S Korea richer than Russia: So SK SSBN might be Affordable

Below Japan's Nuclear Weapon Breakout Capability of August 27, 2021 Gessler  commented on August 30, 2021. Also note my redded responses/suggestions. Gessler said:

Looking at [South] Korea's Joong Ang Daily of August 29, 2021 "Expectations are rising that the Korean military will announce the development of an indigenous nuclear submarine within the year, according to military sources who spoke on the condition of anonymity..."

It seems the South Koreans are intent on following-up the KSS-3 with a nuclear-powered multi-purpose [called KSS-N aka KSSX-N] submarine of approx. 5,000 tons displacement & 100-meters in length. [This coincides with my October 25, 2019 report where an SK study looked at the option of using a French Barracuda class nuclear sub design, which just happens to be 5,000+  tons and is 99.5m long.]  Not that different in size & scope from India's Arihant-class SSBN [Arihant is an estimated 6,000 tonnes and 111m long]. Plus as per the article they'd want to put up to 10 x SLBMs on it, though these are much smaller/shorter-ranged ones than what are carried by the Indian subs.

Two points of note:

1) If they are serious about submarine-launched ballistic missile capability, conventional explosives don't make much sense, only nuclear warheads do. I believe you wrote a good piece on this very topic a while back.

[Yes in my article S Korea Hedging with its KSS-3 Ballistic Missile Submarines of July 7, 2021 I wrote: "(SK) deploying its KSS-3 ballistic missile submarines shows an intention to eventually arm the ballistic missiles with a deterrent warhead - which can only be nuclear...If the SK warheads remained just conventional high explosive this would confuse North Korea (NK) (and everyone else) as to why SK is building ballistic missile submarines of 3,500-4,000 tonnes armed with ballistic missiles with a TOTAL high explosive throw-weight of only 6 to 10 tonnes."]

2) If SK decides to go nuclear (both in terms of warheads & submarine propulsion), then Japan cannot be expected to sit back & watch considering they have a direct rivalry with the Koreans and the mutual distrust seems to be growing in recent times.

[Indeed. My article Japan's Nuclear Weapon Breakout Capability of August 27, 2021 talks about Japan having the 3 major components (delivery platforms, U and Pu explosives and nuclear device knowledge) for a nuclear capability for decades. Also see my S. Korean & Japanese Nuclear Submarine Propulsion & Weapons of April 12, 2020. At the DSME website is Nuclear Propulsion Ship]    

A declining & increasingly isolationist US might prompt both of its East Asian treaty-bound & nuclear umbrella-sharing Allies to decide to go nuclear independently as they might think the US can no longer be depended upon to fulfill its obligations.

[Very true. The US's surprisingly quick withdrawal (looking more like a retreat) from Afghanistan worries many/most allies of the US.] 

This is going to be an interesting decade, that's for sure.

[True. US isolationism or, at least, downgraded relationships with Indo-Pacific allies, may be more than just a Trump policy. There is a risk it may become a US bi-partisan policy, now led by Biden, with US public support, for years.] 

PETE COMMENT

It is difficult to assess how imminent an OFFICIAL South Korean plan to build SSBNs might actaully be. There has been speculation that South Korea might be interested in developing nuclear propelled submarines (presumably nuclear armed) since 2009 if not earlier. Normally South Korea press speculation comes from anonymous South Korean military tip-offs of the type in this August 2021 instance.

There are numerous addition articles at Submarine Matters on South Korean SSBNs, SSBs and nuclear warhead ambiguous SLBMs. Just click on https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/search?q=nuclear+south+korea+submarine+KSS and you'll see more than 10 artcles, particularly if you scroll down and click on "Next Posts".

I would say the US retreat from Afghanistan is one tip-off prompter. Ongoing North Korean nuclear threats another. 

But what may be worrying South Korea most is North Korea restarting its Yongbyon reactor in July 2021 with Yongbyon believed mainly there to produce Pu for nuclear weapons. Also the Yongbyon complex hosts a laboratory which may have been reprocessing spent reactor fuel since March 2021. Any IAEA and US protests seem muted with international attention focussed on Afghanistan.

