French & Israeli? Nuclear Tests

(1 minute, 10 seconds into the video above) the English describes France's 18 early nuclear bomb tests. These took place at Reggane and Ekker in the French Sahara between 1960 to 1966. 

According to Lieutenant Colonel Warner D. Farr in a 1999 report to the USAF Counterproliferation Center "Progress in nuclear science and technology in France and Israel remained closely linked throughout the early fifties." Furthermore, according to Farr, "There were several Israeli observers at the French nuclear tests and the Israelis had 'unrestricted access to French nuclear test explosion data.'"[6]”

Australia has vast deserts for our own tests...one day.

Pete

No Australian Slouch Hats in Submarines!

1 minute 38 seconds in - the side of a slouch hat is pinned up for fashion or to facilitate rifle drill.

2 to 5 min - slouch hats used in Europe and the US Civil War. Slouch hats in action are wide brimmed
                      and unpinned to keep the sun and rain off.

8 min 7 secs onwards - Australian slouch hat (ASH) history.

8m 10s - ASH in Boer War and more detail 

10:07 - ASH in the "Great War" ie WWI. A combination of ASH and other hats at Gallipoli, 1915.

11:22 - ASH in WWII

12:02 - ASH today

I used to wear a slouch hat in the Australian Army Reserve, although I was not a very good soldier (I couldn't do things automatically). Dad was a much better soldier - here wearing an Armoured Corps black beret. 

P.S. There seem to be no biographical details on the Internet for "The History Guy" wonder why?

P.P.S. Submarines lack headroom. So hats are more a submarine movie and/or PR thing? And there is now very little sun - keeping in the shade - worry. 

Pete

USN's Future NEMESIS Drone Swarms to Blind Enemy Sensor Defenses

November 7, 2019 https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/29505/the-navys-secretive-nemesis-electronic-warfare-capability-will-change-naval-combat-forever

South Korea's Relations With US and Japan Deteriorate Further

Following Submarine Matters’ article "Some See Serious Stresses in US-South Korean Alliance" of September 18, 2019 Anonymous commented (with some improved English editing by Pete) on November 20, 2019:

 

The South Korean (SK) President Moon Jae-in rejected maintenance of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) (the deadline is November 23, 2019) in talks with a US delegation (led by US Defense Secretary Mark Esper). The Special Measures Agreement (SMA) negotiation with the US is also not working at all [1, 2]. Withdrawal from the GSOMIA and a breakdown in negotiations on the SMA are likely to happen. According to Japanese academic Takashi Suzuki, the situation on withdrawal of US-SK alliance is deteriorating faster than he expected and will be soon critical [3].

[1] “Moon: Difficult to reconsider GSOMIA termination”, NHK-WORLD, Nov/15/2019
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20191115_45/
SK President Moon Jae-in says it would be difficult to review the country's decision to scrap the GSOMIA intelligence-sharing pact with Japan, as long as Japan keeps its export controls against SK in place.

[2] ”U.S. envoy cuts short troop funding negotiations in South Korea”, Jen Kwon, CBS NEWS, Nov/19/2019, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-south-korea-funding-sma-american-military-presence-kim-jong-uns-deadline-looms-2019-11-19/
Shortly after James DeHart, a US State Department senior advisor, walked out of the talks on November 17, 2019, top SK negotiator, Jeong Eun Bo, said there was "a significant difference between the overall US proposal and the principles that [SK wants] to engage in."

The Special Measures Agreement (SMA) is the formal document that lays out US-SK cost sharing for the American military deployment in SK.

[3] ”Moon Jae-in declared GSOMIA war against JSA. Shift from “Boiling Frog” tactics to early withdrawal of US-South Korea Alliance.” by Japanese academic Takashi Suzuki, DAILY SHINCHO, Nov/18/2019, https://www.dailyshincho.jp/article/2019/11181631/?all=1 [translated from Japanese and Korean] Suzuki refers to the Japan-SK tensions over the likely GSOMIA breakdown and the lack of US influence to stop the breakdown.

