A Dangerous Conspiracy: The Nuclear Proliferation Risk of the
Nuclear-powered Submarines Collaboration in the Context of AUKUS
Source: China
Nuclear Strategic Planning and Research Institute Date: July 21, 2022
On September 15, 2021, the United States, the United Kingdom
and Australia issued a joint statement announcing that they would create an
enhanced trilateral security partnership (known as "AUKUS") to
further deepen their strategic security and defense collaboration. Under the
AUKUS framework, Australia will build at least eight nuclear-powered submarines
with the help of the U.S. and the UK. The news caused an uproar across the
world.
The AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines collaboration will set a
dangerous precedent for the transfer of weapons-grade nuclear materials from
nuclear-weapon states to a non-nuclear-weapon state, which is a blatant act of
nuclear proliferation. Such move by the three countries is a serious violation
of the object and purpose of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), a direct contravention to the Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA’s Statute), and a great challenge to the IAEA’s
existing safeguards system. It runs counter to the spirit of the South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and also undermines ASEAN countries’ efforts to
establish the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. In addition, it ferments
potential risks and hazards in multiple aspects such as nuclear security, arms
race in nuclear submarines and missile technology proliferation, with a
profound negative impact on global strategic balance and stability. Given
Australia's ambition and track record in pursuit of nuclear weapons, especially
the resurgence of forces arguing for nuclear weapons acquisition in recent
years, the international community must maintain keen vigilance with regard to
the AUKUS deal.
Bearing in mind the authority and effectiveness of the global
nuclear nonproliferation regime with the NPT as its cornerstone, we prepared
the report A Dangerous Conspiracy: the Nuclear Proliferation Risk of AUKUS
Nuclear-powered Submarines Collaboration to present an accurate,
comprehensive and informative description and analysis to both domestic
audience and the international community, and make known the firm voice of
Chinese think tanks and scholars with concerns over nuclear proliferation risks
and a desire to safeguard world peace and security from an academic
perspective.
We hope that this report will inform the relevant government
organs, research institutions and the public about the situation and make a
small contribution to the final resolution of the relevant problem. We will
follow closely the complex political, legal, and technical issues involved in
the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines collaboration and update the report
accordingly.
The data and materials referenced and included in the report
are from open sources. Please feel free to contact us for information or
comments. We have received encouragement and advice from many experts and
scholars, and also referred to research findings of domestic and foreign think
tanks and scholars. We extend our sincere gratitude and appreciation to all of
them.
China Arms
Control and Disarmament Association
China
Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy
July 2022
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
the cornerstone of the current global nuclear nonproliferation regime, aims to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. The AUKUS
nuclear-powered submarines collaboration is a serious violation of the object
and purpose of the NPT, sets a dangerous precedent for the illegal transfer of
weapons-grade nuclear materials from nuclear-weapon states to a
non-nuclear-weapon state, and thus constitutes a blatant act of nuclear
proliferation.
The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA's
Statute) specifies the objectives and functions of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), including that the IAEA shall ensure, so far as it is
able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision
or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. The
afore-mentioned collaboration involves weapons-grade nuclear materials,
nuclear-powered submarine reactors and other items and related technical
assistance that are obviously used in a way as to further military purposes.
Therefore, it constitutes a direct violation of the IAEA’s Statute, dealing a
blow to the authority and effectiveness of the Agency.
The AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines collaboration cannot be
brought into effective safeguards under the existing IAEA safeguards system.
From a legal perspective, Article 14 of INFCIRC/153(The Structure and Content
of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) is mainly targeted at
regulating the independent research and development of nuclear-powered
submarines in states signatories. Arbitrary application of Article 14 by AUKUS
will pose a serious legal challenge to the IAEA's safeguards system. From a
technical perspective, it is a recognized challenge to verify nuclear-powered
submarine reactors and nuclear fuels for them. Moves by the three countries
will also present new technical challenges to the IAEA.
The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free- zones (NWFZ), as a
regional non-proliferation approach, is an important part of the global nuclear
non-proliferation regime. The introduction of nuclear-powered submarines, which
are of great strategic importance, into a NWFZ seriously undermines the spirit
of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Meanwhile, it poses a real
threat to regional countries and damages the efforts of ASEAN countries to
establish the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
Claiming that it won’t seek nuclear weapons, Australia is not
without nuclear ambition. Declassified archives show clearly that post-WWII
Australian administrations were keen to develop nuclear weapons, including
seeking to acquire tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery systems from the
United Kingdom and the United States and starting a domestic nuclear weapon
program. In recent years, there have again been people in Australia arguing the
case for nuclear possession. The possibility of Australia seeking the
development of nuclear weapons in the future may not be ruled out.
The proposed AUKUS collaboration will have other baneful
effects, including higher nuclear security risks and a potential arms races in
nuclear submarines. Additionally, the transfer of Tomahawk cruise missiles will
also seriously weaken the existing international missile export control regime
and have a profound negative impact on global strategic balance and stability.
