Indian Carrier Operations in the IOR

Inspired by Ghalib Kabir’s February 24, 2024 comments: and Ghalib spotted this excellent CNN article https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/15/asia/india-navy-dual-aircraft-carrier-operations-intl-hnk-ml/index.html 

In June 2023 India demonstrated its naval strength with a dual aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant "II", battle group exercise in the Arabian Sea off India’s west coast. This was with 35 aircraft as well as Indian surface escorts protected by Indian submarines. 

These two Indian carriers are used regularly in exercises. India is strengthening its carrier airwings and navy generally with the purchase of 24 multi-mission (including anti-submarine) MH-60R Seahawks.

Ghalib Kabir added offline on February 26: One of the reasons India is conducting two carrier ops along with SSK and future SSN use is that China is sending multiple oceanographic and SIGINT ships (and here) besides SSKs, SSNs and other surface ships near India.

China won’t back down and are clear that they will poke their finger onto Indian wounds every chance they get…

India's two carriers were operating together in late February 2024 at the MILAN 2024 multilateral naval exercise (and see) hosted by India. This exercise is held by India every 2 years in India’s Fleet Base East (Vizag) right through to India’s Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Bay of Bengal.

China has had no dual carrier exercises and virtually no operational carrier experience. In  contrast India has decades of carrier experience. The Indian Navy operated INS Vikrant "I" from 1961 and INS Viraat from 1987.

Also there are doubts whether the UK RN has sufficient escorts to operate the UK’s two Queen Elizabeth-class carriers simultaneously - photo opportunities excepted!

Like Russia’s and China’s current carriers India uses STOBAR (short (ski-jump) take-off - arrested recovery) technology. 

India's Carrier Fixed Airwing Problems 

"But even with the advancements demonstrated by the dual-carrier operation, India’s carrier program still has question marks, said Childs from IISS.

“While an impressive-looking display, there may be some question over what this really amounts to as yet in terms of actual operational capability,” he said, noting that images from the Indian operation showed relatively few fighter aircraft on the decks of the Vikramaditya and Vikrant.

“This may indicate limited aircraft availability, or that the ships’ capacities are somewhat constrained at the moment. It would certainly suggest that the Indian Navy could do with more carrier aircraft,” Childs said."

Pete Comment: Having relied on the Russian MiG-29 K for carrier operations ultimately India wants  a locally developed naval fighter-attack aircraft. After testing the very slowly developed “Mirage III in a time warp” HAL Tejas for many years, the Indian Navy has found the Tejas overweight for carrier operations. Some in India’s HAL military-industrial complex have turned their ambitions to a future jet called the HAL TEDBF which is promised to be more than a Tejas with two jet engines rather than one. The TEDBF's first flight is expected in 2026. 

Hence India is buying 26 marine Rafale Ms from France as an interim carrier fighter.

Ghalib Kabir further comments that India’s carrier ops and navy generally will be strengthened with a further lease (perhaps from 2025) of a renovated Russian Akula-class SSN, informally called Chakra "III"

Pete Comment

Indian and Chinese carriers might have difficulty operating in a high intensity naval war in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Their own SSKs (as well as Pakistan's) and SSNs could fire sufficient torpedoes and anti-ship missiles to make carrier ops brutal and short. Nuclear weapons, owned by all three countries, would extinguish carrier ops even more quickly.

The main value of carriers in the Indian Ocean may be: power projection over island groups; over less defended ports of weaker countries on the IOR rim; to complicate the low-medium intensity naval strategy and operations of opponents; and for prestige. 

Also see my March 3, 2015 article Latest on India's Aircraft Carrier Projects 

SECRET Waste Dump Clauses of AUKUS SSN Agreement

In response to some of French Anonymous' February 2, 2024 comments: 

If France sold Barracuda SSNs to Australia and, because they use LEU, France agreed to accept Australian Barracudas (including spent LEU) being returned to France this may be attractive to Australia. 

