Australian Nuclear Weapon Hedging: A Work in Progress

In response to  Shawn C's May 29, 2024 comment:  

True about Australia having very able and fast snorkelling Collins SSKs. Australia has continuously used SSKs since 1967. 

Many commentators are then at a loss as to why Australia is moving to SSNs - costing about 5+ times more than SSKs. The answer is the value Australian governments place on the nuclear weapons potential of Australia's future SSNs. Nuclear subs (the world over) make the best nuclear weapon platforms - hence SSBNs. This implication, of course, contradicts Australian governments' spin - spin that Australia is distorting its whole defence budget in favour of SSNs because  SSNs are the best way to fight a conventional war. 

The whole scope of Australian governmental strategy remains unclear. This is a very secret area with many possibilities. It could be the very long term SSN program permits Australian nuclear insurance hedging under the protection of the US and to a lesser degree the UK. Without this protection China could disrupt the nuclear elements Australia is putting in place in case US extended nuclear deterrence proves insufficient  over the next 3 decades. 

Elements already, or soon, in place include: Australia's world largest Uranium reserves; the Australian invented and owned weapons grade suitable SILEX uranium enrichment method; development of dual-use long range Gilmour rockets/missiles; Australia's long history of Hypersonics research; and, Australia's long possession of nuclear device designs which are publicly available (see "restricteddata"). Also see Howard Moreland and "The H-bomb secret".

Australia needs a deterrent against China. Australia projecting even conventional explosives against the Chinese mainland would likely mean a Chinese nuclear response. Australia, against China, has a need for long range strike weapons - with nuclear subs being the most discrete way to move close to the Chinese coast. This will put China's population centres at risk - thereby improving Australia's essential deterrence strategy.

Australia's use of nuclear explosives won't happen in a broader regional proliferation vacuum. It is likely Australia would find justification moving to nuclear explosives after South Korea and Japan have finalised nuclear weapon capabilities (even short of these countries having such weapons). Also the unknown India factor may play a part if India's power projection in the Indian and Southern oceans become somewhere between ambiguous and threatening. What Indonesia does or may likely do might also be a factor.

If the US extends long range nuclear sharing to Australia - something only extended to short range NATO country strike - might be something that heads off Australia needing to develop a complete national nuclear capability.

I have created the acronym SSHN for Submarine, Nuclear Powered with Hypersonic Missiles. Advanced missiles, with hypersonic glide vehicles. These would make even Australian SSHNs (like Virginias (if ever delivered) or then SSN-AUKUSs) a more cost-effective platform than traditional large SSBNs which would be too expensive for Australia - a middle power. The "B" for Ballistic missiles (SLBMs on submarines) are also proving relatively easy to shoot down in the Ukraine and especially in the latest Israel vs Iran conflict. SSHNs can accommodate smaller intermediate range 3,000-5,500km missiles - missiles with a shorter flight-warning time than full-size SLBMs, like the 12,000+km range Trident D5.

So Australia's long held resistance to all things nuclear is being overcome by fear of China - triggering the need, or option, of having Australian nuclear weapons. Alternate Australian nuclear weapon platforms, be they long range bombers or land based ICBMs in silos, are too specialised. Such bombers and ICBMs are also very vulnerable to pre-emptive strike from Chinese submarines that might launch hypersonic or ballistic missiles off Australia's coast. 

All of the above musings are a work in progress. I have never had paid governmental access to any of the above -  so I can write about it. The only thing near access was a tipoff from a two star Australian Defence Attaché, Washington. He advised that many US officers he was talking to repeatedly raised the rhetorical question:

"Do you really think the US would defend Australia against a major nuclear power if the price was US cities getting nuked by that nuclear power?!"

France also gleaned that response - which is why France developed its own nuclear deterrent in the 1960s. 

Australian-UK-US SigInt Secrets & Subs

The following article “Revealing Secrets About Deep Australia-UK-US Intelligence Connections” was written by Professor John Blaxland and published at the Georgetown [University] Journal of International Affairs on May 17, 2024 at https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/05/17/revealing-secrets-about-deep-australia-uk-us-intelligence-connections/

Other publications by Professor Blaxland are on his ANU website here https://researchprofiles.anu.edu.au/en/persons/john-blaxland/publications/

“Revealing Secrets About Deep Australia-UK-US Intelligence Connections” 

"The AUKUS trilateral security arrangements mark a profound step in deepening security ties between three long-standing, English-speaking democracies. Examining the realm of the most trusted and most secretive domain of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) helps explain how such a compact came to exist.

