USN Starved of SSNs: 3 for Australia Unlikely.

WINDOW DRESSING

The "Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS" of March 13th (14th in Australia) 2023, contained President Biden's intention:

"Starting in the early 2030s, pending Congressional approval, the United States intends to sell Australia three Virginia class submarines, with the potential to sell up to two more if needed."

Noting, even if Biden wins the 2024 Election he can only remain President until January 2029. It will be up to another president to provide for a USN that is seeing its number of SSNs fall beneath the bare minimum needed of 50. 50 or less for the USN will not be enough to handle the increased number and rise in quality of China's SSNs and SSBNs.

With the rolling average of all 50 already earmarked for the USN Biden's intention of selling 3 of those 50 to Australia is but political window dressing to keep the remote hope of AUKUS submarines alive. Hope until the 2040s when UK designed SSN-AUKUS's might actually become available to Australia. 

Biden's window dressing is something US reqirements and an US production rates  cannot meet - see below. 

USN NEEDS AND US PRODUCTION REALITIES

Key advice for the US Government on the USN’s SSN needs is the Congressional Research Service’s “Navy Virginia…Class Attack SubmarineProcurement: Background and Issues for Congress” Number RL32418, dated September 29, 2021.

“…A key issue for Congress concerns the SSN force-level goal and procurement rate. The Navy’s current force-level goal, which was released in December 2016, calls for…66 SSNs. On December 9, 2020, the Navy released a long-range Navy shipbuilding document that called for 72 to 78 SSNs…On June 17, 2021, the Navy released a long-range Navy shipbuilding document that calls for 66 to 72 SSNs.

Under the Navy’s FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan, SSNs would be procured at a steady rate of two per year...” 

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Separately John Grady for USNI reported in part, April 20, 2023: 

"...Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro told House appropriators that the Virginia-class attack boats program is “significantly behind” schedule.

The Navy’s plan was to build one Columbia-class sub and two Virginia-class per year, but the plan did not take into account deliveries to Australia.

General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News shipyards are the only yards capable of building nuclear-powered submarines. Instead of two Virginia-class per year, the Navy reported they are delivering 1.2 boats...[1.2 Virginias per year]"

Comment
To maintain the USN's rolling average of 50 SSNs construction of 2 Virginias per year is needed to make good the retirement of an average 2 Los Angeles SSNs per year. However there are estimated the US may take 5 more years to get Virginia production up to 2 per year. So by 2028 the USN might be down to just 45 to 47 SSNs.

Why ONLY 1.2 Virginia SSNs being produced per year? Several reasons:

-  the minimum of 12 Columbia-class SSBNs commissioned from 2031 right through the 2030s-early 2040s have been assigned a higher priority than the Virginias. The Columbias are around 10% behind schedule and need to replace the outgoing Ohio SSBNs.

-  The Virginia construction industry has Block V challenges with inadequately planned for man-years needed to build the Virginia Payload Modules for the 10 x future Block V SSGN Virginias. This concerns design and construction of those Modules themselves. But it also concerns modified plans and adjustments for the 2,400 short tons heavier (than Blocks I to IV) Block Vs in terms buoyancy management, trim, nuclear reactor propulsion load and some changes to the combat system hardware and software. 

-  Perhaps with the effect of reducing Virginia SSN construction to 1.1 per year is an even more marked design and construction departure. This is a planned one-off "Mod VA SSW" (Modified Virginia, Subsea and Seabed Warfare) Virginia likely to be commissioned in the 2030s. This sub might not be used for conventional SSN combat duties. It will likely have a 30m, 2,500 ton, Special Mission Module, additional hover in-place thrusters and even more adjustments than Block Vs. It will augment the equally Special Mission USS Jimmy Carter. The need for the 2 Special Mission subs simultaneously might be in recognition of:
-  increased seabed warfare by Russia's Special Mission submarine fleet
-  China becoming more active in that field
-  such US subs being able to launch Orca XLUUVs and other bulky vehicles, and
-  for larger (up to 66 men) Special Forces units that used to be accommodated by the outgoing Ohio-class SSGNs. 

The USN will be dangerously stretched with only 1.1 to 1.2 Virginia SSNs under construction for several years. Three being sold to Australia, means three sidelined mainly for training duties promised to Australia. The USN might be down to a low of 42 active SSNs (rather than the present 50) in the 2030s. The 42 may not be supplemented by active combat ready Australian Virginias until about 2040. Even  then Australian Government leaders have stressed Australian Virginias' "sovereignty". This may mean they might not necessarily fight alongside the US.

