Australian Money Useful for Long-Term Nuclear Alliances

What Australia lacks in facing China's massively larger conventional forces AND China's nuclear capability is nuclear armed allies besides the US. Under Trump the US taking its dependent allies for granted was convincingly displayed. After 4 years of Biden Trump could well return in 2024-25. Or perhaps some other US Presidential isolationist, even more alliance-threatening than Trump, could darken international relations.

In part consideration of this Australia has made its two largest naval purchases (France's Attack-class subs and UK Hunter class frigates) as long term alliance sweeteners with (non-US) nuclear allies.  

The France Navy has long sailed its ships into Australia's region (for more than 250 years) and less obviously its subs (since WWII). The medium-long term threat from China is not only to Australia. France sees China as a strategic and neo-colonial threat to France's Indian and Pacific Ocean interests. Hence France has perhaps raised the intensity of its ship and sub flotilla visits.

Australia in part chose the French Naval Group (Attack class) submarines to increase the chances French naval vessels, especially those with a nuclear content like the SSN Émeraude, would visit Australia's region. Within this region the most contested and critical strategic and trade zone is the South China Sea. 

The French Government, which owns Naval Group has its own Indian and Pacific Ocean French overseas island territories, SLOCs and great power status reasons to sail the waters in Australia's region. BUT A$100+ Billions to France over the 60 year life of the Naval Group Attack class Program is also a compelling bilateral economic argument for a closer bilateral strategic alliance with Australia. 

An even more impressive symbol of French naval power allying with Australia's (and broader de facto China Containment Quadrilateral) strategic interests is the visit of the French Mistral-class LHD Tonnerre. The La Fayette-class stealth frigate Surcouf is escorting Tonnerre for training "MISSION JEANNE D'ARC 2021" bilateral and multilateral naval exercises. The Tonnerre led flotilla has been active since early 2021 and will end when Tonnerre and Surcouf return to the French home naval base of Toulon on July 14, 2021 (appropriately Bastille Day).

When Australia chose the French Naval Group (was DCNS) Attack class sub in April 2016, France's nuclear alliance potential was one, unstated, selection factor. Of the others submarine contestants Japan was already locked into (due to its Northeast Asia geography) being a strategic and continuing trade ally of Australia. Germany, represented by TKMS, unlike France, had/has no nuclear weapons to impress China. Also Germany lost the Pacific Ocean island "colonies" in 1914-15 that would have presented an added (or sufficient) reason to visit Australia's region. 

So, to an extent, Australia one day (and perhaps) gaining a nuclear ally, France, was an additional reason for Australia to choose the French submarines in April 2016. Also there is the aspect of encouraging Australia's main nuclear protector, the US, not to take Australia for granted. The US has been the No.1 supplier of weapons to Australia since 1942. So even  US conventional and nuclear protection is underwritten by many Billions of Australian dollars for US arms each year.  

One could draw the bow longer and identify the Type 26 frigate as the basis of the equally huge 9 x 9,000 tonne Australian Hunter class naval order with another potential (UK this time) nuclear ally. This is around A$100+ Billions to Britain over 55 years - a major foreign exchange earner for UK's shaky post-Brexit economy.

The UK is also supporting Australia and the broader Quadrilateral with an UK Carrier Strike Group 21. It is as big as a fleet and led by the large carrier Queen Elizabeth, protected by a UK Astute-class SSN, as well as by surface warships and several supply ships from several nations.

In nuclear ally protection terms international brotherhood doesn't talk. Money talks.

H I Sutton's excellent Yuan Type-039C (or D) Article

Naval News, has republished an excellent article written by H I Sutton of Covert Shores:

"The NewMystery Submarine Seen In China: What We Know" of June 25, 2021 concerning the PLA-N's Yuan Type-039C (or D). That is the Yuan variant with the vaguely A-26 (aka Blekinge-class) like sail and other exterior differences from the preceding Yuans - also many Yuans are suspected of having Swedish srtyle Stirling-engione AIP.

The only statement I would alter siightly is:

"This [the Yuan] likely uses a closed-cycle Stirling engine, similar to that on the A-26 class, to power the submarine when submerged. This means that it doesn’t have to snorkel to run its diesel generators [while its using AIP] to recharge the batteries." [but doers need to use the snorkel to provide air for the  diesels (to recharge the batteries) when the AIP is not being used]. 