Introduction

The extent to which ties between the United States and Australia have deepened recently has surprised many. However, the AUKUS partnership, which emerged in a September 2021 meeting between President Joe Biden, Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and Prime Minister Scott Morrison, should not come as a surprise. After all, the connections upon which AUKUS is built stretch back to 1942 and the SIGINT collaboration that developed during the War in the Pacific.

The United States and Australia are both English-speaking, continent-spanning, bicameral, federal, and constitutional democracies. However, Australia’s ties with the United States go beyond cultural commonalities. This relationship includes the ANZUS security pact (considered the heart of the broad and mature US-Australia relationship) and the Quadrilateral arrangements (addressing health, security, climate, and infrastructure). This is matched on the economic front, as the US is the largest source of foreign direct investment in Australia. However, as a part of the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), ‘Five Eyes’ security and intelligence ties, trusted and highly classified cooperation has played a key role in deepening US-Australia relations. Due to such past collaboration, the trilateral AUKUS pact, which covers nuclear propulsion for submarines, advanced technology, critical minerals, and climate-related technology should be viewed as a continuation and deepening of US-Australia military collaboration.

The History of US-Australia Intelligence Cooperation

The breadth and depth of security ties are well captured in Australia’s American Alliance. However, a seldom discussed aspect of US-Australia relations lies in the domain of SIGINT. Understanding the implications of SIGINT for contemporary US intelligence and foreign policy helps explain the AUKUS decision.

Since 1942, US-Australia collaboration has laid the foundations of trusted engagement and sensitive information sharing. That year, US General Douglas MacArthur arrived in Australia to establish the Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (HQ SWPA), backed by the Australian SIGINT enterprise that was integrated under US leadership.

These combined bodies were given non-descript titles to deflect attention from their military purposes. Working under HQ SWPA, the Central Bureau, for instance, was the combined Australian Army, Royal Australian Air Force, US Army, and US Army Air Force SIGINT agency. By 1945, it employed thousands of Australians and Americans to fight the Pacific War. This wartime collaboration would have an enduring legacy and strengthen US-Australia bonds for generations to follow.

During the Pacific War, the US Navy, working mostly with Admiral Chester Nimitz in Hawaii, combined its SIGINT elements with those of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in the South Pacific to form Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL). Together they broke codes and interpreted messages that aided in the decisive Battle of Midway. The close and trusted collaboration made a difference in the progression and outcome of World War II (WWII). That impact was so profound that the United States and the United Kingdom extended their trusted and secret collaboration to Australia once the Cold War set in.

SIGINT revealed signs of Soviet duplicity. For example, SIGINT uncovered that the Soviet Union had been passing information about Allied plans to Japan, hoping to increase Allied casualties and extend the war in Asia.[1] Venona, the cover name for US efforts to decode Soviet diplomatic traffic, pointed to a nest of Soviet spies in the United States and Australia. For Australia to remain ‘in the club’ for intelligence sharing after the war, it had to assure the United Kingdom and the United States that it would reform to strengthen its domestic counter-espionage efforts. To do so, Prime Minister Ben Chifley established the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) in 1949.

Meanwhile, another new intelligence collection organization emerged from the wartime Australian SIGINT elements. The Australian Signals Intelligence Centre was established but given an anodyne cover name–the Defense Signals Bureau (DSB), now the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)–intended, again, to deflect attention from its secret purpose.[2] With early British support, covering cryptographic and computing shortfalls left by the evacuation of American forces from Australia, DSB became a trusted partner of an intelligence network spanning five countries. Only officials from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, later known as the ‘Five Eyes,’ were permitted to view DSB reports.

Australia’s SIGINT enterprise would provide support to US military forces on operations in Korea, Vietnam,[3] East Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond. Along the way, ties and collaboration between the United States and Australia deepened.

Technological Developments in SIGINT

Electro-mechanical IBM computers aided Allied decoding and helped shorten WWII. These machines relied on intuition and deep knowledge of the target language and its etiquette to unpick the opening threads (often polite greetings). They helped sift through millions of code permutations.

By the mid to late 1990s, the digital revolution had arrived, transforming communications. Analog radio transmissions were overtaken by digital transmissions, but the digital revolution reached much further. [4] Cray computers helped crunch millions of potential code-breaking solutions. US-Australia collaboration on this happened as a matter of routine, building on decades of trusted exchanges.

