HMS Prince of Wales Irrelevant To Australia's Defence

This is a particularly good video here and above, courtesy Nguoi Giai Ma, of AsiaPacificMilitaryWatch entitled “HMS Prince of Wales in Australia: A New Era of UK-Indo-Pacific Dominance?” uploaded July 24/25, 2025.
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Sorry to be negative about UK Queen Elizabeth (QE)-class carriers' usefulness in the defence of Australia, but:

Shared between both QEs the UK Royal Navy has only "37 F-35B aircraft (including 3 or 4 based in the U.S.) [as of] May 2025,^[45][46][47]"

Already the UK's NATO FIRST (against Russia) policies, with the UK to buy more than 100 F-35As (12 to be nuclear armed) are weakening any UK military assistance in defending Australia. The UK has decided to buy 12 F-35As (to be nuclear armed by 2030). This is instead of buying the planned 12 F-35Bs to strengthen the 2 QEs' (Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales) understrength airwings. 

Those 2 carriers are also weakly protected by a shortage of UK surface and SSN escorts when in the Indo-Pacific. It may be that, at the moment, the Royal Navy operates with its 2 QE carriers sharing the one airwing of 17 F-35Bs. The Royal Navy does not have enough escorts to protect both carriers simultaneously.

China's land based medium range DF-21D anti-ship missiles and intermediate range DF-26 missile (which may have an anti-ship capability) present a major threat to powerful US Nimitz/Ford-class carrier groups. The threat to weaker UK QE carrier groups is even greater. 

Unlike the USN, which can send ships across the open Pacific Ocean, to Australia, the UK RN must send its ships through the straits and narrows of the Middle East and across the smaller Indian Ocean to reach Australia. It is in the narrows that China's large navy, with its powerful submarine force, can intercept under-protected QE carrier groups.

Like HMS Repulse and an earlier HMS Prince of Wales (both sunk by Japanese aircraft in 1941) the UK having nowhere near sufficient power projection to defend Australia, again applies to the UK's latest 2 big ships (the QE carriers).

How To Invade Taiwan: China's To Do List (So Far)

Over years China steps up its "heart and minds" soft power campaigns. For example those that apply to Taiwanese, US and Australian youth visits to China.

If Taiwan (T) does not surrender peacefully to diplomacy and economic pressure (like American style punitive tariffs):

Buy up sufficient overland piped Russian gas and oil for a stockpile sufficient for one year's supply in China.

Ask Russia to put decoy or actual pressure on Kazakhstan, Georgia, the Baltic States and anywhere else Putin wants. 

SURPRISE ATTACK?

Launch a mass cyber attack to disrupt T communications, internet, financial, trade and transport facilities. Expect and combat cyber retaliation from T and the US.

Launch sabotage plans by Special Forces' Sleeper Cells and assassinations, if deniable (at initial stage).

Take out Taiwan's (T's) air defenses using hypersonic missiles mainly launched by SSGNs and XLUUVs close to T's shore - mainly from seas East of Taiwan.

Using missiles, drones and aircraft destroy T's energy stockpiles and block ships exporting the 98% of T's energy to T in the form of natural gas, coal, oil and some LEU Uranium.

Simultaneously destroy T's merchant (not passenger) ships and naval shipping (including T's submarines) using missiles, drones, aircraft, pre-laid smart mines. "killer" UUVs and torpedoes.
-  Pre-laid undersea sonar/magnetic sensors that ring Taiwan will locate T's  submarines and small missile craft that evade aerial and satellite sensors.
-  Beware of T and US UUVs and smart mines.
-  Combat the US Navy if it is hostile, especially US subs. 

OR

BLOCKADE?

Inspired by Anonymouse’ July 24th comment I add:

As T produces only 1/3^rd of its food needs T’s food and energy vulnerabilities may make blockade a very effective PRC strategy. Although the PRC would lose the element of surprise in imposing a multi-month blockade.

PRC smart mines-killer UUVs (in "shipping channels to Taipei and Kaohsiung") present an alternative to the need to seize and develop islands around T PRIOR to a takeover of T.

Temporarily, long range anti-air and anti-ship missiles from the PRC mainland, its SSGNs, warships. aircraft and large mother-drones could shutdown Western nation air and ship intervention to support T.

Post invasion, PRC take over of those islands around T would:
- more firmly guarantee PRC's ability to protect its new T possession and
- more easily transit ships and submarines through the First Island Chain that had hitherto blocked access to the Western Pacific.