At a minimum South Korea may be reminding the US of the US nuclear umbrella promise against North Korea. Although as South Korea is ramping up its vertical launch plans toward 10 missile silos for its KSS-3 (future) Batch 2s a later Batch with nuclear propulsion might be a logical step. I also flag South Korea's nominal GDP is equal to or greater than Russia's. So a South Korea SSBN is not as outlandish as many might think.

Gessler and Pete

Japan's Nuclear Weapon Breakout Capability

The term "Nuclear Weapon Breakout Capability" does not necessarily mean a country has an operational nuclear weapon system immediately available (in the open or usually hidden). Capability, particularly considering Japan's Hiroshima-Nagasaki memory, is different from peaceful will or intention. 

Japan's 1960s Nuclear Ambitions

During the administration of Japanese Prime Miniser Sato in the 1960's, it was reported that Japan secretly studied the development of nuclear weapons. In those years Sato argued that Japan needed nuclear weapons to match those of China, but the US opposed the idea. The Johnson administration pressed Japan to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, ending, for then, Japan's nuclear ambitions.

On June 17, 1974, Japanese Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata told reporters that "it's certainly the case that Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons but has not made them." This remark aroused widespread concern in the international media at the time.

"Nuclear Weapon Breakout Capability" means a country, like Japan, already has, or within a limited time (maybe less than 2 years) the capability to put together the 3 major ingredients of a nuclear weapons system. 

These ingredients include:

1. A nuclear delivery system - often land based long range ballistic missiles - like Japan's large MX missile size and shaped Epsilon satellite deployment rocket. The Epsilon, ideally for an ICBM, has three solid fuel stages. See an Epsilon launch 20 seconds into the video below.

2. Nuclear explosives - like Japan's literally tonnes of separated Uranium and Plutonium. Japan has spent many years and $Billions building and maintaining the Tokai Plutonium Reprocessing plant (apparently still open) for economically unconvincing reasons. Japan's Hitachi gained control of SILEX laser enrichment of Uranium technology in the 1990s.

and

3. A nuclear device design which might be in components or at least on paper or computer file. Simple (76 year old) gun type device designs may have been placed on paper and/or computer file by scientists in the  Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) during its 1956-2005 existence. This is before JAERI merged into the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) in 2005. Such designs may not belong to a specific JAEA section, may attract no budgeted cost and are secret, but the designs existence are known to a few JAEA scientists. Two or three Ministry of Defense officials may be aware of the designs existence in JAEA's files.

Putting Japan's capability in perspective - even South Africa in the 1970s (a country with vastly less money and high tech resources than Japan) was on the point of testing nuclear weapons in the late 1970s. South Africa (with a bit of collaboration with countries like Israel, France and Taiwan) actually "developed a small finite deterrence arsenal of gun-type fission weapons in the 1980s. Six were constructed and another was under construction at the time the program ended.^[8]"

FURTHER REFERENCES

Some geo-strategic context

[2017] Japan has large stockpiles of plutonium from civilian uses and already possesses uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies. Estimates of Japan’s breakout time range from six months to several years. Japan’s alliance with the United States has thus far deterred it from developing nuclear weapons because it knows it can rely on the US for defense. However, North Korea’s progress in its nuclear program could drive Japan to reconsider. A nuclear Japan would threaten China’s desired hegemony in the region and force it to proceed with greater caution in its actions in the South China and East China seas.

Epsilon satellite booster quite ICBM suitable

A 2019 Epsilon rocket launch 20 seconds in, boosting a satellite into space.

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The extent to which the US assisted JAXA's Epsilon Project is unclear. Japan Aerospace eXploration Agency (JAXA) is Japan’s NASA equivalent. Space agencies have dual military-civilian use technology and dual-use career personnel. Epsilon's 3 solid fuel stages make it ideal for quick ICBM launch and it doesn't rely on strap-on boosters making silo basing an option.

Kabul Airport Explosion: Aircraft shootdown also threat

Days ago US forces in Afghanistan warned of the risk of suicide bombing in or around  Kabul Airport. A major explosion has occurred in the last few hours - details are unclear. Here's a report.

The US Government would already be aware of the risk that low flying passenger transport aircraft might be shot down landing or taking off from Kabul Airport.

The Taliban have not yet shot down US or other military transport aircraft carrying refugees from Kabul Airport due to the Taliban’s deal with the US Government. This deal is set to end in a week, on August 31.