This is because clauses of the AUKUS agreement require: 

1. (reported but actual wording in unrevealed AUKUS agreement SECRET) a Low to Intermediate level nuclear waste Dump being built in Australia for waste arising from US and Australian Virginia and SSN-AUKUS maintenance. The dump will be at Fleet Base West ie. Perth Naval Base. 

2. (actual wording SECRET) Australia must dispose of high level radioactive materials and Australian Virginia and Australian SSN-AUKUS subs once these SSNs are decommissioned. 

3. (TOP SECRET) - The UK will bear much of the SSN-AUKUS burden for Australia if Australia accepts all/some part of the irradiated reactor compartments and HEU waste of the UK's decommissioned SSNs and SSBNs, in a future Australian High Level Nuclear Waste Dump.

[In a subsequent Guardian (Australian Edition) Article of April 2, 2024 the same concerns were raised - see ‘Poison portal’: US and UK could send nuclear waste to Australia under Aukus, inquiry told | Aukus | The Guardian "New laws to establish a safety framework for Australia’s planned nuclear-powered submarines could also allow the US and UK to send waste here, while both of those countries are struggling to deal with their own waste, as no long-term, high-level waste facilities have been created."]

See AUKUS Briefing Book https://securityanddefenceplus.plusalliance.org/aukus-briefing-book/ and AUKUS Factsheet contains a complex and ambiguous network of overlapping responsibilities. See below official AUKUS flow chart. Nuclear Waste Dumps for Australia may be under "Nuclear  Stewardship" and/or "Non-Proliferation" and/or, more explicitly, under one of the three "Classified or Not Disclosed" activities under "Submarines" below. 

Off Topic - One of the "Classified or Not Disclosed" activities would be a Security Liaison Group mainly led by the FBI, MI5 and ASIO (here and here) and . They would be making high level decisions on Counter Espionage, Foreign Interference, Cybersecurity and high level Vetting as those topics relate to AUKUS. 

An AUKUS Security Liaison Group meeting was held around the time of an "FBI-hosted summit of [security service] heads from the agencies of Five Eyes alliance countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US" held in the US, in late 2023 -  see Beijing seeks to ‘disrupt’ AUKUS, MI5 head says of October 23, 2023 at https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2023/10/23/2003808089  .

Is India Actually Using Both Its Carriers?

I'm wondering whether India has used its two newish carriers (INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant) for operations?

Have they been part of Indian carrier group exercises?

Has their strategic purpose been merely as a counter to China's carrier developments?

France's Naval Nuclear Worker Shortage: No Barracudas for RAN

A France wide lack of nuclear workers foils claims France could deliver Barracuda SSNs to Australia quickly and easily – outside of the likely delay: 2050 or later (see my previous article).

Also Barracudas lack all important VLS. Only VLS can launch ever larger diameter future longer range hypersonic missiles for land attack. Such missiles would act as a partial deterrent against China.

On nuclear workers see the French source “France’s struggle to deliver a second nuclear era” by Sarah White in Saint-Marcel (France) at the Financial Times APRIL 23 2023

at https://www.ft.com/content/d23b14ae-2c4e-458c-af8a-22692119f786 which includes:

“France, which employs some 220,000 people in the nuclear industry, needs to rebuild a deep bench of qualified workers for its new nuclear drive. Among them will be highly trained welders like Geoffray and his colleagues — EDF estimates France will need double the 500 it has today by 2030. At the Hefaïs welding school launched last year by the company and other manufacturers near Cherbourg, on the northern coast close to France’s nuclear submarine shipyards, the complexities of even that task are apparent.  

After nine months of training there, including with headsets on virtual equipment, they can qualify for a first job, says Corentin Lelièvre, the school’s director. But it can take five to seven years of experience and repeat training before they are entrusted with the most intricate tasks.

