New NATO Country Sweden's Ship & Sub Challenges

Indomitable commentator Shawn Chung discussed offline Sweden's Chief of Navy Rear Admiral Ewa Ann-Sofi Haslum talking about updates in the Youtube here and below. 

 

The Chief of the Swedish Navy spoke to Naval News on the side-lines of Sydney's Indo-Pacific 2023 and Sea Power Conference, held in November 2023. Like most senior Swedish officers she speaks English clearly. 4:50 in she foreshadows Sweden will eventually order the "[A]30...next generation submarine" to eventually replace the A26 Blekinge-class. She spoke about the challenges the Swedish Navy is facing, especially with NATO membership and seabed warfare. One the latter she talked about the sabotage of the NordStream undersea gas pipelines. 

[Pete Comment: The US has been implacably opposed to these pipelines delivering Russian gas to Europe. The relative lack of West European curiosity as to who blew up those pipelines on Sept 26, 2022 might suggest the country with the motive and best equipment to do so.]

Sweden will be eventually replacing the 73m long Visby-class large patrol boat sized vessel with the future >100m long large corvette sized Lulea-class future surface combatant, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/06/swedens-future-surface-combatant-to-be-known-as-lulea-class/ which looks a bit like some of the designs that were bandied about for Singapore's future MRCVs.  

Little is known about the Lulea-class (which has four ships named after Swedish coastal cities) - the size and capabilities are unknown, except it will be larger than a standard  corvette (over 100m), as Sweden now will participate in NATO naval missions. The Swedish Navy also wants the ships from 2030, which is quite a rush.. like the 6 MRCVs (from 2028), so we may find out at a later date that the Lulea-class hulls could be produced in Denmark, or Singapore, and delivered to Saab Kockums for outfitting. 

Saab Kockums has a three decade relationship with Singapore - The Bedok-class mine countermeasure vessels are Landsort-class variants. Singapore emptied out Kockum's used submarine yard by buying the Sjoormen-class (renamed Challenger-class) in the late 1990s, and two Vastergotland (now the Archer-class) in the 2010s. Saab Kockums also contributed to the design of the Independence-class littoral mission vessel. 

I also reckon that the Swedish government was lining up Singapore to buy into the A26, but the various issues with Kockums in 2014 (then owned by TKMS) scuppered any deal. Sweden basically lost over $3 billion that would have kickstarted the A26 program.

Further Background

Wiki advises "In January 2021 Saab Kockums was awarded a contract for the product definition phase of the Visby gen 2 corvettes by the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV). These [still patrol boat sized] ships were intended to be an evolved version of the Visby-class corvettes currently in service with the Swedish Navy. 

However, a rapidly changing geopolitical situation in large part due to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and Sweden's subsequent application to join NATO led to the cancellation of the Visby gen 2 in favour of a clean sheet design, the [corvette sized, with many more missiles] Luleå class."

Singapore's MRCV will use IFEP from GE Vernova

Illustrious contributor, Shawn Chung, has commented offline that the power type for Singapore's frigates are improving. The power types are progressing from Combined Diesel and Diesel (CODAD), in the current Formidable-class frigates, to Integrated Full Electric Propulsion (IFEP), in the Singapore Navy’s six-ship future frigate currently called the Multi-Role Combat Vessel (MRCV).

GE Vernova’s Power Conversion business has been awarded a contract by Singapore shipbuilder ST Engineering Marine Limited to supply its Ship’s Electric Grid with Integrated Full Electric Propulsion (IFEP) equipment for the MRCV program.

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/03/ge-vernova-to-supply-full-electric-propulsion-systems-for-singapores-mrcv/

The MRCVs are being built by Saab, Odense and Singapore Technologies ST Engineering Marine Ltd's at Singapore's Shipyard probably drawing on the Absalon/Iver Huitfeldt designs. Back in 2020, when Pete posted about the MRCV, Shawn commented that his  personal favourite guess was that the future MRCVs would be based on the UK Type 26 design.

[Pete Comment: Australia as usual made a poor decision in actually choosing UK BAE's underdeveloped Type 26 design. Like all RAN projects since 2010, the Hunter-class variant is late and overbudget. Not to be forgot BAE is the builder of the equally late overbudget Astute SSN. With some foreboding BAE has been chosen to design and mainly build the SSN-AUKUS. In contrast Singapore always chooses ships and subs more wisely and vastly more cheaply than Australia.] 

