Larger diesel sections better for long range submarines. A Dutch Type 212CD?

Following the article of September 23, 2019 Anonymous has kindly provided, in late September 2019, further comments and links here and here. This is on submarine (diesel section) hull diameter matters. Pete has done some editing to put the comments into standard English and added some extra comments in [...] brackets.

The article below is most useful in calculating the probable diameters of the “double hull” (ie. pressure and light outer hulls) of the future Norwegian and German TKMS designed and built Type 212CD (Common Design) and possibly a larger Type 212CD design for the Netherlands.

The German and Norwegian Type 212CD will be designed for short to mid range missions. [But the Netherlands might in future purchase an enlarged (eg. wider diameter (aka beam)) long range (for Caribbean and Middle East missions) version of the Type 212CD. This is noting that the diameter of a double hull around the diesel section, discussed here, may be less than the largest diameter (published beam) measure. The largest diameter published as “Beam: 8.4m” for the Walrus class may be around the crew quarters and/or control room of a submarine, with a small diameter/beam around the diesel section.]

On long range (oceanic) submarine missions diesels must be capable of a relatively complex level of maintenance at sea. [The maintenance crew need space to use large tools and to slide bulky spare parts into the diesels.] This requires sufficient space in the diesel section. The space inside the double hull of the Netherlands’ Walrus submarines is extremely tight for the Walrus’ 3 diesels [1]. Therefore, this space must be improved/enlarged for the Netherlands’ “Walrus Replacement” future submarine.

Case 1: for the fuel cell air independent propulsion (FC AIP) system oxygen tanks and (hydrogen storing) metal hydride cylinders are placed, for safety, outside of pressure hulls (Type 212A style). The outer diameter of the diesel section should be at least 1m wider than the pressure hull [2-4]. This means the [diesel section] diameter of a 212CD is 7.8m ( = 6.8m + 1m). In this case, the maintainability of diesel will not be as good as case 2 (but still better than the Walrus current diesel section beam?). Still having hydrogen and pure oxygen outside the pressure hull is safer.

Case 2: oxygen tanks inside the pressure hull and metal hydride cylinders outside the pressure hull [but still within the light outer hull] (Type 214 style). For better maintainability, the space between each of the 3 diesels should be 400mm-500mm wider (ie. diesel section diameter of 7.5m-7.8m = 6.3m + 400-500mm x 3 [5] [6] ). [This is greater than that of a [2 diesel, maximum 6.3m beam] Type 214 submarine.

Considering Cases 1 and 2, a diesel section diameter of approximately 8m is reasonable (= around 15% wider). Increase of 15% in beam means an increase of 30% in displacement (2,000t for Type 214 becomes 2,600t for a wider beam) [for a Netherland’s Walrus Replacement/future submarine 212CD]. 

[Note this is not suggesting the smaller/standard Type 212CD for Norway and Germany will be 2,600 tons – more likely their 212CDs will be approximately 2,000 tons maximum/submerged].

[1] from https://naviesworldwide.com/navy-news/do-conventional-submarines-need-diesel-engines/ (above) Diesel engines in the Netherland's Walrus class submarine take up a lot of space, require staff and maintenance. [The engine maintainer in the photo looks exposed to the danger of hot engines.] (Photo courtesy Jaime Karremann / Marineschepen.nl)

[2] above is a cutaway diagram from http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2019/02/tkms-type-212cd-submarine-propulsion.html The complexity of hull diameters along the single diesel 212A above is evident. The maximum diameter of the light outer hull (the "Beam") is known to be 6.8m and the diameter of the pressure hull may be approximately 5.5m. If a 212CD had 2 diesels its pressure and outer hull measures would need to be approximately 1m greater.

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_214_submarine
Beam of Type 214 submarine is 6.3m (General characteristics).

[4] from https://ameblo.jp/calorstars/entry-12157790493.html (above) the lower 2 pictures show the installation of the 2 side-by-side diesels into a South Korean Son Won-II (Type 214 variant). These pictures show the tightness of the diesel section [which may be adequate if South Korea's Son Won-II 's are only used for short missions, close to South Korea's naval bases.]

[5] (see an Oyashio engine room below) For Japan's medium range mission Oyashio and Soryu class submarines there is more space (perhaps >400mm) between the 2 diesels than in the South Korean Son Won-II/Type 214 engine room in [4]. This permits a higher level of maintenance at sea in the Japanese submarines.