H I Sutton's combination of commentary, artwork and photos at Covert Shores and via Naval News is uniformily excellent. 

Here is another interesting H I Sutton article, via Naval News "First Sighting Of New Stealth Fighter For Chinese Navy’s Aircraft Carriers" of June 8, 2021.

Numbers of Submarines Way Overrated

The article "Could America's Submarine Fleet be Surpassed by China?" by ANKUR KUNDU , for the Maritime Executive, overrates sheer numbers until the last paragraph.

But even when Ankur at last points out "But numbers aren’t the whole story." Ankur underrates a whole range of factors, including geography and non-submarine based ASW platforms, that give the USN a huge advantage over all other countries (eg. China, Russia, North Korea, India and US allies) that have a substantial number of submarines.

I'll publish a couple of articles on Monday and Tuesday on this topic.
--------------------------------

After receiving many emails I’ve decided to keep Submarine Matters a public free-view site for all. But I’m encouraging a donation of just A$50 (currently equivalent to US$38) from readers who wish to receive 12 Special Reports over the next 12 months.

That is, once you have expressed interest in another email to me I'll email an invoice to you. Once paid and using your email address I'll email you a Special Report on the 15th of each month. The first Report will be sent on July 15, 2021 with the final Report sent on June 15, 2022.

Enough donations will keep Submarine Matters going. 

I would be grateful if you could donate.

Have a good weekend.

Pete

Why Indonesia Wants Large Frigates from Italy.

Comments by Shawn C. (below) inspired me to forget Sydney's Covid scares and post again after a SubMatts lull. 

Submarine Matters went offline as one was becoming a little tired of some paysites skimming SubMatt's material for free then monetizing it by various methods.

On to frigates. Why, after several years producing 2 x newish 2,400 tonne Sigma light frigates (with 6 more planned), is Indonesia after much larger frigates? I (Pete) reckon,  Indonesia's light frigates may have been a match or superior to all other Southeast Asian (SEA) navies (Singapore’s 3,200 tonne Formidable-class excepted). The Sigmas could deter Malaysia from pressing Ambalat seafloor oil claims and defend Indonesia's fishing claims against other SEA nations.

But the Sigma's are far inferior in confrontations with ever larger, more formidable ships, being deployed recently, eg:

-  Chinese destroyers (like the 7,000+ tonne Type 052Cs ) and frigates,
-  China has more recenetly escalated to the 13,000 tonne Type 055 cruiser sized destoyer
-  the PRC's China Coast Guard has more than 40 x 3,325 ton destroyer sized cutters (up
   to 12,000 tons) mounting serious main guns, and capable of deploying missile or
   lightweight torpedo armed (notionally) "civilian" helicopters.
-  ships from Indonesia's near southern neighbour are growing. Specifically Australia's latest
   7,000 tonne Hobart class destroyers.
-  In the pipeline are even larger Australian warships in the shape of the 9 x almost 9,000
    tonne Hunter-class frigates, on order.

Indonesia is no longer satisfied with a small ship/gunboat surface navy largely limited to anti-piracy, smugglers, other policing and fisheries. There is a surface-ship-size arms race in the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia doesn't want to be dominated by the new large ships being built around it. 

On June 10, 2021 Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri announced that it signed a contract with Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense to supply Indonesia with 8 frigates, namely:
-  6 x new maybe 7,000 tonne FREMM frigates and
-  2 x 40 year old 3,000 tonne Maestrale-class frigates (probably the
   modernised Grecale and Libeccio ) after these Maestrales retire from the Italian Navy.

Fincantieri indicates it will be “prime contractor” for all 8 vessels implying all major work will be done in Italy. But Fincantieri also mentions (unclear) involvement of Indonesia’s
PT-PAL (main shipyard at Surabaya, Java, Indonesia). Maybe Fincantieri and PT-PAL will each do several sections of the FREMMs (similar to the previous Sigma construction program with Damen of the Netherlands). 

