Another Fire on French SSN Perle

Following the 2020 fire another fire broke out on French Rubis-class SSN, Perle, on September 26, 2022 .

The Defense Post reports this 2022 fire occurred:

“…onboard as [Perle's repairs] in the Mediterranean port of Toulon neared completion, officials said [September 27, 2022].

Around 90 firefighters were called to extinguish smoldering on board “La Perle” which is thought to have broken out in insulation “in a storage area used for food,” a spokesman for the local maritime authority, Pierre-Louis Josselin, told AFP.

The incident was described as “combustion without flames” and all hotspots were extinguished by firefighters on [September 26, 2022] evening...."

Pete Comment

Perle had been slated to return to service in the first quarter of 2023. We’ll see if the fire has delayed the return.

Perle is one of five Rubis-class SSNs remaining.

Meanwhile Suffren of the larger replacement Barracuda-class was commissioned in November 2020 and the second Barracuda Duguay-Trouin is slated to be launched later in 2022.

My impression is that fires on submarines seem to occur most often during refits (like this 2022 fire), repairs, maintenance or upgrades - with welding or cutting tools setting insulation alight.

More on Japan's ASCMs Types 12 & 17

Here and above is a video, published in early 2022, on Japan's Type 12 cruise missile, with details on future developments. (Video courtesy Dung Tran Military).
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Further to SubMatt's September 14, 2022 article "Japan's Missiles China Target Capable" -  wispywood2344 on September 24, 2022, provided the following comment :

"I have drawn a genealogy of Japanese Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). [1]

I will use this as a reference to write about the "Type 12 Ground-to-Ship Missile" (Type 12) [aka more commonly in English called a Surface to Surface Missile (SSM)] and its derivatives. 

The "Type 12" was literally adopted in 2012, and several improvement projects exist.

One of them is the "Type 17 Ship-to-Ship Missile" (Type 17 [Projected started in FY2017]), a shipborne version with an extended range. 

In addition, development of two derivatives of the "Type 17" was initiated: a MPA-launched version and a ground-launched version.

However, the latter "Type 12 Ground-to-Ship Missile Kai" (Type 12 Kai) was cancelled due to requirement for longer range and better survivability. 

In order to fulfill this requirement, development of the "Type 12 Ground-to-Ship Missile : Improved" (Type 12 Imp.) and its derivatives were initiated.

Their main features are as follows : "Long-Range", "Stealth", "Ground-attack-capable", and "Rapid-deployment". 

The first three indicate that these ASCMs are capable of destroying enemy fleets [including aircraft carriers] as well as [in land attack mode] air-bases (whether the ASCMs are on land or at sea).

And the last one strongly suggests that the Japanese government expects "the next war" to be imminent." 

========================= 

"By the way, so how imminent is "the next war"?

In my opinion, "the next war" is likely to start in the 2030s.

The timing of the start of deliveries of the "Type 12 Imp." suggests it. 

Since the development of the "Type 12 Imp." is scheduled for completion in FY2025 [2], the first mass production contract should have been awarded in FY2026, and the first delivery should have been in FY2029.

However, the Japanese government decided to accelerate the start of deliveries by 4 years to July 2025. [3]

Naturally, the derivative versions will be deployed similarly ahead of schedule.

There is reports that over 1,000 rounds, including the derivative type, will be purchased [4], but it will take at least several years to complete.

This suggests that the Japanese government expects "the next war" to occur in the 2030s."

[1] [Large Flowchart-diagram in English]

 http://blog.livedoor.jp/wispywood2344/others/Japanese_ASCM_Genealogy.svg

[2] [Large Flowchart-diagram PDF in Japanese]

 https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/hyouka/seisaku/2021/pdf/jizen_02_logic.pdf

[3] [Two page Japanese language document with title translated: “Items scheduled to be procured in FY2022 (central procurement)”. The rest is in Japanese] 

 https://www.mod.go.jp/atla/souhon/pdf_choutatsuyotei/09_yudou_r04.pdf#page=2

[4] [Article from Japanese news website Yomiuri, titled “[Original] Possession of over 1,000 long-range cruise missiles considered” dated August 21, 2022]

https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/20220820-OYT1T50270/ [originally in Japanese. Now  translated to]: “[Original] Possession of over 1,000 long-range cruise missiles considered”  “It turned out that the [Japanese] government is considering possessing more than 1,000 long-range cruise missiles that it has decided to introduce. With Taiwan contingencies in mind, the missiles will be deployed mainly from the Nansei Islands to Kyushu, with the aim of bridging the "missile gap" with China, which deploys a large number of ballistic missiles.