In view of the above-mentioned developments, we urge the
United States, the United Kingdom and Australia to immediately revoke their
wrong decisions, stop their dangerous acts that undermine the global nuclear
nonproliferation regime and damage global security and stability, and
faithfully fulfill their international obligations in non-proliferation. We
call on the international community to take pragmatic actions to jointly
safeguard the integrity, authority and effectiveness of the global nuclear
non-proliferation regime.
On September 15, 2021, the United States, the United Kingdom
and Australia issued a joint statement announcing the establishment of AUKUS to
strengthen their military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region through
cooperation in developing a wide range of advanced defense technologies. As the
first cooperative project under the AUKUS framework, the US and the UK will
assist Australia to build at least 8 nuclear-powered submarines, with specifics
to be agreed in the next 18 months. For this reason, Australia canceled its
on-going project with France for the latter to help it build
conventionally-powered submarine, which had been going on for several years.
In addition to building nuclear-powered submarines, Australia
will also acquire a range of long-range strike capabilities under AUKUS,
including Tomahawk Cruise Missiles, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles
(JASSM), Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM), hypersonic missiles and
precision-strike guided missiles, and develop its own guided weapons
manufacturing capability.
On November 22, the three countries signed the Agreement for
the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information, officially allowing
Australia access to American and British classified information on
nuclear-powered submarines. Australian Minister of Defense Peter Dutton said in
a statement that the Agreement will support Australia in completing the
18-month examination of the requirements underpinning the delivery of
nuclear-powered submarines and provide a mechanism for Australian personnel to
access training from their UK and US counterparts, necessary for learning how
to build, operate and support nuclear-powered submarines.
During the AUKUS Joint Steering Group meeting on Advanced
Capabilities on December 9, participants committed to finalizing a program of
work in relation to advanced capabilities by early 2022. Beyond the four
initial areas of focus outlined in the Joint Leaders’ Statement on AUKUS ——
cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and
additional undersea capabilities —— participants also discussed other
additional capabilities and agreed to identify potential opportunities for
collaboration in those areas.
During the Joint Steering Group meeting on Australia’s
Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program on December 14, participants reaffirmed the
trilateral commitment to bring the Australian capability into service at the
earliest possible date. The delegations agreed on the next steps over the
18-month consultation period to define the optimal pathway for Australia to
acquire nuclear-powered submarines, and for the Working Groups to examine in
detail the critical actions necessary to establish an enduring program in
Australia.
On March 7，2022，Australian Prime Minister Morrison and Defence
Minister Dutton issued a statement saying that a new submarine base will be
built on Australia's east coast to host its future nuclear submarines, and
enable regular visits from of U.S. and U.K. nuclear-powered submarines. As
Australia's first major military base since the 1990s, the total investment of
the base is expected to more than AUD $10 billion.
On April 5，The leaders of the United States, the United
Kingdom and Australia issued a FACT SHEET on Implementation of the Australia –
United Kingdom – United States Partnership (AUKUS), saying that since the
establishment of AUKUS was announced in September last year, the three
countries have held many meetings at the level of Senior Officials Group, Joint
Steering Groups and Working Groups. The two related lines of the Submarines and
Advanced Capabilities under AUKUS have made many important progress.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
is the world's most universal and binding nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It
was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. A total of 191
states have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon states. In the
more than 50 years since its entry into force, the NPT has played a vital and
irreplaceable role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is
the cornerstone of the current global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
2.1 The object
and purpose of the NPT is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in
any form
As stated in the preamble of the Treaty, states parties believe
that preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons is conducive to reducing the
risk of a nuclear war. They considered “the devastation that would be visited
upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort
to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the
security of peoples” and believed “that the proliferation of nuclear weapons
would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war”.
Articles I and II of the NPT specify the nuclear
non-proliferation responsibility and obligation of both nuclear-weapon and
non-nuclear-weapon states. They are the core elements of the Treaty. Article I
states: Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not
to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly,
or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any
non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive
devices." Article II states: "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to
the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."
During the NPT negotiation process, the nuclear
non-proliferation obligation of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states
was most fiercely debated among all countries. It was the focus and most
difficult part of the negotiation. Article 2 (a) of the Guiding Principles for
NPT Negotiations (Resolution 2028), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1965,
made it very clear that "The Treaty should be void of any loop-holes
which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or
indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form".
In short, preventing nuclear weapons proliferation under the
NPT should not be narrowly construed as prohibiting only the direct transfer of
completely-assembled nuclear weapons. Any and all assistance for a
non-nuclear-weapon state to build nuclear weapons, by helping with parts and
components or directly transferring a sufficient quantity of weapon-usable
nuclear materials for example, is also act of proliferation against the object
and purpose of the NPT.