Suzuki’s reference to the “Boiling Frog” fable in the Japan-SK-US relations context means “If you drop a frog into hot water, it dies immediately. But, if you drop a frog (= people) into warm water, it is happy because warm water is effective for health. Then if you slowly heat the water, it dies peacefully. This means SK’s Moon Jae-in tricks people by honey words and tried to end slowly the alliance. But, now, he changes time-consuming Boiling Frog tactics. Soon or later, Moon Jae-in administration makes US a bad guy and tries early withdrawal of the US-SK alliance.”

Underestimation of the US-SK alliance and cheating of US by SK makes US furious regarding SK’s hard posture in GSOMIA and SMA negotiations. As China and North Korea strongly dislike the GSOMIA pact between Japan and SK, withdrawal of GSOMIA implies shift of SK from the blue team to the red team. Previously, SK’s Moon Jae-in promised US maintenance of GSOMIA, but, Moon Jae-in broke the promise including other lies. The Moon Jae-in administration utilizes hard posture of US in GSOMIA and SMA negotiations to stir up nationalism of SK people and to try an early withdrawal from the US-SK alliance.

Takashi Suzuki wrote the book “U.S.-Korean Alliance Disappearance”, published on 

October 17, 2018.

Anonymous

Secret Plans for Non-Chinese Port Outside Darwin For Rotating US Marines

Gradual changes are happening in defense dispositions in Australia, in terms of future possibilities and actual happenings. Perceptions of a withdrawal of US forces and any decline in the US's relative power may depend on the country and the officialness of the country's institutions.

Following Submarine Matters’ article “US told 2 Days After Sale of Port of Darwin to a Chinese Company” November 24, 2015, Australia’s ABC News reported June 23, 2019:

“Secret plans for new port outside Darwin to accommodate visiting US Marines”

"Secret planning has begun for a new port facility just outside Darwin which could eventually help US Marines operate more readily in the Indo-Pacific.

Precise details remain tightly guarded but senior defence and federal government figures concede the proposal may risk angering China even though it's a commercial port, not a new military base.

Projected site of Glyde Point Port (which may accommodate US warships) relative to Darwin Port (leased to a Chinese company for 99 years). (Map above courtesy ABC News June 2019)

---

The folly of leasing Darwin Port for 99 years. Map illustrates Darwin's key position in relation to some strategic concerns (eg. Indonesia, now independent East Timor and Papua New Guinea). Originating map-maker unknown.

---

Multiple officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, have confirmed to the ABC the multi-use development would be in the Glyde Point area, roughly 40 kilometres north-east of Darwin's existing port.[see map above]

In the past, the location has been earmarked by the Northern Territory Government as a possible future industrial port site given its relatively deep waters, but funding arrangements for the yet-to-be announced project remain unclear.

Darwin port, which was controversially leased to a Chinese company in 2015, has existing defence facilities such as a multi-user barge ramp, but the new proposed facility would have the additional advantages of being less busy and less visible.

If approved, the new [Glyde Point] port could eventually be able to accommodate large amphibious warships such as Australia's Landing Helicopter Docks, and American vessels such as the USS Wasp, which recently arrived in Sydney. Strategic experts believe a new deep-water port would be ideally suited for the more than 2,000 US Marines and their equipment during regular rotations through [Australia's Northern Territory].

"The Americans are clearly not withdrawing from the Indo-Pacific, whether it's because of their strategic competition with China or more generally," said [Professor Rory Medcalf, Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University.]

MORE AT ABC NEWS

Pete

Lithium-ion Battery Matters on Type 212 Submarine Variants

Anonymous has provided further details on Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) matters on TKMS future Type 212 variants following the November 13, 2019 article.

Based on the structure of existing Type 212A and battery by FAAB (aka FAAM – see below) total battery energy of Type 212NFS (Near Future Submarine) was estimated to 4-6MWh [1-3] considerably larger than current Type 214A (2-3MWh) with Lead-acid Batteries (LABs) [1a].

As K. R. Energy (parent company of FAAM (aka FAAB)) thinks LIBs for 212NFS are triggers for defense use of LIBs, FAAB presumably show discount price [4].

The amount of LIBs for AIP submarine such as South Korea and Germany is small, while non-AIP Japanese submarine equips with large amount of LIBs.