The Taliban are not a monolithic totally disciplined army, but many tribal groups that have been given the “Taliban” label, with their own agendas. Also non-Taliban, Islamic terrorist groups, already in Afghanistan, may have their own ideas. Some groups may ignore the Taliban-US deal and explode bombs or fire on aircraft before the August 31 deadline, aka “redline”.

The US and other transport aircraft can be seen dropping flares when leaving Kabul Airport to draw off Taliban or terrorist shoulder fired heat seeking missiles.

The Taliban are aware that the aircraft are not safe from much more common RPG7 unguided missiles as the RPG7 missiles cannot be drawn off by flares and may be unjammable.

Also the Taliban would be aware their heavy (50 calibre up) machineguns can shoot down aircraft. Such machineguns (up to 14.5mm) and frequently mounted on pickup trucks, were made in Russia and sold through many middle men.

But the majority of the heavy machineguns are US made 50 calibre M2 Brownings gifted by the US to the Afghan Army who, in turn, gifted them to the Taliban, over the last few weeks. These may be mounted on pickups or the many Humvees captured by the Taliban or Humvees gifted by the Afghan Army to the Taliban.

Russia and/or China to fill Afghanistan power vacuum

Russia and China have only just began to adjust to the Taliban ruling Afghanistan

See https://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2021/08/25/putin-xi-agree-to-jointly-combat-afghanistan-threats/ of August 25, 2021. 

Blood, gold wasted and humiliation of Western forces may give Putin and Xi passing Schadenfreude. However, both realize the revitalized Taliban will again host Islamic terrorist camps. Such terrorist camps will be only a short distance from Russia's and China's   large Muslim populations, which can be radicalized. (Photo courtesy REPUBLICWORLD(DOT)com)
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Rare Article on Indonesia's Military-Industrial Complex

Yas, writing at Singapore’s longest-running independent online media platform, The Online Citizen (TOC), has penned a most excellent August 25, 2021 article:

"Building war ships and submarines: Indonesia bolsters defence capabilities"

"Indonesia's military spending is the seventh-largest in Asia, the data in April 2021 showed.

JAKARTA, INDONESIA — In a bid to buttress its defence capabilities, Indonesia is manufacturing its own war ships and submarines, part of which includes a collaboration with one of South Korea’s shipbuilding titans.

State-owned defence company PT PAL has worked with Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering [DSME] to produce submarines since 2013.

The Indonesia-South Korea partnership has manufactured three submarines: The KRI Nagapasa- 403 [first of class] in 2017, the KRI Ardadedali-404 in 2018, and the KRI Alugoro-405.

[see Submarine Matters' articles on Indonesia's Nagapasa-class subs dated August 4, 2017, 
 April 16, 2019,  April 17, 2019,  April 23, 2019 and October 29, 2019.]

The first two [subs], produced in South Korea, have been used in operations.

As many as 206 Indonesian technicians were involved in the manufacturing process of the KRI-Alugoro.

More recently, Indonesia and South Korea are working jointly on the development of the KF-X [aka KF-21 which Indonesia calls the "IF-X" or F-33 stealth fighter].

South Korea’s Foreign Ministry said on 28 June that ministers from the two nations have “agreed to closely co-operate to make sure that mutually beneficial, substantive co-operation projects like the KF-21/IF-X project will proceed smoothly”.

Indonesia has also agreed on the purchase of six units of trainer jets from South Korea’s Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) in a S$240 million deal.

The extreme lines of KRI Golok (688) (Photo courtesy TNI AL via Tribun-Timur,
August 22, 2021.)

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Indonesia’s Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Yudo Margono said that stealth missile ship KRI Golok-688, launched in Banyuwangi in East Java, is capable of being deployed in all types of operations, from war to non-war ones.

The hit-and-run ship—produced by PT Lundin Industry Invest—is the first one made of carbon fibre composite, making it difficult to be detected by potential adversaries. With higher specific strength, it is also more lightweight and is highly resistant to corrosion. The 28-knot ship is equipped with a 30-mm cannon and a 12.7-mm gun with a cruising speed of 16 knots. It can carry around 25 crew members. Admiral Yudo said that the ship will complete its manufacturing process in October 2021, adding that the boat will be dispatched in the country’s most strategic waters such as the Natuna and the Ambalat waters.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data in April 2021 revealed that Indonesia’s military spending was the seventh-largest in Asia — making up 0.9 per cent of its national GDP. The Indonesian government has allocated Rp 133 trillion for defence in the 2022 State Budget draft, down from the 2021 State Budget with Rp 137.3 trillion. The 2020 budget will be used for developments in defence, order and security to ensure that national development programmes will run as smoothly as planned."

