Lack of Aus Skills Will Impact Nuclear Submarine Build

Geoff Crittenden has written an excellent Nov 25, 2021 commentary titled "OPINION: A lack of local skills will impact [Australian] nuclear submarine manufacture", at Australia's Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter. The following is part of Geoff Crittenden's commentary:

"...Australia will need to rely heavily on the experience, skills and technology of the United States and the United Kingdom in building and maintaining these nuclear submarines because we do not have a local nuclear industry. We don’t have infrastructure, skills or experience in nuclear power—and none of this can be created overnight.

"...for Australian industry—building nuclear powered submarines presents an inordinate number of issues. The skills, knowledge and expertise required to build a submarine are akin to those required to build a space craft chartered for the moon. Building a nuclear submarine is equivalent to building a space craft set for Mars and beyond. It is an entirely new quantum.

Local Content Requirements

Without an existing nuclear industry, it will be difficult for any defence prime contractor building these nuclear-powered submarines to meet the local industry content requirements that are included in all Defence contracts

While ambitious, the Federal Government’s local content requirements are of enormous benefit to Australian industry. However, without exception, they have been extremely difficult to execute effectively on recent Defence projects. There are a number of reasons for this difficulty.

Firstly, the Defence projects are extraordinarily complex, requiring a highly skilled workforce, investments in cutting-edge technology and rapid upskilling. Secondly, the companies delivering these projects are global entities, with priorities that extend beyond Australia’s borders.

Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, several of these major Defence projects were announced simultaneously. Local industry hasn’t been given the opportunity to keep up with the speed and scale of delivery expected. In some areas, and across some skillsets, there are gaps in the local industry. And this is in industries in which Australia already has proven experience—let alone nuclear power.

Mandating local industry content requirements is a powerful government tool that affords many benefits, but it is impossible to create industry capability and capacity overnight. As a result, the defence prime contractors can find themselves stuck between a rock and a hard place—the balance between delivering on time and on budget, and meeting local industry content requirements becomes unworkable.

A Lack of Local Skills

While the Prime Minister has stated that the nuclear-powered submarines will be built in Adelaide, it’s not yet clear whether this will involve manufacturing, or just assembly of US or UK supplied parts. Although, given that there are no welders in Australia certified to the Standards required for nuclear welding, it’s unlikely that manufacture will occur in Adelaide. This will obviously impact local industry content requirements, as well as upskilling, technology transfer and the shipbuilding workforce in general.

Not only that, Australia will need to invest in a whole gamut of infrastructure capable of handling nuclear reactors during both the construction and maintenance phases. It’s highly unlikely that the people of Port Adelaide will warm to a nuclear facility located on their back doorstep. So, where is the Federal Government planning to situate this facility?

All this is compounded by a lack of skilled nuclear engineers and captains. It takes years and years of experience to captain a nuclear submarine; Australia effectively needs mariners in training now to ensure they’re ready to captain submarines when construction is complete. Australia already struggles to crew its Collins Class submarines, which need up to 50 people aboard. The US Fast Attack submarines require crews of around 130 people. How will Australia bridge this shortfall?

Given all these challenges, the timeframe for having nuclear powered submarines battle-ready is quite extended. It is unlikely they would be in the water until the 2040s, at which time the technology could already be obsolete. Plus, in the meantime, the lifespan of the Collins Class fleet will have to be extended beyond recommended years.

No Simple Solution

While I fully support the local industry content premise, in practice it is just not delivering what the Federal Government intended. While the contract with Naval Group may not have been perfect, the Federal Government’s plan for nuclear submarines is beyond the existing skillsets of Australia’s local industry.

The question now is: should the taxpayer be forced to cover the cost of the Federal Government’s pipedream project?

Or, will the Federal Government purchase nuclear submarines from our allies in the United States and United Kingdom? The Morrison Government has already set a precedence for this—quietly shelving their plans to build the Pacific Support Vessel in Australia, and instead purchasing it next year to fast-track its deployment.

Finally, with so much work available for local industry in the wake of recent onshoring motivated by COVID-19 import delays, are local contractors willing to take on defence industry work, which is notorious difficult to win, let alone deliver?

While there is no simple solution, the construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear submarines without a local nuclear industry will be challenging. Industry will need to stand by for clarification from the Federal Government."

READ THE FULL ARTICLE AT ASIA-PACIFIC DEFENCE REPORTER HERE.

SubMatts Intelligence (SMI) On Line Again.

Sorry for the inactivity of Submarine Matters Intelligence (SMI). 