The introduction of personal computers, laptops, personal devices, and mobile cell phones meant that society, industry, and the military transitioned from being web-enabled to web-dependent and, in turn, web-vulnerable. Cyber security needs, therefore, grew exponentially. Working closely with US counterparts, Australian mathematicians and cryptographers developed defensive computer emergency response teams, which became known as cyber security teams.

Businesses and civil society also realized the need for cyber security expertise. As a result, SIGINT, a once secretive organization, went from serving government intelligence needs to engaging with the public, providing a web portal and advertisements to warn of potential cyber threats.[5] As the concept of the ‘Five Eyes’ became commonplace, the breadth and scale of SIGINT cooperation brought trust and respect for Australia in Washington DC.

The Significance of AUKUS

US-Australia trusted collaboration has survived over eighty years and continues to impact current affairs. AUKUS exemplifies such long-lasting ties. After being passed by the US Congress in 2023, AUKUS has led Australia to contribute to resourcing the US nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) production line. Australia is interested in SSNs because its aging fleet of diesel-electric propulsion submarines (SSKs) has become vulnerable. Such submarines are no longer viable for Australia because of their vulnerability to aerial detection and strikes. Satellite coverage, drones, and artificial intelligence (AI) can detect the wake of the submarine funnels when they raise their snorkel to recharge their batteries. Given that stealth had been their only advantage over surface warships, SSKs are no longer useful for long transits. Thus, nuclear propulsion and SSNs are the only viable options for countries with vast ocean distances to transit even to cover their own exclusive economic zones. For Australia, an SSK cannot transit from any domestic or foreign major port to the submarine base in Western Australia without possible detection.[6] In wartime, that presents a great risk.

Operationally, the benefits of SSNs are considerable. Australian submarines are intended to help defend vital shipping lanes for both US and Australian companies. SSNs can travel faster than SSKs (about 20 knots instead of 6.5 knots) and stay on station for longer. A fleet of SSNs should generate three times the effective deployable time compared to the current Australian SSKs because SSNs can deploy faster, loiter longer, and remain undetected without needing to recharge batteries.

Through AUKUS, Australia has entered into an arrangement with the United Kingdom and the United States expected to last decades. Australia pursues strong deterrence against coercion or attack on its security partners and interests in Southeast Asia and the Pacific to maintain the status quo. This involves having US SSNs operate in and around Cockburn Sound on rotation on an interim basis, while efforts to supply Australian SSNs are underway (Pillar I of AUKUS). It also involves collaboration on advanced military-related technology, critical minerals, and climate-related technology (Pillar II). AUKUS is the only model that is politically feasible domestically for Australia and which helps bolster international security.

SSNs are particularly useful to deter the challenge emerging from an assertive, coercive, and expansionist China, which is expected to peak in the coming decade. US and UK SSNs are forming a Submarine Rotation Force-West based at Garden Island on Cockburn Sound in Australia, and a Virginia class submarine visited the island in late 2023. This force will be supported by advanced maintenance facilities, which are already being built.

The geostrategic significance of those submarine facilities echoes their utility from eighty years back–when trusted SIGINT connections first emerged during the Pacific War. Most may not yet fully appreciate that Australia’s current importance to US interests in the Indo-Pacific echoes decades of past cooperation. The strategic rationale and the trusted collaboration, upon which AUKUS builds, is now well-established.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendation

With present geostrategic challenges echoing those from earlier generations, trusted collaboration on SIGINT and now AUKUS is more important than ever. Passed in 2023, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) made considerable progress and displayed US bipartisan support for collaboration with Australia. That has been matched by legislative changes in the United Kingdom and Australia. Such legislation seeks to open the path for a surge in trusted collaboration on science and technology and enhance each other’s defense industrial capacity. The benefits for all three nations are expected to be greater than the sum of their parts.

Unfortunately, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) continue to restrict trade in defense-related items and services. Such regulations inhibit trusted collaboration on research and bolstering each other’s industrial capacity. ITAR presents a significant obstacle to AUKUS cooperation. The US State Department, supporting agencies, and Congress must remove ITAR restrictions to realize the full promise of AUKUS. Bureaucracy has its own inertia, which often enough requires visionary leadership to overcome. Lifting ITAR restrictions for Australia and the United Kingdom would enable the transfer of nuclear propulsion technology to Australia. In addition, it would enable the increased manufacturing and stockpiling of advanced defense-related technologies and munitions – reflecting a growing awareness of the need to bolster industrial capacity and resilience.