Back to Shawn's MRCV - So the MRCV now looks like it'll be related to the UK Type 31 [with the UK Type 31 due in service 2027] which is itself a derivative of the Danish Iver Huitfeldt-class frigate ) but larger. 

The power load for the 8,000 tonne MRCV will be quite high, as apart from a communication system that can simultaneously handle multiple drones (and recharge them), the class will also use large fixed array Sea Fire AESA radar, the larger variant for big frigates and destroyers (bigger than the Sea Fire 500 equipping the FDi) IFEP is still quite a cutting edge technology for naval ships.

45 seconds into the above (and here) Youtube, Naval News' Xavier Vavasseur is interviewing about the MRCV.
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FURTHER BACKGROUND

Gordon Arthur for Naval News, March 14, 2024 reported https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/03/singapore-cuts-steel-on-its-first-multirole-combat-vessel-mrcv/ in part:

“Singapore’s future class of Multirole Combat Vessels (MRCV) took a significant step forward on 8 March [2024], when ST Engineering Marine cut steel on the first of six vessels.”…

The MRCV design – resembling ST Engineering’s own Vanguard 130 concept (that is 130m long and displaces 5,000 tonnes) features an integrated mast, stern flight deck, helicopter hangar and twin stern ramps for deploying small craft. A strong candidate for the integrated mast must be the Saab Lightweight Integrated Mast (SLIM), since it is already employed on Singapore’s eight Independence-class vessels.

The MRCV will replace six 595-tonne Victory-class missile corvettes within the RSN, but Singapore’s MINDEF remains tight-lipped about exact specifications and equipment. However, it is obvious that the MRCVs will be far more capable and larger than the six-corvette Victory class that dates from the early 1990s.

Naval News learned from various industry sources during IMDEX Asia 2023 that the MRCV would have a displacement of around 8,000 tons and a crew complement of about 80 sailors, indicating a high level of automation in the platform. Naval News understand that the mothership vessels would feature: 

Leonardo’s 76mm naval gun in the STRALES variant;

·  MBDA’s VL MICA NG and Aster B1 NT air defence missiles;

·  ST Engineering / IAI Blue Spear anti-ship missiles;

·  Thales’ SeaFire multifunction radar (in four fixed array configuration as aboard
         the FDI frigate);

·  Safran’s PASEO XLR EO/IR system;

·  Safran’s NGDS decoy launching system.

The MRCV is set to become the first surface combatant fitted with a combination of ASTER and VL MICA missiles. The RSN is an existing user of both missiles: ASTER are fitted aboard the Formidable-class frigates while VL-MICA are fitted aboard the Littoral Mission Vessels.

The vessels are set to host, launch and recover ST Engineering’s VENUS family of unmanned surface vessels (USV), both in their mine warfare and maritime security variants. The MRCV will also accommodate a number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).

During the naval defense event held in Singapore last year we also learned that competitions were still ongoing for the secondary gun systems (between Leonardo’s Hitrole and Rafael’s Typhoon), the sonar suite (between DSIT and Thales) and the torpedoes (between MU90 and A244 MOD.3 LWT), among other equipment. 

Story by Gordon Arthur with additional reporting by Xavier Vavasseur”

AUKUS SSNs Excellent Nuclear Weapons Platforms

Unpublicized is the main value of the future AUKUS SSNs. That is as long range strike platforms for nuclear missiles to deter China.

Australia is considered equivalent to a NATO partner by the US and UK.

Within NATO the US shares an estimated 20 nuclear weapons each to Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. These are deterrents against Russia. Europe's geography permits these weapons to be deployed on relatively short range platforms, fighter-bomber aircraft, dropping free-fall B61 nuclear bombs.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_sharing

Australia's requirements are for much longer range nuclear platforms - to put mainland China at risk. Hence the plan for AUKUS by the late 2040s is to supply Australia with the best nuclear weapon platforms, which are nuclear propelled submarines.