Pete's been in hospital for 10 days (heart) arriving back on November 27. Owing to this unwanted situation Pete has been given 2 more medications to add to his existing 7 per day.

Ulilizing my frequent traveller status (short quarantines. Tested for Covid every day in Germany and Australia) and that it was an emergency I was/have been given special exemption under Australia's Covid laws to visit Pete.    

We will again be publishing 2 articles a week.

You can now send comments as No Comments below articles has been lifted.

We will be doing 2 Reports to Donors in December to make up for November's inability.

Petra

Donor Report "Sub Detection from Space" Delayed.

Dear Donors

The Report I am preparing for you, amended to "Submarine Detection from Space" needs to be delayed, for about a week, while authorities clear it. Sorry for missing the deadline.

A sincere hat tip to H I Sutton’s Covert Shores youtubes for prompting a revisitation.

Petra

I'll Be Writing Far Less on "Submarine Matters"

Sorry Chaps

Due to increasingly severe health problems I'll be writing far less on SubMatts.

My medicos advise: though I'm 60 I have a range of health problems more suitable for someone far older, like 80+. The problems being stress, upness, heart and kidneys.

I drink little, don't take drugs, don't eat bad and don't smoke.

Priorities

1.  Monthly Donor Reports, as promised and what donors have already paid for. A report will be published once a month, though not necessarily on the 15th day of the month. 

2.  Blog comments have become too stressful and too full time, to manage and reply to.
     So, no comments from now, unfortunately.

3.  My SubMatts articles, if any, will be short.

P.S. Please note, fellow Aussie, Kym Bergmann, Editor, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, is writing excellent sea/submarine articles, drawing many comments on subs.

Again. Sorry guys. Like Billy's song says.

Petra

Australia Not Buying Astutes as AUKUS Sub: Safety

October 29, 2021 photo of HMS Astute (above) docked at Australia's Fleet Base West, Western Australia. The British High Commissioner to Australia, Vicki Treadell (light blue mask) is standing in the centre. (Photo: Commonwealth of Australia via Overt Defense)

---

The Australian government has conjured up photo opportunities (one above) which could be considered to imply Australia will be acquiring an Astute-class SSN as its "AUKUS submarine" quite soon. 

But, due to nuclear training of Australians requirements, such an acquisition could only be fully Australian crewed in 15+ years. If you throw in a "must be built in Adelaide" requirement, then 20+ years from now. A delay of 15+ or even 20+ years would be too late for a UK-designed Astute-with-PRW2-reactor production line in the UK and/or Australia.  

You'll note that the UK designing most of "Australia's" AUKUS SSN (especially the hull) is taken as a given by sub watchers. In that regard see the photo of a UK design (yes an Astute, with no US Virginia in sight) on Australia's (AUKUS) Nuclear-Powered Submarine Task Force website. 

Meanwhile the Combat System (30-40% of the build) will be very likely integrated by Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin had been the designated Combat System integrator for the Attack-class, up until September 2021.

Other reasons Australia is not buying the UK's Astute-class SSNs.

-  The Astutes' general obsolescence by the late 2030s. 

-  Also see the UK shipyard built Astute-class's "cost overruns and delays". 

The major specific reason Australia is NOT buying the Astute is the Astute's PWR2 reactor and in connection with that, safety. The PWR2 (on UK Vanguard SSBNs as well as the Astutes) will not only be obsolete by the 2030s, but there are safety concerns that now cannot be fully reversed. 

A submarine reactor is the most expensive and safety sensitive component of a nuclear sub. You basically build a submarine around the reactor. Even fitting a new, safer reactor to an Astute class sub would change so many things (eg. the whole submarine's  dimensions, displacement, reactor management electronics, buoyancy and "quieting") that it would fundamentally be a new submarine - with a new name. 

The authors of Wiki report that, by 1997, the UK realised: 

“the size of the Rolls-Royce PWR2 required a much larger [SSN, in terms of] (width and length) and significantly improved acoustic quieting. A new understanding was reached between the [UK Ministry of Defence] and GEC-Marconi that this would be an entirely new class [called Astutes], and far more complex than originally envisioned.^[8]"

PWR2 Safety

The authors of Wiki further report:

"A safety assessment of the PWR2 design by the [UK] Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator in November 2009, was released under a [UK Freedom of Information] request in March 2011.^[8][9] The regulator identified two major areas where UK practice fell significantly short of comparable good practice, loss-of-coolant accident and control of submarine depth following emergency reactor shutdown.^[10][9] 

The regulator concluded that PWR2 was "potentially vulnerable to a structural failure of the primary circuit", which was a failure mode with significant safety hazards to crew and the public.^[9][11]