This was confirmed by several government officials. The government will extend the range of the domestically produced Type 12 surface-to-ship missile deployed by the Ground Self-Defense Force from its current range of over 100 kilometers to around 1,000 kilometers, which will reach the coastal areas of North Korea and China. Improvements are being made so that it can be launched from ships and fighter planes. The plan is to deploy the improved ground-launched version in fiscal 2024, about two years ahead of schedule. It will also be applied to ground attacks targeting the ground.

     In the [Japanese] National Security Strategy to be revised at the end of the year, the government is expected to announce the possession of "counterattack capability" to attack the enemy's missile launching bases for self-defense. Improved missiles will be the core of the "counterattack capability." In order to have more than 1,000 missiles soon, it is necessary to increase the production lines of companies involved in missile development. The [Japanese] Ministry of Defense plans to create a system to support capital investment by related companies, and plans to include related expenses in the budget request for the fiscal 2023 budget.

     The reason why the government is aiming to possess a large number of long-range missiles is because the gap between Japan, the United States and China in their missile attack capabilities is too wide.

     Until now, Japan has not deployed long-range missiles capable of ground-attacking, as it had a policy of not possessing "enemy base attack capability" (counterattack capability). Since signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the former Soviet Union in 1987, the United States has prohibited the possession of ground-launched missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers until it expires in August 2019. Currently, it has resumed development, but has not reached the point of ownership.

     In contrast, according to analysis by the U.S. Department of Defense and other sources, China is said to have about 1,900 ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles and about 300 intermediate-range cruise missiles that can reach Japan. [Even more Chinese missiles can reach Taiwan].

     North Korea also has hundreds of ballistic missiles that can reach Japan. China and North Korea are also developing hypersonic weapons that fly on irregular trajectories and are difficult to intercept. It is difficult for the [Japanese] Self-Defense Forces to deal with it with interceptor missiles alone.”

China Recruits 162 US Nuclear & Other Scientists

Ashish Dangwal for The EurAsian Times, reports, September 24, 2022:

"China Recruited Top US Scientists To Gain Military Edge In Hypersonic, UAV & Submarine Tech – Reports"

China has ostensibly waged a long-running campaign to plant and recruit Chinese researchers from the USA’s leading national security research facilities, according to the latest reports.

…The report [by STRIDER "The Los Alamos Club" 32 pages at https://www.striderintel.com/wp-content/uploads/Strider-Los-Alamos-Report.pdf ] highlighted the government of the PRC’s attempts to nurture its young and talented scientists at US national laboratories and lure the brightest minds back to the country to boost its military projects. 

The government of China has allegedly made a concerted effort to send Chinese scientists to Los Alamos National Laboratory, the site of the first nuclear weapons research. 

The Los Alamos National Laboratory is a multidisciplinary research facility working on various disciplines, including [nuclear weapons] national security, space exploration, nuclear fusion, and supercomputing.

Between 1987 and 2021, at least 162 scientists who had received scientific training at Los Alamos returned to Beijing to assist with various national research and development (R&D) projects.

There were 15 permanent staff members at Los Alamos, many of whom had extremely high levels of security clearance….”

Vague US Intention - Some AUKUS Subs by "mid 2030s"

Here's a rather thin report of not yet authorised, good US intentions. This might not be accepted by Australia, given the Labor Government considers submarines (AUKUS SSNs or not) must be built in Australia. This is THE money to Adelaide, South Australia, vote winning priority.

South Australia's Premier, on September 26, 2022, spoke out against any plans to buy submarines directly from the US.

Super Combat Goggles for Tank Commander Use?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has produced excellent information in its website The Strategist dated September 23, 2022, including:

-  “Despite progress, major challenges lie ahead for AUKUS”

and

-  “The Five Domains Update” This includes mention of US and UK nuclear submarine training of Australians under AUKUS, other issues and the following:

"The US Army is rolling out new combat goggles with an integrated visual augmentation system, or IVAS, to its soldiers in a 10-year investment estimated to cost US$21.8 billion ($32.9 billion). IVASs will provide hologram projections over soldiers’ fields of view and allow them to visualise critical data including maps and enemy and ally positions. They are also capable of picking up feeds from local devices, enabling them to ‘see’ through the inside of vehicles. The army’s move into the so-called metaverse with IVAS technology could be revolutionary for infantry battlefield operations."

Pete Comment

"Super" combat goggles with many capabilities, including “see through” function, have been extremely high priced items for pilots of US built stealth fighters, including F-35 helmet-mounted display systems (HMDS).

If money is available commanders of US made tanks including Australian M1A2 Abrams might, one day, benefit.

Who knows, Australian Special Forces and then even regular infantry might receive such super goggles - if they can be built cheaply enough.

Russian Withdrawals Boost Nuclear, Chemical Threats

Some of Russia's Kilo submarines "almost certainly" moved east from Sevastopol, Crimea, to the eastern base of Russia's Black Sea Fleet at Novorossiysk, Krasnador Krai (district) of Russia. (Map courtesy the UN, via Reconsidering Russia...)