Only multi-mission SSNs (unlike huge specialised SSBNs) are affordable for a middle power like Australia. SSNs have the speed and range to quickly be in striking distance of China's major cities (mainly talking Shanghai and Beijing). This is if China attempted to attack or blockade Australia.

Within patrol areas considerably east of Taiwan, Australia's SSNs will mount 6 to 8 future submarine launched hypersonic missiles (SLHMs - first coined here) with a range of around 4,000km. These would be a generation or two after LRHWs. Missiles China would have a great deal of trouble stopping quickly enough.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-Range_Hypersonic_Weapon

France’s Future SSBN “SNLE 3G” Starts Production

 Offline inimitable submarine commenter Shawn Chung commented:

 (with a nice MS paint graphic from HI Sutton below)

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/03/france-cuts-steel-on-its-first-next-gen-ssbn-snle-3g/

Confirmation that France's SNLE 3G future SSBN project has begun comes hot on the heels of the French built future Dutch Orka announcement. 

According to a 2021 article, the first of four 15,000+ ton displacement SNLE 3G submarines is to be commissioned in 2035, when the Le Triomphant has been in commission for close to 40 years (actually ok for a boomer - USS Ohio will be in service for 44 years when she decommissions in 2026), but considering the last Suffren SSN (1/3rd the displacement of the SNLE-3G) is predicted to take 8 years to build, expecting to launch the first SSBN in 'the early 2030s' is overly ambitious.  

Artwork (which can be expanded) of possible SNLE-3G future French SSBN design (Courtesy H I Sutton of Covert Shores via Naval News, March 20, 2024)
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Pete Comment

A major part of the SNLE 3G project will be the development of France's third? generation submarine reactor called the "K22". This will have an output of 220 MW(th = thermal) which will represent a major increase in power over the Triomphant class' K15 (150 MW(th)) reactor. 

While the USN, and partly the UK RN, rely on the US' massive nuclear propulsion industrial base to develop new reactor technology, France's much smaller base has no such advantage. This means considerable risk is involved in France developing the K22, which may result in delays in SNLE 3G completion.

Like the US Columbia-class, the SNLE 3Gs will probably utilise electric drive, rather than mechanical reduction gears) for quieter/stealthy operation.

India's future S5 SSBN Boasting K-6 SLBMs

On March 22. 2024 Gessler provided some very interesting links, photos and comments along the lines:

"On Pete's note regarding the K-5 SLBM's possible 14m height, something comes to mind:

Photo A - By now we've all seen the first (publicly known) hydrodynamic model (photo above - source https://ibb.co/F3DPCJg ) of the future S5-class full sized Indian SSBN with a prominent missile compartment (or 'hump').

Its hump obviously speaks to the size of the SLBMs it's designed to carry. However, that S5 design (which I'm assuming is only one of many being tested) is now at least 6 years old, considering the first public sighting/leak was in 2018. 

Photo B - More recently I've come across what could be a newer iteration of the evolving S-5 design (see photo above - source https://ibb.co/Wnf9sQK ). This is from an official publication earlier in 2024. Again, there is no context or specific information provided about the program, so we know just as little regarding the program's current status as before.
[Pete comment Wikipedia's drawing apparently from a visit to DRDO supports Photo B being the more likely shape of the S5 class.]

Of note is obviously the fact, at Photo B, that the missile compartment is now far more streamlined into the submarine's hull. Could this be an indication that DRDO's propulsion advancements in ballistic missile development have resulted in a smaller and/or lighter missile being sufficient to reach the same range with the same payload as before? I can only guess.

There are also other differences, such as the dive planes being moved onto the sail/conning tower (which is more in line with how most submarines have them) as opposed to the previous model which had them on the hull in front of the sail (like on UK's Vanguard-class).

Pete Comment

Yes. Ever smaller missiles are achieving longer ranges. This is through use of lighter composite materials, for many parts and casings, rather than using heavier steel. Also solid fuel propellants are being developed that are more energy intensive per kg. 

Furthermore lower throw-weights requiring less boost can be achieved through greater miniaturisation of warheads and MIRV "buses" with no reduction in explosive power. Changing from heavier "old school" boosted fission to 2 staged thermonuclear warheads is one way to achieve smaller, lighter warheads. Increasing accuracy (ie. smaller, lower CEP) can make smaller, lighter warheads (say of 100kT as effective (eg. on deep dug bunkers) as effective as older larger multi-megaton warheads). 