China More Important To US Than Taiwan

It goes without saying that since 1971 the US has gone out of its way to remove any status Taiwan had to being an ally to be protected by the US. For the US China, after all, is given preference as much more import politically and more significant, economically.

So, in terms of a timeline:

1971 the UN removed Taiwan's status as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council giving that status to China. At the same time Taiwan was expelled from the UN altogether. 

also in 1971 Kissinger fundamentally changes US foreign policy towards China by secretly travelling to China to meet its leaders. Kissinger realised that China and the Soviets were not a monolithic bloc. The USSR could be, and was, isolated by the US and China enjoying closer relations.

1972 this was followed by Nixon openly travelling to China to cement relations. 

January 1, 1979 the US switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. So the US Embassy was moved from Taipei to Beijing

later in 1979 Taiwan Relations Act of US Congress indicated the US would not necessarily defend Taiwan. Any defense is given strategic ambiguity. Instead "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capabilities". A weapon digression - for example this would appear to rule out the US organizing remote human triggered, or undersea sensor automatically triggered, land attack missiles to hit Chinese territory.

Although a second example USS Jimmy Carter and/or Orca XLUUVs pre-laying sensors-mine networks in waters some distance from Chinese naval bases, with such networks activated in time of war, in order to destroy Chinese submarines and surface vessels, may be a different matter.

A digression the USS Jimmy Carter follows a proud British tradition more than 100 years old. This specifically was in 1918 when a German submarine (UB-116) attempting to enter the UK Royal Navy Grand Fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, was picked up by hydrophone and magnetic anomaly sensors that were interlaced with minefields. The British efficiently triggered mines around the submarine sinking it. All this has been written at Submarine Matters for alert scholars - see The long tradition of fixed ASW sensor and destruction arrays, dated April 4, 2016. 

January 1, 1980 - returning to Taiwan. The US terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan that had been in force since 1955.

1980 All important US-China trade begins to rise sharply.

US-China relations fluctuate and may not always be bad. The US and China might return to closer relations that may again isolate Russia.

The US did not want to go to world war in 1953 when US and Chinese troops were actually fighting each other in Korea. The US would have even more to lose going to world war over Taiwan, because the Chinese military are much more powerful. Also China has nuclear weapons – all making China a potential “peer adversary”.

2021 - As Japan altered its tradional Defence White Paper wording, in 2021, now indicating "stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan is important for Japan’s security and the stability of the international community,”. Japan should seriously increase  its defense budget to match its new thoughts and make improved precursors towards nuclear weapons. This could be along the lines South Korea is already doing - with South Korea's new 3,000+ tonne "KSS-3" submarine mounting 6 vertical launch cruise or ballistic missile silos. Later subs will have 10 silos.

Conclusion

So all the above indicates - however much some assume the US government might or should go to war with China over Taiwan, this is not grounded in US laws or policy.

India needs more than "Short List" of 1 for Submarine Project-75I

A further comment following Russia to benefit from India's Project-75I AIP Transfer Exercise of August 21, 2021.

India, has effectively eliminated 3 contestants (Russia, France and Spain) from its long running Project-75I. Germany's TKMS also flagged it may drop out. This would only leave South Korea's (SK's) DSME. If India wants to avoid an uncontested "short list" of one India will need to significantly alter the transfer (and re-use) of AIP and other technology terms. Or perhaps India could pay a much higher price.

An uncontested result would give DSME superior bargaining power over India, in technology transfer and local content levels. Just as important DSME could sharply increase prices (eg. development, build per unit, training, spares, etc) upfront and then later, via onerous contract milestones. 

It is also unclear what submarine type DSME is offering. I'm assuming India would want the, less than 2,000 tonne, medium sized, cheaper, Type 214, variant with AIP. DSME has built it as the KSS-2 for SK's navy. However NavalNews, June 16, 2021, reported DSME might also be offering India its 3,000+ tonne KSS-3 (with AIP and maybe for Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs)). 