--- 

Concerning Russian withdrawals within Ukraine and the increasing long range of Ukraine's missile artillery Aljazeera reports September 20, 2022:

"Russia’s Black Sea Fleet [BSF] relocating some of its submarines: UK"

"The UK defence ministry says submarines ‘almost certainly’ moved as Moscow fears them being hit.

Moscow has likely moved its Kilo-class submarines from the Crimean peninsula [see "BSF" in this Table] to southern Russia over fears of them being struck by long-range Ukrainian fire, according to British intelligence. 

In a daily briefing on [September 20, 2022], the United Kingdom’s defence ministry said those submarines had “almost certainly” been moved to Krasnodar Krai in mainland Russia, instead of a naval base at Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula.

…Moscow considers Crimea as Russian territory, but the peninsula is internationally recognised as part of Ukraine, which wants it back.

…Kyiv forces swept through the Kharkiv region this month after bursting through the front line, sending thousands of Russian troops fleeing while abandoning their tanks and ammunition.

…Officially, Russia announced it was moving some troops out of the Kharkiv region to regroup elsewhere. But the losses are being openly acknowledged on state television by local commentators calling for escalation. 

Putin has promised to continue, recently warning of a “more serious” military response to Ukraine’s “acts of terrorism”.

SEE WHOLE ALJAZEERA ARTICLE   

++++++++++++++++++

PETE COMMENT

Its unknowable if Putin is seriously contemplating a tactical nuclear escalation. However its significant that Putin would have authorised Russian politician and general Andrey Gurulev, in this second article, to openly contemplate tactical nuclear war. Gurulev said:

“It will not provoke a nuclear war, because we will use operative - not strategic - nuclear weapons on [Kalibr and Iskander missiles], and bombs on planes. [probably Su-30s or larger]”

If Russia escalates to a tactical nuclear stage it is possible Russia might do a small high altitude warning nuclear explosion over the Black Sea, with the implication Ukrainian armed forces (or even civilians) may be the next target.  

Russia using Chemical Weapons presents a perhaps more likely initial danger.

It seems Putin would prefer to trash the region and kill additional tens of thousands rather than lose his personal control of Russia.

Australian SSBN Nuclear Weapons: Good Idea

Its difficult for future Australian SSNs, with weapons grade HEU reactors, to escape  accusations of nuclear Proliferation. But Australia WILL need nuclear weapons by the 2030s. (Cartoon via Voice of America's POLIGRAPH(dot)info)
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China's objections, voiced to the IAEA this week, are Inconvenient yet accurate.

China's power projection south gives Australia good cause to have nuclear weapons options. 

Very rapid launch of Australian nuclear missiles would improve if Australia's 8 future  SSNs had vertical launch systems. Thinking post astutely I would hope the Brits will design their own UK RN 2040s SSN(R)s with a Virginia Payload Module (VPM) with "two multipurpose Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT)". Each VPT might be capable of carrying 7 vertically launched Tomahawks or, better still, Hypersonic Cruise or small Ballistic missiles.

Any Australian SSN will certainly use the US Combat System (consisting of weapons, torpedo tubes, sensors, comms equipment and huge databases) that is already on the Collins. This would amount to about 33% of a RAN SSN(R). If the Brits didn't incorporate VPMs into their SSN(R)s then a RAN ONLY SSN(R) special fitout of a VPM (around 10% of a RAN SSN(R)) would cause many knock-on readjustments (5+%) and extrordinary added costs for a RAN SSN(R).

Australia buying-building a 50% (with knock-ons) US content RAN SSN(R) would be probably much more problem prone and expensive than a UK or US SSN of 2040s vintage. It would be much more logical for Australia to buy/build a US Virginia design - Block V or VI.

However, I see a PLAN B. ie: Australian SSBNs.

Alternatively Australia might consider building just 6 UK pattern SSN(R)s. Worldwide the top priority of SSNs are to defend ones navy's SSBNs (see "Main missions" here. Those 6 Australian SSNs could defend 4 Australian UK designed Dreadnought class SSBNs armed with Trident II (or Trident IIIs after 2040) ballistic missiles. 

In the end Australia needs its own nuclear deterrent. After the Trump experience, and real chance of further US isolationism in future, Australia can no longer rely on a perhaps mythical US nuclear umbrella to protect us.

By 2030 the Australian public (who already seem to have been sufficiently scared/sensible about China - to accept Australian SSNs) might be sufficiently scared of a China gradually power projecting south, to consider Australian nuclear weapons a serious option.

Japan's Missiles China Target Capable.