Those can require developing a quasi-acrobatic skill of being able to keep a steady hand while working upside down, or using a mirror in cramped corners of a reactor circuit to guide the weld — a one-shot operation that workers can’t go back on once it’s started. It also involves learning to work safely in a radioactive environment, and in a post-Fukushima world, how to grapple with extra layers of documentation.”

++++++++++++

France’s future “PA-NG” nuclear aircraft carrier + its two future K22 reactors are two more major nuclear projects confronting France’s naval nuclear worker shortage.

No early SSN (even in 2032?) for the RAN

As Virginias for the RAN might only arrive in the late 2030s, it is fortunate the first Collins LOTE is scheduled from "mid-2026". See the Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) reference https://www.asa.gov.au/aukus/collins-class-submarines

US Virginias

The most authoritative source, the ASA, is no longer talking first Virginia for Australia in 2032. Rather ASA is on record as writing https://www.asa.gov.au/aukus/australias-nuclear-powered-submarines :

"The United States intends to sell Australia 3 Virginia Class SSNs (nuclear-powered submarines) from as soon as the early 2030s, which was authorised by the US Congress in December 2023. Australia retains the option to seek approval for up to 2 more if needed....". 

The US offer very much relies on much higher yearly Virginia production, through to commissioning, rates of Virginias than the US (now also entering full Columbia SSBN production) has been able to achieve since the 1990s. 

Also a US President in the 2030s must be satisfied that the USN is receiving all the Virginias it needs before he/she can approve any spare Virginias for Australia.  

UK SSN-AUKUS

The UK's final Astute (Agincourt) might be commissioned in 2026 or later. Simultaneously many of the UKs limited nuclear sub building force will be committed to the 4 new generation SSBN (Dreadnought) program until about 2045. This is if Dreadnoughts are  commissioned every 4 years from 2033  see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dreadnought-class_submarine#Boats_of_the_class

About the SSN-AUKUS for Australia the Australian Submarine Agency writes - see https://www.asa.gov.au/aukus/australias-nuclear-powered-submarines :

"The UK will commence construction of its first SSN-AUKUS in Barrow-in-Furness UK, as early as the late 2020s. The UK intends to deliver its first SSN-AUKUS to the UK Royal Navy in the late 2030s. 

[It is only after SSN-AUKUS are delivered to the UK RN that they can be completed at Osborne, Adelaide, for the RAN.]

Hence the Australian Submarine Agency, very ambiguously on timings, writes - https://www.asa.gov.au/aukus/australias-nuclear-powered-submarines :

"Australia's nuclear-powered submarines - SSN-AUKUS - will be based on the UK's next generation design that incorporates technology from all 3 nations, including cutting edge US submarine technologies."

In plain English the UK RN will need to commission its first SSN-AUKUS from "late 2030s" then one should expect several years of trials before commissioning this first-of-class (say 2042) then years to tool up Osborne, Adelaide for production - (say from 2045).

For subsequent confirmation of the difficulties and delays leading to lateness of the UK's SSN-AUKUS, flowing on to late Australian SSN-AUKUS timings, see Peter Briggs' excellent essay at ASPI’s The Strategist titled “SSN AUKUS is at the back of the queue” of 27 Feb 2024, at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ssn-aukus-is-at-the-back-of-the-queue/ .

French Barracuda SSNs

There is a myth that France could deliver SSNs to the RAN simply and more quickly if President Macron or Naval Group so will it. But France's very limited NUCLEAR (as distinct from CONVENTIONAL) submarine designing-building workforce are mainly committed to finishing their own Navy's last Barracudas - until 2031 see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barracuda-class_submarine_%28France%29#Boats. 

In parallel the balance of France's NUCLEAR submarine workforce are working on France's 3rd Generation SSBN (French acronym "SNLE 3G") see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SNLE_3G#Design_and_operation  :

"first steel [was] cut for the vessels in 2023 and completed submarines delivered at a rate of one every five years from 2035, with the programme completing in 2050." 