DSME selling a KSS-3 to India would be a much more expensive proposition for India than a KSS-2. If India (via export customer sale dynamics) could cross-subsidize the very high development costs of the, so far, SK Navy only KSS-3 then DSME and the SK Navy would be very happy. Sale of the much larger, more expensive, KSS-3 would also attract a higher profit margin for DSME.

So India is likely to want to keep Germany's TKMS, with the Type 212, in the Project-75I shortlist along with DSME. Though even with TKMS there may be uncertainty for India. Indian selectors now have a choice of 2 AIP Type 212s from TKMS. TKMS may prefer to sell India 6 of the new, much larger, more expensive 2,500+ tonne Type 212CDs rather than 6 of the smaller, cheaper, established 212As (weighing in at less than 2,000 tonnes). TKMS might also give India the choice of medium sized Type 214 or large, 2,500 tonne, 214.

The longer India haggles and procrastinates over Project-75I the steeper the price increases offered by the declining short list of sellers.

Collins & Attack-class Submarine Costings Very Complex

There is an excellent article What's The Real Cost of Australia's Submarine Capability? by senior analyst, Marcus Hellyer, for Australian Strategic Policy Institute's (ASPI's) THE STRATEGIST website. Here he comments on the sheer complexity of costing Australia's current Collins-class submarine program and the more than $1 Billion already spent on Australia's future Attack-class submarines.

Chinese Aggression (eg. Taiwan) & Quad Security Discussers

The following is my response to the first comment from Anonymous  (of August 16, 2021) concerning Submarine Matters Second Report to Donors.

First, thank you for your fulsome praise. I appreciate it.

What the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue discussers may or may not do if/when China invades Taiwan cannot be gamed, because the Quad is only a dialogue, not a solid organisation. I over-egged the status of the Quad in the Second Report, because I want it to expand into an Indo-Pacic NATO eventually.

In the academic and intelligence world looking for clarity is frequently frustrated by realities. Understanding complex world events is less a science and more an art based on experience – of which I humbly have 40 years in both worlds. The surprise fall of the Warsaw Pact Iron Curtain defied the best laid expectations, arguments and imaginations of many thousands of PhD Kremlinologists in Western academia and “intelligence”. In 1989 (fall of the Berlin Wall) I was 28 and everyone was surprised even though Poland’s Solidarity had been active for almost a decade.

The US may be even less likely to strike Chinese territory than in 1953 when Chinese and US/UN troops were actually fighting each other in Korea. Ever since Truman sacked MacArthur (when Mac was seeking to hijack Presidential policy in wanting to fight China on Chinese territory) China has grown vastly more powerful economically and militarily (in conventional and nuclear terms).

That said China is an even more complex case than Cold War Soviet Russia ever was, because not only is China on the way to being a conventional and nuclear military Superpower perhaps within 10 years, it is it may even have the world’s largest economy in 10 years. Many countries may forgive China its military transgressions if Belt and Road enriches their economies.

The Quadrilateral Security discussers are nowhere near being a NATO. The Quad does not constitute an alliance or a treaty even if I implied it in the Second Report. Nothing is written down. No formal members, no guarantees, no tripwires or promises that a Chinese attack on one country will be considered an attack on all.

The Quad Dialogue is aspirational – a vague warning to China that countries may band together against Chinese military aggression. China’s ecomic power might always buy countries off instead of going to war.

In my Second Report I subscribe to increasing US Government moves in 2020-2021 that there should be an Indo-Pacific (aka "Asian") NATO. The Quad demonstration of ambiguous solidarity has found expression in the US Trump and Biden administrations organising Indo-Pacific countries to do Freedom of Navigations Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea (SCS). US administrations have also persuaded NATO countries to “pivot” to the Indo-Pacific by also doing FONOPs in the SCS. While India has been mentioned as the second most powerful Quad discusser it has never seen itself as a junior ally of the US (like Australia and Japan are) and won’t surrender its freedom of action if/when China attacks Taiwan.

“A major question here is does China have further ambitions?” Maybe, maybe not.

The Quad Dialogue is a Dialogue – nothing solid with credibility to “retain”.

