Following March 11 2019 this article focuses on uses of India's current Akula Chakra II ("II") and what its replacement ex-Kashalot (K-322) Chakra "III" will do from 2025.
The deployment pattern of II is classified - so it is unclear how long II spends in and away from its homeport at India's Eastern Naval Command Base - Visakhapatnam. It is significant that
Visakhapatnam is well situated against Chinese submarine threats and potential nuclear targets within China.
All India's submarines and warships at Visakhapatnam benefit from the new SOSUS link strung between Port Blair (capital of India's Andaman Island territory - see Map below) and then west to the naval bases at Chennai and/or Visakhapatnam itself. See Section B. This SOSUS link acts as a force multiplier, giving early warning of Chinese ship and especially submarine movements in the Indian Ocean. Chinese nuclear submarines crossing through the narrows of the Indonesian Archipelago and even moving the long way between Australia and Antarctica would be of particular interest. See a more detailed description of the Bay of Bengal SOSUS here.
Like SSN's worldwide a major job for II and then III would be protecting SSBNs, in India's case INS Arihant and INS Arighat. These SSBNs may perform rare deterent patrols within the protected naval bastion of the Bay of Bengal. From the SSBN and SSN base at Visakhapatnam this might begin with a SSN search patrol in the Bay of Bengal beginning some time before an SSBN deterrence patrol. The main threats are opposing SSNs, SSKs, opposing SOSUS (and other sensors). China heading the list followed by Pakistan.
If, in the medium-long term, a Chinese SSBN were detected entering the Indian Ocean then that would also be a high value submarine "target" to follow at a discrete distance.
By the mid 2020s India will probably rely on 3 SSBNs (due to the "Rule of thirds") permitting one to be on deterrent patrol at all times. It would be equally prudent to have at least 6 x SSNs to allow 2 SSNs to protect that SSBN on patrol.
Pete
Broadly India uses II and will use future III for technology transfer, training (including
ASW, anti-shipping and land-attack), exercises, protection of India's SSBN
deterrent patrols and shadowing Chinese SSNs and ships.
From
about 2030 If Russia agrees to integration of Indian and foreign made components AND Russia shares key software interface modules, III may be upgraded to the:
In
part drawing from GhalibKabir's comments:
Currently much of II's use is as a design and testbed for technology transfer for India's current and future indigenous SSBNs and future indigenous SSNs. This especially includes testing/training on II's and future III's powerful 190MW OK-650B/OK-650M Russian built reactor. India needs to upgrade from INS Arihant's and (maybe) Arighat's underpowered 83MW reactors.
Currently much of II's use is as a design and testbed for technology transfer for India's current and future indigenous SSBNs and future indigenous SSNs. This especially includes testing/training on II's and future III's powerful 190MW OK-650B/OK-650M Russian built reactor. India needs to upgrade from INS Arihant's and (maybe) Arighat's underpowered 83MW reactors.
India
may currently be working on an Indian land based derivative of the OK-650B/OK-650M. before it installs a
seabased version in a larger Indian SSBN (under construction).
FOLLOW
THE WEAPONS
II is cloaked in mystery and may carry no weapons at
present. But it is most likely that III from 2025 will initially carry such weapons as
those fitted to India's Russian built Kilo submarines. This
includes the:
- Type
53 (530mm) torpedoes (ASW and anti-ship), and
- Club-S, cruise missiles (anti-ship and land
attack).
- Indian made advanced 530mm Varunastra torpedo (may need 12+ tests and years to mature)
- new Indian built smaller 500mm BrahMos missiles (anti-ship and land attack)
Some combat system elements might be placed in III and then on indigenous Indian SSNs to make them more capable eg. Israeli electronics (eg. those used on Dolphin Is and IIs) and/or French Optronic/Photonic masts (like the Safran AOM 30) and French advanced low frequency flank array sonars.
The Indian military establishment has useful experience cross wiring 'different source' systems to talk to each other. The Russian designed Su-30 MKI multirole fighter built under licence by India's Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is a good example.
The Indian military establishment has useful experience cross wiring 'different source' systems to talk to each other. The Russian designed Su-30 MKI multirole fighter built under licence by India's Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is a good example.
GEOGRAPHICALLY WHAT II and III MAY BE USED FOR
The deployment pattern of II is classified - so it is unclear how long II spends in and away from its homeport at India's Eastern Naval Command Base - Visakhapatnam. It is significant that
Visakhapatnam is well situated against Chinese submarine threats and potential nuclear targets within China.
All India's submarines and warships at Visakhapatnam benefit from the new SOSUS link strung between Port Blair (capital of India's Andaman Island territory - see Map below) and then west to the naval bases at Chennai and/or Visakhapatnam itself. See Section B. This SOSUS link acts as a force multiplier, giving early warning of Chinese ship and especially submarine movements in the Indian Ocean. Chinese nuclear submarines crossing through the narrows of the Indonesian Archipelago and even moving the long way between Australia and Antarctica would be of particular interest. See a more detailed description of the Bay of Bengal SOSUS here.
If, in the medium-long term, a Chinese SSBN were detected entering the Indian Ocean then that would also be a high value submarine "target" to follow at a discrete distance.
By the mid 2020s India will probably rely on 3 SSBNs (due to the "Rule of thirds") permitting one to be on deterrent patrol at all times. It would be equally prudent to have at least 6 x SSNs to allow 2 SSNs to protect that SSBN on patrol.
Pete
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