[6] http://japanese.china.org.cn/politics/txt/2012-09/16/content_26536166_12.htm (above) Inside the diesel section of a Japanese Oyashio class submarine. The double hull structure consists of an outer light hull (diameter 9.1m) and inner pressure hull (approximately 7.2m?) for the diesel section. A KAWASAKI diesel is on each side of the metal walkway. 12 square-shaped dark metal cylinder head covers can be seen. 

For Japan's newer generation Soryu submarines 2 x KAWASAKI 12V/25/25 diesels are installed, with a bore of  250mm. The width of the passage is approximately 1.2 m which is considerably bigger than those of a Type 212A [2] or the Walrus sub's crowded and dangerous (?) engine room [1]. 

A larger space for the diesel section facilitates maintenance of diesels during the long mission (such as 10 weeks) of an oceanic submarine [like Australia's Collins class. With the Collins having 3 diesels but only within a beam of 7.8m is the Collins' engine room crowded?]

Mainly Anonymous (and Pete)

Details Emerging on the German-Norwegian Type 212CD Submarine

Following Submarine Matters' German vs Swedish Advanced AIP for Submarine Sales to Poland, the Netherlands and India of September 16, 2019, Anonymous has kindly provided the following comments on the Type 212CD under development for the German and Norwegian navies.

Information on the Type 212CD (Common Design) is limited. The 212CD:

i) is a Norwegian-German TKMS joint development with Norway purchasing 4 and Germany 2. Deliveries are expected in 2016 [1]. The 212CD are based on the Types 212A and 214

ii) will have a displacement of 2,400 tons [source? displacement not in 4 . This is similar in size to the Netherland’s Walrus-class (see Table in [4], displacement of 2,400-3,000 tons, [or less see right sidebar] and hull is made out of non-magnetic steel [1][3],

iii) will have extended range, speed and endurance(6 to 8 weeks) [2] [3, 4]. Hence it will use two MTU 12V 4000s because just one diesel (used in the 212A) is not suitable or safe for long range operation. To accommodate the two MTU diesels the beam/diameter has been enlarged to 8m. This is an increase from the 212A 6m beam useed for just one MTU 396 diesel

iv) use of SAFT made lithium iron phosphate batteries (LFP) is likely [source?]. This is more stable [than other LIBs and/or more stable than LABs?] at the low Baltic and North Sea, North Atlantic and Arctic Ocean temperatures the 212CD will operate in.

v) The latest Permasyn magnetic propulsion motor will be used.

vi) As with the 212A and 214 for safety the AIP oxygen tanks and hydrogen cylinders are outside the pressure hull and inside the light outer hull. The 212CD will use fourth generation fuel cell (FC4G) AIP

vii) Italy, the Netherlands [1] and Poland could buy into the 212CD program (does it satisfy their requirements?) [5]. But, published data on 212A and 214 may provide some important information on 212CD [6].

[1] “The Royal Netherlands Navy’s Submarine Replacement Programme”, European Security and Defense, May/09/2019, https://euro-sd.com/2019/05/articles/13140/the-royal-netherlands-navys-submarine-replacement-programme/ 

“The Type 212CD followed the [curtailed Type 212NG (Next Generation) program], a design by tkMS for the German Navy. In turn, the NG was derived from the Type 212A and the Type 214. When Norway joined the programme, the requirements were merged into a new design: Type 212 Common Design. Not much has been disclosed about these submarines, except that their displacement is 2400 tons and their hulls are made of amagnetic steel.”

[2] “German-Norwegian Type 212 CD submarine contract to be signed early 2020”, NAVAL TODAY. COM, Jun/014/2019, https://navaltoday.com/2019/06/14/german-norwegian-type-212-cd-submarine-contract-to-be-signed-early-2020/ 

“The new Type 212 CD submarines will share the low signatures of the Type 212 boats in service with the navies of Germany and Italy but will have extended range, speed and endurance to allow worldwide operations, according to TKMS.”

[3] “U 212 CD, the next Norwegian submarine, but what for? (1/2)” , DefenceChronicles, https://www.defencechronicles.eu/u-212-cd-the-next-norwegian-submarine-but-what-for/ 

“Of course, in terms of the RNN submarines’ capabilities, the Norwegian Sea surveillance mission is very demanding since they must keep submerged almost permanently in sectors of the North Norwegian Sea or along some fjords. This requires endurance at sea (6 to 8 weeks), keeping watch in a patrol area between two long dived snorkeling transits on the way out of the home base and on the way back.”