Japan's Type 12 surface to ship missile would need major changes to upsize it into an intermediate-range (out to 5,500km) hypersonic cruise missile. It would need to be longer, wider, with a much larger warhead to impress Chinese targets. Japan's Epsilon rocket, at the end of this Submarine Matters' article, is more capable.
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Gessler, with customary acuity, commented on September 13, 2022, along the lines: 

There is “an important development with regard to Japan's 're-armament' program:

During the ongoing 2+2 Ministerial (Defence & Foreign Ministries) dialogue between Japan & India, the Indian side has expressed its support for Japan's development of 'counter-strike' capabilities.

While the terms 'counter-strike' and 'counter-value' are invariably linked to nuclear weapons in any other context, it appears that at least so far the Japanese are only hinting at a conventional long-range strike capability with cruise missiles. The procurement in question is this. 

Keeping in mind what Pete has already written regarding Japan's capability to go nuclear in a 'long weekend', I think nobody can realistically dismiss that such a long-range strike capability, once obtained, will always remain conventionally-armed.

In my opinion, these strike missiles will be made to be nuclear-capable platforms, conventionally armed now and in the foreseeable future, but able to be mated with the nuclear warheads as and when required. 

The question now is, why the Japanese side considered it important to make this part of the agenda in the high-level meeting with Indian counterparts, and why India felt it important to pledge support for the same...This is considering the missile project (modified Type-12 ) is not a joint Japan-India program. In any event, the Japanese option of extending a force of 1,500 supersonic or hypersonic? Type 12 missiles upsized to a 1,000km range is not long enough to reach India. So there is no reason to think that the purpose of the mention was to allay any fears the Indian side may have regarding Japan's re-armament.

Could the two countries be attempting to send a signal to China that nuclear weapons-related cooperation between India & Japan is not off the table? That India would/could be willing to allow cold-testing of nukes meant for/designed by Japan to be carried out on its soil? Using its established infrastructure (which is NOT regulated/checked by anyone as India is not an NPT member)?

We are in for some interesting times ahead.

Pete Responds

The above mentioned Type 12 as a super or hyper sonic cruise missile is more difficult to shoot down than a subsonic cruise missile counter-strike against China, Russia or North Korea. Sheer flight speed makes counter-strike or even pre-emptive strike more credible.

Given the short Chinese ballistic missile flight time to Japan – Japan would be well advised to mount many of its Type 12s variants on hard to detect and hit Japanese submarines.

Japanese conventional warheads are insufficient to impress nuclear armed opponents. Conventional warheads wouldn't make much impression on ICBM silos rapidly being constructed in central-western China. Also Japan would need to preach Mutually Assured Destruction to counter China's SSBN first or second strike capability.

For a land silo force Japan's solid fuel "ICBM in waiting" Epsilon rockets may be suitable. Japan’s nuclear explosive and easily built device precursors would give Japan a "breakout" capacity of 12 months or less.

Concerning broader northeast Asian nuclear weapons proliferation - there is the illogicality of South Korea going to the expense of building KSS-III SSBs unless these missile submarines could be nuclear armed.

Another way of seeing things may be - secret discussions between India and Japan - which might include the possibility of India passing on Agni MRBM-ICBM technology (including thermonuclear warhead data) particularly to face the main common enemy, China.

It could be a two way barter deal with Japan passing on its (probably Minuteman III  range) solid fuel Epsilon rocket technology and especially Japan's (literally) tonnes of stockpiled Plutonium could be bartered to India. Japan reputedly has 9 tonnes of Plutonium stored in Japan and 35 tonnes stored in Europe.

So there are many aspects that are unprovable without benefit of large intelligence organisation confirmation, but possible.

Japan's ICBM capable 26m tall, 91 tonne, solid fuel, Epsilon rocket struts its stuff in this video.
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Japanese Submarine LIBs Program Documents

wispywood2344, on September 11, 2022, made very interesting comments and provided Japanese language documents (now translated by Pete) regarding the developments of Japan's Submarine Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) Program from 2006 out to 2023.

COMMENTS

The Japanese Ministry of Defense's (MoD's) Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) (see the present MoD Acquisition Technology & Logistic's Agency (ATLA) pointed out that the advantages of Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs) over Lead-acid Batteries (LABs) are not only that more than twice energy density for LIBs, but also higher charging speeds, and also that more than 1.5 times more charge-discharge cycles in the LIBs' lifetime. [1] 

This means that compared to LABs, LIBs can handle 3 (=2x1.5) times more energy until they need to be replaced.

If the total amount of energy handled in a year is equivalent, the battery replacement frequency of LIBs can be less than 1/3 of the replacement frquency than LABs. 