Looking at Wikipedia's entry for the future S5-class SSBN it will be:

-  13,500 tonnes (presumably surfaced)

- it might carry K-5 SLBMs but with severe range limitations of only 6,000km (barely adequate to hit Beijing). This might mean an S5 might need to operate in waters near land. Chinese patrol aircraft based in Myanmar might strike it. Also fixed Chinese undersea sensors might detect it. Or its possible patrol area is within a predictable seaspace for  Chinese SSNs or Pakistani SSKs (lurking near the Vizag current Indian SSBN base) to detect it. 

-  So its better to carry between 12 and 16 much longer range K6 SLBMs . Not yet developed K6s might be just over 12m tall. With a 3,000kg (presumably max) MIRVed payload its range might be the minimum 8,000km for patrolling in a "safe haven" south of Diego Garcia but still in range of Beijing. 
=  With a 1,000kg "light load" a K6 SLBM might have range of 12,000km allowing the S5 SSBN to be safer, far into the southern Indian Ocean, yet still in range of Beijing. 

Australia awards BAE & ASC first SSN-AUKUS Contract

Courtesy NavalNews: SSN-AUKUS concept model showcased by BAE Systems during the UK's DSEI 2023.

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Distinguished commentator Shawn Chung commented on March 22, 2024:

There's quite a bit of naval news this week, with the first one about Australia.

"Australia awards BAE & ASC first SSN-AUKUS contract"

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/03/australia-selects-bae-systems-and-asc-to-build-ssn-aukus/ 

This is totally expected, as they are the only submarine builders in the UK and Australia, and Pete has commented on this award in his own article.  

My own opinion is that Australia, after investing US$3 billion in the US submarine industrial base, is not likely to receive new-build Virginia-class submarines. Although, by the 2030s, 30 year old Virginia Block 1s [a subclass of just 4 boats commissioned 2004-2008] are highly likely (and Australia will also have to pay for their Mid Life Update). [The Block 1s suffer from only having 12 x single Tomahawk sized VLS (see right sidebar). They would need to be reconstructed at huge extra expense to incorporate 2 x large multipurpose Virginia Payload Tubes (VPTs) that could take larger, more potent, hypersonic missiles, to deter China.]

A more viable option could be to speed up the delivery of SSN-AUKUS, from the 2040s to the mid-2030s. This can be done by expanding the production infrastructure at ASC and by starting industrial training early (first 100 welders being sent to Hawaii next year). 

According to ASC, only 1% of all the welds on the Collins-class, from 1987 to 2003, were found to be defective. So ASC could start producing hull sections for all the SSN-AUKUS boats (Australian and UK), for example the rear-half, and send them to Barrow to assemble and build the UK boats. This would speed up production efficiencies for both navies.

Indian MIRVs Highlight Australia's Nuclear Impotence

On March 19, 2024 Gessler, from India, commented:

"India has officially announced its test of an improved Agni-5 ballistic missile (aka, the Agni-V ICBM) with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) last week.

https://fas.org/publication/indian-test-launch-of-mirv-missile-latest-sign-of-emerging-nuclear-arms-race/  [This article indicates MIRVs can be very destabilising.]

They did not release any information regarding how many re-entry vehicles this payload bus was tested with, but some defence journalists are speculating it wouldn't be bigger than a 3 or 4-MIRV configuration.

It serves to note that at least two Chinese intelligence-gathering vessels were in the Indian Ocean Region during the period when the Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) for the test was in effect.

One can't help but think back to the times when the Americans and the Soviets used to launch SLBM tests from their submarines when in positions where they can be assured that the other side gets a good look at your nuclear delivery capabilities - so that the purpose of deterrence is served.

I wonder when the MIRVed K5 SLBM will show up."

[Pete Comment - On K-5 SLBMs see https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/agni-5-test-allows-india-to-deploy-mirv-equipped-sub-launched-ballistic-missiles/ . K-5s will need to be highly modified (down to the Trident II's 14m height) from the Agni-5's 18m height. 14m may be too tall to fit in India's small size Arihant class future S4 and S4* SSBNs. K-5 deployment may need to await the launch of India's full size SSBNs, the S5s, after 2030.]