[4] “U 212 CD, the next Norwegian submarine, but what for? (2/2)” https://www.defencechronicles.eu/u-212-cd-the-next-norwegian-submarine-but-what-for-22/    

“By selecting the U 212 German class, the Norwegian MOD made certainly the best choice of a coast guard submarine, while objectively giving up the ambition to extend its Navy control to the open Norwegian Sea and play a combined role with other friendly ocean going submariners, in the hunt for the new “Red Octobers”. Also see Table.

[5] “German, Norwegian officials huddle over joint submarine program” https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/04/30/german-norwegian-officials-huddle-over-joint-submarine-program/ 

“The design of the new boats has yet to be locked down, which may reflect a last glimmer of hope in Berlin and Oslo that other countries in the market for submarines — namely Italy, the Netherlands or Poland - could join the effort.”

[6] The TYPE 212A is a small and stealthy submarine design. Both oxygen tanks and hydrogen cylinders are stowed outside of the pressure hull on [safety grounds]. In line with the stealth, extensive use is made of non-magnetic steel, supplemented by lightweight [graphite fiber reinforced plastic] GFRP for hull outer coverings and the fin. TYPE 214 is described as an evolution of the TYPE 209 with the addition of a number of innovations found in [later model 209s].

Pete Comment: I estimate "2,400 tons" displacement for the 212CD for the Norwegian and German navies to be too high for the shallow Baltic. Perhaps 2,200 tonnes submerged may be more accurate. This is similar to TKMS latest launched 2 or 3 diesel Singaporean Invincible (was 218) class. The Invincible/218 for the shallow Malacca and Singapore Straits is estimated at 2,000 tonnes (surfaced), 2,200 tonnes (submerged). The 212CD is likely to have X-plane rudders (below) like the 212A and Invincible class. The the photos of Invincible/218 model above and below may be most like the future Type 212CD.

Anonymous (with some editing and comments by Pete)

Excellent The Diplomat Article on South Korea, Japan, US, GSOMIA.

DongJoon Park at The Diplomat (paysite) has written an excellent article which corroborates 

much of Anonymous’ advice here, here and here. DongJoon Park’s article, of September 19, 2019, at https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/the-us-japan-and-south-korea-should-shelve-gsomia-for-now/ is titled:

“The US, Japan and South Korea Should Shelve GSOMIA (For Now)”. Parts include:

“Insisting that Seoul rejoin [the General Security of Military Information Agreement] GSOMIA may make South Korea more skeptical about Washington’s ability to arbitrate impartially.

...In Washington, experts are alarmed at Seoul’s decision to discontinue GSOMIA, arguing that it plays right into the hands of North Korea and China by weakening trilateral security cooperation between the United States and its two most important allies in East Asia. 

Many have pointed to historical animosity between [Seoul and Tokyo's] contrasting views over the “final and irreversible” nature of the 2015 agreement, and lack of mediation by the United States as key reasons behind this rapid downturn in bilateral relations. Even the threat posed by Pyongyang evidenced by its frequent missile tests in recent months appears to have done little to curb rising tensions.  

...Jennifer Lind has noted how the “crisis fits a predictable pattern” in which a progressive [Seoul] government tends to be “more dovish toward North Korea and more prickly toward Japan and the United States.”

...Seoul has also used its quarrel with Tokyo to signal its independence from Washington. High-ranking South Korean officials have openly retorted that Seoul would not seek mediation because they would then get slapped with a hefty bill in return.

...Though it may resemble similar instances from the past, what is unique about this present moment is U.S. President Donald Trump’s apparent eagerness to pursue negotiations with North Korea...Recent reports suggest that the United States and North Korea may meet again as early as late September. 

However unrealistic a breakthrough may seem to be, the fact that there is an ongoing dialogue of sorts between the United States and North Korea gives Seoul further leeway to maintain its current conciliatory stance vis-à-vis Pyongyang. 

Moreover, this unique set of circumstances has exposed the stark differences that lie in how Seoul and Tokyo perceive North Korea as a threat to their national security. North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons programs often overshadow the fact that most South Koreans still believe unification between the two Koreas to be both desirable and feasible. And in this regard, Pyongyang will never be an adversary for Seoul in the same way it is for Japan. 

...Historically, calls for a stronger partnership between Seoul and Japan, and by extension trilateral cooperation including the United States, have been predicated on the notion that it is necessary to deter North Korean aggression, and for good reason.