All this means is France will not have some nuclear manpower resources for any Australian  Barracuda SSN Project until the late 2040s, if not after 2050. That includes too few Frenchmen even to train up an Australian workforce - with our workforce totally inexperienced in building SSNs.

Hedging Plan

As SSNs from the US are politically unprovable until the 2030s and unlikely to be in the form of SSN-AUKUS for the RAN before 2045, and even less likely and later from France, a hedging plan is appropriate. That is:

 -  as ASA has written, Australia doing its Collins LOTE. I suggest Saab with its experience, effectively LOTEing the Gotland-class, can assist see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gotland-class_submarine#Mid-life_upgrade_contract . 

-  Australia is also developing XLUUVs (partly under AUKUS Pillar 2). XLUUVs can lay smartmines, do electronic intercepts and other reconnaissance and even tow sonars. 

-  Australia alongside the US and UK, partly under AUKUS, could develop ever longer range missiles for long range strike, including anti-shipping. Such missiles already include Tomahawks. New types of longer range hypersonic (steerable) missiles are where the West's peer competitors (China and Russia) are venturing. For example something like a Western equivalent of China's DF-26 (anti-ship capable) missile may be of medium-long term value for Australia.  

It is no coincidence that Australia is developing dual-use long range missile capabilities under cover of NASA assistance (see the "Mar 2018" and "Jul 2018" items here) in Australia's Gilmour Space Technologies "Block 1" "rocket" or missile. 

Please don't get me started on the possibilities of the Australian developed third generation "SILEX" laser enrichment of Uranium technology or where I'm going might be too obvious...

Honeytrap: Love Interest or Sexpionage?

See Peter Suciu’s article of Feb 14, 2024

Honeytrap Warning: Love Interest or Sexpionage?

at https://news.clearancejobs.com/2024/02/14/honeytrap-warning-love-interest-or-sexpionage/  

Would-be "SSN Countries" US Rejected: RL32418 Part 1.

Much military information, normally Secret throughout the West, Russia and China, is Unclassified in the US, via the US Government supported/manned Congressional Research Service (CRS).

See the CRS' February 13, 2024 report RL32418

titled “Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress”

at https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL32418.pdf

For the record - Excerpts include:

[Page 16] "Previous Countries That Requested but Did Not Receive U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Technology 

Overview

U.S. submarine technology and naval nuclear propulsion technology, reflecting decades of cumulative U.S. Navy research, development, design, construction, and operational experience, are generally considered crown jewels of U.S. military technology and consequently are highly protected. As noted earlier, the technical (including acoustic) superiority of U.S. Navy nuclear powered submarines is generally considered a foundation of U.S. superiority in undersea warfare, which in turn underpins a U.S. ability to leverage the world’s oceans as a medium of operations and maneuver, deny that to others, and thereby generate a huge asymmetric strategic advantage for the United States. 

Given both its high degree of importance to overall U.S. national security strategy and U.S. technical superiority in the field, U.S. naval nuclear propulsion technology to date has been shared with only one other country—the UK, through an arrangement begun in 1958 reflecting the U.S.-UK special relationship and U.S.-UK cooperation on nuclear-related matters dating back to the Manhattan project in World War II. 

[Page 17] As detailed below, during the Cold War, when the United States and its allies were engaged in an extended, high-stakes, and costly strategic competition against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact allies, the United States reportedly turned down requests from four U.S. treaty allies [other than the UK, namely]—France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan—to share U.S. naval nuclear propulsion technology. A fifth U.S. treaty ally—Canada—also requested but did not receive this technology. 

Canada canceled its SSN project before the United States acted fully on Canada’s request. A sixth country, Pakistan, also requested but did not receive the technology.