Both Type 212NFS and future Type 212CD  (Common Design) have non-magnetic hulls and LIBS. Type 212NFS is different from Type 212CD (which Norway selected presumably to avoid electromagnetic submarine detection by Russia) [5]. Is capacity of 70MWh (70MW is wrong expression?) for Type 212NFS mistake of 7MW [6]?

Notes

[1] https://www.udt-global.com/__media/libraries/sensors-and-processing/116---Vincenzo-Pennino-Slides.pdf

Page 17/32

[1a] ibid, page16/32

Capacity and volume of module consisted of 120 cells are 25.2kWh and 135.5L. Volumetric capacity of module is 186Wh/L-module (=25.2kWh/135.5L). Assuming capacity of 75Wh/L for LIB, then total capacity of LIBs in battery section is 1.95MWh [=(75Wh/L)/(186Wh/L)]. In the case of module consisted of 96 cells, total capacity of LABs is 2.29MWh. In these cases, Battery Management System (BMS) is not considered for LIBs. Then, actual total capacity of LABs may be 2-3MWh.

[2] Dimension (D x W x H [m])of battery section in Type 212A is estimated to be 10m x 2- 3m x 1.6m [3]. Based on dimension (diameter 63mm, length 225mm), weight metric capacity (139Wh/kg) and weight (1.510-1.520kg) LIB by FAAB, total capacity of Type 212NFS is estimated as follows. 

Case I

96 cells are arranged in a battery module (6 columns x 4 rows x 4 layers = 478 x 252 x 900mm). Dimension (D x W x H) of battery section is 10 x 2 x 1.6m. In this case, 192 battery modules arranged in a battery section (24 columns x 8 rows) with 18432 cells. Then, total weight of cell is 27.8t and capacity of total cell is 3.87MWh (=139Wh/kg x 27800kg). In this case, ideal minimization of stray magnetic field in x, y and z directions is achieved.

Case II

120 cells are arranged in a battery module (6 columns x 4 rows x 5 layers = 478 x 252 x 1125mm). Dimension (D x W x H) of battery section is 10 x 2 x 1.6m. In this case, 192 battery modules arranged in a battery section (24 columns x 8 rows) with 23040 cells. Then, total weight of cell is 34.8t and capacity of total cell is 4.84MWh (=139Wh/kg x 34800kg).

Case III

96 cells are arranged in a battery module (6 columns x 4 rows x 4 layers=478 x 252 x 900mm). Dimension (D x W x H) of battery section is 10 x 3 x 1.6m. In this case, 288 battery modules arranged in a battery section (24 columns x 12 rows) with 27072 cells. Then, total weight of cell is 40.9t and capacity of total cell is 5.68MWh (=139Wh/kg x 40900kg).

[3] Stray magnetic field caused by batteries has three directions, x (horizontal bow-stern), y (horizontal starboard-port), z (vertical). Minimization of stray magnetic field in x and y directions is conducted by even number arrangement of battery modules which cancels stray magnetic field by battery module pairing. Battery modules near the starboard or port wall of pressure hull locates at higher position than those on the keel due to cylindrical cross section of pressure hull, resulting vertical (z direction) unbalance of stray magnetic field. Usually minimization of stray magnetic field is mainly conducted on x and y directions, not on z direction. In Type 212A, to achieve thorough magnetic transparency, minimization of stray magnetic field in z direction is presumably conducted by adopting long and narrow battery section in addition to non-magnetic hull. Dimension (D x W x H [m]) of battery section in Type 214A is estimated to be 10m x 2- 3m x 1.6m based on its structure.

As Norway Navy also demands magnetic transparency for Type 212CD, shape of its battery section will resemble Type 212A or 212NFS. In Case I arrangement with two battery section for Type 212CD, its battery capacity is 7.74MWh with perfect minimization of stray magnetic field.

In DSME2000 and KSS-III Batch2 submarine by South Korea, battery arrangement in z direction is in normal manner. If it is true, magnetic steel such as HY100 is used for pressure hull.

[4] Concerning K. R. Energy (parent company of FAAM (aka FAAB) see Full Company Report (page 52/56) Lithium and defence are the key drivers of the investment case,

“ 2) the reaching of a deal on the supply of battery packs for the new Italian Navy U-212 “NFS” submarines represent major triggers for the investment case, possibly materializing in the next 6 months.