Then, Let's consider the impact of this on the Japanese Navy aka Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) submarine fleet. In addition to the effect of the 1.33(=640 LIBs/480 LABs) times increase in the number of LIBs  units installed [2], the frequency of battery replacement in the JMSDF LIBs submarine [the Taigeis and the Soryu's Oryu and Toryu] will be less than 1/4 of that in the conventional JMSDF LABs submarines [all the Soryus (except Oryu and Toryu) and all the Oyashios]. See Table [5] at the end of this article.

The JMSDF LABs submarines experience battery replacement once every 6 years.

So it can be expected that the JMSDF LIBs submarines will need LIBs replacement  once every 24 years. What is noteworthy is that this is almost equal to the lifetime of a JMSDF submarine.

In other words, there is a strong possibility that the JMSDF LIB submarines will not experience any battery replacement until their decommission. 

As battery technology continues to advance [3], the current submarine LIBs formula/types are expected to become obsolete in the future.

Eliminating the need for battery replacement would eliminate the need to procure technologically-obsolete batteries for replacements, thereby rationalizing the procurement of submarine batteries. Also see Document [4] and Table [5].

DOCUMENTS

[1]  A Japanese document translated by Pete https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11339364/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/hyouka/seisaku/results/18/jigo/honbun/jigo05_honbun.pdf 

Fiscal 2006 Policy Evaluation Report (Ex-post project evaluation)

Department in charge: the Technical Planning Office, Department of Accounting and Equipment

Implementation period: October 2006 to March 2007

Project name: Research on new main storage batteries for submarines

Policy system: Ⅰ-4-(2)-② Research (development)

Business description: As the main storage battery (Note 1) for next-generation submarines, we will conduct research on high-performance main storage batteries that will replace the lead-acid batteries (Note 2) currently in use.

Technical data.

(Note 1) Main storage battery: A general term for all storage batteries used as a power source for submarine propulsion and on-board auxiliary equipment.

(Note 2) Lead-acid battery: A storage battery composed of a lead dioxide positive electrode, a lead negative electrode, and an acidic aqueous solution.

Required expenses: about 4.6 billion yen [US$32.1 million]

○ Contents of evaluation

1 Purpose of business

Lithium batteries with high energy density (Note 5) can replace lead-acid batteries, which are heavy and bulky, complicated to handle, and have long snorkel charging times (Note 3).

The aim was to study the Muion secondary battery (Note 6) as a new high-performance main storage battery for submarines and to demonstrate its feasibility and effectiveness.

(Note 3) Snorkel charging time: A submarine takes in air from a snorkel that is exposed to the surface of the sea, and uses diesel power to charge the onboard storage battery.

Time to charge

(Note 4) Target strength: (Target Strength) An index that expresses the strength of the sound reflected from the target (strength of reflected sound/strength of incident sound)

(Note 5) Energy density: Amount of energy that can be generated per unit weight or volume

(Note 6) Lithium-ion secondary battery: Lithium ion and metal oxide for positive electrode, carbon-based material for negative electrode, organic solvent of lithium salt for electrolyte, capable of repeated use.

Battery

2 Achievements

(1) Achievement effect

By achieving the following technical items, we have established a technological base for using large, high-capacity lithium-ion secondary batteries as the main storage battery for submarines.

stood up. In addition, the submarine's anti-detection ability and maneuverability will be improved, its underwater endurance will be extended, its ability to evade attacks will be improved, and its maintainability will be improved.

We obtained technical data on the performance, safety and life of submarine main storage batteries that can contribute to the above.

A. Energy density

By adopting a lithium-ion secondary battery, we have realized a new storage battery with an energy density per weight volume that is more than double that of a lead-acid battery.

B. Charging efficiency

Compared to lead-acid batteries, lead-acid batteries can be charged more efficiently, and the decrease in electrical capacity (amount of electricity that can be discharged) due to high-rate discharge is reduced.

I confirmed that it is smaller than the battery.

C. Safety

It was confirmed that the designed safety can be ensured [against] overcharge, overdischarge, and external short-circuit conditions.

D. Number of charge/discharge repetitions [cycles]

It was confirmed that the number of charge-discharge repetitions was 1.5 times or more that of a lead-acid battery, and that the battery had excellent life characteristics.

(2) Achievement period

Research prototypes were started in 2002, and in-house tests were completed by 2005.

(3) Matters such as lessons learned

This research aims to increase the capacity of lithium-ion secondary batteries, which are being used more and more in the private sector, with a view to putting them into practical use.