Also unclear is whether Indonesia will even more suddenly and massively expand its Navy through buying:

-  8 new frigates from Japan (Pete Comment - surely not given Japan's lack of large naval
   export orders and stronger competition from Fincantieri's proven FREMM export
   product)  
-  some in Indonesia have also pressed for a purchase of up to 9 Improved Jang Bogos 
   aka Indonesian Nagapasa-class submarines designed in South Korea. The most recent one
   KRI Alugoro was assembled by PT-PAL at Surabaya. More Nagapasas, built at PT-PAL,
   will likely follow.
-  In any case submarine replacements for the tragically sunk KRI Nanggala and what must
   now be the equally dangerous elderly "sistersub" KRI Cakra is a pressing Indonesian
   necessity.

Like India (the endless, ongoing MMRCA (1 and 2.0) and Project-75(I) selections) Indonesia is notorious for different interests haggling for years to get the best deals. For Indonesia it has been with different factions shopping for "commissions" from several aircraft or naval suppliers simultaneously. A deal is only proven when weapon systems have actually been delivered. 

In that regard there appears to be mixed Indonesian messages over the frigate deal. On June 10, when Fincantieri announced the deal, Indonesia's Berita Benar (trans "True News") reported: 

...the Japan Times daily reported in November [2020] that Japan was in talks to export a number of units of the latest generation of destroyers and frigates for the Indonesian Navy." 

"Spokesman for the Minister of Defense, Dahnil Anzar Simanjuntak, refused to confirm the signing of the [Fincantieri] purchase contract...

...[Marapi Consulting & Advisory senior military researcher, Beni Sukadis] “This [FREMM] agreement is quite surprising because it is predicted that the price of this ship is not cheap. Now the only thing we are waiting for is when the government is willing to pay the down payment ," 

[and]...Head of the Information Service of the Indonesian Navy, First Admiral Julius Widjojono, hoped that the Ministry of Defense would not acquire used ships [the 2 Maestrale-class frigates] from the Italian Navy."

Years before similar Indonesian mixed messages concerned submarine purchasing plans. At times since 1977, when Indonesia ordered the 2 Cakri-class Type 209 subs, then later bought South Korean Improved Jang Bogo/Type 209 variants, Indonesian admirals, officials, businessmen and politicians continued to express interest and host visits from French and Russian submarine sellers. It is suspected that commissions changed hands for each expression of interest. Indonesia is down there with some dodgy African countries in being perceived a highly corrupt country.

SHAWN C's COMMENTS

Shawn C sees the sudden size jump from Indonesia's Sigma light frigates to medium-heavy FREMM frigates as surprising. Shawn adds though, that the FREMM's are in mass production, so cost will not be as high as the USN's future FREMM variant, and spares should be plenty. Indonesia's FREMM are likely to be armed with Aster 30 long range SAMs and maybe Thales Herakles radar?

Shawn comments further: Indonesia's 5 x near 3,000 ton Ahmad Yani-class frigates are all 40 years old, so buying two 40 year old ex-Italian Maestrale class doesn't seem to make sense. That is unless Indonesia has urgent ASW holes to fill, which is highly likely. Shawn feels the Indonesian Navy's ASW assets are almost non-existent. 

Shawn is surprised India hasn't done a deal with Indonesia for ASW assets - it's obvious the PLAAN plans to send their subs into the Indian Ocean, and they can't do it submerged through the Malacca Straits or Sunda Straits, so they have to head further South, around the Lombok Straits. 

[Pete adds: in extremis Chinese SSKs, refueled at sea, may even avoid the Indonesian straits by going south of Australia, through the Southern (near Antarctic) Ocean. This may be a viable prospect for China's longer range, much faster moving, SSNs.]

A 2020 explosion forced early return of SSN Chakra to Russia

Poor India. Another major accident on INS Chakra "II" ex-Nerpa, the Russian SSN 10 year leased to India.

For the latest, 2020 accident see this Indian source:

"...The 'early' return of the INS Chakra [for complete repairs] had triggered a buzz as she was the only nuclear-powered attack submarine in the Indian Navy. Attack submarines are meant primarily to destroy enemy surface ships and submarines. The Chakra was from a Russian class of submarines that NATO codenamed the Akula (shark in Russian). Before being handed over to the Indian Navy, the Chakra was known as the Nerpa in Russian service.