Responses from Japan? South Korea? 

Singapore, India and Australia seizing or sinking PRC vessels in the Indian Ocean?

Western banking system freezing PRC assets worldwide?

Additional items for this To Do List?

Astute Submarine Shortage: No Astute Rotations to Australia?

Shawn C. made some interesting comments on July 16, 2025. My response on submarines is: 

The UK's Astute-class submarines have a record of low availability. This is perhaps because their PWR2 reactors have high pressure pipe issues that need frequent inspection and maintenance. Leaks are usually contained within the subs' reactor sections. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_PWR#PWR2. 

Wiki advises https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astute-class_submarine#Propulsion_and_general_specifications 

"A 2009 safety assessment by the [UK] Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator concluded that PWR2 reactor safety was significantly short of good practice in two important areas: loss-of-coolant accident and control of submarine depth following emergency reactor shutdown.^[37] The regulator concluded that PWR2 was "potentially vulnerable to a structural failure of the primary circuit", which is a failure mode with significant safety hazards to crew and the public.^[38] Operational procedures have been amended to minimise these risks.^[39]"

Australia would be less able to maintain problematic Astutes (at Fleet Base West/HMAS Stirling or Osborne) than all the UK's 10s of Billions of pounds of inspection and maintenance facilities, developed over decades.

The UK has only 5 Astutes for the next 3 years. This is due to HMS Astute undergoing its first "decommissioning" and Mid Life Re-Validation Period (MLRP) in Devonport UK for around 3 years. The final Astute, HMS Achilles, will only be commissioned in 2028 or, more likely, 2029. So dividing the 5 commissioned Astutes by the naval Rule of Thirds yields only 1.66 Astutes being operational at any one time until 2028. 

The 2 or maybe 1 Astutes' highest priority is Vanguard SSBN escort duties, in and out of Faslane. When all 5 commissioned Astutes are under maintenance (as has been recorded) US or French SSNs might escort UK SSBNs in and out of Faslane.

The emerging NATO First policy may keep Astutes in seas around NATO more than currently. Their North Sea and Arctic Ocean duties include shadowing Russian ships and submarines and collection of Russian land based intelligence. The UK may insist NATO First will not diminish non-NATO missions - but worldwide Astute and associated US SSN availability is already stretched.

See mentions of AUKUS here https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/optimising-readiness-uk-astute-fleet. Also US SSNs are being shifted from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific against China in the above link. This is increasing the Atlantic workload for Astutes.

Between SSBN escort priorities the Royal Navy could perhaps spare one Astute for one month rotation every 2 or 3 years at HMAS Stirling. Ex submarine commander and continuing expert Peter Briggs reported all 6 Astutes are at times in dock. Their  maintenance issues (often kept secret) may frequently involve their reactors. Chronic maintenance problems may mean no Astutes might come to Australia for more than 3 years.

"NATO First" UK NUCLEAR STRIKE Aircraft Less Emphasis on UK Carriers

Shawn C. made some interesting comments on July 16, 2025. My response on carriers, aircraft and "NATO First" is: 

With the rise of expensive UK RN nuclear submarines the UK turned away from full size carriers for decades until the Queen Elizabeth (QE)-class emerged in 2017-2023. The preceding half or 2/3rds size Invincible-class carriers only had fairly small airwings (of RN Harriers). In the Falklands War the non-Invincible-class Hermes needed to be supplemented by carrier based RAF Harriers. 

So far the Queen Elizabeth (QE)-class, including HMS Prince of Wales, only have half (or less) of a full airwing of UK F-35Bs. That number may remain low because UK carriers are poorly adapted to the Russian threat in Europe and given emerging UK "NATO First" policies. Rather the QEs may have been designed mainly for counter-insurgency airstrikes - a declining mission for the UK. Since June 2025 (see 1/3rd down here) there has also been a pause on buying new F-35Bs for carriers. 

Other "NATO First" priorities may see the low numbers of UK surface ship escorts continue. The UK relies heavily on foreign escorts and US Marine F-35Bs for its carriers when UK carriers are in the Indo-Pacific.

NUCLEAR STRIKE AIRCRAFT

Announced by the UK Government on June 24, 2025 NATO First will include 12 new F-35As for the RAF for NUCLEAR STRIKE by 2030. The "nuclear" F-35As are instead of the original intention of buying 12 new conventionally armed F-35Bs for UK carriers. 

