Anonymous, on October 28, 2022
made the following excellent comments:
Pete. Thanks for [France's
SSN offer Should be a Taskforce Plan B] and link back to your previous accurate posts. I share this view to the point that your plan
B is now my plan A.
I note ASPI interviewed Admiral Mead [on October 27, 2022] who remained optimistic about the RN-USN project. Of
course it is his job to do so. Yet the fact that he suggested a (now) “14 year
old girl” might become the commander of Australia’s first SSN suggests it will
take another 20 years.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-navy-is-cultivating-a-nuclear-mindset-says-ssn-taskforce-chief/
Since the announcements that
both:
(1) USA are struggling with Virginia
program delivery and would have difficulty supporting RAN SSNs before 2040 and
(2) the UK cannot supply the
Astute class and would presumably offer Australian participation in the SSN(R]
program it is difficult to share Mead’s optimism.
The Columbia SSBN program runs
to 2041 assuming no further delay. Starting a US SSN design then assuming a two
year drumbeat and 8 year construction time would mean a first RAN SSN by 2049
and 8 not completed until 2063. What will the PLAN have by then? As per your point
on US politics, there will be another 4 POTUS elections before that start date.
The UK SSN(R) will best case
not complete design till 2026, while the Dreadnought SSBN program runs to 2038.
The corresponding start date would give a first RAN SSN by 2046 and 8 by 2060.
The UK approach now also has a lot more cost and delivery risk because the
SSN(R) design is not complete.
The cost of the US SSN(X) and
UK SSN(R) will also be so much higher that they might delay other defence
programs, like the Hunter frigates and completion of the F-35 acquisition.
Also the potential decade plus
delay in the start of Adelaide sub construction jobs won’t go down well in the
new government, which creates political risks for the RAN. What if Labor
decides to fund something else instead in the mean time?
So I’d rather we set out on a
more achievable and affordable task sooner and got 8 French SSNs that would
still be regionally superior to Chinese or Russian SSNs, than wait to build the
world’s best SSNs and possibly never receive them.
Pete Comments
Thanks Anonymous. Taking your points
in turn.
Yes a French SSN offer, if
firm, may well be more useful and relevant for Australia to face a China that refuses to wait for the late 2040s AUKUS sub in-service date. Australia rejecting a
French SSN option on refueling grounds seems a false goalpost when it is
recalled the French fuel is lower proliferation sensitive LEU. Also amidst the
$10s Billions of SSN infrastructure Australia will need to construct an
Adelaide or HMAS Stirling LEU refueling capability could be part of it.
I think a US SSN, be it late model
Virginia or SSN(X), will be built to include such high anti-China, anti-Russia ASW Seawolf-like
specs, that its higher cost and technical sensitivity will prevent export to Australia.
The Astutes going out of production, UK SSBN production hiatus, and SSN(R) high ASW specs and cost and delay also being nonstarters.
Added to all that is unforeseen
inflation in the US, UK and Australia and unfavourable exchange Australian dollar rates making an
already extremely expensive AUKUS SSN project a huge financial risk over the 25
years until an Aus SSN is operational.
So, yes a French Barracuda SSN
could cut risks in several ways.
On the ASPI article Mead is as careful as his position allows. Marles has more latitude though
runs against the US and UK’s well documented delays till 2040s when Marles talks
of “need for haste is dictated by deteriorating strategic circumstances”.
Nowhere in the public AUKUS SSN program delivery timings is there hope for “haste”.
I see the article’s statement “Marles has undertaken to
strengthen the lethality and deterrent effect” as providing distant hope that
Marles is hinting that the 25 tonne Conventional high explosive limit for AUKUS
SSN weapons can be enriched by other explosive technologies.
But this is probably a
faint hope until
A. In Ukraine Russia uses a Radiological Weapon (eg. using explosives to spread radioactive substances in the large power Reactor complex over a wide area) or uses a Nuclear Weapon.
or
B. After China installs
ballistic or hypersonic missiles on the Solomons
or
C. When China invades Taiwan.
Fear of China made SSNs for
Australia an unexpected possibility and even greater future fears of Chinese or Russian acts may
make Australian weapon “ambiguity” possible.