2.2
Weapons-grade nuclear materials transfer
The AUKUS countries have been coy about the details of their
nuclear-powered submarine collaboration and so far failed to disclose to the
international community information central to the world’s concern. What
nuclear materials will be used in the submarine reactors and how will they be
transferred? Australian Prime Minister Morrison explicitly stated that the
nuclear submarine reactors will never need to be refueled for their entire
lifespans, which is a feature currently only of reactors using
weapons-grade highly-enriched uranium(HEU). In view of the fact that the US and
the UK are currently using weapons-grade HEU (93.5% U-235) in their
submarine reactors, the international community generally believes that the
nuclear materials involved in the proposed AUKUS collaboration will also be
weapons-grade HEU. International arms control experts estimated that the eight
nuclear submarines will need a total of 1.6 to 2 tons of weapons-grade HEU. As
25 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU is needed to make one nuclear weapon, the
weapons-grade nuclear materials to be transferred to Australia by the other two
countries would be sufficient to build as many as 64 to 80 nuclear weapons.
Weapons-grade nuclear materials are the source, material
basis, and fundamental prerequisite for nuclear weapons. Historically, many
countries with nuclear ambitions failed to obtain weapons-grade nuclear
materials in a sufficient quantity due to limitations in production technology
and capability when they tried to develop nuclear weapons. The US and the UK,
both nuclear-weapon states under the NPT, blatantly exporting tons of
weapons-grade nuclear materials to a non-nuclear weapon state is an obvious act
of nuclear proliferation. Australia, a non-nuclear-weapon state under the NPT,
openly accepting such a large quantity of weapons-grade nuclear materials is
nothing short of "getting one foot across the nuclear threshold". The
move will be in serious violation of the object and purpose of the NPT,
with enormous harm.
The IAEA is the intergovernmental organization responsible for
regulating the activities related to peaceful uses of atomic energy. Through
years of efforts, the IAEA’s Statute was adopted at the UN General Assembly in
1956 and opened for signature. It entered into force in 1957. As the basic
document of the IAEA, the Statute is the legal basis for the establishment and
operation of the Agency and the legal basis for the Agency to formulate and
implement the safeguards.
3.2 The
Statute specifies that the IAEA shall make sure that any assistance provided
under its supervision or control is not used to further any military purpose
Article II of the Statute sets out the objectives of the IAEA,
i.e., “The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of
atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It
shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its
request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to
further any military purpose.”
Article III of the Statute details the functions of the IAEA.
Paragraph A(5) reads, “(the IAEA is authorized) To establish and administer
safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials,
services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency
or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a
way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the
request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the
request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic
energy.”
3.3 The AUKUS
nuclear-powered submarine collaboration is in direct violation of the IAEA’s
Statute
The Statute authorizes the IAEA to apply safeguards to prevent
any assistance provided under its supervision or control from any use to
further any military purpose. It is noteworthy that "military
purpose" is not restricted to nuclear weapons, but apparently includes
other military uses, e.g. nuclear-powered submarines. The proposed transfer of
weapons-grade nuclear materials, nuclear-powered submarine reactors and other
items and related technical assistance from the US and the UK to Australia
obviously constitutes a clear "military purpose". The three countries
not only are members of the IAEA but also used to lead the negotiation of the
draft Statute. They have now gone back on their words and put their own selfish
interests above the international order based on international law, seriously
undermining the authority and effectiveness of the IAEA’s Statute with
far-reaching negative impact on the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The IAEA implements safeguards to verify whether a state is in
compliance with its international commitment not to divert nuclear programs and
activities to nuclear weapon purposes. The legal authority of the Agency to
develop and implement safeguards comes from its Statute, the NPT,
nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, bilateral and multilateral treaties between
states, and other arrangements. In fact, safeguards emerged long before the
establishment of the IAEA and were further strengthened and improved after the
conclusion of the Statute in 1956. They have been adapted and updated since the
NPT entered into force in 1970, leading to iterations of the template documents
for the safeguard agreements between the IAEA and the states concerned, from
the earliest INFCIRC/26 (IAEA's earliest verification code), INFCIRC/66 (a
specific template document for safeguards agreement), INFCIRC/153 (the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and the states concerned in
accordance with the NPT requirements) to the latest INFCIRC/540 (the model
additional protocol). This section will focus on the prevailing comprehensive
safeguards agreements.
4.1 The AUKUS
nuclear-powered submarine collaboration poses a serious legal challenge to the
IAEA’s safeguards system
In order to make space for their own development of
nuclear-powered submarines, some non-nuclear-weapon states pushed to exempt the
nuclear materials used in "non-proscribed military activities" from
the safeguards during the negotiation of the comprehensive safeguards
agreements in the 1960s and 1970s. Under Article 14 of the comprehensive
safeguards agreement, a state seeking an exemption from the IAEA
safeguards needs to provide assurance that the nuclear materials used in
"non-proscribed military activities" are not used in the building of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device. The IAEA shall immediately
implement the safeguards if such nuclear materials are used again in peaceful
activities (e.g., spent fuel reprocessing) and shall have continuous access to
the information on the quantity and composition of such nuclear materials and
any notifications on the export of them, provided that military secrets are not
involved.