[5] Rosoboronexport (the sole state intermediary agency for Russia's exports/imports of defense-related and dual use products, technologies and services) http://roe.ru/eng/catalog/naval-systems/stationary-electronic-systems/komor/

“The Komor electromagnetic stationary submarine detection system is designed to control the sea-situation to ASW border”

[6] As capacity of FAAB-cell is 139Wh/kg, the amount of LIBs, which is currently 35-41t has to increase to 500t (=70x10^6[Wh]/139[Wh/kg]) to achieve a total capacity of 70MWh.

Anonymous

Submarine Choices for the Phillipines

A comment by jaimecenturion101 indicates the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Horizon Modernization Program saw a need for between 2 and 6 submarines from the 2020s. In 2018 current Philippine Navy chief, Vice Admiral Robert Empedrad pushed hard for (conventional diesel-electric) submarines to be included in medium term plans.

 

rhk111 on November 10, 2019 made interesting comments on Submarine Matters article South Korea Could Export Submarines to Philippines and an additional comment of November 13, 2019 under article "Any US Block on Philippines Buying Submarines a Big Mistake". rhk111’s November 13 comment indicated the Philippine President had little constitutional power if the President had any inclination to source submarines from China or Russia. The Philippine military (including Philippine Navy (PN) is reputedly still mostly pro-US.

 

Pete comment – This pro-US orientation/tradition might undergo change if the US imposed pro-Human Rights embargoes/punishments on the Philippines. If the PN were starved of Western submarine choices because the US imposed a ban on any US parts in these submarines then a PN preference for non-US parts subs (ie. Russian or Chinese) may grow.

 

China - Yuan variant S20s

 

China has been marketing an export Yuan class variant known as the S20 in the Asian region with one being bought by the Thai Navy under the designation S26T and two expected to be bought. Eight S20s will be sold (or perhaps virtually gifted) to the Pakistani Navy.

The high cost of submarines means that the relationship between seller country and buyer is often highly political. For example the 8 x S20s to being sold by China to Pakistan has alliance cementing aspects being a naval means to contain/encircle their mutual adversary, India.

However, as China has probably been the main adversary of the Philippines in South China Seas frictions one would think it unlikely the Philippines would buy submarines from China, but surprises can happen. For example China could offer subs at very low “foot in the door” prices.

 

Russia – Improved Kilo submarines

 

Russia successfully exported Kilo submarines up to the mid 1990s and then an Improved Kilo class development (Project 636) exported since 1996. China received 10 Improved Kilos, Vietnam (6) and Algeria (4).

Russia’s export of 6 Improved Kilos to Vietnam provided an opportunity to increase Russian influence. One reason being many Vietnamese submarine naval officers, petty officers and especially engineers were stationed in Russia for years to learn Russian in order to become proficient at all the Improved Kilos procedures. These Russian influences may be carried over to Cam Ranh main base back in Vietnam - see this article from Vietnam.

A large number of naval, civilian political and economic factors go into submarine selection. Reasons include the vast costs of purchasing, training, crewing and maintenance involved.

Another major selection criteria What does the PN want to do with the submarines?

Often the main use in peacetime is surveillance of non-state actors eg. Islamic terrorist-separatists (in southern Philippines?) smugglers, private army "wars" and illegal fishing boats, surveillance of adversary navies (Chinese Navy and others nosing around “West Philippine Sea” islands with undersea oil/gas potential) and to create doubt in adversary navies’ captains if they decide to trespass in Philippine waters.

Submarine uses in wartime still includes surveillance and threat creating doubt, a sub’s torpedoes and anti-ship missiles can sink enemy ships, expediting naval blockades, a sub’s land attack missiles can hit cities and high value military targets, also a sub laying mines in-near enemy harbours/bases.

Potential Western sellers to the Philippines and some key strength, weaknesses include:

Franch Naval Group’s (NG’s) Scorpenes

A mature export design (so development costs long paid for) as it has been sold since the 1990s to 4 customers including Malaysia. Generous commissions possible (as in Malaysia). If the PN wants AIP (especially useful for longer term submerged surveillance missions sitting on the seabed) then NG’s second generation AIP may be almost ready (but such AIP may be expensive due to recent development costs). NG is French Government owned so corporate structure likely to remain stable. Can often speak English.