The 2030s could see Presidents Putin and Xi probably still in power, both still pursuing aggressive defence policies with ever more capable SSNs and SSBNs (also, for Russia, advanced SSGNs). China's future Type 095 SSNs and Type 096 SSBNs might be discrete/silent enough to operate east of the First Island Chain, for the first time and perhaps, into the mid-Pacific. This will present an increased threat to the US, demanding more than 50, not less, USN SSNs.  

Virginias for Australia being a longshot is something Albanese and Marles currently refuse to admit.

Air Exercise Cope India: Containing China

In a well organised series of comments and links Gessler advised, April 20, 2023:

What can be seen as a QUAD (almost) alliance China containing bilateral air activity, is Exercise Cope India, running from April 13 to 24, 2023.

The US and India have restarted Exercise Cope India which was cancelled 2020 to 2022 during the peak of the COVID Crisis.

See https://twitter.com/IAF_MCC/status/1648306610530553857 

[John] Thomas Newdick over at The War Zone wrote a nice report on this.   

Gathering from various sources reporting on the on-going events, I find several  points of particular interest in this edition of the Exercise: 

1)   A USAF brought in a B-1B Lancer to Cope India for the first time. This is a swing wing supersonic long-range heavy bomber.

2)   Other USAF entrants were F-15E Strike Eagles. Both the B-1B and F-15Es focused on Air-to-Ground Strike missions of varying magnitudes. 

3)   Special Forces units of the two countries have reportedly practiced Forward Air Control missions in the run-up to the Air component of the exercises. 

[4)    Indian Air Force participants included Su-30 MKIs, Rafales, Tejas and Jaguar fighter aircraft. The exercise is supported by aerial refuellers and Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AEW&CS) aircraft.] 

5)   The locations of the exercises are significant. They are spread across three China-facing Air Force Stations in Eastern India.  

6)    For the first time is the presence of personnel from the Japanese Air Force in an observer capacity (which is usually a precursor to participation...we'll see)

[7)    It is also likely that personnel from the defence section, Australian High Commission, Delhi, also came as observers.]

A similar QUAD activity is naval Exercise Malabar at which the US, India, Japan and increasingly Australia participate.

Exercises are interesting events overall. Expansion in the size, scope and complexity of joint exercises is never a bad thing.

Qatar Locks Up 8 Former Indian Naval Officers

India’s The Print on April 19, 2023 reported that:

Eight former Indian Navy officers have been imprisoned by Qatar. What those officers were doing for Qatar is unclear. They are accused of spying for Israel on Qatar’s (until now secret) project to acquire 2 or more (smaller than the Italian Navy's version) of the Fincantieri-TKMS Type 212 Near Future Submarines (NFS). The 212NFS's for the Italian Navy are to have both AIP and LIBs [for perhaps 4 weeks continuous submerged operation]. Possibly Qatar’s 212NFS's would have AIP and LIBs as well.

Pete Comment

India might logically have also been a recipient of the officers’ information, in part because Qatar is reportedly close militarily with India’s nemesis Pakistan.

Canadian XLUUVs after the Victorias?

Artwork of Canada's British Columbia based (current or future) Cellula Robotics Solus-XR XLUUV - see brochure.
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Further to my article "Canada's RCN Using the RAN's Attack-class Plan?" 
of April 14, 2023:

If Canada orders new SSKs after several reviews it may receive them in about 15-25 years. As Canada's Upholder/Victoria-class SSKs were launched in the UK  between the mid-1980s to early 1990s then the "youngest", Corner Brook and Windsor, might last until 2030, if there are no major life-extension overhauls. 

Canada (like Australia) might well be hedging against a substantial No-submarine capability gap (say) from 2030 to, say, 2045, by investing in XLUUV development.  

We live in a world of ever more capable unmanned submarines, that are vastly cheaper than manned subs. As XLUUVs are large (say 1.5m diameter and more than 10m long) they may finally attain an unrefueled range of 5,000nm. This is enough to cross the Atlantic (Canada to Spain - see Cellula's map scrolling half way down) or Australia to Hawaii (or Aus to Diego Garcia). They might not be able to launch from any Western submarine, other than USS Jimmy Carter, so rely on pier side launch. 