Since Article 14 has never been activated in reality and has
not been considered by sessions of the NPT Review Conference or the IAEA Board
of Governors, the international community does not have an agreed view about
the definition of "non-proscribed military activities" or the scope
or procedures for exemptions from the safeguards. In 1978, Australia wrote to
the Director General of the IAEA, seeking a clarification about the application
of Article 14 and stating the Australian understanding that the parties are
obliged to follow the procedures set out in this Article, to notify the IAEA in
this regard and to clarify the situation with the members of the Board of
Governors, that the arrangements with the IAEA in this regard are subject to
the approval of the Board of Governors, and that failure by the parties to
follow these procedures would constitute a breach of the comprehensive
safeguards agreement. The Director General of the IAEA responded that, as no
NPT party had so far sought to apply Article 14, the Board of Governors had not
yet had the opportunity to interpret the Article and relevant procedures, but
from the perspective of the IAEA Secretariat, Australia understood it
correctly, and that the Secretariat would report to the Board of Governors any
notification by the party’s application of Article 14, the arrangements entered
into by the IAEA with the party, or any breach by the party of the procedures
set out in Article 14, and accordingly the Board of Governors has the authority
to take appropriate action in this regard. In the 1980s, some international
arms control experts also sought clarification from the IAEA, and the
Secretariat responded that given the lack of a clear definition of
"non-proscribed military activities", nuclear-powered submarine
reactors were considered the most likely activity, but that activities such as
uranium enrichment or reprocessing of the nuclear fuel in the reactor by the
state in question would still be subject to the IAEA’s safeguards.
Notably, the international community generally accepts that
Article 14 is primarily targeted at the development of nuclear-powered
submarines by the state concerned, rather than by the building assistance by
another state(s). This is because the Statute, since the inception of the IAEA,
clearly states that the IAEA shall apply safeguards to prevent any assistance
provided under its supervision or control from the use in furtherance of any
military purpose. Therefore, applying Article 14 arbitrarily to a situation
where a state receives assistance from another state to build a nuclear-powered
submarine would be in direct violation of the above provisions of the Statute
and jeopardize the object and purpose of the NPT, which is apparently not the
intent of the negotiators of the comprehensive safeguards agreement. It was
reported that the US, the UK and Australia had informed the IAEA of their
proposed nuclear-powered submarines collaboration and been in contact with the
Secretariat, which will certainly involve complex legal issues related to the
safeguards of the nuclear fuels used in nuclear-powered submarine reactors. As
such, the collaboration undoubtedly poses a huge legal challenge to the IAEA's
existing safeguards system.
In addition, it needs to be clear that neither the three
countries nor the IAEA have the authority to interpret Article 14 of the
comprehensive safeguards agreements. According to Article IV.C of the
Statute, "the Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality
of all its members." Historically, the modification, interpretation and
implementation of the various types of the IAEA’s safeguards agreements, e.g.
INFCIRC/66, INFCIRC/153 or INFCIRC/540, require consensus among all willing
IAEA member states and then are approved and adopted by the IAEA Board of
Governors. Regardless of the involvement of the IAEA Secretariat, no state or
group of states shall discuss the issues related to the safeguards
implementation unilaterally and in a small scope, because such discussion will
certainly have far-reaching impacts on the IAEA's safeguards system and affect
the interests of all members of the Agency.
4.2 The AUKUS
nuclear-powered submarines collaboration poses significant technical challenges
to the IAEA with regard to verification
Firstly, the verification process will inevitably involve
sensitive information such as internal composition, geometric structure and
size of nuclear fuel assemblies, and therefore how to achieve effective
monitoring while protecting sensitive information has long vexed the
international community. Secondly, as nuclear-powered submarines
cruise in the deep sea for a long time, the IAEA are not able to have full
tracking and verification on them at anytime and anywhere and needs to upgrade
its technical means. Thirdly, since no non-nuclear-weapon state to the NPT
has previously invoked exemptions from safeguards on nuclear-powered submarine
reactors, it is necessary to verify the operability and effectiveness of any
verification technology before use. Fourthly, a universally agreed
verification scheme has not yet been developed internationally due to the
different attention and concerns of states regarding sensitive information on
nuclear fuel in nuclear-powered submarine reactors. Fifthly, the
international verification schemes that have been proposed all have some
shortcomings. The "black box" scheme, for instance, is controversial
with regard to the starting and end points of verification and lacks essential
timeliness, credibility or operability, or the technical means for verification
tracking and information shielding. The IAEA and its member states have made
long-standing arduous efforts to maintain the comprehensiveness and
effectiveness of the safeguards system. Allowing a large number of
weapons-grade nuclear materials to stay out of regulation for an extended time
runs counter to the international non-proliferation efforts. The AUKUS move has
already posed a new technical challenge to the IAEA and the international
community.