Future action

In this research, we have confirmed the function and performance with the actual equipment in mind, and we are planning to install the results of this research in the submarine built in 2020. [This was achieved, with JS Oryu being Commissioned with LIBs in March 2020]

○ Other reference information

Configuration of the prototype ----------------------- Attachment 1

Technology comparison with domestic & foreign countries Attachment 2

[2]  The JMSDF specification "Submarine motor system (SMC-8B)" p.9

[3] A Japanese document translated by Pete with some difficulty https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11339364/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/hyouka/seisaku/results/30/pdf/jizen_08_honbun.pdf

FY2018 Policy Evaluation Report (preliminary project evaluation)

Responsible Department Name: Defense Acquisition Agency Project Management Department Business Supervisor (Naval Ships)

Evaluation implementation period: July 2018 to August 2018

1 business name

Research prototype of high-efficiency power storage and supply system for submarines

2 Positioning in the policy system

(1) Name of measure

Promotion of research and development

(2) Overview of measures

Given the severe financial situation, prioritize the implementation of R&D that meets the operational needs of the Self-Defense Forces.

In order to ensure that, when starting R&D, ensure consistency with the priority order of defense buildup.

It can also respond to new threats and ensure technological superiority in areas of strategic importance.

Trends in science and technology, changes in combat modalities, cost-effectiveness, possibility of international joint research and development, etc.

We will promote research and development based on a medium- to long-term perspective, while also taking into account From the perspective of security, technology.

Always keep abreast of trends in science and technology, such as development-related information, and combine the strengths of industry, academia, and government.

A technology management system to prevent the outflow of advanced technology, etc.

Strengthen your ability. In addition, through enhanced cooperation with universities and research institutes, civil

In addition to striving to actively utilize technology (dual-use technology),

We plan to expand.

(3) Goals to be achieved

Prioritize research and development that meets the operational needs of the Self-Defense Forces. In addition, new threats the latest scientific and technological developments to ensure technological superiority in areas of strategic importance.

Medium- to long-term, while taking into account the direction of warfare, changes in combat modalities, cost-effectiveness, and the possibility of international joint research and development.

We will promote research and development based on diverse perspectives.

3.  Business overview, etc.

(1) Business overview

Future submarines will have the ability to perform missions in a more stringent security environment and a higher level of detection and defense.

Sustainability and mobility are required, and it is necessary to study how to meet these requirements.

In this project, in order to improve the submarine's underwater sustainability and to control the size of the submarine, an electric power storage system will be installed.

Prototype system and power supply system, miniaturize main storage battery for submarine, increase energy.

This is to establish technology for downsizing and improving the efficiency of equipment such as power converters.

(2) Required expenses

Approximately 4.4 billion yen [US$30.7 millions] (approximate amount requested in 2019. Including the amount to be borne in later years. Total cost of research prototypes: approx. 8.2 billion yen [US$57.3 million]

(3) Timing of project implementation

A research prototype will be implemented from FY2019 to FY2022. In addition, the results of this project and related precedents.

Combined with the results of the project, an in-house test simulating the state of installation on a submarine will be conducted in FY2023.

Implement and verify the results. (Experimental research expenses for in-house tests will be recorded separately.)

[Japanese Imperial] Years 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

Actual project (research prototype)

Done

Of which, related preceding business In-house test

Capacity

Research implementation schedule

4 Aim of evaluation

Conducted a preliminary evaluation of research to be newly implemented  from FY2019 among the research and development projects thing. Evaluation was made from the viewpoint of necessity, efficiency and effectiveness of this research.

5 Policy evaluation results

(1) Necessity

A Reason for the Ministry of Defense to implement the project

This project aims to improve the efficiency and energy of the power storage and supply system installed on submarines.

This is a research and verification [program] that considers the feasibility and safety of the submarine as a whole is essential. 

Therefore, since there is no research institute other than the Ministry of Defense that conducts the research, the Ministry of Defense is independent.

You have to do it yourself.

B Necessity of implementation from the relevant fiscal year

The results of this project are related to the basics of submarines, such as the size of the hull and the amount of power supplied.

Maritime Self-Defense Force's total ship (entire submarine including on-board equipment) study.

This is the premise of off-study (examination for reconciling contradictory performance). 

In order to carry out these studies with high precision without rework, it is necessary to obtain results within FY2023.

However, since it takes 5 years including the research prototype and the in-house test, FY 2019.

C. Reasons for not relying on existing organizations, equipment, etc.

In other countries, Germany is developing lithium-ion batteries for submarines.

The power storage technology and power supply technology are highly sensitive, including the other countries. 

In addition, [the aim of minimising] the enlargement of the hull and improving underwater sustainability.

Since it is essential to connect with the study of the ship, it is expected that the equipment of other countries will be introduced as it is.

D. Status of comparative examination with alternative means

We examined the possibility of improving and improving the existing equipment, the current power storage and supply system.

In the system, the high-density installation of the main storage battery, miniaturization and high efficiency of the entire power supply circuit could not be implemented.

Elucidation and investigation of technical issues such as new design and safety of the entire power supply system equipment, power storage / supply characteristics, etc.

Since proof is required, this research and development is necessary instead of light improvements and improvements.