Future Canadian XLUUVs might gather intelligence (say) with onboard passive sonar for ASW, mine countermeasures and concerning drug smuggling in the Caribbean and off the Pacific coast of Central America. Against China and Russia laying seabed or tethered sensors and even smart-mines may be a quiet future function.  

The RCN may be looking at several XLUUV solutions. I'm aware of Canada's British Columbia based Cellula Robotics Solus-XR XLUUV - see brochure (artwork above). Canada's economy being capable of developing formidable XLUUVs is another incentive to build them.

The RCN (like the RAN?) may also have a watching brief on the US Orca Program. Although Orca's huge size, consequent high cost and USN domination of the Orca Program might be a turnoff. Alternatively Canada (and Australia) might be members of a quiet Orca Operational Coalition with Canada and Australia serving as pier side refueling stops for transitting or return leg USN owned Orcas. 

Shared Interests with the US trumps Aussie "Sovereignty"

When it comes to US strategic operations in the Indo-Pacific Australian forces interoperate in alliance with the US rather than standing apart out of sovereign separateness. The US is supplying 3 to 5 Virginia SSNs to Australia in the 2030s precisely because this allows Australia to fight in far off theatres like Taiwan – something that Australia’s Collins SSKs simply don’t have the range or speed to do.

After the AUKUS submarine schedule was announced on March 14, 2023 Australia's Defence Minister Marles quickly started to argue Australian having Virginia SSNs would not erode Australia’s sovereignty/discretion on whether or not they would work with the USN to defend Taiwan. Marles’ main concern was widespread opposition (within his own governing Labor Party ranks and in public surveys) to the “A$368 Billion” SSN price-tag and perceived loss of sovereignty. Put another way Marles argued Australia would enjoy sovereign freedom of choice not to fight alongside the US Navy.

US Governments don’t see things that way - since America forces in WWII saved Australia’s “bacon” in the Battle of the Coral Sea and Guadalcanal (in the Solomons). Both represented Japanese threats on the approaches to Australia. The US doesn’t see Australia always fighting in alliance with the US as a “loss of Australian sovereignty”. The US sees it as in Australia’s best interests. This includes the mythical or actual US nuclear umbrella that theoretically keeps any Chinese nuclear threat to Australia at bay.

Marles’ spurious reaction “Australia would retain its sovereignty” flies in the face of regular US State Department, US Defense Department and retired US admirals' and generals' reminders that the US and Australia have fought shoulder-to-shoulder for more than 100 years and will continue to do so, through shared interests.

FOR EXAMPLE

Said current US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on the US DoD website in September 2021 https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2777798/australia-us-alliance-is-stronger-deeper-than-ever-officials-say/ 

“Today, we still stand shoulder-to-shoulder as mates, ready to face the challenges and the opportunities of the future,” Austin said. “That’s what this new trilateral security partnership between the U.S., the U.K. and Australia is all about. … An important first step for AUKUS will be our efforts to help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines. This will significantly improve the Australian Navy’s reach and defensive capabilities.

[and this is the "Kicker", Austin further stated] "It will also help contribute to what I call ‘integrated deterrence’ in the region — the ability for the United States military to work more effectively with our allies and partners in defense of our shared security interests.” 

Pete Comment

Basically “‘integrated deterrence’ in the region” and US defined "shared security interests" (a la the US and allies deterring China over Taiwan) trumps separate Australian defence sovereignty or choice.

Australian Nuclear Weapons: Making SSNs Cost Effective

I’ve just had a brainwave that can keep 1,000s of newly trained Australian nuclear engineers, techos, scientists and managers busy while they await the Virginias of the 2030s. Also they need gainfull employment in their post nuke submarine careers.

Australia doesn’t need a complementary civilian nuclear program when Aussies, like many Indian N techos, can busy themselves on a Nuclear Weapons program prior to nuclear propelled subs availability. 

Australia could even mine the U and then produce the HEU with indigenous Australian SILEX laser enrichment technology. In WW2 Australian-UK radar and atomic bomb inventions were delivered to the US as highly valuable "reverse lend-lease". In a similar way a commercial SILEX enrichment plant is being built in Paducah, Kentucky - in what can be termed "reverse AUKUS". 