For more than eighty years, Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom have shared their most sensitive intelligence secrets. That trust has been matched by military practitioners on battlefields around the globe. Now, ITAR restrictions to collaborative research and design must be removed. This is necessary to strengthen and deepen military capacity amongst these like-minded security allies and deter authoritarian challengers to the established order.

[1] Desmond Ball and David Horner, Breaking The Codes: Australia’s KGB network 1944-1950 (Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1998), pp. 73-114.

[2] David Horner, The Spy Catchers: The Official history of ASIO, Vol. I, 1949-1963 (Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 2014), p. 39.

[3] John Blaxland and Clare Birgin, Revealing Secrets: An Unofficial History of Australian Signals Intelligence and the Advent of Cyber (Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 2023), pp. 222-261.

[4] Blaxland and Birgin, Revealing Secrets, pp. 301-331.

[5] Blaxland and Birgin, Revealing Secrets, pp. 313-321.

[6] The distance from Fremantle to Darwin, for instance, is 4024km or 2172 nautical miles. A Collins Class submarine is reputed to be able to travel 480 nautical miles submerged before a snorkel or full surfacing is required to recharge batteries. See https://www.seaforces.org/marint/Australian-Navy/Submarine/Collins-class.htm 

…

Professor John Blaxland is the newly appointed Director of the Australian National University’s (ANU) North America Liaison Office in Washington DC. He teaches “Honeypots and Overcoats: Australian Intelligence in the World” and is co-author of Revealing Secrets; An Unofficial History of Australian Signals Intelligence and the Advent of Cyber (Sydney, UNSW Press, 2023). See his ANU bio here."

France's First Naval Reactors Were HEU

Following Submarine Matter's articles France’s Future SSBN “SNLE 3G” Starts Production of March 28, 2024; France's New K22 reactor for Carrier & 3G SSBN of December 27, 2023; and French LEU Reactor & SSN Implications of March 24, 2023: 

The USN, and partly the UK RN, rely on the US' massive HEU naval reactor industrial base to develop new reactor technology and to create the 94+% HEU fuel.

In contrast France developed LEU naval reactors. HEU requires a specialized and expensive naval reactor fuelling program, while dual civilian-naval LEU fuel is less expensive. 

But it was not always so. Alain Tournyol du Clos in a Federation  of American Scientists (FAS) study of December 2016, reported https://uploads.fas.org/2016/12/Frances-Choice-for-Naval-Nuclear-Propulsion.pdf on page 1:

"In 1959, a French delegation went to the United States in order to negotiate some technology transfer in [page 2] naval reactors; it was a failure. The United States refused any cooperation with France; however, the US agreed to sell a limited amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU), provided that it should only be used in a land-based installation. Hence, the first naval propulsion reactor, conceived by French scientists, was a land-based prototype (PAT: prototype à terre) set up near Cadarache in the southeast of France. It was designed and built in less than five years. The French Government decided — unlike other countries, which started using nuclear submarines — to start with SSBNs."

"[The Redoubtable-class SSBNs always used HEU reactors. They] were equipped with nuclear plants identical to" [France’s land based prototype HEU reactor known as “PAT”]. 

“Yet, very soon after the start of the first SSBN, the scientists working in CEA (the French Atomic Energy Commission) who were in charge of developing nuclear propulsion, realized that [French nuclear submarine classes after the Redoubtables] could use LEU, in dioxide form, to produce cores which would provide energy to the SSBNs four to five times (20 to 25 years) greater than with the first generation of cores. This was possible, on the one hand, because the conception of the first generation cores included high margins and, on the other hand, because SSBNs are low consumers of energy due to the nature of the slow, steady speed of patrolling.”

“After [the Redoubtables], the French Navy decided to adopt cores using low-enriched uranium dioxide for all the following classes of nuclear ships: SSN Rubis class, SSBN Le Triomphant class, SSN Barracuda class, and CVN Charles de Gaulle."

Alain Tournyol du Clos further reports: 

"In 1996, France decided to stop enriching uranium to HEU levels for weapons purposes [A secret - France by 1996 then mainly relied on Pu and Tritium for its all 2-stage thermonuclear weapon arsenal]. If the Navy had wanted to use HEU fuel, it would have had to invest significant money to have its own HEU enrichment facility. By choosing to only use LEU fuel with enrichments much less than 20 percent in the fissile isotope uranium-235, France has saved money by purchasing from the commercial market. Moreover, France’s decision to use LEU fuel for naval propulsion has not degraded the operational performance of the ships." 