FURTHER PETE COMMENT

India became a (then illegal) nuclear weapons state following its first nuclear test in 1974 under Russian protection. I mean initially Russian protection prevented India’s main large enemy, China, from disrupting India’s nuclear weaponization. This was even though China had become a thermonuclear state once China tested its first "3 stage" thermonuclear weapon in 1967. India then performed further nuclear tests in 1998 (code-named "Operation Shakti").  

The general international response to Shakti was initially condemnation. But once it was obvious India would not eliminate its nuclear arsenal Western powers generally accepted India as a semi-legal nuclear weapons power. Also the West and Russia recognised much of India’s nuclear arsenal was aimed as the common opponent, China.

Where this is going is that part of the deal of letting India into the nuclear club was that India would (and does) maintain a low profile on its rising nuclear power. This profile serves two Western great power policies: not to openly reward India for breaking the nuclear proliferation taboo; and, not to encourage other countries to break this taboo. 

One aspect of India's nuclear rise is India most probably had two-stage thermonuclear weapons (not merely boosted fission) by the year 2000. Another is India’s ability to MIRV its nuclear warheads. “The [MIRV] concept is almost invariably associated with intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying thermonuclear warheads”. MIRVS act as force multipliers for India’s limited number of IRBMs and ICBMs aimed at China.

India can secretly “cold test” Russian provided two-stage thermonuclear designs with confidence. This confidence is achieved using Indian computer simulations (matched to historical Soviet/Russian nuclear test results). But India cannot hide high altitude kinetic MIRV tests from Chinese and Western sensors.    

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pine_Gap#Operational_history

Nuclear Capabilities Count Against Australia

Australia is becoming increasingly worried about its isolated geographical and strategic position in the face of a changing nuclear weapons' balance of power. There is a return of Russian aggression against the West (seen in Ukraine) alongside Trump’s Russian friendly world view. China’s nuclear arsenal is expanding and gaining in quality, particularly in hypersonic warheads.

India's nuclear arsenal remains non-aligned. India has longer been close to the USSR/Russia on nuclear issues (eg. SSN training) than a cautious friend of the West. In the next 2 decades India may become so powerful (economically and strategically) in the India Ocean that countries on that ocean rim might be guided by Indian wishes.

In the face of increasing nuclear isolation, part of Australia’s decision to rely on AUKUS is to delay or cancel Australia's need to have long range nuclear weapons. The highest value of AUKUS SSNs are as long range platforms for dual-use Australian hypersonic missiles. China accurately recognises this.

Biden has created the Virginia possibility, but he will leave office certainly by 2029 if not in 2025. The Virginia possibility will likely become a mirage, never reached, as the USN's Virginia needs increase.

The UK’s provision of SSN-AUKUS’s for Australia, most probably in the late 2040s, may just be too late for Australia. Instead, to avoid nuclear impotence, Australia  would need to accelerate its technical nuclear hedging.

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-07/features/seeking-bomb-strategies-nuclear-proliferation

Australia also gifting UK AU$4.6 Billion for AUKUS

In an excellent article, REUTERS, via The Strait Times, reported March 21/22, 2024 https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australia-earmarks-billions-for-naval-infrastructure-as-bae-wins-aukus-submarine-work

"Australia earmarks billions for naval infrastructure as British firm wins Aukus submarine work" 

"SYDNEY - Australia said on March 21 that it would spend billions of dollars on docks, shipyards and factories at home and in Britain for nuclear-powered submarines under the Aukus security pact, and named Britain’s BAE Systems to help build the boats.

The Aukus agreement among Australia, Britain and the United States will see Australia buy up to five nuclear submarines from Washington in the early 2030s, before jointly building and operating a new class, SSN-Aukus, with Britain, roughly a decade later.

The pact, which will see Australia become the seventh nation to operate nuclear-powered submarines, will stress shipyards in Britain and the US that are already beset by delays and cost overruns.

To help alleviate the strain, Australia will give Britain £2.4 billion [AU$4.6 billion] towards design work on the conventionally armed SSN-Aukus and expanding a Rolls-Royce plant that builds nuclear reactors for submarines.