In January 2012 radiation was detected in the PWR2 test reactor's coolant water, caused by a microscopic breach in fuel cladding. This discovery led to HMS Vanguard being scheduled to be refueled early and contingency measures being applied to other Vanguard and Astute-class submarines, at a cost of £270 million. This was not revealed to the public until 2014.^[12][13]"

USS Connecticut's Sonar Navigation Wasn't Working

 

Artwork of a submarine operating its short-range, faintly "active", seafloor (and mine) imaging navigation sonar (NavSon) (Artwork courtesy

 https://blog.assemblrworld.com/how-submarine-works/ dated May 5, 2021)
---

ARTICLE

After covering USS Connecticut (SSN-22) since October 8, 2021 I have some new thoughts. Connecticut would use an active Navigation Sonar (NavSon) (see artwork above). The NavSon is narrow "beam",  narrow band and very short-range, hence quiet/faint and usually undetectable. It is used to obtain a navigational "picture" of the seafloor that Connecticut is about to move over. 

Again, although an active sonar, the NavSon's subtle nature makes it usable and undetectable in normal submarine operating conditions.

However, to theorize about Connecticut's collision:

A.  If, for some reason, Connecticut is moving very quickly it might hit a seafloor / seamount before it has an adequatee NavSon picture. Although the relatively low damage in this case suggests a slow speed collision.

B.  If an opponent, eg. a PRC Navy ship, sub or seafloor sound emitter project noise - then that may effectively drown out/jam Connecticut's NavSon functionality.

or

C.  Connecticut may have chosen to turn off its NavSon because this sub needed to operate in "Stealth Mode". This would be appropriate in highly sensitive sea-space - protected by seafloor sensors. I'll leave it up to people's imagination where may be sensitive. In no NavSon Stealth Mode Connecticut would be "flying blind". 

And, a big "and", if, in conjunction with possibilities A, B or C, Connecticut encounters an uncharted seamont (or other obstruction on the seafloor) Connecticut could collide.

SOURCES

1.  Australia’s 9News reported November 5, 2021

[David Sandwell, Professor of Geophysics, Scripps Institution of Oceanography in California, told CNN.]

“Those sonar pings — so ubiquitous in submarine movies — also give away the sub's position to opposing forces.

"Sonar is your only way to look at the bottom, but you don't want to put out more sound than you have to," Mr Shugart said.

"You'd have to do that about every 20 seconds or so," to get an accurate picture…”

2.  https://blog.assemblrworld.com/how-submarine-works/ scroll ½ way down to

"How submarine works underwater"

3.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonar Sound Navigation and Ranging

and

4.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine_navigation#Deep_water_navigation
     footnote 2. which is: 

     "Lesson 14: Electronic Navigation". Navigation and Operations I. University of Kansas, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps. pp. Slides 19 [especially 20 mentioning "SSBN"] to 21. Archived from the original (Microsoft PowerPoint) on September 11, 2006. Retrieved 2007-11-14.

Pete

China's Nuclear Gambit Deterring the US: Taiwan?

A great essay by distinguished academic and researcher Valérie Niquet for The Diplomat,

November 6, 2021, at https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/chinas-nuclear-gambit/

As she is writing at that essential reading paysite here is the first sentence only:

"Don’t be distracted by the aerial incursions and naval build-ups - the real action is China’s

 nuclear build-up, in the hopes of deterring any U.S. intervention in a regional conflict."

USS Connecticut: Sackings as Expected

Regarding chain of command responsibility for USS Connecticut's seamount encounter, on October 12, 2021, I commented:

"Pete said...

Hi KQN [your Oct 12, 2021, 2:53:00 PM]

I think the USN will hold a Board of Inquiry given the likely US$millions taxpayer money repair bill.

To justify sacking Connecticut's Commander, Officer of the Watch and possibly some Petty Officers reasons will likely be published. After a Judicial and Public Relations pause.

If a Chinese ship/"fishing boat" rammed it - then that might change things.

Pete"
------------------------

On November 5, 2021 The Sydney Morning Herald reported:

"As a result, the statement said [Vice Admiral Karl Thomas, commander of the US 7th Fleet, based in Japan] relieved Commander Cameron Aljilani as commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Patrick Cashin as executive officer, and Master Chief Sonar Technician Cory Rodgers as chief of the boat, “due to loss of confidence.” The chief of the boat is the senior enlisted adviser to the commander and the executive officer.