Germany’s TKMS – Type 209s and 214s

Could offer the Type 209 (no AIP) or Type 214 (with a mature AIP though expensive). Type 209s and 214s are mature designs sold to many export customers. Corruption opportunities generally low. TKMS corporate structure may be subject to change in medium-long term. German staff might generally speak English.

South Korea’s (SK’s) DSME

Can offer ChangBogo Type 209 variant. Mature design. Nine sold to SK Navy. Three have been delivered to Indonesia with 3 more on order – all as Nagapasa-class. Maturity, established sales record and known efficiency of SK shipping industry tend to indicate on-time, on-budget. Medium corruption opportunities?

SK also builds Type 214 variants (with AIP) for SK Navy. But SK has no licence to export Germany’s highly valuable mature Fuel Cell AIP technology.

DSME 2000 concept export submarine – too early to assess, but purchase cost would be high for first customer(s) as it would be a new submarine design incorporating new Lithium-ion Battery technology. English proficiency may be low.

Sweden’s Saab-Kockums - A26 Submarines

A new design though influenced by Sweden’s Gotland class. Two A26s (called Blekinge-class) being built for Swedish Navy. Has mature Stirling AIP. Low corruption opportunities. With just 2 x A26s not yet built Sweden’s development costs likely to boost price for any initial export customer(s). Though Sweden originally built subs for cold water Baltic Sweden successfully modified Challenger and Archer class subs for warm water/air Singaporean Navy. Swedish staff generally speak good English.

Spain’s Navantia S-80 Plus

First S-80 Plus (Isaac Peral) class not yet completed for Spanish Navy after a troubled development. Its AIP immature as it has not been tested operationally. Some of prolonged development costs likely to be passed on to export customer(s). Includes some sensitive US combat system components (and Harpoon missiles) that may not be exportable from Spain. Navantia staff may speak English and definitely Spanish.

Japan? or other exporters (eg. Taiwan?) unknown.

Pete

Further LIB Details for Italy's Future Type 212NFS Submarine

Anonymous provided further Lithium-ion Battery (LIB) details on November 11, 2019 concerning Italy’s 4 future Type 212NFS (Near Future Submarines). This follows Submarine Matters’ article "Type 212NFS Submarines with Lithium-ion Batteries planned by Italy" of October 29, 2019

 

Anonymous wrote (with some editing by Pete)

Based on the structure of the Type 212A and LIBs by FAAM total battery energy of the Type 212NFS was estimated to 8 MWh [1-3]. K. R. Energy (parent company of FAAM see page 5) sees LIBs for the Type 212NFS as an opening to broader defense use of LIBs. So FAAM presumably offered a discount price for Type 212NFS LIBs [4].

The amount of LIBs for Fuel Cell AIP submarines, such as those built by DSME in South Korea and TKMS in Germany, is relatively small. While Japanese Soryu Mark II (Mk II) submarines, which will no longer use their Stirling engine AIP, will be equipped with large amounts of LIBs.

Both the Type 212NFS and Type 212CD will have non-magnetic steel hulls and LIBS. The Type 212NFS will be different from the Type 212CD. The German and Norwegian navies have selected Type 212CD presumably, in part, to avoid Russian fixed undersea sensor networks in Russian waters in the Baltic and North Seas and Arctic Ocean [5].

[1] https://www.udt-global.com/__media/libraries/sensors-and-processing/116---Vincenzo-Pennino-Slides.pdf see page 17

[2] A battery module of 4 columns, 6 rows and 5 layers of cylindrical battery cells (diameter 63mm, length 225mm) was considered. Size and capacity of battery module is Depth 252mm (63mm x 4), Width 378mm(63mm x 6), Height  1225mm (225mm x 5) and 25.0kWh (65A x 3.2 V x 120 battery cells)

[3] Battery section (length ca. 10m) is under the weapons stowage and handling room in a Type 212A. 40 columns and 8 rows of battery modules (320 battery modules, 8 MWh) are assumed to be in the battery section.