 ...Much like it did a few years ago, the United States can and should play a positive role in facilitating reconciliation between its two allies through such processes. But to do so, it must not overly stress the importance of a vigorous trilateral relationship when it rests on such shaky ground. Insisting that Seoul rejoin GSOMIA, for example, will only exacerbate the situation by making South Korea more skeptical about Washington’s ability to arbitrate impartially...”

 DongJoon Park is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Government at Georgetown University.”
-----------------------------------------

Read the whole excellent THE DIPLOMAT (paysite) article, by DongJoon Park, HERE.

Some See Serious Stresses in US-South Korean Alliance

Following the September 10, 2019 article Anonymous, on September 14, 2019, provided further comments and links on what some see as serious tensions in the US-South Korean (SK) alliance:

US expert on Asian, Michael J. Green, has begun to doubt the continuation of the US-SK alliance. Green is not only fed up with the anti-American administration of SK President Moon Jae-in, but also concluded that SK was not originally an alliance partner. See “U.S.-China Relations in 2019: A Year in Review” by Michael J. Green, Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, pages 5-6, September 4, 2019, at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Panel%20II%20Green_Written%20Testimony.pdf

-----------------------------

Separately the following is a Question and Answer interview of Japanese commentator on Korean affairs Takabumi Suzuoki in “South Korea originally subject state of China-Inherent weakness of USA-SK alliance spoken openly in USA” by T. Suzuoki, in [Japanese newspaper] DAILY SHINCHO, of September 13, 2019.

(Suzuoki) A notable change has occurred in US. Dr Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair of CSIS said continuation of the US-SK alliance was difficult.

(In source text) “Korea has a very different history and a very different geopolitical situation from Japan and the Chinese view Korea as a much more likely candidate for dealignment from the U.S.”

(Q) What does “Korea has a very different history and a very different geopolitical situation” mean?

(A) It means, “The successive dynasties of the Korean peninsula belonged to the dynasty of China.

Therefore, the US-SK alliance is extremely unstable.”

(In source text)“Korea was historically more associated with the Chinese tributary state system than Japan and Beijing has put significant coercive pressure on South Korea to dealign from the United States since Xi Jinping came to power.”

(Suzuoki) As SK is originally pro-China country, maintenance of the US-SK alliance is difficult whether SK government is anti-America or not. Whatever US makes effort, eventually the alliance will be withdrawn. This is already pointed out “Withdrawal of the US-SK alliance), but the fact that Asian experts in America began to point out inherent weakness of the US-SK alliance is important. “Left wing Moon Jae-in administration results in collapse of the US-SK alliance “ is dominative view in US, but, it is too optimistic idea. Asian experts in US used to think, “As SK is a democratic country, it will eventually select US not China.” But, now, Asian experts conclude, ”SK will select China.”

(Q) Why did they conclude, “SK will select China.”

(A) Because SK is hesitating participation in “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Strategy”, China encirclement network. Also, SK withdraw GSOMIA.

(In source text) Seoul took over a year to participate in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, for example, and South Korea ambassadors in Southeast Asia often steer clear of the like-minded coordination meetings of U.S, Japanese, Australian and European embassies.

(A) China ordered SK, “Do not military cooperation by US, SK and Japan”, and Moon administration accepted this order. SK sucked up to China by withdrawal of GSOMIA.

(Q) Is there any other Asian experts except Dr. Green who Give up SK?

(A) Mr. Michael Armacost (ex-Ambassador to the Philippines and also to Japan, former Acting Secretary of State) doubts continuation of the US-SK alliance. He pointed out the anti-American sentiments by Korean and suggested the possibility of withdrawal of the US military. In SK, not only the left wing but also conservatives believe, “the US wants to place troops in the continent. So, whatever Korea says, US will not pull the its troops in Korea.” But, Professor Gi-Wook Shin of Stanford University pointed out, “We left the Philippines with which we allied for 100 years. I can't say it won't happen in SK.”

(Q) Are there conservatives in SK?

(A) That is problem. They chant pro-America, but, in their heart, have strong antipathy against US who dominates their destiny. In critical situation, their anti-America sentiment will explode. In May 2019, Goldon Chan published “Losing South Korea” where nationalism of SK results in withdrawal of the US-SK alliance. Ordinary American still believes, “SK is our side.” But, experts begin to face ex- subject state of China, deep anti-America sentiment and increasing nationalism which will change public opinion in US.

(Q) Is change in a view point of experts reflected in diplomacy of US?