5.The AUKUS
nuclear-powered submarine collaboration seriously undermines nuclear-weapon-free-zone
treaties
A nuclear-weapon-free zone refers to a zone free of nuclear
weapons recognized by the UN General Assembly, which is established voluntarily
by a group of states in the region concerned through a treaty based on the free
exercise of their sovereignty. The NPT gives the state parties the right to
establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. Since the emergence of the concept in the
1950s, nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established in Latin America and the
Caribbean, South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa and Central Asia. These
creations, as a regional non-proliferation approach, are an important part of
the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.
5.1 The
proposed AUKUS collaboration seriously under-mines the spirit of the South
Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty
Specified by the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (“Treaty
of Rarotonga”), each party undertakes: (a) not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means
anywhere inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone; (b) not to
seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear
explosive device; (c) not to store any nuclear explosive device in the
territory of any party; and (d) not to dump radioactive wastes and other
radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone.
As stated above, the treaty prohibits not only nuclear weapons but also nuclear
explosive devices for peaceful purposes and it does not allow the dumping of
nuclear waste and other radioactive materials at sea. The restrictions on
nuclear activities are very firm and thorough, reflecting the common
aspirations of the island states and people of the South Pacific. However, the
AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines collaboration will give Australia access to
tons of weapons-grade HEU, putting the South Pacific region once again under
the cloud of nuclear proliferation and seriously undermining the spirit of the
Treaty of Rarotonga.
In addition, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty is
accompanied by three protocols. Each party to Protocol 1 undertakes to apply
certain prohibitions and safeguards under the Treaty to the territories
situated within the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone for which it is
internationally responsible. The intended parties are the US, the UK and
France. Each party to Protocol 2 undertakes not to use or threaten to use any
nuclear explosive device against parties to the Treaty. The intended
parties are the US, the Soviet Union, the UK, France and China. Each party to
Protocol 3 undertakes not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within
the Zone. The intended parties are the US, the Soviet Union, the UK, France and
China. It is worth noting that the US has not ratified any of the three
protocols so far. It is also the only one of the five nuclear-weapon states
that has not done so.
5.2 The
proposed AUKUS collaboration undermine the efforts of ASEAN countries to
establish the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Under the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (“SEANWFZ
Treaty”), each state party undertakes not to: develop, manufacture or otherwise
acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; station nuclear weapons
by any means; test or use nuclear weapons in anywhere inside or outside the
Zone; seek or receive any assistance with this regard; take any action to
assist or encourage to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons; supply source materials or special fissionable materials or
equipment to any non-nuclear-weapon state or any nuclear-weapon state, except
under full-scope safeguards of the IAEA; or dump at sea anywhere within the
Zone any radioactive material or wastes. The potential entry of Australian
nuclear-powered submarines into Southeast Asian waters have caused serious
concerns among countries in the region. It is therefore a real threat to
regional countries and undermines the efforts of ASEAN countries to establish
the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
6.1
Australia's nuclear ambition
6.1.1
The Australian military actively sought to purchase tactical nuclear weapons
In 1956, Townley, then commander of Royal Australian Air Force
(RAAF), wrote to Minister of Defense McBride, proposing to purchase tactical
nuclear weapons for the “Canberra” bomber. In 1957, during a meeting with a
visiting British delegation, then Prime Minister Menzies personally asked if
the UK could supply Australia with nuclear weapons, and subsequently the RAAF
Lieutenant General made a direct request to the Marshal of the British Royal
Air Force to purchase tactical nuclear weapons. In January 1958, when the then
British Prime Minister Macmillan visited Australia, the Australian Government
made a formal request to purchase tactical nuclear weapons. In August of the
same year, Menzies once again asked visiting British Minister of Supply Jones
about purchasing nuclear warheads.
6.1.2
Australia pursued nuclear delivery systems to indirectly acquire nuclear
weapons
In January 1958, Australia approached the British Royal Air
Force about purchasing the V-Bombers. In September of the same year, during a
visit to the UK, the RAAF Lieutenant General once again expressed Australia’s
willingness to purchase the V-Bombers. Since 1960, Australia's interest in
nuclear-capable bombers has turned to TSR-2 bomber. In 1961, during a meeting
between the Australian and British defense ministers, Australia explained its
interest in TSR-2 bomber, stating that "if Australia were to purchase the
TSR-2 bomber, it would like to ensure that British nuclear weapons would be
available to the bomber if necessary". As the TSR-2 bomber development
program was canceled, Australia eventually purchased the F-111 fighter-bomber
from the US, which is also capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Moreover,
Australia also sought to purchase the British
"Bloodhound" missile, including the Mk-III capable of carrying
nuclear warheads, but also failed due to the termination of the British
development program.
