South Korean "Kill Chain" Preemptive Strike on North Korea - Problems

A South Korean preemptive ("Kill Chain") strike on North Korea would be even more complicated and dangerous than described below. To what extent would the US, Russia, China and Japan become embroiled? Note that the map may be dated 2008 as many of the orbat and budget figures are dated 2005-6 and US carrier Kitty Hawk is listed (even though decommissioned 2009). Still the locations in North Korea appear still accurate. (Click National Post to then expand image)

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In relation to North Korea’s developing nuclear ballistic missile and submarine launch capabilities South Korean preemptive strike (“Kill Chain”) doctrine is under pressure. Kill Chain may be obsolete with the possibility that eventual South Korean nuclear deterrence will be needed to replace it. Over the next three days I will write three articles on this issue. This is the first.

South Korea has been pushing for an indigenous nuclear deterrence capability since the early 1970s however US pressure and promises have been sufficient for South Korea to accept US extended nuclear deterrence. Nevertheless South Korea is more advanced in ballistic missile development than is generally known. 

The pressure on South Korea’s leadership of North Korea's action over the last week is reflected in Korea Joongang Daily’s, May 13, 2015 article "Park calls for a response to North’s launch" http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3004109&cloc=joongangdaily%7Chome%7Cnewslist1. President Park is seeking an expansion of preemptive strike sensor infrastructure to handle the emerging North Korean SLBM threat.

The process and requirements of Kill Chain premptive strike were summarised by Professor Choi Jong-kun of Yonsei University, Seoul in 2013. Under this doctrine the South Korean (with presumably US assistance) intelligence and military establishment would need to react to North Korea in order to:

“1. Within one minute, South Korean intelligence must pick up signals that North Korea intends to attack preemptively; and

2. Within one minute, South Korea must establish what and where North Korea intends to attack preemptively; and

3. Within three minutes, the supreme commander of the South Korean military must be able to hand down an order to strike preemptively against North Korean targets; and

4. South Korea must attack the relevant sites in North Korea before North Korea has time to launch its own attack; and

5. South Korea must be able to establish whether its initial strikes were sufficient to eliminate the source of the intended North Korean strike; and

6. South Korea must be capable of responding to immediate North Korean counterstrikes from elsewhere."

Problems with South Korean Kill Chain preemptive strike include:

-  The role of civilian South Korean authority particularly President Park in the chain of command and decision making?

-  The role of the US military and civilian authorities? South Korea needs complete confidence that US compliance and involvement in the Kill Chain will be nearly instant.

-  South Korea and the US need complete confidence that China would allow a preemptive strike on its client-buffer state North Korea.

-  Kill Chain requires perfect knowledge that North Korea wishes to launch a major strike against South Korea. By major this means that at least one nuclear (not conventional high explosive or chemical?) missile is about to be launched at South Korea (not Japan).

-  the problem of only one nuclear missile but (say) 100+ decoy high explosive missiles?

-  All the North Korea missiles must be destroyed on their launch platforms or shot down and all NK submarines, warships, air force aircraft and disguised North Korea “civilian” ships or "civilian" aircraft capable of firing nuclear tipped ballistic OR cruise missiles or bombs must be destroyed.

-  These shoot downs and sinkings must be as close to instant and simultaneous as possible. In that regard South Korean cruise missiles might be far too slow for the job.

Without perfect knowledge South Korea could make a situation where North Korea is merely debating the notion of a strike OR only wishes a conventional missile/bomb strike a nationally fatal act be South Korea. 

Where South Korea commits what might be considered an unnecessary preemptive "Pearl Harbor" attack will that make South Korea an international outcast? 

An unfounded South Korea preemptive strike would almost guarantee a massive nuclear response to South Korea (and perhaps Japan) or total North Korea desire to build a nuclear response in future.

Unless regime change to North Korea took place a South Korean preemptive strike would just be the beginning of further hostilities.

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The second article will be on South Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear history and future intentions. The third article will be on the extention of the Kill Chain to SLBM capable submarines. 

Connect with North Korea's alleged new SINPO class submarine and missile test, May 13, 2015 (below).

Pete

Abbott's Choice of Japan Possibly Influences Defence Testimony

Australia's Senator Nick Xenophon. He comes to Senator Committe meetings well prepared with research. He then asks questions defence officers would prefer he forgot.

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As the Abbott Government has already chosen Japan's Soryu even the most senior defence officials are limited in what they can say to Australian Senate Committees. To provide full and accurate answer to Senators risks being considered disloyal to Australia's (current) Prime Minister Abbott's decision - increasingly know as the Captain's Pick. Put another way accurate information should be avoided if it potentially provides ammunition for politicians who oppose the Japan decision.