(A) Of course. President Trump said, “SK probably doesn’t like us too much.” Deep anti-America sentiment of Korean is recognized by political leaders in US. Asian experts and security experts checked withdrawal trend of Trump administration, but, now, Asian experts begin to say, “The US-SK alliance is not maintained.” Resignation of John Robert Bolton will result in restart of dialogue between US and NK.

(Q) How Korean think mind change of US?

(A) Conservatives pointed out risk of national security caused by light wing, but, can not say to join FOIP. They scare China. Light wing must be very happy. Because, US may withdraw the US-SK alliance. On Sept/09/2019, Special Assistant to SK President, Moon Chung-in called demonstration by citizen in front of US embassy to change the US-SK relation. See “Special Advisor Moon Chung-in said,”The biggest obstacle for NK-SK relations is the UN Command”” [in SK language] Chosun Online, September 10, 2019 http://www.chosunonline.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/09/10/2019091080020.html

(Q) How can Special Assistant to the SK President call anti-American demonstration?

(A) Currently US is fed up with SK. Special Assistant is going to shake the US-SK relation in this opportunity. If citizen surrounds the US embassy, anti-Korea sentiment will definitely increase in USA. Conservatives severely criticize Cho Kuk's nomination as SK's next justice minister and try the overthrow of a government. Full collision between Left wing and Conservatives started in SK. Collapse of the US-SK alliance will be brought forward. ENDS

US Developing 3+ Missiles (eg. Pershing III?) - Post INF Treaty

Kingston Reif wrote an excellent article “Trump Increases Budget for Banned Missiles” at the Arms Control Association website, on May 2019 at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-05/news/trump-increases-budget-banned-missiles. Parts (with some bolding and redding by Pete) include:

“The Trump administration has requested nearly $100 million in fiscal year 2020 to develop three new missile systems that would exceed the range limits of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a pact the United States [exited on August 2, 2019]

... The budget submission includes $76 million in the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Prompt Global Strike Capability Development account to develop a mobile, conventionally armed, land-based cruise missile and a ballistic missile system...”

...Defense Department officials told reporters in March that the Pentagon is planning to test [1] a ground-launched variant of the Navy’s Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile that has a range of about 1,000 kilometers in August and [2] a ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers in November [2019]. [Is this a Pershing III or extended range AtacMS?] 

...The officials estimated that the new cruise missile could be deployed in 18 months while the new ballistic missile would not be ready for at least five years....”

“...[officials] noted that there have been no discussions with allies in Europe and Asia about hosting the missiles. One official said the new ballistic missile could be deployed in Guam, a U.S. territory, which would allow the missile to strike targets in mainland China.

[3] “A New, Third Weapon

The budget request also contains $20 million for the Army to begin development of a mobile, land-based, medium-range missile “that can attack specific threat vulnerabilities in order to penetrate, dis-integrate, and exploit in the strategic and deep maneuver areas.” The Army is planning to request to total of $900 million for the missile through fiscal year 2024.”

“...the congressional aide confirmed that the weapon would fall within the range prohibited by the INF Treaty. The Defense Department classifies a medium-range missile as having a range between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers.

In addition, the Army is pursuing [4+] several other ground-launched missile systems with ranges that could exceed 500 kilometers.”

“Gen. John Murray, the chief of Army Futures Command, told Congress last September that the service is “looking very hard and starting down the path of hypersonics and then also looking at what we call the [5] Strategic Long-Range Cannon, which conceivably could have a range of up to 1,000 nautical miles.”

“...Several countries, including Poland, have made it clear that any deployment of the new systems in Europe would have to be approved by all NATO members...”

SEE Kingston Reif’s whole great article HERE.

German vs Swedish Advanced AIP for Submarine Sales to Poland, the Netherlands and India

Summary

Germany’s TKMS and Sweden’s Saab-Kockums have released latest generation Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) details. AIP prolongs submerged endurance of diesel electric submarines. The overall strategy is likely:

-  TKMS packaging its latest AIP in submarine Types 214, 212A, 212CD, South Korean KSS-IIIs
   and Israeli Dolphin 3s.

-  while Sweden is likely offering its latest Stirling AIP in the three A26 submarine sizes. 

The release of details may be with a view to sales in the long running future submarine competitions for:

-  up to 4 submarines for Poland’s long running ORKA Program, 

-  around 4 submarines for the Netherlands Walrus Replacement, and

-  6 submarines for India’s 75 (I for India) with Saab-Kockums and TKMS still on the shortlist of 4

   competitors

Analysis and Background in More Detail

TKMS appears to be developing its (see B. below) 4th Generation Fuel Cell (FC4G) technology in competition against:

-  Saab-Kockums' A. 5th Generation Stirling AIP, and

-  D. methanol reforming fuel cell (MRFC) that TKMS itself is co-developing with Spain’s SENER. 