Australia has already agreed to invest US$3 billion [also AU$4.6 billion] in US shipyards, which build the Virginia-class nuclear submarines that will be sold early next decade amid concerns that a backlog of orders could jeopardise the deal.

“What Aukus is doing is allowing Australian industry to further invest here, but there are opportunities also opening up with our UK and US partners,” [Australian] Defence Minister Richard Marles said in a statement on March 21.

Australia will also invest AU$1.5 billion to prepare a naval base in Western Australia for nuclear submarines, in particular, a US and British force set to be based there part of each year starting in 2027.

The total cost of the work is expected to be about AU$8 billion.

Australian and British foreign and defence ministers will officially launch the investments on March 22 at a joint news conference at shipyards in South Australia, where Australia will build its Aukus fleet.

Australia said BAE Systems had been selected to build the submarines in South Australia in partnership with local naval firm ASC.

Work is expected to start in the late 2020s, after at least AU$2 billion worth of new shipbuilding facilities are completed.

Once the submarines are in the water, ASC will handle maintenance and logistics. The firm, which builds and maintains Australia's diesel-powered Collins-class fleet, will work with unspecified US and British companies.

SSN-Aukus submarines will also be built in Britain, and BAE won a £4 billion contract in October 2023 to start design work and infrastructure at the [UK] shipyard at Barrow-in-Furness.

Nuclear submarines require a specialised workforce, and BAE and ASC will set up a joint skills centre in South Australia to begin training workers.

Australia plans to send roughly 100 ASC workers to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in 2025 to train at the US naval facility there. REUTERS"

Australian Liberal’s Nuclear Policy Lacks Weapons

In Australia the myth of quick, easy, uncomplicated building anywhere of "economical" small modular reactor (SMR) projects just won't die out. 

Large conventional reactors of over 3 GW, as in France, make more sense in Australia. This is from a zero base of no power reactors in Australia at present. This will lead to decades-long legal, planning and political battles for each and every reactor project and nuclear waste dump in Australia. This will be followed by 2 decades of construction and high security protection costs for reactors and waste dumps. 

The minority Australian Liberal Party's nuclear electricity lobby, that makes  outlandish claims, please take note of the following:

71 years ago the Father of the US Nuclear (propulsion) Navy and Father of the US electricity reactor in the US Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral Rickover, pointed out the nuclear ignorance of the likes of our Liberal Party.

"Admiral Rickover's 'Paper Reactor' Memo" written on June 5, 1953 at http://whatisnuclear.com/rickover.html is as accurate now as it was then. Rickover drew a distinction between:

A. academic "paper reactor" policy proponents "The academic-reactor designer is a dilettante. He has not had to assume any real responsibility in connection with his projects." and

B. those who actually build reactors. Noting "Rickover oversaw the development of the Shippingport Atomic Power Station, the [world's] first commercial pressurized water reactor nuclear power [ie. electricity] plant."  

Wrote Rickover in 1953:

A. "An academic reactor...almost always has the following basic characteristics:

1. It is simple.

2. It is small.

3. It is cheap.

4. It is light.

5. It can be built very quickly.

6. It is very flexible in purpose (“omnibus reactor”)

7. Very little development is required. It will use mostly “off-the-shelf” components.

8. The reactor is in the study phase. It is not being built now."

[eg. there is still no built SMR for sale on the market.]
 

B. "On the other hand, a practical reactor plant can be distinguished by the following characteristics:

1. It is being built now.

2. It is behind schedule.

3. It is requiring an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. Corrosion, in particular, is a problem.

4. It is very expensive.

5. It takes a long time to build because of the engineering development problems.

6. It is large.

7. It is heavy.

8. It is complicated."

Does all that sound familiar?

The biggest political question is what majority of Australian voters in a town, city, state or Electorate would welcome a reactor in their "backyard"? Given that concern it is best to build a reactor on defence land, ie. long owned by the Federal Government, not somewhere pretty or with a long Aboriginal heritage (that will not be questioned).

The overarching reality is, unless a national nuclear industry has dual-use civilian and nuclear weapons qualities (a reality the P5 early sprinters, eg. the US, UK and France, exploited for THEMSELVES) Australia won't accept reactors politically, economically or strategically.