Yes Australia's Southeast Asian and Pacific Island neighbours, and the nuclear haves, like China (all failing to disarm) may harbour reservations about this N weapons make work plan. But you can't make  pavlovas without breaking eggs.

Australia's A$368500 billion by 2053 nuclear propelled sub program will be an under-armed (15 tonnes of conventional explosives max per sub) extravagance unless our SSNs have nuclear tipped future hypersonic cruise missiles.

“All I Am Saying Is [NOT] Give Peace A Chance” as the Beatles misguidedly sang, but Give Nuclear Weapons A Chance. This is while Indo-Pacific medium powers, like South Korea, Taiwan and under-armed great power Japan are thinking nuclear weapons.

Canada's RCN Using the RAN's Attack-class Plan?

Pete Comment

Both Canada and Australia hosted UK RN submarine units post WW2 and both then acquired UK build Oberon-class submarines (aka "O-boats"). Canada commissioned 3 O-boats in the 1960s and Australia 6 in the 1960s-70s. 

In the mid-late 1980s Canada (or mainly the RCN) considered, as its O-boats aged, a plan to buy Canada-class SSNs from the UK or France. Many Canadian citizens and other government departments objected to the wildly unrealistic low cost estimates. Also expecting Canadian industry, having not ever built any submarines, to go straight to building nuclear submarines was a tad unrealistic. 

Probably the main veto was from the ever fickle USA which did not want a rival SSN owner (pressing its own territorial interests) sharing America's Western Hemisphere. But its now OK for Australia, safely not in that hemisphere, to own SSNs. Any hint whether Canada was ever invited to a CAUKUS? 

So once Canada and Australia retired both O-boat fleets, by the year 2000, they replaced them with Canada buying 4 second-hand UK Upholder/Victoria-class SSKs and Australia built 6 Collins-class SSKs.

After the cosy (wet, dripping, smelly) O-boat arrangements the Upholder/Victoria-class and Australian Collins-class solutions both had their problems. The UK laid "up" the 4 Upholders, down in saltwater for years in the 1990s. This led to rust/corrosion, then years of necessary derusting, and perhaps ongoing problems, once handed over to Canada. In a 2004 transatlantic “ferrying” to Canada one of the Upholder/Victorias (HMCS Chicoutimi) suffered an almost catastrophic fire that left one crewman dead and several injured. 

Since then the 4 Victorias, like the 6 Collins, have spent inordinate downtimes undergoing very expensive overhauls. With 20/20 hindsight if the 100 year old UK or US industries had supplied newbuild SSKs in the 1990s. Or if Canada and Australia had imported newbuild AIP subs from the best, most efficient maker, what is now Germany’s TKMS, much of the pain could have been avoided. 

The RAN has always gone out of its way not to choose Germany for a German “Collins” or German Attack-class. Perhaps the Germans build subs too quickly and efficiently, in Germany, for the “slow build, problem plagued, in Australia” post retirement sinecures of Australian admirals and South Australian politicians?! Anyway, I digress. 

The RCN idea in the article below (for 12 very expensive, so presumably very large, tailor made, SSKs) seems to be more than coincidentally reminiscent of the terminated Australian Attack class. Also, following RAN thinking, if the RCN expects in the end just 6 subs (3 on your east coast, 3 on your west) then asking the politicians for 12 subs looks appropriate. The reduction from 12 to 6 will appear to said pollies and a relieved public (worried about health costs, education and welfare etc) as a money saver. That is, until the 6 subs wind up costing the full amount of cash the navy originally estimated would buy 12 subs. I’ll write about RAN and RCN XLUUV ideas another day.

ARTICLE

The article below has been obtained via the O canada.com website and is by David Pugliese, first published at the Ottawa Citizen, dated April 4, 2023.
 

"Royal Canadian Navy pitches $60 billion submarine purchase, say defence and industry sources

But that price tag could climb to $100 billion as military equipment procurement programs are rarely on budget

HMCS Windsor, one of Canada's Victoria-class long range patrol submarines, returns to port in Halifax on Wednesday, June 20, 2018 after completing a 5-month deployment in the Euro-Atlantic region. PHOTO BY ANDREW VAUGHAN /THE CANADIAN PRESS
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The Royal Canadian Navy is making a pitch for the purchase of up to 12 new submarines at a cost of $60 billion, say National Defence and industry sources. 