[4] K. R. Energy’s (parent company of FAAM), Full Company Report (of June 4, 2018) indicated Lithium and defence are the key drivers of the investment case, see page 52:

“ 2) the reaching of a deal on the supply of battery packs for the new Italian Navy U-212 “NFS” submarines represent major triggers for the investment case, possibly materializing in the next 6 months."

Also see page 29:

“In the [K R Energy]  management’s expectations, each of the above segments may absorb ~10% of its Li-ion output; this stance appears to be rather cautious: consider that the battery pack of a single submarine can have a 70 MW capacity [!]: if KRE gets a contract for similar platforms, its 200 MW production capacity would be easily saturated.”

[5] Rosoboronexport is the sole state intermediary agency for Russia's exports/imports of defense-related and dual use products, technologies and services. See http://roe.ru/eng/catalog/naval-systems/stationary-electronic-systems/komor/ on:

“The Komor electromagnetic stationary submarine detection system [more commonly known as magnetic anomaly detector] is designed to control the sea-situation to ASW border”

Anonymous (with some editing by Pete)

Further Estimated Propulsion Details for the Future KSS-III Batch 2 Submarines

On November 8, 2019 Anonymous provided further estimated propulsion details for South Korea’s future KSS-III Batch 2. This follows Submarine Matters’ article "South Korean Lithium-ion Batteries for Submarine use Estimates" of November 8, 2019.

Anonymous writes:

Interesting energy technologies likely to be used in the future KSS-III Batch 2 submarines are as follows.

1 Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs)

Use of the NMC type LIB. Full formula is Lithium Nickel Manganese Cobalt Oxide (LiNiMnCoO2).

Experimental and estimates cycle lives of SAMSUNG SDI 94Ah battery cell are 3,600 (red circles) and for 4,600 cycles (red dotted line, capacity 80%), respectively. 120Ah will be achieved soon [1].

Total energy for the future DSME 2000 submarine using 94Ah/111 battery cells is 8.6/10.1/11.0 MWh and KSS-III Batch 2 submarine using Ah/120Ah battery cells is 12.9/15.2/16.4 MWh.

2 Propulsion motor [2]

Propulsion motors consist of two motors (blue big one, silver small one) connected directly to each other. This system is different from Siemens’ PERMASYN and Jeumont Electric’s MAGTONIC. A small motor rotates at low speed while two motors rotate at middle/high speed.

3 Diesels engines [2]

The appearance of the diesel is different from the 12PA4 V200 SMDS (MAN Diesel & Turbo). The positions of DM-185 (UDMZ) ? compressor are different as is the MTU 12V 4000 U83 generator which has twin turbos. Has South Korea succeeded in developing a new diesel for submarine?

4 Hydrogen sources in Fuel Cell AIP: patent issue.

As DSME has no full patent rights to use metal hydride for hydrogen in a KSS-III Batch 2’s FC AIP, the use of metal hydride would be difficult without Siemens’ permission. Such permission would be expensive. Another hydrogen sources such as a carbon nanotube might be used, but there are still patent barriers.

[1] For display photos, data and tables on Samsung SDI 94Ah LIB cells 

see https://insideevs.com/news/338067/bmw-i3-samsung-sdi-94-ah-battery-rated-for-524000-miles/

“Samsung SDI is presenting at the 2018 Energy Storage Europe in Germany its latest high-energy density 111 Ah battery cells for energy storage purposes along with its 94 Ah cells used in all-electric cars.” And, see page 5/5, Figure “Samsun 94Ah battery cells”.

[2] starting at https://youtu.be/SWIBOmw9VRQ?t=5m50s (help to read the "CC" closed captions)  the diesel generator and propulsion motor (depicted as a gray ring?) can be seen 6 minutes 52 seconds in. 

Any US Block on Philippines Buying Submarines a Big Mistake

Nicky on November 9, 2019 made interesting comments on Submarine Matters article South Korea Could Export Submarines to Philippines of November 6, 2019 to which I respond.

No matter the US attitude to human rights in the Philippines (Phils) the US has little influence over what country the Phils buys submarines from. The US has not exported a conventional sub in decades so wouldn’t itself export subs to the Phils. Furthermore the US combat system (eg. sensors and computer components) are generally too electrical power hungry to be included in any submarines that other countries would export to the Phils.