Australia has stated a preference for the US submarine AN/BYG-1 combat system (made for US weapons) and US Admiral Thomas is enthusiastic that Australia buy the Soryu. The implication from this is that the US is more likely to supply its combat system with associated US weapons if Australia chooses Japan's Soryu, 

Like many countries Australia has a number of Senate Committees that seek answers from defence civilian and armed services officers. In late February 2015 in a Senate Committee meeting Senator Nick Xenophon (from South Australia) asked questions concerning Australia's known preference in “competitive evaluation process” for a submarine that is highly compatible with, or already uses US weapons. The relevant US weapons include the Harpoon (short-medium range) cruise missile, Mark 48 heavyweight torpedo, and, in future, the Tomahawk (longer range) cruise missile.

More specifically Senator Xenophon asked Australia’s Chief of Navy and the head of the Defence Material Organisation (DMO) whether Australia's defence sector could reply to the Senate Committee's Question on Notice 171. See Committee Meeting transcript 3/4s way down. Question 171, (d)(iii) was:

"Do any German designed submarines carry US weapons (e.g. Mk 48s torpedoes [any variant] or Harpoon missiles)?" 

To this they responded that:

 “Defence is not aware of any German designed submarines that carry US weapons”.

Senator Xenophon then pointed out that a range of Wikipedia articles and official US government documents confirmed that a number of German designed submarines used or can use some US weapons, including those owned by South Korea (in Australia’s region) Greece, Turkey, Israel and Brazil.  

.. Senator Xenophon commented: "Would you understand, Mr King [Head of DMO], that I would be concerned of an error of that nature given the significance? I am concerned that, with such a fundamental error, are you not making decisions on a preferred combat system with US based weapons on the presumption that other combat systems are not compatible with US weapons, which in turn could influence the choice of submarine? You can see my point."

Most have accepted the response to Senator Xenophon as ignorance or oversight, but there is an equally likely explanation.

The head of the Navy and the head of DMO would have been aware that those who oppose "build in Japan" (such as Senator Xenophon) would have been able to use "German built submarines can use US weapons" as an argument for "build German designed submarines in South Australia". 

Naturally Abbott does not want Xenophon or the Labor opposition to be able to say "but the Navy  and DMO have already indicated that "compatibility with US weapons" is a non-argument when claiming Japan's Soryu is preferable to the German contender". 

The defence heads therefore had to rely on seeming ignorance. To provide political ammunition to Senator Xenophon would be entering into the highly political submarine selection issue, after all... 

Another possibility is that the Prime Minister's Office took carriage of the question, provided the wrong answer and the defence heads were forced to live with it. It has already been established that the Prime Minister's Office has taken much of the political carriage of the Soryu issue. After this office handled the Senate Committees questions the defence heads had to wear the acute embarrassment at the Senate committee meeting on the day.

So all this mean's that Abbott's Captain's pick of Japan's Soryu, for the sake of alliance with Japan and the US's advocacy of the Soryu, is influencing otherwise expert testimony on Australia's multi billion (taxpayer) dollar submarine selection.
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This is the testimony in question given to Senator Xenophon, on US weapons on German designed submarines, at the Senate Committee meeting.

Possible Japanese Submarine Deployment Area

Differing submarine patrol areas strung along China's First Island Chain. Japan's submarine patrol area may be from Kyushu, along the Ryukyu island chain (which includes Okinawa), south to Taiwan, then across the Bashi Channel (Luzon Strait) down to Luzon Island, Philippines.

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Part of the "First Island Chain" is what Japan calls the Senkaku Islands. A potential China-Japan-(maybe)Taiwan flashpoint due to undersea oil deposits. These deposits may become economically extractable as oil prices rise and technology permits. 

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Below is an interesting snippet which may reflect how Japan's submarine fleet is deployed:

Tetsuo Kotani, U.S.-Japan Allied Maritime Strategy: Balancing the Rise of Maritime China, (Strategic Japan, Japan Chair) Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC, April 2014, pp. 1-15. http://csis.org/files/publication/140422_Kotani_USJapanAlliance.pdf wrote on page 12:

"In addition, the submarine fleet will be increased from 16 to 22. Due to the lack of Chinese ASW capabilities, the expansion of the submarine fleet enhances sea-denial capability vis-à-vis the PLAN. To patrol the waters along southwestern Japan, it is estimated that at least eight submarines are necessary (six for the Okinawa island chain [Japan to Taiwan] and two for the Bashi Channel [also called (Luzon Strait) Taiwan to Luzon island, Philippines]. Typically, a [submarine] requires two backups for training and maintenance. Thus a submarine fleet of 24 is ideal, but a fleet of 22 provides more operational flexibility than the current fleet of 16. [35] On the other hand, for the effective use of the reinforced submarine fleet, the JMSDF needs to recruit and train more submariners." 

