The China Coast Guard (CCG) would be allowed to use weapons against
foreign ships in waters China claims sovereignty. This is under a proposed
revision to China's maritime police/coast guard law,
according to a translated version. Lets call it the "fire on law".
China routinely accuses the US of infringing its sovereignty by sending naval vessels through contested waters. China claims waters within 12 nautical mile of some Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea (SCS). See map above (courtesy). These are waters the USN conducts FONOPs through with the US considering them international waters.
This Chinese announcement may have been timed to counter an
earlier US Trump Administration October 24, 2020 announcement that
the US Coast Guard would base "Enhanced Response Cutters" which seems
to mean Fast Response Cutters (main gun only being a 25mm
autocannon) in the Western Pacific. China may positioning itself for a
test of future Biden Administration resolve, after Biden is augurated on
January 20, 2021.
Also China may be facing down a Philippine intention,
expressed in October 2020 that the Philippines was considering recruiting
fishermen into SCS seaborne militia units similar to those used by Beijing. In
early November the Philippines appeared to shelve that idea as Manila is keen
to avoid “actions that would
be misconstrued”.
China's consideration of a fire on law would
also weaken the resolve of less formidable Southeast Asian navies and coast
guards (all but Singapore's and Vietnam's relatively strong navies) to
entertain any counter Chinese naval militia or CCG policies.
_________________________________________
CCG VESSELS AND WEAPONS
The draft fire on law of course does not specify what weapons the CCG could use. Vessel classes and weapons include:
- 100+
Chinese patrol boats size “cutters”
with twin 14.5mm Type
56 machine guns and
smaller weapons.
- 70+ corvette sized (500-2,700
ton) cutters and
- 44 x destroyer sized
(3,325-5,500 ton) with corvette and destroyer sizes capable of mounting 40mm up
to 76mm guns.
- And up to 2 x Zhaotou class 12,000 ton cruiser sized cutters (CCG 2901 and CCG 3901) each armed with a 76mm gun. Foreground, above is one of the two. (Photo courtesy reddit).
With more than 100 CCG cutters capable of mounting 40+mm guns they well
and truly outgun the cutters of their coast guard opponents. This includes the
25mm guns on the 6 USCG Sentinel
class/"Enhanced" Fast Response Cutters to be sent to the
Western Pacific.
Current USCG cutters may be deploying smaller guns than in the past. I can only see the Medium Endurance Cutter as having a 76mm gun.
Guided missiles and an
armed medium sized helicopter can also fly off the 2,700+ ton larger CCG
cutters.
See Youtube of
various CCG vessels in action.
5 comments:
More strategic context on the USCG Fast Response Cutters due to ply the South China Sea https://www.voanews.com/usa/why-us-wants-send-coast-guard-seas-near-china
The article states the following "A U.S. plan to steer Coast Guard vessels toward waters frequented by Chinese vessels will bulk up Washington’s resolve to contain Beijing’s maritime expansion without inviting a hot conflict, analysts believe."
The idea of sending USCG in my opinion is simply foolish. A country's resolve is not underpinned by projecting presence but rather its willingness to escalate when challenged. If sending highly militarized and capable vessels cannot deter China's aggression and coercive activities, why would the lightly armed USGC vessels make a difference? The last sentence says it all "avoiding hot conflict". China intends to dominate the SCS - period. If the US do not intend to compete fully against China in the SCS then don't play in that region. There is no room for half measures. Chinese CG vessels in the 10000 ton class will ram those puny Fast Response Cutters (353 tons). It is an act of malfeasance to consider such a move.
Brumby
Thanks Brumby
Might the USCG also have roles against non-state actors, like Philippine private armies and pirates?
Pete
Hi Pete,
The referenced article on proposed USCG deployment was specifically about China and my comments pertain to my views over such a consideration. In this conversation it is important to distinguish the difference between territorial waters and EEZ as established under UNCLOS.
The role of the CG concerns maritime security and economic activity enforcement within its jurisdiction. Firstly the USGC has no jurisdiction in the SCS. If it operates there then its authority is delegated through some form of bilateral country arrangements or else it can only operate as an observer not enforcer.
The core issue with China in the SCS is its rather ambiquous approach in territorial claim through its nine dash line. Whenever a dispute arise with conflicting economic activities it simply maintain a position that it is operating well within its sovereign waters. Under UNCLOS it is well established the nature of EEZ and what sea rights are attached to it. Given that the nine dash line overlaps the EEZ of the surrounding SCS countries, China can argue that it has sovereign rights to operate in those waters regardless of the presence of the USCG. The source of the problem is a sea grab grounded not on international law but by military might. Sending in the USCG just demonstrate a lack of resolve in recognizing that the claim is premised on might is right and the US is unwilling to match such a stance.
The FONOPs to-date serves a different but limited purpose in pushing back Chinese claims concerning territorial waters as defined in UNCLOS. Meanwhile the Chinese is just building up its military might and fortifying its man made islands that eventually will force the US out of the region by the simple fact that it will become too risky to operate within that Chinese bubble.
Until and unless those countries in the region allow US military basing to create a counter bubble, there is not much effective pushback to be had. Ultimately those countries would have to decide whether they want to become Chinese vassal states under the Chinese tributary model or remain independent sovereign nations.
The same story applies for Australia if it continues to rely on Chinese money for its economic growth. Given what has happened with Covid-19. Australia should take the opportunity to decouple itself from over relying on China. Australia should adopt Singapore's approach. It limits itself by quota concerning economic engagement so that it would not be subject to economic coercion.
Brumby
Hi Brumby
Thanks for your reply. I stand corrected.
In an attempt to clarify what the US may be doing with its Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) I looked at https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/guam-coast-guard-receives-first-of-three-fast-response-cutters-planned-for-the-island-1.646378 . This indicates 3 FRCs arrived in Guam for basing there on September 24, 2020. The article indicates "Three have been home-ported already in Honolulu, with two others in Alaska."
It is unclear whether another article, this time of October 24, 2020 means the Guam-Honolulu 6 or a later set of 6. "“To that end, the USCG is strategically homeporting significantly enhanced Fast Response Cutters ... in the western Pacific,” implies a port in US territory/territories. So maybe the September and October articles are both talking about the same Guam-Honolulu 6 - which significantly don't have the range to operate in the SCS even if permitted.
Meanwhile this article https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/07/31/the-us-navy-is-preparing-a-major-surge-of-lcs-deployments/ describes an LCS in the SCS and "Singapore, where the ships are supposed to be forward based."
Also noting US destroyers doing FONOPs in the SCS, now and then, which will delay the Chinese peril, if only for a few years.
Cheers
Pete
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