The risk is if there are even small US components on subs of potential sub suppliers to the Philippines (ie. German-TKMS, French-Naval Group, Spanish-Navantia, Swedish-Saab or South Korean-DSME) the US might block such a sale on intellectual property-licencing grounds. The Philippines may then turn to suppliers that have no US components, ie. China and Russia.

If the US did try to pressure the Phils on a submarine buy over human rights or other reasons this might just encourage the Phils to "do a Thailand". Thailand was heavily criticized by the US after Thailand's 2014 coup. Thailand commenced the purchase of 3 Chinese submarines in 2015. Alternatively US pressure might speed the Phils into the arms of Putin with a possible sale of Russian built Kilo subs to the Phils.

The Philippines buying submarines from China or Russia would not be an outcome that the US (though tending to downgrade established alliances under Trump) would want.

If a sale of Chinese or Russian submarines did occur this may mean years of Russian or Chinese supervision of Philippine submarines (and perhaps increased undersea sensor laying). This would heighten the geographical reality that Philippine archipelago forms a part barrier to access of US submarines from Squadron 15 (based in Guam) to the South China Sea. 

Even though the US no longer has air or naval bases in the Philippines USN SSNs, SSGNs and surface ships still visit the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. 

The US also relies on the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines which permits US Special Forces to fight and advise against Philippine Islamist-Separatist “terrorists” in the southern Philippines - part of the US’s international “War on Terrorism”. Some of these terrorists can be categorized as Islamic State while others come under the longer established acronyms MNLF and MILF. 

Thursday I'll respond to rhk111's November 10, 2019 comments. 

Pete

South Korean Lithium-ion Batteries for Submarine use Estimates

Following Submarine Matters’ article of November 5, 2019 there is still little published information on South Korea’s (SK’s) lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) for submarine use. To partly fill the gap Anonymous has provided likely estimates and links below.

Significant estimates for SK LIB include dimensions of battery modules and total price of the SK LIBs producer SAMSUG SDI battery modules for the DSME 2000 and KSS-III Batch 2 submarines. This is based on the video and other data - see [1] and [2] below.

DSME 2000 and KSS-III Batch 2 submarines will be equipped with the same battery tray, but, the number and total energy of battery trays will be different. 2,200 ton DSME 2000s will have 128 trays producing total energy of 8.6 MWh. While 3,700 ton (submerged)  KSS-III Batch 2s will have 192 trays producing 12.9 MWh).

SK LIBs price per unit power [measured in US$/Wh] is quite low and may be cheaper than lead-acid batteries (LABs). That is a ratio of US$0.3 for a SAMSUNG SDI LIB cell compared to US$0.69 for a Japanese GS-YUASA LAB cell. Meanwhile a Japanese GS-YUASA LIB cell (developed for Japan’s Soryu subs) may cost US$1.61. From the viewpoint of cost, DSME 2000 may be serious export competition to the TKMS Type 214, SAAB A26 and Naval Group Scorpene.

(above and below) LIBs in yellow can be seen on these future DSME 2000 submarine models. (Above courtesy Naval News and Below courtesy IHS Markit/M Boruah )

[1] Assumptions

As the LIBs market for submarines is extremely small, SAMSUM SDI will use existing battery modules and cells of proven reliability.

Use a standard battery trays in future DSME 2000s and KSS-III Batch 2s reduces costs.

Battery trays arrangements in the battery section of DSME 2000s is 8 rows x 8 columns and in the KSS-III Batch 2s it is 12 rows x 8 columns. Such arrangements minimize stray magnetic fields.

Dimensions (W x D x H in mm) of battery trays are from 500 x 300 x 900 to around 600 x 400 x 1200.

A battery tray consists of 8 battery modules. A battery module in turn consists of 12 cells.

The price per submarine of  LABs is around US$137 million and if it were to have LIBs the price currently is around US$780 million (or 85 Billion Japanese Yen). Cost of LIBs is currently very high as they are new, rare and still include high development costs portions in their overall price. Costs would also include extensive computer control for safety. But LIBs have many advantages (longer lasting between recharges, faster and deeper charging by diesel engines, and SK LIBs will have about twice as many cycles (4,000) compared to LABs (2,000). The price of battery trays are more expensive than the sum of their cells.

