubes per submarine, three Jin-class boats could carry 36 missiles with an equal number of warheads - a significant increase from the 12 SLBMs that the sole Xia-class submarine carried.

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The Pentagon asserts that the Jin/JL-2 weapon system “will give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent” (Defense Department, 2013: 6). While that may be true in theory, a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine fleet faces several doctrinal, technical, and operational constraints in practice. Under current doctrine, China’s Central Military Commission does not allow the military services to have warheads deployed on missiles under normal circumstances. Handing over custody of nuclear warheads to deployed submarines in peacetime would constitute a significant change of Chinese doctrine.

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Moreover, no Chinese ballistic missile submarine has ever sailed on a deterrent patrol, so China’s navy and the Central Military Commission have essentially no experience in operating a submarine force during realistic military operations. Developing this capability will require development of new command-and control technologies and procedures.

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But even if China deployed warheads on submarines and sent them to sea in a crisis, where would they sail? For a JL-2 to reach the continental United States, a Jin-class submarine would have to sail through the East China Sea and well into the Pacific Ocean, through dangerous choke points where it would be vulnerable to hostile antisubmarine warfare. [Endnote 6: Chinese nuclear submarines are apparently very noisy (Kristensen, 2009b).]

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China’s main concern is the survivability of its minimum nuclear deterrent, and it spends considerable resources on dispersing and hiding its land-based missiles. This makes its submarine program puzzling, for it is much riskier to deploy nuclear weapons at sea, where submarines can be sunk by unfriendly forces, than to deploy them on land.”

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DF-21D Anti-ship (and anti-submarine?) Missile

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Pete’s Comment - Chinese area or sea denial MRBMs missiles perform some of the anti-surface ship and ASW functions usually performed by submarines.

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[p. 81] “China’s primary regional nuclear missile is the two-stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile DF-21 (CSS-5) medium range ballistic missile (MRBM). The DF-21 exists in two nuclear versions: the DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1) and the newer DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod2)… the new version probably has a longer range of about 2,150 km.

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China has also started deploying conventionally armed versions of the DF-21 (the DF-21C, and the DF-21D which is an anti-ship missile), a potentially dangerous mix of nuclear and conventional missiles that creates risks of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and mistaken nuclear escalation in a crisis. [Endnote 4: The Second Artillery's organization of DF-21s is unclear, but it is thought that nuclear and conventional units are kept separate. For insightful studies of China's missile force, see Stokes (2010) and Stokes (2012).]”

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Pete’s Comment

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The existence of the DF-21D MRBM may reduce the need for rapid development of China’s conventional and nuclear submarine forces (forces that are believed to be evolving slowly). The disparity of estimates of the DF-21D's range - from 1,450 km to 3,000 km may reflect Chinese political objectives or may be physical facts. 1,450 km may be the range with a heavy warhead (typically 1,500 kg) or for a "bus" of 3 MIRVed warheads. 3,000 km may the range for a light (typically 500 kg) warhead.  

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Pete