Detailed Discussion

In a November 18, 1987, presentation at a conference in Ottawa, Canada, U.S. Navy Captain Robert F. Hofford, the U.S. naval attaché in Ottawa—who stated that he was expressing his own views, which did not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government—stated that 

Canada is not the only country that has requested this particular advantage from the U.S. As a matter of fact, Canada stands at the end of a line of about six different nations [other than the UK] that have requested exactly the same support from the U.S. for [a] nuclear submarine program. In fact we have turned them all down up to this point, so Canada is in a unique position of being the first country other than the British to be allowed or to even start a technology information flow that will allow the country to pursue its lines toward a nuclear program.39 

Regarding France, Italy, and the Netherlands, a November 5, 1987, letter from Representative Melvin Price to Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and Secretary of Energy John S. Herrington, the full text of which is reprinted in Appendix E, states in part

It is important to appreciate that there is nothing new about an ally wanting our naval nuclear propulsion technology—or about the consistently strong U.S. policy against its releases. Over the years, we have turned down requests from a number of countries, including France, Italy, and the Netherlands.

 Regarding France, a 1989 journal article on assistance that the United States provided to France on the design of French nuclear warheads stated 

One area in which the French requested but did not receive help was in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technology and, in particular, in silencing their own ballistic missile submarines to make them less easily tracked by Soviet hunter-killers. The U.S. Navy adamantly opposed any such assistance. Behind the navy’s position was the extreme sensitivity of its own counter-ASW regime. “The security of our Poseidon-Trident force was so important that we were not going to share with anybody else the methods we used to preserve it,” a senior civilian told me. Another said, “This is a jewel the navy will give to no one.”40 

Regarding Japan, Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee, then-Director of the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (aka Naval Reactors), testified in March 1988: 

Frankly, I think Japan is smart enough, if they really want to, to develop a phase-to-phase [sic: phased-array] radar.41 They have also asked us for help in nuclear submarines. We say[,] “If you want to get into the nuclear submarine business, go ahead and do it. You don’t need our help.”42

Regarding Pakistan, Admiral McKee testified in March 1988: “We have a letter from the Pakistanis who want one [i.e., a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine] because the Soviets gave [sic: leased] one [i.e., a Soviet nuclear-powered submarine] to India.43

Admiral McKee’s testimony about Japan and Pakistan was given in connection with a project that Canada initiated in 1987 to acquire a force of 10 to 12 UK- or French-made SSNs. A choice by Canada to select the UK SSN design (the Trafalgar-class design) would have involved the transfer to Canada of naval nuclear propulsion technology in the Trafalgar-class design that was derived from the naval nuclear propulsion technology that the United States provided to the UK beginning in 1958, which would have raised a question of U.S. approval for a potential sale of UK-made SSNs to Canada. The issue was discussed in a 1988 CRS report.44 Canada canceled its SSN project in 1989, mooting the potential question of whether to share with Canada naval nuclear propulsion technology in the Trafalgar-class design that was derived from the naval nuclear propulsion technology that the United States provided to the UK beginning in 1958. For 1987-1988 letters and statements from Members of Congress regarding the Canadian SSN project, see Appendix E.

[Footnotes]
39 Transcript of presentation.
40 Richard H. Ullman, “The Covert French Connection,” Foreign Policy, Summer 1989 (No. 75): 16-17, accessed at https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148862
41 Admiral McKee’s testimony at this point is referring to a proposal at the time, which he was asked to comment on, to sell to Japan the U.S. Navy’s surface ship Aegis weapon system, which included the SPY-1 phased-array radar. The system was eventually sold to Japan and is now used on eight Japanese destroyers. The system was also sold to South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway for use on ships in the navies of those countries. For more on the Aegis system, (continued...) Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal Congressional Research Service 18 say[,] “If you want to get into the nuclear submarine business, go ahead and do it. You don’t need our help.”
42 Regarding Pakistan, Admiral McKee testified in March 1988: “We have a letter from the Pakistanis who want one [i.e., a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine] because the Soviets gave [sic: leased] one [i.e., a Soviet nuclear-powered submarine] to India.
43 Admiral McKee’s testimony about Japan and Pakistan was given in connection with a project that Canada initiated in 1987 to acquire a force of 10 to 12 UK- or French-made SSNs. A choice by Canada to select the UK SSN design (the Trafalgar-class design) would have involved the transfer to Canada of naval nuclear propulsion technology in the Trafalgar-class design that was derived from the naval nuclear propulsion technology that the United States provided to the UK beginning in 1958, which would have raised a question of U.S. approval for a potential sale of UK-made SSNs to Canada. The issue was discussed in a 1988 CRS report.
44 Canada canceled its SSN project in 1989, mooting the potential question of whether to share with Canada naval nuclear propulsion technology in the Trafalgar-class design that was derived from the naval nuclear propulsion technology that the United States provided to the UK beginning in 1958. For 1987-1988 letters and statements from Members of Congress regarding the Canadian SSN project, see Appendix E." 