(2) Efficiency

Among the components of the submarine's power storage and supply system, the minimum necessary for clarifying technical issues

By making a prototype of a limited combination, we aim to shorten the research period and reduce the cost.

(3) Effectiveness

A. Effects to be obtained

(a) Main storage battery high capacity technology

High-precision measurement technology for voltage, temperature, etc., and charging technology that can demonstrate the capabilities of submarine main storage batteries.

While establishing discharge management technology, we will apply the latest storage material technology to increase the capacity of the main storage battery.

(b) High-density outfitting technology for main storage battery and power supply system equipment.

Confirm high-density outfitting technology for submarines, cooling technology for high-density outfitting, fire extinguishing technology, etc.

(c) High-efficiency power conversion, power saving technology

High-efficiency power supply technology and high-efficiency power that meet the load characteristics, safety, and environmental resistance of submarines.

Establish conversion technology and protection device technology.

B How to grasp the effect.

In this project, we will design and manufacture a prototype and test each component.

Confirm the overall performance of the system by conducting in-house tests simulating the state of installation on a watership.

At the same time, we will verify whether technological superiority and safety are ensured.

In the design and manufacture of prototypes, the technical validity of the design shall be

Conduct business while confirming In addition, are the "General Guidelines for National Research and Development Evaluation" (decided by the Prime Minister in 2016), multiple stages of research and development before and during the project.

We are planning to conduct evaluations to ensure appropriate project implementation.

(4) Cost and effect

In implementing this project, Japan's excellent consumer technology such as battery technology and power conversion element technology should be used to test and evaluate the feasibility and safety of the ship as a whole for installation on a submarine.

Targets are narrowed down to reduce costs. In addition, we will gradually introduce these consumer technologies that are developing rapidly.

Considering that it is easy to replace the main storage battery, the design makes it easy to replace the battery.

Aim to reduce cycle costs.

While making these efforts, in addition to the establishment of various technologies mentioned in the previous issue, the superiority of these technologies is expected to be secured, it is judged appropriate to start this project.

6 Timing of ex-post verification

Regarding technical verification, the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency will provide technical verification at the intermediate stage. In addition, after verifying the progress of this project in cooperation with the administrative project review, will carry out rational policy evaluation.

7 Comprehensive evaluation

By implementing this project, it is expected that the various technologies mentioned in item 5, item 3 will be established. 

These results will be verified through in-house tests simulating installation on a submarine. If the verification results are obtained, Japan will develop world-leading high-capacity storage materials and high-efficiency.

Establishment of basic technology for applying power conversion devices to submarines is expected.

These are extremely important achievements in securing technological superiority in areas of strategic importance.

Ultimately, this will lead to the establishment of a foundation for demonstrating the capability of the defense force, which is the policy goal.

8 Opinions of Experts

- If the results of this research can be used in the private sector, we would like you to consider the transfer of technology.

・ A little more additional explanation about the performance improvement of high efficiency and miniaturization of the power supply system.

- I would like you to consider conducting post-evaluation after the completion of research and development for which pre-evaluation was conducted.

9 Direction of reflection in policies, etc.

Based on the comprehensive evaluation, a budget request for FY2019 will be implemented.

10 Other reference information

Research summary (Attachment)

[4]  Example of success - commissioning ceremony for new sub JS Toryu March 24, 2021 https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2021/03/edb7a684dc1b61b33d4462cf7d5fde9e7866eb40.html “...Defense Minister Nakayama attended the commission ceremony for the new submarine JS Toryu, the 12th submarine of “Soryu” type and instructed to the crew.

The newer “Soryu” type submarine that were planned after FY2015 [equipped with]   lithium batteries that are superior in underwater durability. “Toryu” is to be deployed at the 6th Submarine Division and enhances our information gathering, warning and surveillance capability .”

[5]  Submarine Matters' Oyashio-Soryu-Taigei TABLE as at September 12, 2022. 