France’s new K22 220 MW (thermal) about 37 MW (electrical?) naval reactor

Regarding France’s latest naval reactor, the K22 French Anonymous commented (along the lines) the K22 is not a major problem. It has been tested in land based prototype form at the new RÉS facility https://inis.iaea.org/search/search.aspx?orig_q=RN:38002931. This K22 prototype went critical in 2018 at France’s major nuclear reactor research centre at Cadarache.

Cadarache's location on the red dot above. Map courtesy CIA World Factbook. Cadarache is just up the road from the French naval base at Toulon (French naval bases map below).

The K22’s engineering may have been completed in 2023 with actual construction of the sea based K22 being started at Naval Group’s Nantes-Indret complex https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/06/naval-group-signs-first-industrial-orders-for-future-french-navys-third-generation-ssbns/ . K22s will initially go into France’s future SSBNs (SNLE 3Gs).

More interesting on the Naval Group video [Alas Pierre (Pete) cannot find it!?] is the computerized thick steel plates water jet cutting in a swimming pool sized facility (very high precision and no thermal stresses).

Two x K22s will later go into France’s future nuclear powered aircraft carrier PA-NG (see video here and below) with construction beginning in France’s Saint Nazaire shipyard in the mid 2020s to early 2030s.

Significantly the K22 is a development of the K15 with 50% more power and perhaps a 25% increase in size. The K22 will use the same LEU refuelling and inspection processes as the K15 – that is using robots.

A Nuclear Threat Initiative 2010 paper https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/expanding-nuclear-propulsion-challenges/  makes some interesting points about LEU "Caramel" fuel in French Navy reactors including the K15 and presumably the K22: 

"...French nuclear vessels are able to extract more energy from LEU than are U.S. vessels by taking advantage of a more LEU-efficient fuel design. The French navy uses a uranium-dioxide composite embedded in a zirconium alloy grid, an arrangement known as "caramel" fuel.

CARAMEL fuel increases the efficiency of the burn-up of uranium-235 so that lower enrichment levels and/or smaller reactor volumes can be employed with a greater energy yield. Studies have shown that a design in which small spheres of uranium dioxide are embedded in a zirconium matrix can boost the efficiency of the fission reaction even further.[32]"

India vs China in the Indo-Pacific: Indian Carrier visit to Australia?

Hello to readers of Pete's blog! This is my (Gessler's) first post here since Pete made me a co-author so I'll try not to mess this up.

I originally commented (on Pete's article regarding Collins Life of Type Extension (LOTE)) about the Indian Navy's 2024 deployment to the South China Sea making Singapore their first stop.

I speculated at the time that the Indian Navy (IN) deployment which consists of: INS Kiltan a Kamorta-class ASW corvette; INS Delhi an upgraded Delhi-class destroyer; and INS Shakti a Fincantieri-built Deepak-class fleet tanker, could have the Philippines on its itinerary given the upsurge in defence and strategic relations between New Delhi and Manila in recent times.

Shawn C had commented that the Indian deployment could also call on Vietnam's ports, pointing to the potential of an increased strategic relationship between India and Vietnam as well.

It turns out, we were both right with our speculations: The Indian contingent has visited both Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay and the Philippines' naval anchorage in Manila!

INS Kiltan at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam
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INS Shakti at Manila harbour, Philippines
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The intent of the 'regularization' of India's naval deployments to the South China Sea includes Delhi's extension of diplomatic support to Pacific states troubled by China's expansionism. This seems to be a message aimed squarely at Beijing and is a probable response to China's increasing reach in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Aspects include: China's deployment of naval task forces to the western periphery of the IOR; China's construction of strategic/dual-use infrastructure around India; as well as China's almost continuous deployment of various intelligence-gathering vessels to monitor India's missile tests and naval activity.

How these deployments and counter-deployments evolve over the next few years will probably be interesting to followers of geopolitics to keep an eye on...especially as the number and frequency of vessels increase. Of interest as well will be any increasing possibility of actual confrontations.