So, in C. TKMS indicates its 4th Generation Fuel Cell technology is superior to reformer AIP of which D. TKMS’ co-development with SENER could be an example, and A. Sweden’s Stirling engine technology.

A.  SWEDEN Saab-Kockums Richard Scott for Jane's International Defence Review  reported June 17, 2019 in part, “Sweden set to test ‘Double Stirling’ AIP plant”

“Saab Kockums and Sweden's Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) are preparing to begin testing of a prototype 'Double Stirling' air-independent propulsion (AIP) system aimed at a nascent Swedish future submarine programme.

The 150 kW module, which occupies the same footprint as the original 75 kW Type A19 Gotland-class installation, represents the fifth generation of Stirling cycle AIP to be developed for Swedish submarines.

Saab Kockums' Stirling engines burn oxygen (stored in liquid form [LOX] in cryogenic tanks) and diesel fuel in a pressurised combustion chamber to generate electricity for propulsion or for charging batteries within a conventional diesel-electric plant. The company has iteratively developed Stirling AIP technology since testing a prototype plant that went to sea in 1989; the latest Mk 4 version was refitted to HMS Gotland and HMS Uppland as part of the Gotland-class mid-life update (MLU).

Want to read more? For analysis on this article and access to all our insight content, please enquire about our subscription options at  ihsmarkit.com/janes... To read the full article, Client Login  (162 of 444 words)”

B.  GERMANY TKMS - on September 11, DEFPOST  reported TKMS unveiled the 4th Generation Fuel Cell (FC4G) for submarine indicating that:

after having finished an extensive test program with more than 70,000 operating hours in the test environment, an improvement over TKMS existing fuel cell AIP which has been used by customers for over 15 years.

TKMS indicated FC4G has “huge improvements in availability, redundancy, and stealth.”

“The FC4G is designed to be a high-availability modular system composed of redundant components to retain a maximum performance at all times. In terms of H2-storage, the systems rely on the well-proven and exceptionally safe system of metal hydride cylinders as previous generations. These cylinders do not contain any active components; thus, reducing failure to a minimum holding hydrogen molecules safe in place in the crystal lattice of the hydride. Since hydrogen is fed to the system in its purest form, no chemical conversion is required and, therewith, the efficiency of the overall system remains very high.”

Overall signatures of the FC4G are the most favourable ones on the market. No by-products put overboard, the thermal and the acoustic signatures are kept to a minimum while the overall system efficiency is twice as good as any combustion engine.”

“Philipp Schön, Head of Product Sales Submarines: “These are the reasons, why 38 [submarines with AIP] systems [have been sold to] 7 customer navies, another 10 [submarines with AIP] systems presently being under negotiation.”

C.  TKMS compares its fuel cell AIP with competing AIP technologies

DEFPOST continues “In contrast, reformer systems inevitably create CO2 out of a liquid fuel such as diesel oil leaving a trace of CO2 – and potentially other by-products contained in diesel oil such as Sulphur – that must be dissolved into the surrounding sea water by operating electrical pumps. 

The same applies to AIP systems based on other principles, such as Stirling engines, closed-cycle diesels, or closed-cycle steam turbines. Not so the FC4G system. The only by-product besides electrical energy is pure water, which is stored on board for weight compensation. H2 is easily available where ever chemical industry is operative, typically in every customer country, or may be produced by utilizing green energy sources by splitting water into H2 and O2.”

D.  Anonymous advised on September 12, 2019 that Germany’s TKMS is also developing another AIP technology with SENER of Spain.

TKMS is developing methanol reforming fuel cell (MRFC) technology with SENER to minimise hydrogen risks. Carbon dioxide exhaust, which is a major issue of MRFC, has been improved [1]. I once heard that improved fuel cell AIP would be developed before the establishment of MRFC. Development of MRFC in SENER started in 2012. When does TKMS expect MRFC-AIP development to be completed? Germany's Siemens, which developed hydride fuel cell technology, does not welcome any adoption or competition from MRFC.

MK III V4-275R for Japan's Soryu submarines is a 4-cylinder double acting type Stirling engine which is compact and high performance. The fifth generation Stirling engine (MK V V4-275R?) belongs to this family [4]. Though the footprint of MK V is as same as MK IV, its output increased twice (150kW). The combustion chamber of the MK V may have been  significantly improved.