The navy is pushing for the acquisition of the submarines to be included in the Liberal government’s Defence Policy Update. Last month at a defence conference in Ottawa, Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Wayne Eyre acknowledged he was advocating on behalf of the navy for submarines.

The navy has a team examining the replacement of the current Victoria-class submarine fleet and there have been initial discussions with industry officials, sources said.

Asked about the navy’s new submarine proposal, National Defence spokesman Dan Le Bouthillier stated that, “the Defence Policy Update is currently underway, with public consultations ongoing, and we look forward to releasing the DPU in due course.”

The navy has created the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, or CPSP. “The CPSP is examining all conventional options available, gathering information, and conducting an analysis of potential submarines capable of meeting the Royal Canadian Navy’s requirements,” said Le Bouthillier.

But he noted the work on the submarine project is part of the navy’s routine analysis. “The CPSP does not commit the government to any specific course of action, but is intended to facilitate an informed decision when required,” Le Bouthillier added.

Canadian defence industry sources say the cost of the new subs would be around [all figures in this article are in Canadian dollars] $60 billion but that price tag could climb to $100 billion as military equipment procurement programs are rarely on budget. Industry representatives pointed to the program to build 15 new surface combatants for the Canadian navy. The cost for those vessels has climbed from $25 billion to more than $80 billion.

In 2016, Australia had a project to build 12 conventional-powered submarines at a cost of more than $50 billion. But it withdrew from that and instead entered into a new plan to buy at least eight nuclear submarines with help from the U.S. and Britain. The Australian government has estimated that program will cost between $260 billion to $360 billion over 30 years.

There are hurdles to the Royal Canadian Navy’s proposal to buy new subs. In the past, the navy has had trouble training enough submariners to crew its current fleet of four boats, let alone 12.

The other hurdle is whether the federal government wants to fund such a massive naval project at a time when Canadians are more concerned about the lack of health care system and affordable housing, inflation and increasing costs for basic necessities such as food.

The four Victoria-class boats, originally known as the Upholder-class, were purchased second-hand from the Royal Navy and delivered between 2000 and 2004.

But the latest data provided to this newspaper by National Defence shows the submarines have had limited use since 2017. HMCS Corner Brook has not been to sea over the last five years.

From 2017 to April 2023, the Canadian Forces has spent $1.9 billion on submarine maintenance with three boats totaling 529 days at sea. In 2019 and 2020, no submarine operations were conducted at all by Canada, according to National Defence.

Victoria-class submarines were recognized in the Liberal government’s 2017 defence policy, Strong Secure Engaged, as key contributors to national defence. The Liberal government has committed to modernizing the subs so they can continue to operate until the mid-2030s.

While the Canadian Armed Forces has suggested it could take 15 years for a new submarine to be eventually acquired, National Defence documents obtained by this newspaper through the Access to Information law warn the process could take much longer. “The procurement timeline from project establishment to contract award is highly specific to the project but staff analysis has shown that the procurement of a new submarine class will take a minimum of 15 years total from project establishment to first delivery and could exceed 25 years depending on the adopted procurement strategy,” National Defence and military officials told then-Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan in a Jan. 6, 2021 briefing note.

The Canadian Patrol Submarine Project office would start out small but will be incrementally augmented with “hand-selected submariners, engineers and procurement professionals,” Sajjan was told. The staff will follow the normal project activities leading to departmental government boards, an independent review panel for defence acquisition, and eventual approval by Treasury Board for the project to proceed.

In its 2021 briefing to the then-defence minister, the Royal Canadian Navy noted submarines are a key element of the Canadian Armed Forces continental defence and are critical to the detection of foreign submarines. “Given that submarine technology is being exploited by non-state actors (e.g. Caribbean drug cartels) the significance of sub-surface MDA (maritime domain awareness)/maritime undersea surveillance is an important capability to retain and grow pursuant to recent departmental discussions,” Sajjan was told.

The current Defence Minister Anita Anand also received a similar briefing on the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project.

The Conservative party has supported an immediate replacement program for the Victoria-class submarines.

David Pugliese is an award-winning journalist covering Canadian Forces and military issues in Canada. To support his work, including exclusive content for subscribers only, sign up here: ottawacitizen.com/subscribe"

"The (South) Korean Nuclear Threat"

Dr Jeffrey Robertson, writing at the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) website, has written the excellent article, of April 13, 2023, below:

The (South) Korean Nuclear Threat 
By Dr Jeffrey Robertson
ANALYSIS

SHARE

South Korea is in the midst of a debate to secure nuclear weapons and few outside realise the seriousness and level of the debate. Few inside realise the question is much bigger than just South Korea, with great implications for the region, including Australia. 