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Speaking of India's naval deployments to friendly states, it seems there may be a major event soon. An Indian Navy (IN) aircraft carrier may make its maiden visit to Australia to participate in an International Fleet Review in 2026 celebrating the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN's) 125th anniversary. It's not yet known which of India's two carriers, INS Vikrant or INS Vikramaditya, will visit. Either way, I reckon a number of cross-decking exercises between rotary wing assets of both the IN and RAN (flying off Canberra-class LHDs) is to be expected at some point during the visit.

Though it's also possible we don't have to wait that long to see exercises of that kind between IN and RAN.

Cheers,

Gessler

UAVs, USVs, AUVs: Black Sea Submarine Mystery: Part 2

In Part 1 of this long thought exercise, I discussed whether diesel submarines (middle size or mini) would make sense for Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania in the Black Sea.

The Russian-Ukraine War has seen the rapid development of drone warfare on both sides - everything from tiny FPS UAV drones delivering grenades to larger drones conducting strategic attacks on infrastructure.

The current situation in the Black Sea: Ukraine, a country without warships bigger than minesweepers, has pinned the major fleet units of the vaunted Russian Black Sea fleet to Sevastopol (where they will be further destroyed by Storm Shadow missiles) and Novorossiysk. This is primarily due to the historic use of suicide Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs), alongside strategic strikes by ATACMS small ballistic missiles, Storm Shadow cruise missiles and Ukrainian Special Forces units. These have also been degrading Russian naval facilities, ground-based air defences, airfields and essential infrastructure in Crimea and Russian territories bordering the Black Sea. 

The main priority for Ukraine now (May 2024) in the Black Sea is to restrict the remaining Black Sea Fleet (BSF) units to Novorossiysk Naval Base. Ukraine has proved that it can loop UAVs and USVs around the Crimean peninsula to attack Novorossiyk - a one-way journey of about 700km, in the face of heavy Russian GPS and satellite communication jamming. 

This long distance does mean that these USVs have to pass relatively close to Crimea, which makes them vulnerable to interdiction from Russian aviation operating from Crimea. This is why some Ukrainian USVs are now carrying missiles eg. by modifying AA-11 Archer AAMs to lock onto airborne targets, even while the USV is moving.

The BSF’s three remaining Improved Kilo subs are relatively new, while the older Kilo Alrosa is likely un-operational and cannot leave Sevastopol. If the Improved Kilos were to ‘break out’ of Novorossiyk - snort transit to somewhere to the North of Yalta in Crimea, then switch to batteries, they could stay underwater, evade Ukraine/NATO surveillance and attack the vital shipping lanes from Ukraine's Port of Odesa.

AUVs aka XLUUVs

The one type of unmanned vehicle that we have not seen, YET, are Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) - see H I Sutton's comprehensive list of AUVS and XLUUVs (eXtra Large Underwater Unmanned Vehicles) that are now in prototype or in production. It is my opinion that it is only a matter of time before Ukraine will have an AUV in operation - if they don’t have one in the water already.

 

Ukraine recently started Project FURY, a "hackathon" (intense information gathering) to rapidly develop AUVs that will probably have loitering persistence, and AI ability to detect and attack surface and subsurface targets, alone or as a swarm. These AUVs should be hard for Russian ASW helicopters and submarines to detect, as they can hide at extreme depths, ‘pop up’ at intervals to get GPS fixes and instructions, lay mines, or even attack targets with torpedoes or ASMs.

Ukraine's allies are likely to contribute to Project Fury and would certainly be interested in the real war results.

Image: TKMS/Naval News
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TKMS recently started production of the MUM (modifiable Underwater Mothership) in 2023 - at 25m long, this long-endurance XLUUV could perform a form of submarine barrier patrol. Situated 500km (or more) from its base, MUM might only rise to near the surface to extend a comms antenna, to send an alert when it detects a target and positively identifies that it is an enemy warship (from visual and passive sonar recognition). Once MUM receives an order to attack, it selects the optimal weapon for the environmental conditions and fires. The MUM's modular design enables this XLUUV to swap out modules and it can also be disassembled into containers (see below) for a train or truck ride.

Image: TKMS
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MUM is a big design, and would likely cost around 1/3rd the price of a traditional small SSK, especially as it uses fuel cell AIP.

A cheaper, more viable design (for Ukraine) could be the DRASS Ronda AUV - again spotted by the indomitable H I Sutton (see arrow in the photo below) of the DRASS DS8 Swimmer Delivery Vehicle during a visit by Italian dignitaries to DRASS’ Livorno, Italy, facilities. 