[2] Possible battery module and cell

A SAMSUNG SDI Battery module used for submarine may be designated M8994 E2. See the specifications and small diagram of the M8994 E2, under the subheading “2016 module” by scrolling about half way down http://www.samsungsdi.com/upload/ess_brochure/Samsung%20SDI%20brochure_EN.pdf 

Note Energy quoted is 8.39kWh, Dimensions 370 x 588 x 160mm, weight <60kg span="">.

Does the SAMSUNG SDI LIBs for submarine use the chemical formula Lithium Nickel Manganese Cobalt Oxide (LiNiMnCoO2) abbreviated NMC? Such a cell is the SAMSUNG 94 Ah. see https://pushevs.com/2017/02/20/details-samsung-sdi-94-ah-battery-cell/ where Energy is 350Wh, Dimensions 173x125x45mm, weight 2kg, price 162.69€,

Scrolling a fifth way down https://batteryuniversity.com/learn/article/types_of_lithium_ion at “Figure 7: Snapshot of NMC” you will see NMC has a good balance of characteristics, ie: Specific Energy, Specific Power, Safety, Performance, Life span and Cost.

Battery tray. Estimated specification of tray consisted of eight layers of M8994 E2 with dimensions (W x D x H in mm) = 588 x 370 x 1280.

Calculation of energy of KSS-III Batch 2 is 8.39kWh (energy of M8994 E2) x 8 (layers of M8994 E2 in a battery tray) x (12 x 8) (row and column of battery tray) x 2 (battery sections) = 12.88MWh.

DSME, SAMSUNG SDI, GS-YUASA and any other readers are invited to correct, fill-in and thereby expand public knowledge on specifications of LIBs for submarines and comparison with LABs.

China’s Future Forward Base of Tulagi a Threat to Australia.

In August 1942 US Marines (in the Guadalcanal Campaign) fought and died to liberate the strategically important island of Tulagi (in the Solomon Islands) from the Japanese. Now Tulagi, with its dual-use capable natural deep water harbour and airfield has been leased, cheaply, for 75 years to China. See the map below.

Australian politicians appear to have been taken by surprise and have been unable to head off the lease. China is now too politically powerful and can target its increasing cash reserves to buy off islands that are close to, and strategically important to, Australia.

The New York Times, not Australian news outlets, broke the story on October 16, 2019 and advised:

“The renewable 75-year lease was granted to the China Sam Enterprise Group, a conglomerate founded in 1985 as a state-owned enterprise, according to corporate records.

A copy of the “strategic cooperation agreement,” obtained by The New York Times ... reveals both the immediate ambitions of China Sam and the potential...for infrastructure that could share civilian and military uses.

Signed on September 22, 2019 the [lease] agreement includes provisions for a fishery base, an operations center, and “the building or enhancement of the airport.”

Tulagi island (part of the Solomon Islands) in relation to Australia. (Map courtesy Agency France Press via Yahoo News, October 2019)

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The military value of Tulagi includes its potential use as a forward Chinese naval and air base in cutting naval strategic lines of communication between the US and Australia (map above). China can improve Tulagi’s airfied to accommodate maritime patrol aircraft to blockade Australia northern approaches (Tulagi to Port Moresby (New Guinea) and return) and Australia’s eastern approaches (from Tulagi to New Caledonia and return). From Tulagi Chinese strike aircraft could hit the cities of Cairns and Townsville (both on the Australian mainland).

Tulagi as a forward operating base for Chinese surface ships and submarines would save many days of passage to block the major east coast Australian city-ports of Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne.

Australia’s leaders have been virtually silent about the strategic possibilities of the Tulagi Lease:

“News of the lease agreement sent Australian diplomats scrambling to find out more details. [Australian] Foreign Minister Marise Payne...had not responded to a request for comment...”.

Perhaps Australia knew about Tulagi-China negotiations in advance. But as Australia could not alter the situation, because of China's power and money, Australia was reduced to feigning surprise.

The possibility that China could develop Tulagi at the rate of its rapid South China Sea island seaport-airport building is a major concern, to say the least. 

Also see an article in The Strategist.

Pete