Debate on securing an independent nuclear weapons capacity once sat on the fringe of mainstream politics in Seoul. The extreme left and right, ex-military, religionists, and mavericks seeking attention were its champions. This is no longer the case. Today it is widely accepted, even common. Polls taken over the last year put public support in the 70-80 percent range. Securing nuclear weapons is now mainstream, viable, and if trends continue, even likely.

What makes South Korea want nuclear weapons? There’s a ready response from those pushing the agenda. North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and concerns regarding a rising China. Each can readily be used to justify the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Yet, each are just squalls on the surface of the sea. Underneath, more powerful currents are pushing the pursuit of nuclear weapons: national pride, the desire to be more independent, and a healthy dose of domestic political opportunism.

National pride is a core contributor to the decision to pursue nuclear weapons. For both Koreas, there’s a keen sense of historical injustice marked by invasions from all sides, including occupation, and division. For South Koreans, there’s also a competitive streak that stretches from the individual to the national desire to be number one. There’s even speculation that the U.S. would be willing to allow Seoul to secure nuclear weapons in order for it to play a larger role in balancing China, placing South Korea at a new level of partnership with Washington. Among many, securing a nuclear weapons capacity provokes a certain element of national pride: more than just a middle power – a member of the nuclear weapons club.

The desire to be more independent is also an important contributing factor. Donald Trump, and the fear of a second Trump administration, may have given the extra push, but the desire for greater independence is much older. From the earliest negotiations between the U.S. and South Korea to secure agreement on a Korean War ceasefire, Seoul fought not just for the promise of U.S. support in the event of another North Korean invasion, but also for the capability to make its own decisions. Since the 1950s, South Korea clawed back this capability, steadily removing U.S. restrictions on its armed forces and building an independent armed forces capacity. It is now a leading global arms supplier, ship (and submarine) builder, has an indigenous jet fighter program, and is developing its own military satellite and missile defense programs.

South Korea is now the tenth largest economy in the world. The desire for a greater capability to act independently is an inevitable trend – and some see nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of independent action.

Domestic political opportunism is the icing on the cake. Already, civic groups with professors, former public servants, students, journalists, and other budding politicians have emerged to push for an independent nuclear weapons capacity. Ostensibly, such groups are formed to coordinate and educate citizens on nuclear weapons. In reality, they are used to pursue political power. They exploit latent nationalism with popular concerns and fears, exacerbate and muddy debate, and ultimately position group leaders into positions of political power. Any subject that mixes national pride and independence is ripe for exploitation. The current president, Yoon Suk-yeol [photo above, in white mask], has made remarks supporting the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the Mayor of Seoul – a position that is a stepping stone to the presidency – has also stated his support. Nuclear weapons will see multiple candidates jump on the bandwagon in the lead-up to the April 2024 legislative elections, and likely more than one candidate in the 2027 presidential elections.

Proliferation, from France to North Korea, is a story of national pride, independence, and political opportunism. South Korea is no different.

It is likely the consequences of this momentous decision to pursue an independent nuclear weapons capacity have not been fully thought through. The short to medium-term impact can be easily ascertained. South Korea will face global condemnation and potentially political and economic sanctions. Yet, South Korea’s diplomatic credentials as a state that exercises substantial restraint may also give pause for thought. So, too, will its role in global supply chains. In the current political climate, a well-coordinated diplomatic campaign, demonstrating that much of the blame lies not in Seoul but in Pyongyang and its enablers, could limit sanction severity and longevity.

In the 1960s, Australia made the decision to forego nuclear weapons in the context of a global diplomatic and strategic understanding that proliferation could be controlled. Since that time, debates about Australia securing nuclear weapons have arisen, but they’ve never been mainstream. Debates in recent years have been more brain-storming and speculation than serious policy-specific programming. A South Korean decision to pursue nuclear weapons would substantially transform strategic outlooks across the region and lead to a more serious debate in Australia. The current nuclear submarine debate would look like a Sunday School picnic.