6.1.3
Australia sought British and American commitment to provide it with nuclear
weapons if needed
Into the 1960s, during negotiations among the Soviet Union,
the US and the UK on a nuclear test ban, the Soviet Union insisted that
the treaty should include the Australian monitoring stations because
Britain had conducted several nuclear tests in Australia. In order to resume
negotiations, the UK requested permission to provide these monitoring
stations. Menzies, then Prime Minister of Australia, argued that in return for
joining the treaty, the US and the UK should commit to providing Australia with
extended deterrence and, if Australia needs them, nuclear weapons. In June
1961, the Cabinet of Australian Government adopted Menzies' proposal and
authorized a response to the UK request , seeking "formal recognition of
the United Kingdom about its obligation to provide Australia with nuclear
capabilities when necessary".
6.1.4
Australia launched a program to build nuclear weapons domestically
Since 1964, the Australian Government has re-examined its
nuclear policy and reckoned with how to realize and strengthen its local
manufacturing capability of nuclear weapons. In 1965, the Australian Government
ordered the Australian Ministry of Supply and the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission to estimate the cost of manufacturing nuclear weapons domestically.
In 1967, then Prime Minister Holt and the Defense Council of Australia arranged
a research program to assess the possibility of Australia to manufacture
nuclear weapons independently and the arrangements with its allies. In January
1968, new Prime Minister Gorton explicitly refused to sign the NPT, and at the
same time launched an ambitious nuclear weapons program that included spending
on building nuclear reactors and uranium enrichment plants, producing
weapons-grade plutonium and weapons-grade HEU for nuclear warheads, and
strengthening its nuclear research talent pool. The then Australian Foreign
Minister McMahon supported joining the NPT and pressured Prime Minister Gorton
through the UK and the US. Australia finally approved the NPT in January 1973,
and since then Australia's status as a non-nuclear-weapon state was formally
fixed in legal form.
6.2 Nuclear
weapons possession advocates have resurged in Australia in recent years
In July 2019, White, a former official of Australian
Department of Defense who participated in writing Australia’s Defense White
Paper 2000, published a book titled How to Defend Australia, saying that the
strategic situation in the region where Australia is located is undergoing a
fundamental shift, that Australia's current policy of not possessing nuclear
weapons may not be sustainable, and that Australia must reflect on its military
position and may need to consider possessing nuclear weapons. [Pete Comment: see a review of White's book here.]
In September 2020, Mukilan, a researcher at the Australian
Institute of International Affairs (AIIA), published an article titled
Australia's Nuclear Dilemma, [Pete Comment: that article appears to have been renamed "...Nuclear Conundrum..."] pointing out that Australia, with its abundant
uranium resources and nuclear research forces, has the inherent advantage of
developing nuclear defense capabilities. The author suggests that, in the face
of the changing situation in the Asia-Pacific Region, Australia should adopt a
"hedging strategy" and gradually build up its nuclear defense capabilities
on the basis of its current non-proliferation policy to avoid being trapped in
a strategic dilemma; at the same time, Australia should maintain its
"nuclear option", focus on upgrading its manufacturing capability of
nuclear weapons, and acquire the necessary nuclear technology and materials on
a low profile, so as to shorten its "strategic vulnerable period" and
rapidly manufacture nuclear weapons when needed.
6.3 The
possibility of Australia pursuing nuclear weapons again in the
future cannot be ruled out
Successive Australian administrations have actively sought to
develop nuclear weapons, including acquiring tactical nuclear weapons from the
UK and the US, or otherwise indirectly acquiring nuclear weapons by purchasing
nuclear delivery systems, or promoting Australia's independent manufacture of
nuclear weapons. In recent years, some Australian scholars have been
consistently advocating the possession of nuclear weapons. The Australian
nuclear ambition must cause great vigilance of the countries in the region and
the international community.
The AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine collaboration
involves the transfer of a great deal of weapons-grade nuclear materials, which
cannot be effectively regulated under the IAEA's current safeguards system. In
addition, given the fact that Australia already has a body of nuclear
weapons-related knowledge accumulated historically and that it will get into
its hands nuclear-capable delivery systems, once the country takes the
desperate step to develop nuclear weapons again, the lead time to a nuclear
breakthrough will be too short for the international community to respond
effectively.
The US and some other Western countries have been sending
nuclear-powered submarines to patrol other countries' waters under the banner
of "freedom of navigation" for years, and these submarines cause
serious radioactive pollution to the surrounding environment in case of nuclear
accidents. Since 1954, there have been more than 140 accidents of various
scales involving American nuclear-powered submarines, including many major ones
such as reactor failures and sinking of nuclear-powered submarines. After the
collision accident of the US Navy nuclear-powered attack submarine "USS
Connecticut" in the South China Sea in October 2021, the US deliberately
delayed and concealed the details. So far, it has not yet given a responsible
and detailed account of whether the accident caused nuclear leakage or damage
to the marine environment, causing widespread suspicion and criticism. What is
true of the US is even truer of Australia, a country without the appropriate
accident handling capabilities and experience. In the event of an accident, a
large amount of radioactive nuclear waste will be released into the sea, which
will not only be a direct violation of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone
Treaty, but also seriously damage the global marine environment and endanger
human health.