[35] =  [retired Vice Admiral] Masao Kobayashi, “Sensuikan 22 sekitaiseino Kaijoboei” [Maritime Defense under a 22-Submarine Force], Gunji Kenkyu [Japan Military Review], December 2011. http://gunken.jp/blog/archives/2011/11/10_0000.php

COMMENTS

Page 1, 2nd paragraph indicates Japan's submarine deployments may, in part, respond to "Beijing’s attempts to deny access by other maritime powers to its Near Seas (the Yellow Sea and the East and South China Seas), which are enclosed by the first island chain (a chain of islands from Kyushu, Okinawa, to Taiwan and Borneo)." 

Japanese strategy using all forces, including submarines, is partly to provide a blockading force (in time of conflict) to keep China forces and trade bottled up in China's near seas. Japan, its SSK owning allies, and the US SSN force could also block Chinese naval vessels and supplies (such as oil) from reaching China. 

As the CSIS excerpt above indicates Japan's main submarine patrol area would be from the the southern home island of Kyushu, along the Ryukyu island chain (which includes Okinawa), south to Taiwan, then across the Bashi Channel (Luzon Strait) down to Luzon Island, Philippines. 

Countries in the region may make frequent use of undersea arrays (along with future use of UUVs (including wavegliders)), particularly in narrow straits and harbour mouths. Such use would diminish reliance on virtually stationary submarines guarding critical straits and harbour mouths. 

South Korea would monitor movements in all the congested seas and straits near South Korea. In those seas are threats or possible competitors North Korea, China, Russia and Japan itself.

The US with its wide ranging SSNs may guard some straits and narrows but the speed and range of its SSNs allow open ocean (blue water) coverage throughout the Pacific, Indian Oceans and under receding Arctic ice to the Atlantic Ocean. US SSNs can act as backup to the SSK navies (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia) particularly against Russian and Chinese SSNs. All of the allies would directly or indirectly (via the US as the common ally) work together under the blanket term SeaWeb.

Naturally submarines are not the only blockers or monitors and don't work alone. Other platforms (surface warships, surveillance satellites, UAVs, UUVs, patrol aircraft including helicopters, land based missiles and ground stations (deploying radar, intercept and other arrays)) can work with submarines in the whole defence mix. 

Pete

Bangladesh, Philippine, Burma and Thailand Submarine Issues

One of China's remaining Type 035 Ming-class conventional submarine soon to be scrapped or sold off to Bangladesh (and other small nations?).

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A Russian built Kilo conventional submarine - main users are Russia, India and China. Vietnam is a growing operator (having bought 6).

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India feels threatened by the prospect of increasing Chinese submarine proliferation in the Indian Ocean. Such proliferation comes through such means as:

-  Chinese anti-piracy conventional and nuclear propelled subs moving across the Indian Ocean for operations off the Horn of Africa,

-  submarine visits to such ports as Columbo, Sri Lanka, and

-  sale of Chinese subs to such Indian neighbours as Bangladesh (around 2019) and perhaps in future to Burma and Pakistan (see India's "West Coast Worries").

For more than a year there have been reports of a pending sale of obsolescent Chinese Ming-class submarines to Bangladesh. See my article http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/china-selling-two-type-035-ming-class.html of December 24, 2013. It is highly likely that, after expected delivery of the Mings in 2019, part of a Bangladesh Ming crew and on-shore maintainers would be Chinese for a transition period. This would cause a range of anxieties in India.

In late 2014 Indian intelligence and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs have pushed the possibility (or for India a hope) that Bangladesh might buy Russian submarines instead.

It is unclear whether these "Russian" Submarines would be:

- new build Kilos (surely too expensive for Bangladesh without credit-finance)

- used Kilos from Russia (cheaper but probably unreliable with a short remaining service life) or

- ex-Indian Kilos (cheaper but probably unreliable with a short remaining service life).

Two nations that probably will not buy submarines in the short to medium term are:

- the Philippines (it usually receives low-or-no cost used naval and coastguard vessels) - see http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-philippine-navys-submarine-quest/  December 31, 2013, 

- Thailand - http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/thailand-eyes-submarine-fleet/, January 4, 2015,
  Pete's Comment: If Thailand bought used Ming subs from China Thailand might receive them in 2019 - depending on Chinese modifications. Used Kilos are harder to estimate. If Thailand prefered 2 or 3 new submarines costs would be much higher and involve:
- significant lead times for negotiating, ordering and building submarines - generally around 6 years for a new customer like Thailand
- in the case of South Korea as a supplier a backlog of pre-existing orders might perhaps cause delays. This may mean a minimum delivery year of 2020 for Thailand to receive the first sub then add 3 years for commissioning (tests, trials and training) the sub into the Thai Navy ie. 2023.

Pete