Jeffrey Robertson is an Associate Professor of Diplomatic Studies at Yonsei University and a Visiting Fellow at the Asia Institute, University of Melbourne. He researches the diplomatic practice and foreign policy of middle powers with a focus on the Korean Peninsula. He writes and updates research at https://junotane.com and on Twitter @junotane. 

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution."

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Pete Comment

I'm one of the "band of brothers" writing outside the mainstream on a future Australian  second strike, nuclear deterrent capability. See my:

-  "B-21 Nuclear Bombers for Australia May Be Worth It." August 23, 2022

-  "US Nuclear Weapon Sharing Under AUKUS? Addition." January 7, 2023

-  "Australian Nuclear Deterrent: French Missile Help?" January 12, 2023, and

-  "B-21s May Be A Good Idea: Further Thoughts" March 16, 2023, which talks of Australian B-21s, from a base in Alice Springs, conducting nuclear strike on Beijing.

Submarine Costs Killing Aus Defence Strategic Review?

 

The A$268 Billion estimated by the Australian Government as necessary to prepare for and buy Australia’s future nuclear submarines may have constrained funds for most of the defence purchases that were to be recommended by Australia's Defence Strategic Review (DSR). The subs are to be 3 to 5 imported Virginias and then up to 8 SSN-AUKUSs home built in Osborne, South Australia. 

The secret version of the DSR Report was handed to PM Albanese and Defence Minister Marles by the main author, retired Air Chief Marshal Sir Angus Houston, on February 14, 2023 (photo above). The public version of the Report was expected to be released basically the same time as the March 14, 2023 AUKUS submarine announcement. A delay caused by culling of subsequently unaffordable Report recommendations may have occurred.

Albanese would be aware of significant political and public resistance to paying A$100s Billions for the subs and therefore public reluctance to pay for other new big ticket defence items. 

A possible big ticket highlight of the public DSR Report may have been a recommendation that Australia consider buying a squadron of B-21 future stealth bombers from the US. A$100s Billions for the subs would clash with A$10s Billions for a squadron of B-21s to be based in central Australia. This would probably place a B-21 purchase, always a long shot for Australia, off the table, eliminating it as a Report recommendation.

Alternatively the DSR Report might re-announce the October 2022 announcement of a plan for B-52s being based part-time at Tindal, in the Northern Territory. But even a Tindal infrastructure upgrade for the B-52s and for other support aircraft might cost A$Billions. So a Tindal upgrade might also be unpopular with the public on defence bill-shock grounds.

In short the huge future cost of the subs may have severely constrained DSR recommendations making the public DSR Report a very thin document indeed. Might be a great opportunity for the Report to wax lyrical about those subs?! :)

Israel's Drakon Sub Maybe Has a VMPL

Above artwork depicts INS Drakon's possible fit-out, 6 single vertical launch missile tubes each able to launch a c.640mm Popeye Turbo nuclear missile. In contrast my money is on one Vertical Multi-Purpose Lock (VMPL). A VMPL could permit Drakon to carry larger diameter missiles in future eg. hypersonic missiles or small ballistic missiles. Click here to enable image expansion. (Courtesy H I Sutton via NavalNews )
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It is suspected the last of the Dolphin 2 class, INS Drakon, has had an extended 6 year fit-out period in Israel (since launch in Germany in 2017) to install a vertical launch system (VLS). If Israel is smart its VLS may be in the form of a Vertical Multi-Purpose Lock (VMPL) the same concept as the Virginia Payload Tube (VPT)  within a Virginia Payload Module. A VMPL may have been envisaged by TKMS for the not fully designed Type 216 offered to Australia (see at base of SubMatts' 2015 article). 

A VMPL (unlike single launch tubes) would permit Drakon, and the follow on Dakar-class Dolphin 3s to vertically launch significantly larger diameter missiles than c.640mm Popeye Turbos, standard 520mm Israeli Tomahawk clones (if they exist) or 500mm MdCNs. 

Assumed to be nuclear armed larger future missiles might include hypersonic missiles (eg. cold launch then rocket then scramjet propelled), or small ballistic missiles. 

Israel's quasi-ballistic Long Range Attack (LORA) missile looks ripe for enlargement from its current 624mm diameter, 5.2m length, 570kg warhead and 400km range. 