The INS Chakra was also used to train personnel who would work on the indigenously built nuclear submarines of the Indian Navy.

On [June 9, 2021], Russian state news agency TASS reported the early return of the INS Chakra was necessitated due to an explosion on board the vessel in the spring of 2020, which damaged both its hulls. The Chakra, like many other Russian-designed submarines of its era, is a 'double-hulled' submarine, with a pressure inner hull and a lighter outer hull to allow for more buoyancy and capacity to absorb damage in the event of being hit by a torpedo or mine.

The Russian language website of TASS quoted a source in the Russian "military-industrial complex" as saying, "The explosion of a high-pressure air cylinder on the Chakra submarine... occurred in the spring of 2020." The report claimed the high-pressure air cylinder was located between the two hulls. In addition to damage to the hulls, the explosion also damaged "electronic weapons and hydro-acoustic equipment"...."

Total Cost Table for Japanese Sub Main Batteries: Taigei Table

 (Table in Billions of Japanese Yen. At June 3, 2021 approx 110 Yen = 1 $US )

wispywood2344, on May 29, 2021, kindly provided the above table and comments to the effect: 

I have prepared a Total Cost Table for Japanese Submarine Main Batteries above and at image (rather than website):

 http://blog.livedoor.jp/wispywood2344/others/JMSDF_Submarine_Battery_Contract_v1.png ) of procurement contracts providing the total cost of the “Main Battery” (total of 100s tonnes of individual battery cells) installed/soon to be installed on the 17 most recent Japanese submarines.

See Submarine Matters'  Oyashio-Soryu-Taigei TABLE below to place the 17 subs.

These 17 submarines are:

- 1 The last sub of the Oyashio class Japanese Submarine (JS) Mochishio (SS15)

- +10 /The ten Lead-acid Battery (LABs) and AIP (LABs + AIP) Soryu Mk.1 subs (JS Soryu (SS16) to JS Shoryu (SS26) inclusive). Note there was never a sub designated "SS21" as "SS21" was a Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) Development Program which years later provided LIBs on the Soryu Mk.2s and the Taigei-class.

- +2 The two Soryu Mk.2s (JS Oryu and JS Toryu)

- +4 The first four hulls of the Taigei-class.

The list is based on documents downloaded from the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) of Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) or ATLA’s predecessor's website. But there were many documents and some of them have already been deleted. For this reason wispy has not included the URLs of the sources.

This list shows that the price of the Main Battery (LABs for Japanese submarines  codenamed “SCG”) for JS Shoryu (26SS) was 8.9% cheaper than that for the first of class JS Soryu (16SS) and the price of LCO formula (codenamed “SLH”) LIBs for JS Toryu (28SS) was 8.7% cheaper than for its predecessor JS Oryu (27SS).

If the price of the Main Battery is proportional to quantity, the quantity of SCG for JS Shoryu (26SS) should be 8.7% less than that for JS Soryu (16SS) and the quantity of SLH for JS Toryu (28SS) should be 8.9% less than that for JS Oryu (27SS).

A reduction in the quantity of main batteries would mean a reduction in dive time.

How can such a "performance reduction" be possible? It is completely irrational.

Therefore, it should be considered that the contract price of batteries is not proportional to the quantity.
------------------------- 

Anonymous commented on June 2, 2021:

Usually, the price of purchased items decreases somewhat every year due to progress in returning their capital investment and work efficiency improvement and so on. If the MoD paid the same money every day, the Board of Audit (BoA) would ask the MoD for the reason. Not only batteries but also the price of the 12V25/25SB submarine diesels shows similar trends.

Then, the higher price of SLHs in JS Toryu compared to JS Taigei clearly suggests increased numbers battery cells (+ca.5% = +ca. 30SLHs) of SLHs in JS Taigei.
----------------------- 

Pete Comment

I agree with Anonymous’s explanation for the cost reduction and add.

Another way of saying costs reduce due to “progress in returning their capital investment and work efficiency improvement” is the MoD and Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF) make a conscious accounting decision to attribute more of the new Main Battery development costs to the first submarine with that Main Battery fitout.