America may be unique in having a Presidency that can literally be bought by a non-politician, who, once he lost his inherited $100,000,000s relied on Russian-Putin money to bail him out of bankruptcy. I hope the other Five Eye countries and Japan have higher democratic standards.

Unlike Tibet and Hong Kong, Taiwan is likely to be a tougher domino, but China could still buy it.

I think Chinese territory should only be damaged or its ports and sea lanes blockaded if China proves itself that aggressive first.

My second response will be to Anonymous's second comment of August 16, 2021, which is pitched more at the tactical and weapon (submarines, mines, UUVs, etc) level.

Russia to benefit from India's Project-75I AIP Transfer Exercise

India's and Russia's military-industrial relations go back 60 years (MiG-21s), if not longer. Also see Foxtrot submarines exported to India in 1967.  

/Kjell in a comment has alerted me to a Eurasian Times article of August 20, 2021 that reports:

Germany's TKMS "has said that it might not be able to move forward with the project as it finds the tender requirements “too restrictive”, The Economic Times  [in a PaySite article of Aug 20, 2021] reported."

"[TKMS] entered the project when the Indian Navy expressed its requirement for a sea-proven Air Independent Propulsion (AIP). This was a crucial component as it provided the boats with the ability to stay underwater for more than two weeks, as opposed to the underwater endurance of 2-3 days in the submarines currently in service.

This requirement of a sea-proven AIP resulted in the removal of many shortlisted foreign vendors and left only Germany and South Korea as the contenders.

The other contenders, Russia, France, and Spain did have AIP technology but they were not suitable for a submarine and thus could not be demonstrated. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has also demonstrated its AIP technology, however, it is not yet sea-proven.

According to DRDO, this could take another 4-5 years...." 

[most significantly] "...Keeping in mind the technical requirements that come with the project, India says it wants the transfer of high technology [including AIP, maybe to also pass on to Russia, see below] as well as the rights to use these for its future, home-grown projects.

Pete Comment

India has been planning a class of 6 modern AIP, LACM firing submarines under
 Project-75I as far back as 2008. Acquiring mature AIP tech has always been the main reason that project has been delayed. India has been claiming, as far back as November 2014, that its DRDO AIP technology would be ready for use for that project. This claim continues, to this day, to be disproven by reality. Only Germany's TKMS and to a lesser extent Sweden have successfully invented mature, proven, efficient AIP tech.

TKMS's AIP tech was transferred to South Korea in Type 214 variants in the early 2000s. South Korea appears to have been given a licence to market TKMS designed subs including AIP tech to countries to Asia-Pacific countries (which includes India). South Korea may also have modified TKMS AIP to the extent that it is considered an indigenous South Korean invention.

India needs Western AIP tech for its own conventional submarines. I also believe Russia sees India as a front or transfer-conduit of that AIP tech to Russian industry. Russia's submarine development budget has been spread thin largely to develop its nuclear subs. There hasn't been enough to develop mature, efficient AIP. So I think Russia has been attempting to legally transfer or steal such AIP - for at least 2 decades. Such AIP for Russia would form the basis of Kilo replacements in the shape of Lada and Amur submarines for the Russian Navy and to export to customer navies, respectively.

India's 13 year old Project-75I rolls haphazardly along but there is a method to this Western technology transfer exercise. The Russian Navy and Russia's export industry may yet be  surprising beneficiaries.

Satellite Photos INS Arihant, Arighat & Chakra 2 in Port

Below is an aircraft photo (courtesy mapio.net) of India's nuclear submarine building yard and SSBN/SSN base at Vishakhapatnam (aka Vizag). Vizag is also the HQ Base of India's Eastern Naval Command. 

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Ghalib Kabir has located the commercial satellite photos below nuclear subs at Vizag Base:

Above and posted on numerous websites like) can be seen India's first SSBN INS Arihant. 
INS Chakra 2 - a Russian built Akula-class SSN, was 10 year leased from Russia and reportedly returned to Russia in June 2021. When leased Chakra 2 may have been armed  with torpedoes and Klub missiles (restricted to 300km under MTCR restrictions). India will eventually deploy its own submarine launched Nirbhay land attack cruise missiles and BrahMos anti-ship missiles independently of Russian development help.

