INS Aridhaman's (probably) Symbolic Launch late 2017

Artist's rendering of the future INS Aridhaman. Diagram courtesy Indian Defence Research Wing (IDRW)

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The following is partly based on Ghalib Kabir's comments of 28 to 29 August 2017 mixed with Pete’s research.

India's future SSBN INS Aridhaman has been under construction at the Ship Building Centre in Visakhapatnam since 2011.  Aridhaman might be symbolically launched in late 2017. Actual  launch (into the water for fitting out) may be in 2018. Then would follow harbor trials and sea trials for 2 years with commissioning expected sometime in 2020 or 2021.

Aridhaman is the second in the Arihant class and is larger than INS Arihant. While Arihant only has 4 large launch tubes Aridhaman has 8 making Aridhaman more useful as an SSBN. Each launch tube will be able to  carry 3 K-15 Sagarika missiles (total of 24) with a range of 750 km or a total of 8 future K-4 missiles (with a range of 3,500 km)

Aridhaman length and displacement will increase due to the 4 extra launch tubes, a longer more powerful reactor, extra crew, more powerful sonars and other mission critical equipment. Aridhaman  may be 125m long and 7,000 tonnes (surfaced) larger than INS Arihant’s 111m and 6,000 tonnes (surfaced). Aridhaman's dimention would be very similar to the no longer operating US Ethan Allan class (at 125m long/7,000 tonnes). 

Aridhaman will have one seven-blade propeller powered by a PWR reactor. INS Arihant has a 83 MWt (12 MWe, 16,000 shp) reactor while Aridhaman may have a 100 MWt reactor (approx 16 MWe or 20,000+ shp)

The increase in power of Aridhaman's 100 MWt reactor may be achieved by many means including:

-  larger size 

-  higher HEU than the usual 40% for Indian nuclear subs (see page 67 of this pdf) and

-  higher steam pressure

If the reactor heavily relies on Russian design assistance then Russia’s VM-4 reactor (70-90 MWt) may be an influence. Alternatively India's advanced nuclear complexes (especially that at Kalpakkam) might have allowed India to develop the 100 MWt reactor without Russian help. 

Another INS Aridhaman image (courtesy Defense News).

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Ghalib Kabir and Pete

North Korean Missile Test Over Japan (the 3rd in 20 years)

MAP A

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MAP B - Path of missile over Japan. The missile was perhaps a Hwasong-12 (aka KN-17) IRBM according to some analysts (Map courtesy Agency France Press (AFP) via UK Telegraph)

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North Korea's test of a missile over Japan's northern island of Hokkaido (maps above) in the last 24 hours is not the first North Korean missile test over Japanese territory. The main difference is that  North Korea is now suspected (over the last few months) of being capable of building miniaturised nuclear warheads that would fit onto missiles.

Previous missile tests over Japanese territory, include:

-  In December 2012 North Korea fired a missile over the Japanese territory of Okinawa.

-  In August 1998: North Korea fired a suspected missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean. 

   North Korea called the payload a satellite.

Are there other proven or suspected tests over Japan?

It is not known if North Korea gave Japanese authorities prior warning of this latest (August 2017) test?

Pete

Possible Systemic Problems on Pre-Collision Destroyers

Anonymous (at 23/8/17 11:57 PM) and Ztev made some good points that I'll paraphrase below.

As the US Navy rapidly sacks admirals and officers of lower rank over the USS Fitzgerald and USS McCain collisions the search for systemic (recurring) reasons continues in public and more secretly in the navy.

Pre-dawn (USS Fitzgerald collided at about 1.30am and USS McCain at 5:24am) is one of the worst times as there is enough sunlight emerging to make lights less effective but not enough to see other ship structures particularly well. However, watch keepers and captains should know all this. 

Professionals should not be making these sort of mistakes with today's radar, optical night vision aids and other sensors.

USS Fitzgerald and USS McCain were  not involved in special manoeuvres (such as underway replenishment at sea (RAS), sailing close to shore, sailing in formation, or boarding at sea while underway, etc.

Civilian freighters and tankers are big and slow. They tend to be lit up like Christmas trees when running at night in heavy/congested shipping lanes. 

In contrast destroyers are fast (often capable of more than 30 knots) and have some of the most expensive radars and other sensors in existence. A systemic problem may be destroyers might be concentrating so hard on detecting small fast things like fighter jets and anti-ship missiles that they may not be looking for 30,000 ton tankers or freighters.

Might destroyers be turning down their sensors to save on hotel load electricity use to save on gas/fuel use out of misplaced greenhouse gas concerns?

Or are destroyers being run on autopilots, wrongly programmed and/or malfunctioning?

There may be many more systemic weaknesses that have crept in like fewers months of watch keeping training over the last few years for junior USN officers. Also there may have been lower then usual numbers of senior officers on both destroyers' bridges. Senior officers who wanted to be fresh for the delicate manoeuvres involved when arriving in port in the early morning.