UK defence policy toward the Russian threat will include more conventionally armed F-35s as UK Typhoons are gradually retired over several decades. This may mean more than 100 F-35As or at least a mixture of 138 F-35As and Bs. Scroll a third way down here. F-35As carry a greater war load over longer ranges than F-35Bs, if As and Bs are not mid-air refueled. 

Also the UK Army needs expansion for anti-Russia European wars, particularly in armoured vehicles, artillery and small drones. 

More UK money spent on military aid to Ukraine may also mean less UK money available for the conventionally armed AND conventionally powered UK RN.

Australia Rejects US Coercion on Taiwan

Australian Prime Minister Albanese has batted away public demands from US de facto Defense Secretary, Elbridge Colby, that Australia state it would defend Taiwan. This undiplomatic American baiting comes as Albanese visits China for 6 days to discuss trade. Albanese responded that Australia supports "the status quo" in regards to Taiwan. 

This US demand on Australia is hypocritical given the US has practiced strategic ambiguity since the 1970s, refusing to say whether it would defend Taiwan.

The official US Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, an inexperienced, rightwing Yes Man, is mute. It is increasingly apparent to Australians and poor US citizens, that aggressive neo-fascism reigns in Trump's isolationist America. Neo-fascism? -Trump's ultranationalism, love of military parades, inciting a mob to storm the Capitol, setting troops on unremarkable protesters, hounding and expelling peaceful minorities, disdain for judicial processes and giving authoritarian Putin a 50 day invasion incentive while Trump repeatedly pressures democratic Zelensky. 

Undersecretary of Defence, Elbridge Colby, took to social media (24 hours ago)  attempting to coerce Australia and Japan into stating their positions on Taiwan's defence. This comes while the US is deserting or antagonising its allies, except for  Israel.  

Russia has a special place in Trump's heart. See the importance of Russia in financing Trump over the years https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Trump_Organization#Financing  

China is shaping up to be a more reliable ally for Australia, especially in economic terms, than Trump's US.

Australia could only make an impact on Taiwan's defence if Australia had SSNs that are fast enough to get to Taiwan in about a week. Colby is likely to demand higher gifts (than the current A$800 million per year) for Australia to then buy, at increasing prices, used Virginia-class SSNs in 7 to 15 years. It is highly unlikely that America, will deliver on Biden's AUKUS promise because the USN is desperately in need of all Virginias through to the 2040s. 

More see https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-07-13/albanese-taiwan-us-defence-demands-china-visit/105526626

Carrier HMS Prince of Wales Soon in Darwin, Australia.

This is a follow up to Shawn C’s excellent article “When the Carrier Prince of Wales Cruised into Singapore” of July 11, 2025 at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2025/07/when-carrier-prince-of-wales-cruised.html 

See a great photo of HMS Prince of Wales (PofW) docking in Singapore at https://www.navylookout.com/uk-carrier-strike-group-sails-to-australia-for-multinational-exercise/ 

China’s Type 815 ship Beijixing (Polaris). Photo courtesy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_815_spy_ship#Type_815   
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Chinese spy ships (possibly Type 815s, photo and link above) are now in the Southeast Asian-Australian northern region, in part to monitor PofW, its F-35Bs and its carrier battle group https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-07-12/adf-watching-for-chinese-spy-ships-as-pm-heads-to-shanghai/105523778. This is during the Talisman Sabre 2025 (TS25) and Bersama Lima 25 exercises Shawn mentions. 

Note the UK RN has insufficient ships (only 14 destroyers/frigates in the whole RN) to fully escort PofW and the carrier Queen Elizabeth on Indo-Pacific missions. Between one and three non-British escort ships always form part of their carrier battle groups. A US SSN might also lend a hand.

The Chinese navy's job is made easier because PofW's coming and going from the Chinese owned port of Darwin can be easily tracked. PofW will likely be docking at Kuru Wharf, HMAS Coonawarra, Port of Darwin, mid to late July 2025. More on Kuru at https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2025/03/darwin-port-hosts-us-ssn-us-submarine.html .

PofW is to host an afternoon tea for the Australian British Chamber of Commerce at Port of Darwin, Friday July 25, 2025. https://www.britishchamber.com/events/hms-prince-of-wales-darwin

A harder to spot Chinese Type 093 SSN surveillance submarine mission will also likely work with the Chinese spy ships, satellites and maybe UUVs, to surveil PofW and the other Western vessels involved in the 2025 exercises.