Nirbhay and BrahMos will be fitted to India's conventional subs and future 6 x indigenous "Project Alpha" SSNs (the latter to be developed by the 2030s). 

Visible above are INS Arihant and what is believed to be a section of INS Arighat. Arighat (being of the Arihant class) may also have the same specs as Arihant: ie. 83MW PWR, displacement 6,000 tonnes, dimensions (111m long, 11m beam) and 4 missile silos. The silos on Arihant might accommodate 12 x K-15 SLBMs in total and in future 4 x K-4s (in total). See India's K  SLBM family.

The white covered shed may house the 7,000 tonne S4 under construction. It may eventually have a 90MW PWR, and 8 silos. Optimistically S4 might be ready for launching by mid 2022. Then S4* (with same specs) may be launched months afterward. Future S-4 and S-4* are also categorized in the Arihant class.

Probably in the 2030s India is also planning to build full sized "S5 class" SSBNs. These will accommodate 12 to 16 x K-5 or K-6 SLBMs.

Ghalib advises the K-5 missile tests are apparently under lengthy discussions and might see some tests by 2023 if all goes well. As Pete thinks the K-5 would likely be too large to fit in Arihant class subs its deployment may need to await construction of the S5s. Apparently there is a concept called limited deployment, used recently to deploy the Nirbhay LACM in the Ladakh region - in range of Pakistani and Chinese forces.  

Ghalib advises the 7,000 tonne S4 and S4* may be on track for sea trials by 2024-25 with the SLBM K-5 tests occurring concurrently. Ghalib believes the S4 will carry the K-5 in all likelihood (although Pete disagrees :-) and in 6 to 8 silos. and that the K-5s may have single boosted fission warheads (yielding 60-100 kT). 

Pete estimates that India, like all the P5 legal nuclear weapon states, would have developed 2 stage thermonuclear weapons years ago. India was assisted by Russian designs and test data, so no live testing by India has been needed. China successfully exploded its first multi-stage thermonuclear weapon in 1967! - so hasn't India caught up 53 years later? I believe India has caught up. India's reticence is about multi-layered perceptions. This is about India's illegal nuclear weapon status (while still being accepted as a defacto legal nuclear power). Hence India does not want to highlight the true power of its nuclear arsenal on a public relations or international legal level.  

Above is a very grainy shot of Arihant and Arighat tied alongside each other (circa January 2021). INS Arighat was apparently undergoing harbour trials earlier in 2021. This may especially include running its reactor and testing its electricals and electronics. Arighat may have commenced sea trials, testing its planes, any propeller cavitation, hydrodynamic noise, crew efficiency, new combat systems, silo hatches and many other systems. If all goes well Arighat might be commissioned this year. 

India and other Quads Tracking Chinese Submarines

Pete, inspired by geo-strategic legend's, Ghalib Kabir's comments, on August 14 and 16 2021, writes: 

The Indo-Pacific undersea Sensor Array (which not only features audio, but other undersea sensor technologies) is successfully picking up Chinese nuclear and conventional submarines emissions in the Indo-Pacific. This array (map below) is maintained and ultimately weaponized by Quadrilateral (Quad) members. 

 
Map above is from page 54 “Map 4. The US ‘Fish Hook’ Undersea Defense Line” by (the late) Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, The Tools of Owatatsumi Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities (2015, ANU Press) at http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p309261/pdf/book.pdf?referer=444. 
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Parts of the Array are of the well known deep water passive sonar (SOSUS) technology for detection of submarines. Other seafloor sections (some called Fixed, Distributed System (FDS) nodes) consist of a higher concentration of sensors to detect submarines and other vessels passing over them in shallower water littorals and narrows. 

The "Quad" Sensor Array can detect minute submarine emissions. This includes Chinese nuclear and conventional submarines. Many, maybe most, of the conventional Chinese Song-class and Yuans rely on Stirling engine AIP. This AIP technology has relatively noisy moving parts (compared to Fuel Cell AIP) and also suffers from a working depth limitation which cannot exceed 200m. Even Chinese subs using AIP while sitting on the seafloor create tell-tale emissions.

Chinese Type 093 SSNs even use the Sunda Strait rather than the Malacca Strait to pass through the Pacific to Indian Oceans and vice versa. 