USS McCain Collision: Equipment and Human Error Suspected

I think commanders senior to USS Fitzgerald's and USS McCain's captains may be retired or moved following the collisions. It may be significant that both destroyers belong to Destroyer Squadron 15 (also here) at US Naval Base Yokosuka, Japan.  

The head (known as "Commodore") of Destroyer Squadron 15 is CURRENTLY Captain Jeffrey A. Bennett.

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With the August 21, 2017 collision between USS John S. McCain and Alnic MC there's more tragedy for US sailors and embarrassment for the US Navy. This being the second US destroyer collision in just over 2 months (since the June 17, 2017 USS Fitzgerald collision).

Both the USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald collisions

-  took place in highly congested waters (packed with ships).

-  involved 30.000+ ton civilian ships generally considered too large to take evasive action

-  the onus to avoid collision may be on the more manoeuvrable smaller destroyers, which also have more lookouts and sensors (eg. radar and satellite sensors (including AIS)).

The US Navy has already blamed "a steering failure" for a collision. But steering problems given backup systems involve a "combination of mechanical [equipment] and procedural [human] failure"

 Under its own power, USS McCain has reached Changi Naval Base in Singapore where US investigators will look for the "missing" sailors.

The location of the destroyer USS John S. McCain collision off Malaysia and Singapore and actual damage to destroyer (inset)(Map and inset courtesy The Sun)

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Pete

Amended Improvements & Higher Costs of Soryu Mark IIs Over Mark Is

Based on Anonymous comments of August 11-12, 2017 I have compiled TABLE 1 below. For an overview of the Soryu program see TABLE 2 below that:

Soryu Mark IIs are likely to cost more than US$91 million = 10 Billion (B) Yen (¥) than Soryu Mark Is, due to new:

-  LIB batteries replacing (LABs+Stirling AIP) and diesel generator sets (gensets) for greater power

   generation, and

-  sonar systems for improved detection of the enemy and for better submerged navigation-by-sonar

Anonymous on August 18-21, 2017 kindly provided amendments direct to Pete for TABLE 1 and the footnotes below it. 

TABLE 1 [Amendments in Green and Violet]]

Item/Submarine Type	Soryu Mark I	Soryu Mark II (27SS & 28SS)		Comments
SS order number	26SS	27SS	28SS	See Soryu Table below
Batteries + AIP (where applicable)	LABs + Stiling AIP	NCA-LIBs [1]	ß
Cost of battery/Soryu in Billion Yen (\***B) [2]	LABs \1.44B	NCA-LIBs \8.3B	ß	LIBs per Soryu almost 6 times costs of LABs
Relative price to LABs [3]	1	4.8 (576 LIBs) 5.8 (480 LIBs)	ß
Specific energy (Wh/kg) [4]	40-60	240	ß	LIBs have 4-6 x the specific energy of LABs
Total cost per Soyu in Billion Yen [5]	\51.7B	\64.4B	\63.6B
Building cost [6]	\31.2B	\38.7B	\35.9B
(a)Cost of customer-supplied products [7]	\20.5B	\25.7B	\27.7B
(b)LABs or LIBs	\1.44B	\8.3B	\8.3B
(c)Stirling AIP	\2.72B	0	0	Estimation value
(d)=(a)-(b)-(c) [8]	\16.3B	\17.4B	\19.4B	Estimation value
(e)Sonars	\3-4B	+w B	+x B	Estimation value
(f)Generators	\2B	+y B	+z B	Estimation value
(g)Propulsion motor [10]	\1.3B (25SS)	\1.2B	\1.0B

[1]  The Soryu Mark IIs (27SS and 28SS) will likely be equipped with (NCA LIBs) Lithium nickel cobalt aluminium oxide ( LiNiCoAlO2 ) made by GS Yuasa.

 

[2]  According to the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s (MOD's) Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) the costs of LABs and NCA-LIBs are reported to be 1.44 ¥B and 8.3 ¥B, respectively. This makes NCA-LIBs just under 6 times more expensive than LABs for each Soryu sub. But, in terms of cost/performance (see [3]), NCA-LIBs are not overly expensive.

[3]  More precisely, price ratio of LAB to NCA-LIB is 4.8 and 5.8 for 576 and 480 LIBs in Soryu Mark II, respectively.

[4]  Specific energy of NCA-LIBs are 240 Wh/kg and LABs are 40-60 Wh/kg. The specific energy of NCA-LIBs are 4 to 6 times that of LABs, nearly the same as the above mentioned price raitio.

[5]  Soryu Mark IIs will cost ¥12-13B more than Mark Is. That cost increase is due to major Soryu Mark II enhancements, including LIBs, new snorkel generation system, new gensets and new sonar system.

[6]  In Japanese submarine building, the MOD offers customer-supplied products to the builders (KHI and MHI) for cost reduction and the MOD pays building costs. Building costs consist of materials, labor and utilities (water, electricity, etc) etc.

