Indian MIRVs Highlight Australia's Nuclear Impotence

On March 19, 2024 Gessler, from India, commented:

"India has officially announced its test of an improved Agni-5 ballistic missile (aka, the Agni-V ICBM) with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) last week.

https://fas.org/publication/indian-test-launch-of-mirv-missile-latest-sign-of-emerging-nuclear-arms-race/  [This article indicates MIRVs can be very destabilising.]

They did not release any information regarding how many re-entry vehicles this payload bus was tested with, but some defence journalists are speculating it wouldn't be bigger than a 3 or 4-MIRV configuration.

It serves to note that at least two Chinese intelligence-gathering vessels were in the Indian Ocean Region during the period when the Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) for the test was in effect.

One can't help but think back to the times when the Americans and the Soviets used to launch SLBM tests from their submarines when in positions where they can be assured that the other side gets a good look at your nuclear delivery capabilities - so that the purpose of deterrence is served.

I wonder when the MIRVed K5 SLBM will show up."

[Pete Comment - On K-5 SLBMs see https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/agni-5-test-allows-india-to-deploy-mirv-equipped-sub-launched-ballistic-missiles/ . K-5s will need to be highly modified (down to the Trident II's 14m height) from the Agni-5's 18m height. 14m may be too tall to fit in India's small size Arihant class future S4 and S4* SSBNs. K-5 deployment may need to await the launch of India's full size SSBNs, the S5s, after 2030.]

FURTHER PETE COMMENT

India became a (then illegal) nuclear weapons state following its first nuclear test in 1974 under Russian protection. I mean initially Russian protection prevented India’s main large enemy, China, from disrupting India’s nuclear weaponization. This was even though China had become a thermonuclear state once China tested its first "3 stage" thermonuclear weapon in 1967. India then performed further nuclear tests in 1998 (code-named "Operation Shakti").  

The general international response to Shakti was initially condemnation. But once it was obvious India would not eliminate its nuclear arsenal Western powers generally accepted India as a semi-legal nuclear weapons power. Also the West and Russia recognised much of India’s nuclear arsenal was aimed as the common opponent, China.

Where this is going is that part of the deal of letting India into the nuclear club was that India would (and does) maintain a low profile on its rising nuclear power. This profile serves two Western great power policies: not to openly reward India for breaking the nuclear proliferation taboo; and, not to encourage other countries to break this taboo. 

One aspect of India's nuclear rise is India most probably had two-stage thermonuclear weapons (not merely boosted fission) by the year 2000. Another is India’s ability to MIRV its nuclear warheads. “The [MIRV] concept is almost invariably associated with intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying thermonuclear warheads”. MIRVS act as force multipliers for India’s limited number of IRBMs and ICBMs aimed at China.

India can secretly “cold test” Russian provided two-stage thermonuclear designs with confidence. This confidence is achieved using Indian computer simulations (matched to historical Soviet/Russian nuclear test results). But India cannot hide high altitude kinetic MIRV tests from Chinese and Western sensors.    

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pine_Gap#Operational_history

Nuclear Capabilities Count Against Australia

Australia is becoming increasingly worried about its isolated geographical and strategic position in the face of a changing nuclear weapons' balance of power. There is a return of Russian aggression against the West (seen in Ukraine) alongside Trump’s Russian friendly world view. China’s nuclear arsenal is expanding and gaining in quality, particularly in hypersonic warheads.

India's nuclear arsenal remains non-aligned. India has longer been close to the USSR/Russia on nuclear issues (eg. SSN training) than a cautious friend of the West. In the next 2 decades India may become so powerful (economically and strategically) in the India Ocean that countries on that ocean rim might be guided by Indian wishes.

In the face of increasing nuclear isolation, part of Australia’s decision to rely on AUKUS is to delay or cancel Australia's need to have long range nuclear weapons. The highest value of AUKUS SSNs are as long range platforms for dual-use Australian hypersonic missiles. China accurately recognises this.

Biden has created the Virginia possibility, but he will leave office certainly by 2029 if not in 2025. The Virginia possibility will likely become a mirage, never reached, as the USN's Virginia needs increase.

The UK’s provision of SSN-AUKUS’s for Australia, most probably in the late 2040s, may just be too late for Australia. Instead, to avoid nuclear impotence, Australia  would need to accelerate its technical nuclear hedging.

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-07/features/seeking-bomb-strategies-nuclear-proliferation