Regarding the South China Sea, which Chinese subs are trying to control, it is shallower than most seas. This makes the South China Sea relatively transparent to Western optical, LIDAR and magnetic anomaly sensors.

Indian Ocean Legs of the Quad Array

Several years ago the Quad Sensor Array was expanded from Port Blair in India's  Andaman Island territory, Indian Ocean, to Chennai communications intelligence node (map below) on the east coast of India. 

(See more details of Chennai and other 2017- onwards Indian intelligence-communication network matters)
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The Indian Navy continues to expand an undersea (passive sonar) and surface-sea (long-range radar and satellite) detection network to the Seychelles and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean (see yellow stars indicating Indian bases in the map below). India is also negotiating to build an airstrip near Mauritius for P-8 maritime patrol aircraft. Chinese SSNs are major targets for detection. 

(See more details)
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 You will see a peculiar sight soon on INS Vikramaditya, India's Russian made carrier, that is US made MH-60R helicopters. These helicopter's ASW missions will start to get Indian personnel ready for deployment of the 24 x MH-60Rs being delivered to India. The reason to rush MH-60R procurements is to track Chinese and Pakistani subs better.

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Tomorrow - satellite photos of INS Arihant, Arighat and Chakra II in port.

Next Week - I'll respond to comments on the Second Report to Donors
                     "China vs Taiwan/US..."

"West China Sea" to replace Indian Ocean

Following "Fewer Pakistani subs operational while India to gain one" of August 13, 2021 and inspired by Ghalib Kabir’s comments:

"West China Sea" is not as funny as it sounds. Senior Chinese Communist Party leaders in the past have been so contemptuous of India, that they felt India did not deserve to be associated with one of the world’s large oceans. 

Fortunately, China still has a long way to go to create its own Mare Nostrum "West China Sea". India's forces and the US Air Force and Navy are still much more powerful and have bigger, better, bases in the Indian Ocean.

Assisted by new Chinese ports/bases in the Indian Ocean, Chinese vessels are becoming a regular presence. Vessels include:

-  Chinese Song and Yuan class SSKs, their submarine tenders and Type 093 SSNs.

-  more obvious surface flotillas, featuring Type 052D destroyers, Type 54A frigates along with their logistical supply ships carrying fuel and dry stores. These mini flotillas operate  under the pretext of anti piracy patrols off the East African coast, while also acting as "cover" for Chinese submarine operations.

Chinese submarines, secretly surveilling the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea (in concert with Pakistani submarines) are much more common than generally known. Type 093s, Songs, Yuans and tenders regularly show up at the Chinese base in Hambantota in Sri Lanka and at Gwadar in Pakistan. Pakistan is becoming more dependent on the future supply of 8 x Yuan export variants from China because Pakistan's return to financial crisis means it cannot afford to repair or upgrade its 5 Agosta subs.

The Red dots mark the locations of emerging ports/bases being developed by China in the Indian Ocean (Map courtesy CIMSEC). 

Further clear indicators that China has major "String of Pearls" economic and strategic aspirations in the Indian Ocean are the emerging Chinese built port facilities in Myanmar and Djibouti in East Africa. 

Island Chain Strategies

Associated with the "String of Pearls" are the Island Chains China wants to be able pass through freely with large military forces (especially naval fleets and SSBNs) to have the type of geo-strategic freedom the US Navy enjoys. The US Island Chain Strategy means power and freedom for the US already. Below is the Island Chain map.

Of the Island Chains the first three are in the Pacific and next two in the Indian Ocean. So:

-  First - runs from the Kurile islands, down through the Japanese Archipelago, Okinawa, very significantly Taiwan, Philippines, then hooks around encompassing most of the South China Sea.

-  Second - Japan, through Guam, down to Western New Guinea (aka Irian Jaya) encompassing much of the Wester Pacific.

-  Third - Aleution islands, Hawaii down to New Zealand. Australia being at the southern base between Second and Third island chains.

-  Fourth - less defined - central Indian Ocean from Gwadar, Pakistan, in the north, through the Diego Garcia presumably to Antarctica, and

-  Fifth - less defined, Gulf of Aden, then south along the East African coast presumably to Antarctica.

Stay tuned for two more articles tomorrow, based on Ghalib Kabir’s (and some of my own) thoughts.