[7]  Customer-supplied products include the command system, weapon/sensor system, communication system and propulsion/generater/battery system. Building costs consist of materials, labor, utilities (water, electricity, etc) etc.

[8]  (c) is changes in customer-supplied products, except AIP + batteries. This gives some insights into other modifications. In the Soryu Mark II, priority in modifications is orientated towards the performance of the LIBs. In terms of changes in (d), the snorkel generation system and gensets are modified for 27SS and the sonar system is also modified for 28SS, I believe.

[9]  The Japanese submarine builders (KHI and MHI) cannot earn much because of strict budget management by the MOD. But, the cost of Japanese submarines may provide some insight into the price of other convensional submarines. The size of submarines will affect the cost of submarine building more than the cost of customer-supplied products. Even very small submarines need a  command system, weapon/sensor system, communication system and propulsion/generater/battery system. 

But, in the small submarine building process, amounts of materials, labor (in man days) and utilities can be reduced. In submarines half the size of the Soryu, building costs become significantly lower and other costs become a bit lower, Y20-25B and Y10B, respecrively. The purchaser can buy the latest small submarine for Y30-35B. If a submarine builders can sell subs for Y50-60B, they can make high profits. That is why bribe scandals are prominent.

[10] The propusion system consists of one small motor and one large motor in the Soryu Mark I. The small motor  is used at low speed and the two motors are used at high speed. Soryu Mark II is likely to be equipped with two same large motors. If these Soryu Mark II armatures are larger a higher speed performance is expected.

 TABLE 2 - Overview of SORYU (& Oyashio) Programs as at August 15, 2017

SS No.	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions & FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi-ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio	8105 Oyashio	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios 10 subs	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu Mk 1	8116 Sōryū	SS-501	¥60B FY2004	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
No 21SS			No 21SS built
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct 2016	Mar? 2018	MHI
26SS	8125	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014	LABs + AIP	2014	?	Mar 2019?	KHI
27SS First Soryu Mk 2	8126	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015	LIBs only	2015	2017?	Mar 2020	MHI
28SS  Second Soryu Mark 2	8127	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016	LIBs only	2016?	2018?	Mar 2021?	KHI
29SS First of New Class	?	?	¥76B FY2018	LIBs only	?	?	2023?	MHI?

Table courtesy of exclusive information provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP=air independent propulsion, LIBs=lithium-ion batteries. ¥***B = Billion Yen.

Anonymous and Pete

Australian Naval Shipbuilding Essential In So Many Ways

Comments (of 6/8/17 1:39 AM and 11/8/17 1:20 AM) below Submarine Matters' article Could Australia be Pyne's major weapons exporter? Unkikely. have prompted me to write about the advantages of building major weapon systems (eg. ships, subs, tanks and jet aircraft) in Australia. Advantages include:

-  employing workers and management in Australia rather than overseas means all their living

   expenses are spent in Australia. The resulting money multiplier effect benefits surrounding

   communities, eg. Adelaide. If living expenses are spent in Adelaide it doesn't matter if the

   workforce carry the corporate identity of Naval Group, ASC, RAN, Lockheed Martin or other

   entities.

-  providing the skills to undertake major overhauls of weapons and repair major battle damage

   in wartime building and overhauling weapons in Australia can be done more safely than exposing

   them to enemy interference on long range journeys to foreign shipyards

-  maintaining skills (like designing and welding) for other manufacturing sectors including civilian
   shipbuilding. For background here is the Australian Manufacturing website and Defence Teaming 
   Centre Inc

-  Federal money spent on weapons building in specific states promotes national unity and equity for

   disadvantaged regions or states.

-  spending large amounts of money has inherent political dimensions eg. winning sufficient Federal

   seats in South Australia enabling the Turnbull Government to win the 2016 Election.

-  a production run of weapons built in Australia creates efficiencies for each successive unit built
   with resulting economies of scale for more competitive sales to foreign countries

-  domestic production runs also spawn more competitive sales of components to foreign countries

-  exporting weapons built in Australia has terms of trade benefits and diplomate benefits (eg. Pacific

   Patrol Boat to small island nations and larger vessels to New Zealand).

Are not these arguments compelling?  

The timeline/graph above (Courtesy Defence Teaming Centre Inc), is now out of date but the "Valley of Death" concern still applies. The Valley of Death applies to the downturn in AWD shipbuilding in Adelaide 2018-2021 that will not be totally rectified by the Federal Governments project to build 2 much smaller OPVs in Adelaide. The closing of the last car factory in Adelaide in October 2017 is an example of a different manufacturing sector contributing to Adelaide's manufacturing "Valley of Death".

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Timeline courtesy the Australian Government's Naval Shipbuilding Plan May 2017, page 15. This illustrates the continuous shipbuilding strategy which will particularly benefit South Australia, Western Australia and all other states to a lesser extent. Canberra (ACT) also benefits.

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Naval Shipbuilding Timeline Australian Government Budget 2016-2017. This more centralised government document also demonstrates continuous shipbuilding (and also overhaul) strategy.

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Pete