SS No. Diesel Type Motor	Build No Name	Pennant No.	MoF approved amount ¥ Billions FY	LABs, LIBs, AIP	Laid Down	Laun -ched	Commi ssioned	Built By
5SS Oyashio 2 Toshiba motors	8105 Oyashio currents	SS-590/ TS3608	¥52.2B FY1993 2 x 12V25/25S  diesels for all Oyashio class (each diesel 2,000kW)	LABs only	Jan 1994	Oct 1996	Mar 1998	KHI
6SS-15SS Oyashios  10 subs 2 Toshiba motors SMC-7?	8106 -8115 various	SS-591-600	¥52.2B per sub FY1994-FY2003	LABs only	15SS Feb 2004	15SS Nov 2006	15SS Mar 2008	MHI & KHI
16SS Soryu/ Dragon class  Mk I Collided with Ocean Artemis Feb 8, 2021	8116 Sōryū dragons	SS-501	¥60B FY2004 all Mk.1 LAB+AIP Soryus have 2 x Kawasaki  12V25/25SB  diesels (totaling 4,240kW) + 4 AIP SMC-8 motor	LABs + AIP	Mar 2005	Dec 2007	Mar 2009	MHI
17SS	8117 Unryū	SS-502	¥58.7B FY2005	LABs + AIP	Mar 2006	Oct 2008	Mar 2010	KHI
18SS	8118 Hakuryū	SS-503	¥56.2 FY2006	LABs + AIP	Feb 2007	Oct 2009	Mar 2011	MHI
19SS	8119 Kenryū	SS-504	¥53B FY2007	LABs + AIP	Mar 2008	Nov 2010	Mar 2012	KHI
20SS	8120 Zuiryū	SS-505	¥51B FY2008	LABs + AIP	Mar 2009	Oct 2011	Mar 2013	MHI
21SS LIBs Concept Research Project			No 21SS built. It was an 8 year research project on LIBs. 1st LIBs sub launched was 27SS in 2018.
22SS	8121 Kokuryū	SS-506	¥52.8B FY2010	LABs + AIP	Jan 2011	Oct 2013	Mar 2015	KHI
23SS	8122 Jinryu	SS-507	¥54.6B FY2011	LABs + AIP	Feb 2012	Oct 2014	7 Mar 2016	MHI
24SS	8123 Sekiryū	SS-508	¥54.7B FY2012	LABs + AIP	15 Mar 2013	2 Nov 2015	13 Mar 2017	KHI
25SS	8124 Seiryū	SS-509	¥53.1B FY2013	LABs + AIP	22 Oct 2013	12 Oct   2016	12 Mar 2018	MHI
26SS	8125 Shoryū	SS-510	¥51.7B FY2014 last SMC-8 motor	LABs + AIP	2014	6 Nov 2017	18 Mar 2019	KHI
27SS a Soryu "Mk II" as it has LIBs. 1st Soryu Mk II	8126 Oryū 11th Soryu	SS-511	¥64.4B FY2015  with 2 12V25/25SB diesels (totaling 4,240kW)  SMC-8B motor Soryu Mk IIs may have twice as many batteries as Mk Is, ie 960 LIB-arrays in Mk IIs, other improvements	LIBs only (SLH type)	Nov 2015	4 Oct 2018	5 Mar 2020	MHI
28SS Soryu Mk II, 12th & final Soryu	8127 Toryu	SS-512	¥63.6B FY2016 "2,950t" surfaced 2 12V25/25SB diesels	NCA? LIBs	Jan 2017	6 Nov  2019	24 Mar 2021	KHI
29SS 1st Taigei Class "Big  whale" 3,000 tonne (surfaced)	8128 Taigei "Big  whale"	SS-513	¥76B FY2017 (Heisei 29) Higher ¥76B budget  may be due to 1st of class many changes & new layout of LIBs. 2 x 12V25/25SB diesels or variants (totaling 4,240kW)	SLH LIBs maybe 960	16 Mar 2018	14 Oct 2020	9 Mar 2022	MHI
30SS  2nd Taigei Class  whale a mythol- ogical creature	8129 Hakugei "White whale"	SS-514	¥71.5B FY2018  (Heisei 30) 12V25/25SB diesels or variants (totaling 4,240kW)	SLH LIBs	25 Jan 2019	14 Oct 2021	March? 2023	KHI
31/01SS  3rd Taigei Class		SS-515	¥B? FY2019 (Reiwa 01) 12V25/25SB diesels or variants (total 4,240kW)	SLH LIBs maybe 960+	2019?	2022?	2024?	MHI
02SS  4th Taigei Class	8130?	SS-516	¥B? FY2020 (Reiwa 02) Improved SLH LIBS. New 2 x 12V25/31S diesels (totaling 5,520kW)	Impro ved SLH LIBs	2020?	2022?	2024?	KHI?
03SS	8131?	SS-517	¥B? FY2021	LIBs	2021?	2023?	2025?	KHI?
04SS	8132?	SS-518	¥B? FY2022	LIBs	2022?	2024?	2026?	MHI?
05SS	8133?	SS-519	¥B? FY2023	LIBs	2023?	2025?	2027?	KHI?
06SS	8134?	SS-520	¥B? FY2024	LIBs	2024?	2026?	2028?	MHI?
07SS	8135?	SS-521	¥B? FY2025	LIBs	2025?	2027?	2029?	KHI?
08SS	8136?	SS-522	¥B? FY2026	LIBs	2026?	2028?	2030?	MHI?

Key to Table: Table information provided by Anonymous to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries, AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = Lithium-ion Batteries. 
¥***B = Billion Yen. MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, KHI = Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation of Kawasaki Heavy Industries. 

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