7.2 Potential
arms race in nuclear-powered submarines
The AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine deal will prompt other
countries to reconsider their submarine ambitions, unleashing new nuclear
proliferation momentum among non-nuclear-weapon states that pursue nuclear-powered
submarines or have expressed a similar intention. The resources and
technologies required to build and operate these nuclear-powered submarines are
daunting for most countries. However, the bad precedent set by the AUKUS deal
is likely to stimulate some countries to try and possess nuclear-powered
submarines in the same way, thus triggering a submarine arms race. Some may
even try to cross the nuclear threshold, thus stimulating regional countries to
expand their military power, which will raise the risk of military conflicts
and ultimately pose a great threat to world peace and stability.
7.3 The
transfer of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles will pose a great challenge to the current
international missile export control regimes
Upon the announcement of AUKUS, the three countries emphasized
that the US and the UK would not only assist Australia in building
nuclear-powered submarines, but also provide it with long-range
precision-strike capabilities, including Tomahawk Cruise Missiles, joint
air-to-surface standoff missiles, long-range anti-ship missiles, hypersonic
missiles and precision-strike guided missiles. The Tomahawk Cruise Missile, for
example, is an offensive nuclear-capable weapon developed by the US and has
been deeply marked by American militarism since its inception. The deal this
time will involve the latest version of Tomahawk, with a range of 1,700km, far
exceeding the maximum limit of the "Missile Technology Control
Regime" (MTCR). Ironically, the three countries, who are not only members
but also major advocates of the MTCR, are now putting the pursuit of defense
capabilities ahead of their non-proliferation and export control commitments,
in stark contrast to the restrained, prudent and responsible attitude of other
countries in missile transfer. This once again reflects their double standards
in international order, and poses a great challenge to international missile
export control regimes, including MTCR.
7.4 Profound
negative impact on global strategic balance and stability
The development of AUKUS and the proposed nuclear-powered
submarine collaboration are, in essence, attempting to drawing ideological
lines and creating a new military bloc. The move will aggravate
geopolitical tensions. While the international community is generally opposed
to cold war and division, the US, openly violating its policy declaration of
not engaging in a new Cold War, gangs up to create an Anglo-Saxon
"circle", mobilizes resources toward the Indo-Pacific region, applies
high-tech and strategic forces to expand its military influence, and puts
geopolitical self-interest ahead of international solidarity. Such a move
represents a resurgence of Cold War thinking and will exacerbate the risk of
military confrontation and conflict. Nuclear-powered submarines not only have a
mobile strategic strike capability, but also have the potential to carry
nuclear weapons. With Australia attached to the US and UK leading to increased
military capabilities as a group, the nuclear balance among nuclear-weapon
states and global strategic stability will be profoundly impacted.
8.The AUKUS
countries are urged to immediately revoke the wrong decision, and the
international community is called upon to take joint action to safeguard the
global nuclear nonproliferation regime
On June 6，2022，upon China's proposal, the IAEA decided by
consensus to add a formal agenda item for the Board of Governors to discuss
"Transfer of nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards
in all aspects under the NPT". This is the third time that the
IAEA has reviewed this agenda item since the Board of Governors in
November 2021 and March 2022. This reflects the serious concern of the
members of the Board of Governors on this matter and the somber realization
that it is beyond the existing mandate of the IAEA Secretariat and must be explored
and solved by the IAEA member states through an intergovernmental process. In
light of these developments, we hereby urge these three countries to
immediately revoke the wrong decision, and at the same time call on the
international community to act together to safeguard the global nuclear
nonproliferation regime and prevent the international order from being affected
again.
8.1 The AUKUS
countries are urged to immediately revoke their wrong decisions
The US and the UK, as nuclear-weapon states under the NPT,
should abandon their old "Cold War" thinking and narrow geopolitical
ideas, immediately stop their dangerous nuclear proliferation practices,
immediately revoke their wrong decisions, faithfully fulfill their
international non-proliferation obligations, and do more things beneficial to
the international non-proliferation regime and world peace and security.
Australia, as a non-nuclear-weapon state under the NPT, should cease its
dangerous collaboration with the other two countries with a sense of responsibility
for its own people and the international community as a whole, pending a
solution is determined by consensus among all member states of the IAEA.