Trump Parrots Putin's Policies

One of the KGB's top Cold War roles was to use covert methods (including Agents of Influence) to try to split the NATO alliance and alienate Western citizens from their governments. Hence the USSR encouraged unilateral nuclear disarmament calls of protesters within NATO countries in the 1980s, but not among the threatened masses of Warsaw Pact countries. 

Ex-KGB man Putin (now Commander-in-Chief of all Russia's external intelligence agencies as well as FSB) has a record of successfully manipulating Trump as an Agent of Influence. Trump parroted some Putin policies during Trump's first presidency. Such as Trump typifying the US intelligence community as a "Deep State". This may resume during Trump's second presidency.

1. Reported 12 Feb: Speaking at a rally in South Carolina on 10/11 Feb 2024 Trump recalled when he was President (2017-2021) Trump told a NATO member that Trump would "encourage" Russia to do as it wishes in cases of NATO allies who are "delinquent".[ie. A NATO country paying less than 2% of its GDP on Defence]. "'No I would not protect you. In fact I would encourage them [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want”. [to your NATO country].

Biden commented: "If my opponent, Donald Trump, is able to regain power, he is making it clear as day that he will abandon our NATO allies if Russia attacks," he said. "[Trump’s] admission that he intends to give Putin a green-light for more war and violence, to continue his brutal assault against a free Ukraine, and to expand his aggression to the people of Poland and the Baltic states are appalling and dangerous."

2. If Trump wins the November 5th, 2024 Election Trump may broker a Russo-Ukraine peace treaty that might largely be drafted by Putin. Hence the resulting Russian victory over Ukraine would benefit Putin as well as Putin's friend Trump. This is in terms of Russian money through intermediaries for Trump. A Russian victory over Ukraine might also embolden China into such risky behavior as blockading Taiwan – starving Taiwan into surrender. 
If China took Taiwan then the current third of Chinese military forces (aimed at Taiwan) would be freed up for longer distance ventures – one day impacting us in Australia. After all China is not just rapidly expanding its military budget (now more than A$400 Billion per year) for mainland defence.

3. Further on US politics that directly impacts Australia. Biden’s loss in the November Election seems assured with the horserace like odds on a Biden win plunging over the last week to 3.40 against Trump’s 1.91 (as at 12 Feb). Biden is now seen by many as an illegal hoarder of secret documents like Trump. What’s worse Biden is seen by the Justice Department Special Counsel Robert Hur as a “well-meaning, elderly man with a poor memory”. Hur is a former official nominated to high office by Trump. The Trump camp are saying if Biden is too senile to stand trial Biden is too senile to be President. 

There may be hope Biden is prepared for someone else, like Michelle Obama, to become the Democrat nominee, pre 2024 Election.

PNG Prime Minister Marape Visits Australia

As if in answer to my prayers the Australian Government is suddenly taking more notice of Papua New Guinea (PNG).