This conscious accounting decision is evident in the non-coincidental pattern of cost reduction, ie. the reductions above are almost the same (8.9% versus 8.7%).

“Work efficiency improvement” might apply to more efficient battery production and more efficient installation of those batteries in the submarines over time.

AND/OR

It could include a much wider range of adjustments in the submarine to accommodate a heavier Main Battery tonnage, including ballast and buoyancy changes within the sub.
-------------------

Oyashio-Soryu-Taigei TABLE as at October 15, 2021.
 

SS No. Diesel Type Motor	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio 2 Toshiba motors	8105 Oyashio currents	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993 2 x 12V25/25S  diesels for all Oyashio class (each diesel 2,000kW)	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios  10 subs 2 Toshiba motors SMC-7?	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu/ Dragon class  Mk I Collided with Ocean Artemis Feb 8, 2021	8116 Sōryū dragons	SS-501	¥60B FY2004 all Mk.1 LAB+AIP Soryus have 2 x Kawasaki  12V25/25SB  diesels (totaling 4,240kW) + 4 AIP SMC-8 motor	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
21SS LIBs Concept Research Project			No 21SS built. It was an 8 year research project on LIBs. 1st LIBs sub launched was 27SS in 2018.
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct   2016	12 Mar 2018	MHI
26SS	8125 Shoryū	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014 last SMC-8 motor	LABs + AIP	2014	6 Nov 2017	18 Mar 2019	KHI
27SS a Soryu "Mk II" as it has LIBs. 1st Soryu Mk II	8126 Oryū 11th Soryu	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015  with 2 12V25/25SB diesels (totaling 4,240kW)  SMC-8B motor Soryu Mk IIs may have twice as many batteries as Mk Is, ie 960 LIB-arrays in Mk IIs, other improvements	LIBs only (SLH type)	Nov 2015	4 Oct 2018	5 Mar 2020	MHI
28SS Soryu Mk II, 12th & final Soryu	8127 Toryu	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016 "2,950t" surfaced 2 12V25/25SB diesels	NCA LIBs	Jan 2017	6 Nov  2019	24 Mar 2021	KHI
29SS 1st Taigei Class ("Great Whale") 3,000 tonne (surfaced)	8128 Taigei	SS-513	¥76B FY2017 (Heisei 29) Higher ¥76B budget  may be due to 1st of class many changes & new layout of LIBs. 2 x 12V25/25SB diesels or variants (totaling 4,240kW)	SLH LIBs maybe 960	month?in  2017	14 Oct 2020	Mar 2022	MHI
30SS  2nd Taigei Class  whale a mythol- ogical creature	8129? Hakugei	SS-514	¥71.5B FY2018  (Heisei 30) 12V25/25SB diesels or variants (totaling 4,240kW)	SLH LIBs	2018?	14 Oct 2021	2023	KHI
31/01SS  3rd Taigei Class		SS-515	¥B? FY2019 (Reiwa 01) 12V25/25SB diesels or variants (total 4,240kW)	SLH LIBs maybe 960+	2019?	2021?	2023?	MHI?
02SS  4th Taigei Class	8130?	SS-516	¥B? FY2020 (Reiwa 02) Improved SLH LIBS. New 2 x 12V25/31S diesels (totaling 5,520kW)	Impro ved SLH LIBs	2020?	2022?	2024?	KHI?
03SS	8131?	SS-517	¥B? FY2021	LIBs	2021?	2023?	2025?	KHI?
04SS	8132?	SS-518	¥B? FY2022	LIBs	2022?	2024?	2026?	MHI?
05SS	8133?	SS-519	¥B? FY2023	LIBs	2023?	2025?	2027?	KHI?
06SS	8134?	SS-520	¥B? FY2024	LIBs	2024?	2026?	2028?	MHI?
07SS	8135?	SS-521	¥B? FY2025	LIBs	2025?	2027?	2029?	KHI?
08SS	8136?	SS-522	¥B? FY2026	LIBs	2026?	2028?	2030?	MHI?

Key to Table: Table information provided by Anonymous to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = Lithium-ion Batteries. 
¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries. 

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