[1] http://www.revistanoticias.sener/en/news/aip-system-for-submarines/50/

[2] http://www.engineeringandconstruction.sener/press-releases/sener-and-hdw-announce-an-industrial-agreement-for-the-production-of-a-methanol-reformer-system-for-aip-for-non-nuclear-submarines

[3] http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2018/11/kockums-mark-5-stirling-engine-for-a26.html

[4] https://www.janes.com/article/89328/sweden-set-to-test-double-stirling-aip-plant

Like other systems (eg. combat systems, batteries, diesels and hull stealth) AIP is a major technology  arena to give a seller of submarines the edge over the opposition.

Pete and Anonymous

Are Australia's Two Main Naval Bases Too Far South?

Pete Comment

Babones' contention (bolded below) that Australia's 2 main naval bases (in Sydney and just below Perth) are too far south, could be refuted on several grounds. This includes:

- cost of moving bases 
- psychological impact of moving bases from the major population centers 
- loss of personnel, as they and families would reject living in isolated (hot, cyclonic) northern towns.
- need for large cities to support major naval bases 
- loss of distance protection from Chinese airstrikes
- ships and submarines can transit from Perth area and Sydney anyway.

ARTICLE

Salvatore Babones, for The National Interest has written an excellent article of August 28, 2019, titled "If Australia Wants Collective Defense, Then It Should Get Its Own Navy in Ship Shape". 
I have bolded the parts directly on submarines and base locations. Here it is below:

"China’s rise and rearmament has introduced a security schizophrenia into Australian politics. This is what lawmakers can do to address their fears of a Beijing invasion.

If Australia Wants Collective Defense, Then It Should Get Its Own Navy in Ship Shape

With the South China Sea dispute back on the front burner and trade tensions between the United States and China bubbling over, some of America’s regional allies are starting to feel the heat. Yet when Mike Pompeo told a Sydney forum that “You can sell your soul for a pile of soybeans or you can protect your people,” Australia’s good and great were “gobsmacked,” according to an eyewitness account from The Spectator Australia. Substitute a lump of Australian coal for a pile of American soybeans, and Pompeo’s message was clear.

China’s rise and rearmament has introduced a security schizophrenia into Australian politics. Canberra’s China doves argue that Australia should accommodate its giant neighbor and number one export partner, sign up to Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, and do whatever it takes to avoid attracting China’s ire.

Meanwhile a certain species of Australian hawk believes that the United States is no longer a reliable ally, and that Australia should muscle up for a potential future confrontation with China. The most prominent of these is Professor Hugh White of the Australian National University, who thinks thatAustralia should be considering the development of an independent nuclear deterrent.

He’s not alone in worrying about American staying power in the Pacific. One of Australia’s most prominent conservative commentators, Paul Kelly, says that “the strong and astute America [that Australia] needs is not on display,” while the governor of Australia’s central bank says that he does “not have a clear idea of what strategy the U.S. has” for dealing with China.

Now a major research paper from the University of Sydney’s United States Studies Centre concludes that the United States “no longer enjoys military primacy in the Indo-Pacific” region and “has an atrophying force that is not sufficiently ready, equipped or postured for great power competition.” The paper was partly funded by the Australian Department of Defence, American defense giant Northrop Grumman, and the French multinational Thales Group.

The paper’s authors, Ashley Townshend, Brendan Thomas-Noone, and Matilda Steward, call for a NATO-style strategy of “collective defense” in the Indo-Pacific as a “way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power.” They repeatedly highlight the “decline,” “inadequacy,” and “questionable abilities” of the United States Armed Forces.

Meanwhile they laud Australia’s “significant submarine modernisation” program, which consists of the construction of twelve new diesel-electric boats to enter service in the 2030s and 2040s. Australia’s [former] Defence Minister Christopher Pyne has described the submarines “regionally superior,” which only makes sense if the region they’re talking about is Southeast Asia. He can’t mean the Indo-Pacific region. India and China already have nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines.

They also praise Australia’s “surface vessel recapitalisation” program, with nine new frigates to be built on a British design. Like the submarines, these likely won’t enter service until the 2030s. They are mainly designed for anti-submarine warfare, but as the Royal Australian Navy’s new workhorse vessels, they will have to do general duty as well.