Orka-class Specifications Table: Dutch: Naval Group

After internet searching no current, precise, detailed, list of Naval Group (NG) specifications (specs) for the Orkas have been located. Instead I've drawn together (and sometimes inferred) specs from a variety of internet sources (see some links in the Table below). 

NG has limited the publication of the Orkas' projected specs as keeping the specs secret for as long as politically possible is standard in the submarine industry for National Security and Commercial-in-Confidence reasons. Detailed specs would reflect some of the Netherlands’s more secret needs. NG and the Netherlands will gradually release more spec details.

Now NG has won the Walrus replacement competition on the basis of the March 15, 2024 decision of the Dutch Council of Ministers. But the lower House of the Dutch Parliament, from debate beginning March 18, 2024, still needs to approve this decision. Best description of political situation is from the Netherland's Jaime Karremann the founder of Marineschips.nl.

Specs for preceding Walrus-class and Barracuda-class variants help. Also see Wikipedia's Orka website.

ORKA SPECIFICATIONS TABLE

Figures as at March 19, 2024
Class overview
Name:	Naval Group Orka-class for the Netherlands. "Variant chain" is Barracuda to Shortfin to Blacksword to Orka-class.
Operator:	Envisaged only for the Royal Netherlands Navy so far.
4 planned	Netherlands requires 2 commissioned (Orka and Zvaardvis) by 2034–2035. Then the 2 others (Barracuda and Tijgerhaai) before 2040. To be built at NG's Cherbourg shipyard in France?
Preceded by:	Walrus class .
Pressure hull steel	Likely to be 100 HLES high-yield pressure hull steel, see US HY-100 and HY-130 . Also  see Submarine Matters article Table that uses a Japanese document.
Officers and Crew	Between 35 and 43 standard + 16 extra bunks for divers/special forces or intelligence intercept/linguist officers (depending on mission)
Speed/range and Endurance	14 knots (surfaced), 22 knots (submerged). 15,000 nm. All improvements over Walrus specs.  Endurance est 70 days depending on fuel, food & crew exhaustion. Typical mission profiles may be: Transit + Ops Netherlands to Dutch Caribbean and return. Transit + Ops Netherlands to Arabian Sea and return. North Sea and Arctic Ocean against Russia.
Displacement:	3,300 tonnes (surfaced) so 3,700 tonnes (submerged) is estimated
Length	82 m  See Artwork with Specs below.
Diameter (Beam)	8.2 m  Artwork with Specs below.
Height	? meters (hull + fin/sail)
Pumpjet, Propeller	Pumpjet unlikely no pumpjet on NG artwork. Likely skewback propeller
Acoustic stealth	Rubber/elastic mountings for moving and reverberating parts inside. Noise cancelers.
Capable of projecting	Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) Underwater decoys (against torpedoes and mobile mines)
On hull behind fin/sail.	Dry dock shelter for divers, diver delivery vehicles and large displacement UUVs (XLUUVs)
Weapons	6 × 533 mm (21.0 in) torpedo tubes. 30 heavyweight (HW) weapons. Maybe Walrus weapons will be transferred ie Mk 48 HWTs, Harpoon SSMs, even Tomahawk land attack SLCMs and Stonefish mines. Or maybe French weapons. This is a big area of uncertain debate?
Sensors	Mainly French NG-Thales UMS-3000 ?
Combat System	A mixed US and French Combat System likely. Using a TTCWS interface. US Lockheed Martin and mainly French NG-Thales likely main intergrators. Combat system being the network of sensors, databases, consoles, optronic masts and weapons costing about one third of the upfront price of a submarine.
Max Depth	300+ meters
Exterior stealth	Anechoic tiles/coating
Propulsion:	4 x MTU 16V 396 SE or 4 x MTU 12V 4000 diesels. Likely no AIP. Jeumont Electric Motors (Jeumont now subsidiary of NG-Framatome). with 4.5 to 5MW of power.  Saft Lithium-ion batteries also see on the LIBs.

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Artwork with Specs courtesy Naval Group (March 16, 2024) via (Mr) Jaime Karremann's website https://marineschepen.nl/nieuws/Wat-we-nu-weten-over-de-nieuwe-Nederlandse-onderzeeboten-160324.html