The Navy has yet to publicly explain how or why the USS Connecticut, a Seawolf-class submarine, struck a seamount, or underwater mountain, or to reveal the extent of damage to the vessel."

UK Trafalgar-class Submarine Reactor End Leaks

A famous nuclear submarines for Australia exponent has apparently suggested Australia actually buy aging UK Trafalgar-class nuclear submarines. 

Beware, submarine reactors and the complex pipes connected to them, wear out, sometimes needing urgent inspection.

Trafalgar-class Service Problems

"In 1998, [HMS] Trenchant experienced a steam leak, forcing the crew to shut down the nuclear reactor. [HMS Trenchant suffered an earlier seafloor accident off Australia's west coast in 1997]. 

In 2000 a leak in the PWR1 reactor primary cooling circuit was discovered on [HMS] Tireless, forcing her to proceed to Gibraltar on diesel power.^[17] The fault was found to be due to thermal fatigue cracks, requiring the other Trafalgar-class boats, and some of the remaining Swiftsure-class boats, to be urgently inspected and if necessary modified.^[17]

In 2013 the UK Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator [see nuclear "hazards"] reported that the reactor systems were suffering increasing technical problems due to ageing, requiring effective management. An example was that [HMS] Tireless had had a small radioactive coolant leak for eight days in February 2013.^[18]"

From UK Government reports via Wikipedia and the The Guardian. 

Macron vs Morrison: All About Their Huge Coming Elections

Why are President Macron and Prime Minister Morrison still bitterly fighting over an Australian decision already made - to cancel the Attack-class program?

Macron and Morrison are actually cooperating in order to improve their chances as they go into their  national elections in April 2022. 

Macron knows he must look patriotic as he goes into France's first round April 2022 Presidential Election.

Equally Morrison (behind in the polls) knows he must look even more patriotic as he goes into Australia's next Federal Election likely to be held in April 2022 (or May 2022 at the latest). 

Fighting with Macron has also been serving Morrison as a distraction from Morrison's poor climate policies that Morrison has brought along to the Glasgow COP26 Summit Conference.

USS Connecticut DID Hit "Rising" Seafloor/Seamount

Regarding what USS Connecticut hit on October 2, 2021 to cause major bow damage.  

On October 8, 2021 I wrote:
 
 “But I’d put my money on [Connecticut] hitting the seafloor, a rock or islet.” 

On November 1, 2021, USNI News reported:   

"Investigators have determined USS Connecticut (SSN-22) hit an uncharted seamount that grounded the nuclear attack submarine on the underwater feature in the South China Sea Navy, USNI News has learned....” 

A “seamount” is defined as “a large geologic landform that rises from the ocean floor but that does not reach to the water's surface”. 

Japanese Submarine and Broader High Tech Projects

wispywood2344 on October 31, 2021, made some very interesting comments:  

In recent years, Japan has been increasing its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW) capabilities in response to the expansion of the Chinese Navy (PLAN).

 

Japanese submarine and broader high tech projects are not well known outside Japan, so I will introduce some of them. 
 
・There is an increase in the number of submarines [following Japanese Ministry of Defense (mod.go.jp) link string listed as "Not Secure" on my browser - beware!]  
 http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2017/html/nc008000.html 

 from 16+2 to 22+2 [for the JMSDF “Navy”] [does “22” mean operational submarines and +2 mean training submarines?]  

  
・Development and deployment of Type 18 torpedoes [For Soryu and Taigei class submarines, but not for Oyashio class. On the Type 18s also see.] 

 
・Deployment of Type 12 surface [or ground] to ship missiles (12SSM) to 4 islands (Ishigakijima, Amami-ohshima, Miyakojima, and Okinawa-main-island) 
 
・Development and deployment of Type 17 ship-to-ship missiles (17SSM) 
 
・Replace aging P-3C Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPAs) with P-1 MPAs [and see English Wiki on the P-1s] 
 
・Introduction of Joint Strike Missiles (JSMs) for F-35 fleet  
 
・Range extension of supersonic supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles (ASM-3A & ASM-3(Kai)) for F-2 multirole jetfighter fleet. 
 
・Range extension of subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles for P-1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft fleet   
 
・Development of subsonic stealth stand-off anti-ship cruise missiles (Launched from air/ground/ship)  
 
・Research of elemental technology for hypersonic anti-ship cruise missiles [document has nice artwork of missiles] 

and the last high tech project mentioned
 
・Development of hypersonic glide missiles (For use not only anti-ground but also anti-ship missions) [see artwork on page 12 on hypersonic missile’s heat signature/buildup].

By wispwood2344
[with some edits by Pete]