Doing the math: If the Drakon fits a standard a Virginia Payload Tube (VPT) with its standard inner diameter of 87 inch = 2.2m needs to be shortened to 8.0m in height to fit into a slightly humped hull. Then 2.2m can accommodate 3 x 1.0m tubes. To hit Tehran from the eastern Mediterranean might require a 1,800km range. The enlarged LORA SLBM might then be 950mm in diameter, with an extra 2.5m stage, lighter stage casings and a more powerful rocket propellant.

China Angered by High Level US-Taiwan Meeting

Following SubMatts' article yesterday China is using another Grey-zone tactic.

The mysterios US Axios website reported April 7, 2023 (2 hous ago):

"Beijing pushes Taiwan Strait claims"

by Rebecca Falconer and Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian

A cargo ship sails in the Taiwan Strait, behind tourists on a lighthouse on Pingtan Island, the closest point to Taiwan, in China's southeast Fujian province on Thursday. Photo: Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images
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"The U.S. State Department says it's "monitoring closely" a Chinese maritime operation in the Taiwan Strait this week that includes boarding and inspecting ships.

Why it matters: Officials in Taipei believe the unprecedented action in the Taiwan Strait is in reprisal for their president's D.C. meeting with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy.

• Taiwan's Maritime and Port Bureau said it had told ship crews not to comply with Chinese maritime "boardings and inspections" requests and instead contact the island's coast guard for protection.

The big picture: Taiwanese authorities lodged an official complaint with Beijing after China's Maritime Safety Administration of Fujian Province announced the three-day operation on Wednesday, just before Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen met with McCarthy.

• There were no immediate reports of Chinese officials boarding Taiwanese vessels.
• Beijing officials had repeatedly warned Congress members not to meet with Tsai and said the visit would "have a severe impact on China-U.S. relations."
• The patrols came as a bipartisan U.S. delegation led by House Foreign Affairs Chair Michael McCaul (R-Texas) visited Taiwan.

Meanwhile, Taiwan's Defense Ministry reported three Chinese warships had sailed round the self-governing island and two military aircrafts had been detected in its Air Defense Identification Zone on Friday.

• It was the second straight day Chinese warships and aircrafts had been detected in the area.

What they're saying: A State Department spokesperson told Axios in an email Thursday that U.S. officials "have been very clear that there is no reason for Beijing to turn this transit — which was consistent with longstanding U.S. policy — into something it is not or use it as pretext to overreact."

• The spokesperson said U.S. communication channels with Chinese officials remain open "and we have consistently urged restraint" and for the status quo of peace in the Asia-Pacific region to remain.
• "The risk of miscalculation and escalation would have direct impacts to global security and prosperity," the spokesperson added.
• "The United States shares with other countries an abiding interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the broader Indo-Pacific region, which impact global security and prosperity."

Meanwhile, McCaul told Fox News the operation was "an act of aggression" and his delegation would not be intimidated.

Between the lines: The operation "is definitely an escalation — albeit in a boiling the frog sort-of-way," said John Hemmings, a senior director of U.S. research institute Pacific Forum, in an email Friday.

• However, it "isn't as dramatic as the military action of the type that Russia took over Crimea in 2014 or more recently, but it’s certainly a strategic use of legalistic-seeming measures to apply pressure on Taiwan."
• As part of a long-term trend of Beijing's "coercive behavior ... it is disturbing," added Hemmings, pointing to the push to the erosion of rights in Hong Kong, the Asian financial hub that was once the only free Chinese city.

• Hemmings told Axios in a phone interview Friday that the patrols were a "demonstration of jurisdiction" over a democratically run island China's ruling Communist Party regards as a breakaway province.

Of note: Taiwan is not a member state and Taiwanese officials have faced growing barriers abroad as Beijing becomes more aggressive in its attempts to marginalize an island it sees as its own sovereign territory.

• The Chinese Communist Party has been steadily eroding Taiwan's ability to formally engage on the world stage and has used economic coercion to punish Taiwan for its informal outreach to other countries since Beijing-skeptical Tsai was elected in 2016.
• The CCP has actively poached Taiwanese diplomatic partners and the number has declined since Tsai took office from 22 to 13.
• The Chinese Communist Party said for the first time last year it had sovereignty over the Taiwan Strait — a claim roundly rejected by U.S. and other officials noting that it's an international waterway, where freedoms are guaranteed by international law.

What to watch: Expect to see more action in which Chinese officials conduct exercises they maintain are "normal sovereignty being exercised," per Hemmings."