ABC Article

On February 8, 2024 foreign affairs reporter Stephen Dziedzic and PNG correspondent Tim Swanston for Australia's Government owned ABC News reported: 

[In a visit to Australia on February 8, 2024] "Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape urges Australia to not 'give up' on his country in historic parliament address"

Here and above [PNG's Prime Minister James Marape is the first Pacific leader to address a joint sitting of both houses of Australia's Parliament.]
---

"In Short: PNG's Prime Minister James Marape became the first Pacific leader to address a joint sitting of both houses of parliament.

• He said the two countries shared a unique relationship and urged Australia not to give up on PNG.
• What's next? Mr Marape will return home on Friday where he could face a no confidence motion as soon as next week.

The Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea James Marape has urged Australia to not  "give up" on his country during an historic address to the federal parliament.

On Thursday morning, Mr Marape became the first Pacific leader to address the joint sitting of both houses, with MPs and Senators packing into the lower house to listen.

The prime minister dwelt heavily on the shared history between Australia and Papua New Guinea, paying tribute to prime minister Gough Whitlam who helped shepherd his country to independence almost 50 years ago.

"It was from this parliament that many decisions were made that have helped and shaped what Papua New Guinea was before 1975, and what Papua New Guinea is after 1975," Mr Marape said.

"This is why Papua New Guinea has a very special and very unique relationship with Australia. We are the only country Australia has birthed."

He acknowledged that Papua New Guinea continues to grapple with profound social and economic difficulties in the wake of riots that gripped the capital Port Moresby [on January 10, 2024], but declared that his government was intent on overhauling the public sector, police force and judiciary in order to improve stability.

"It is true our people need greater empowerment in many aspects of their life. But not all is bad. Not all is bad," he told the joint sitting.

"Nearly 50 years on, our democracy remains strong as ever …. we have not fallen to the barrel of the gun as many emerging nations."

Australia has extended multiple loans and grants to Papua New Guinea worth billions of dollars to help support its budget bottom line and develop its infrastructure, and last year the two nations struck a security pact which will see Canberra plough a further $200 million into developing PNG's police force and judiciary.

Mr Marape said PNG's leaders had to deal with a vast and inaccessible landscape, widespread illiteracy and a large and hugely diverse population.

"As I visit you today, I ask you — do not give up on Papua New Guinea," the prime minister said.

"We have always bounced back from our low moments and we will continue to grow, learning from every low moments and every high moments."

Mr Marape has repeatedly spoken about the critical need to expand PNG's economic base and cut its dependency on development assistance, and he struck a similar theme on [the morning of February 8, 2024].

"Papua New Guinea must not continue to be an aid grant receiving nation, a nation that is borrowing every year to survive," he told the joint sitting.

"We must become a strong country standing on our own two feet economically independent and strong so we too can help Australia maintain democracy, preserve peace and ensure stability in our part of planet Earth, in our Pacific."

The prime minister also drew a laugh when describing Australia and PNG as siblings which were joined at the hip.

[Said Prime Minister Marape] "One is stuck with family forever … our two countries are stuck with each other. We have no choice but to get along."

PNG-China Security Cooperation Increasing

Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a large island nation. See PNG above in relation to Australia and the Solomon Islands. (Map courtesy VOA News).  

It is likely China will win the new round of competition to supply security police and training to Papua New Guinea (PNG). Unlike PNG’s long term security sponsor (Australia) China has been prepared to bribe whole Pacific Island parliaments, as China did with the Solomon Islands in 2022.

PNG holds many attractions for China, including abundant energy resources, minerals and an ideal strategic position between the Indian and Pacific oceans (epitomised by Lombrum Naval Base).

Corruption in PNG is widely accepted as a political necessity. China, with its deeper pockets and the higher priority it places on expanding relations with Pacific islands, can outbid even Australian and US efforts. PNG politicians can accept "commissions" for Chinese security equipment deals - equipment that goes to the underpaid, under-resourced, PNG police force. Chinese security police advisors can then help set the tone of bilateral relations.  

For previous Submarine Matters' articles on PNG see here and here.