They criticize the United States for planning to buy “only” 2457 fifth-generation F-35 fighters and cancelling the F-22. For the record, Australia has committed to buying just seventy-two F-35s in total. They expect to have ten by the end of the year. The USAF, Navy, and Marines already fly more than three hundred.

A Look in the Mirror

If, as the Australian report claims, the United States “no longer enjoys military primacy in the Indo-Pacific” region, then who does? If the United States is “not sufficiently ready, equipped or postured for great power competition,” then who is? Webster’s defines primacy as “the state of being first,” and no one seriously doubts that the United States is first in the Indo-Pacific region. Great-power competition implies a great-power competitor, and no one seriously believes that China is better-prepared for competition than the United States.

If Australians really are worried that the United States is no longer able to come to their defense, then perhaps they should take White’s advice and take a long, hard look in the mirror. No one expects a country of twenty-five million people to match the military spending of a global superpower thirteen times its size. But since the turn of the millennium, Australia has spent an average of only 1.8 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on defense, compared to 3.7 percent for the United States.

What the Australians do spend, they often spend inefficiently. For example, Australia’s politicized navy is buying diesel-powered submarines out of an ideological aversion to nuclear power. The United States, which has a real fighting navy, hasn’t built a diesel submarine since 1959.

There are also questions about readiness. Australia’s two main naval bases, Fleet Base East and Fleet Base West, are located in the pleasant southern cities of Sydney and Perth, ideally placed to defend the country against the march of the penguins from Antarctica. Meanwhile the U.S. Marines are sweating it out in Australia’s remote northern outpost of Darwin, where they serve as a rapid reaction force ready for deployment throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

Naval Gazing

The Royal Australian Navy's Sydney headquarters is particularly self-indulgent. Strategically stationed in the posh inner-Sydney suburb of Potts Point, the RAN’s top brass can comfortably grab a croissant on their morning walk to work from subsidized housing in one of Australia’s most expensive neighborhoods. In 2018, the city of Sydney wanted to acquire the base, which has golden sunset views of the landmark Sydney Opera House and Harbour Bridge, to use as a cruise ship terminal. The Navy turned them down.

Yet the base is incredibly insecure—and incredibly dangerous. Pedestrians walk on a public inner-city street within ten yards of the bows of the nearest ships. The whole base is hemmed in by a city park on one side and a luxury hotel on the other. Any decent quarterback could hit six ships with bombs lobbed from the park overlooking the base; a determined terrorist could sink half the fleet with a portable rocket launcher. Even an onboard accident could take out the civilian hotel just one hundred yards away.

A serious fighting navy would move north to the country town of Townsville, fifteen hundred sea miles closer to any potential threat emanating from China or emergency arising in the Pacific. The RAN has refused to move out of congested Sydney Harbour to nearby suburban Botany Bay. They say the reason is “tradition.” Another word for it is “lifestyle.”

Australia’s Fleet Base West should also be relocated fifteen hundred sea miles north to Port Hedland (population fifteen thousand). Australia’s iron miners tough it out on the country’s remote northwest coast, but then they have to: that’s where the iron is. The RAN prefers the comfortable climate and urban amenities of metropolitan Perth (population two million). And who can blame them? But if Australians prefer the good life to the rigors of military readiness, they’re in no position to demand additional American sacrifices on their behalf.

The Political Reality of Collective Defense

As the experience of NATO amply demonstrates, “collective defense” is really just a polite way of saying “American defense.” When it comes to collective defense, what is everyone's responsibility becomes no one’s responsibility—except America’s. In 2018, America’s European NATO allies spent an average of 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, in flagrant violation of their long-standing commitments to raise spending to 2 percent. Only five NATO members meet their 2 percent spending commitments: three frontline Eastern European countries, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Australia is an important political ally that has provided welcome symbolic support for American missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and (most recently) the Persian Gulf. Australia lost forty-one soldiers in fierce fighting in Afghanistan after taking up the call of Operation Enduring Freedom. Americans will always be grateful and proud to have Australians standing beside them in time of need.

But if Australians are serious about defending freedom in the Indo-Pacific region, then they should take a more active role in their own defense. That means buying the most effective weapons systems available and deploying them as efficiently as possible. It also means accommodating and hosting American forces, when its own aren’t sufficient to do the job. But most of all, it means making a genuine commitment to security partnership.

Opinion polls consistently show that the Australian people are willing to take on these responsibilities. It’s long past time for Australia’s political class to step up to the plate.

Salvatore Babones is the author of  The New Authoritarianism: Trump, Populism, and the Tyranny of Experts.