8.2 The
international community is called upon to take joint actions to safeguard the
global nuclear nonproliferation regime
We also call on the international community to take pragmatic
actions to safeguard the object and purpose of the NPT and jointly maintain the
integrity, effectiveness and authority of the global nuclear nonproliferation
regime. Firstly, joint efforts should be made to promote the early
establishment of a special committee-like regime by the IAEA, open to all
member states, to discuss the legal and technical aspects of the application of
safeguards on nuclear submarine power reactors and related nuclear materials in
non-nuclear-weapon states, and to submit recommendations to the IAEA Board of
Governors and the UN General Assembly. Secondly, broader discussions should be
held within the international multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation
regime, such as the five nuclear-weapon states (P5), the UN Security Council,
the UN General Assembly First Committee and the UN Conference on Disarmament.
In particular, there should a separate agenda at the 10th NPT Review
Conference to consider the transfer of nuclear materials, safeguards and other
issues affecting the NPT as a result of the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine
collaboration. Thirdly, with this as a warning and from a practical point of
view, efforts should be stepped up to improve the comprehensiveness of the
current global nuclear nonproliferation regime and clarify the scope of
application of the relevant provisions in legal instruments, so as to avoid
malicious use and confusion by certain states with ulterior motives.
1:According to IAEA report, HEU refers to the uranium with a
U-235 isotopic content of greater than or equal to 20%. Generally, uranium with
a U-235 isotopic content greater than or equal to 90% is considered
weapons-grade.
2:International Panel on Fissile Materials, "US study of
reactor and fuel types to enable naval reactors to shift from HEU fuel".
3:This is stated in a related article by Tariq Rauf, Director of
the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Program of the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, Sweden.
4:According to IAEA report, 25 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU or
5:kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium constitutes a
"significant quantity," i.e., the minimum quantity to make one
nuclear weapon.
6:United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs, “South Pacific
Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty: Status”
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/rarotonga and “Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones:
South Pacific,” Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and
Regimes, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Last Update: 11 May 2012.
7:Australian Archives (ACT): A1945/13 186-5-3; Memo from Athol
Townley, Minister for Air, to Philip McBride, Minister for Defense September
12, 1956, p. 1.
8:Australian Archives (ACT): A1945/13,186-5-3; Extracts from
Notes of Meeting in Cabinet Room at Parliament House, Canberra at 10:30 AM on
Friday, March 15, 1957 (Top Secret).
9:PRO: D0 35/8287; Cabinet: Prime Minister’s Commonwealth Tour,
Brief by the Commonwealth Relations Office, Supply of Kiloton Bombs to
Australia, January/February 1958, GEN 622/1/60, December 18, 1957, p. 1.
10:Australian Archives (ACT): A1838/269, TS680-10; Record of
Discussions with Mr. Aubrey Jones, Minister of Supply in the United Kingdom
Government, 13th August, 1958 (Top Secret).
11:PRO: D0 35/8287; Memo from F. R. Carey, UK Joint Service
Liaison Staff, to William S Bates, Office of High Commissioner for the United
Kingdom, Canberra, October 31, 1958, p. 2; Cawte, Atomic Australia, p. 108.
12:PRO: D0 35/8287; Memo from F. R. Carey, UK Joint Service
Liaison Staff, to William S Bates, Office of High Commissioner for the United
Kingdom, Canberra, October 31, 1958, p. 2; Cawte, Atomic Australia, p. 108.
13:PRO: DO 35/8288; Committee Minutes, Ministry of Defence, Co-operation
with Australia in the Development of New Weapons, (S.E. (0)C / P (60)25) July
19, 1960, pp. 1, 5 (Secret).
14:PRO: D0 35/8287; Memo from N. Pritchard, [Acting Deputy
Under-Secretary of State, CRO], to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations,
July 20, 1961. pp. 1-2.
15:PRO: DO 35/8288; Draft Minute from Secretary of State to
Prime Minister, March 21, 1960; PRO: DO 35/8288, Outward Telegram from
Commonwealth Relations Office, Canberra, No. 471, March 30, 1960 (Top Secret).
16:Australian Archives (ACT): A5818/2; Robert Menzies to the
Cabinet, Nuclear Tests Conference: Control Posts in Australia, Submission No.
1156, V6, pp. 1-6 (Secret).
17:Australian Archives (ACT): A5818/2; Robert Menzies to the
Cabinet, Nuclear Tests Conference: Control Posts in Australia, Submission No.
1156, V6, p. 13 (Secret).
18:Australian Archives (ACT): A5818/2; Cabinet Minute, Canberra,
June 13, 1961, Decision No. 1383, Submission No. 1156, Nuclear Tests
Conference: Control Posts in Australia, V6 (Secret).
Howson, The Howson Diaries..., pp. 181- 183.
19:Archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
Unregistered document; Paper y Department of Supply and A.A.E.C., Costs of a
Nuclear Explosives Programme, p. (Top Secret).
20:The "Missile Technology Control Regime", aiming to
prevent the proliferation of the missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass
destruction and related technologies, restricts member countries from exporting
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with a range of more than 300km and a
payload of more than 500kg.
Contribution | Arms Control Research Team of the General Academy