Image: DRASS DS-8 via HI Sutton
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The Ronda AUV is rumoured to be the "Autonomous Attack Submarine" that was mentioned when DRASS signed an MOU with Indonesian shipbuilder PT Republik Palino. According to Sutton, Ronda is an AUV version of the DRASS DS8 swimmer delivery vehicle, a 9-metre, 4-tonne vehicle that can transport 8 combat divers and 1,000kg of equipment 50 nautical miles, with a maximum depth of 80 metres, and a speed of 6.5 knots.

DRASS conducted sea trials of the DS8 in Tuscany in late 2023, as well as a calendar shoot (I kid you not!). See the video below.

An AUV version of the DS8 is quite feasible for a Black Sea nation as the SDV can be built at the DRASS Romania production facilities - thus not infringing on the Montreux Convention, with crew facilities replaced with batteries.  DRASS has recently partnered with Italian company INTECS for AI to “bolster surveillance and performance in the underwater domain” - which could mean that an autonomous system is currently being developed.

Image: DRASS via H I Sutton
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Polish news site ESSA reported in February 2024 that Sweden was sending the new Torpedo 47 SLWT (SAAB Lightweight Torpedo) to Ukraine. The replacement for the 400mm Torpedo 45 that equips Swedish (and Singaporean?) submarines and naval vessels, the Torpedo 47 is a versatile weapon that has a 20km range and can be launched from subs, ships, and helicopters, or over the side of a pier. The Torpedo 47 is a 2.8m long torpedo that should fit into a Ronda AUV. But as the Torpedo 47 does not require torpedo tubes to launch, it can simply be shackled to the outside of a Ronda AUV. 

Ukraine's use of unmanned drones of all types will continue to be a real war testing ground that is benefitting Ukraine's allies. They are likely assisting Ukraine in developing these drones or gifting them to Ukraine outright.

Update 25 May 2024

Pete has asked for my thoughts on the two Ukraine AUVs that are on HI Suttons's  Overview of Maritime Drones of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Toloka TLK 150

Images and some details were released by the creators, Ukranian startup Brave1, in May 2023. Brave1 claims it is developing a family of these attack AUVs, with the TLK 150 having a range of 100km carrying a warhead of up to 50kg, and the TLK 1000 has an operational range of 2000km carrying a payload up to 5,000kg.

Graphic: Brave1

There have been zero updates on this AUV project since it was revealed, not even on Brave1's own website and Facebook page, and this company now seems to be focused on FPS, UGV, and UAV development. 

Marichka AUV

Appeared at an arms show in August 2023, followed by one video of the device in water, which was picked up by social media. The video does show a powered device, apparently with a ballast system, and 4 guys riding it, which demonstrates that it can carry at least 400kg.

The video also shows that this prototype is wire-controlled and powered by the RIB following it. So it could be lacking internal systems - such as batteries, navigation, guidance, sensors and communication equipment.

This AUV is the creation of a group called AMMO Ukraine, which has a marketing page sans any details of the project's development or deliverables, but they are happy to accept your donation.

DRASS DG-160: Black Sea Submarine Mystery: Part 1

In late 2023, H I Sutton kicked off a flurry of media speculation when he published an article on his Covert Shores blog about the DRASS DG-160 midget submarine. This submarine, or two, are separately or jointly under construction at the DRASS fabrication facilities in the Romanian towns of Timisoara and Giurgiu . The Giurgiu assembly site is significant in that even though it is 600km away from the Black Sea a DG-160 could be barged on inland waterways to the Black Sea.

Map of the Black Sea. Note how shallow the seafloor is off the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts. Minisubs like the DG-160 are better suited to the shallows than medium sized SSKs. (Map courtesy Brittanica).
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This DG-160 is for an "Undisclosed Customer" claimed Sutton. It is for "Ukraine!" claimed a host of many pro-Russian media outlets. As will be explained below DRASS's assembling DG-160s at Giurgiu factory has politico-legal advantages if the intended customer is the Ukrainian Navy.  

Artwork: DRASS
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I did some googling (without resorting to Gemini AI) and discovered a YouTube link, available on the DRASS website, to the actual TVR News Romania report that H I Sutton referred to for his article. 

DRASS DG-160 Youtube here and above uploaded by DRASS in 2022.
See all DRASS underwater videos.
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As you can see, the above is basically an infomercial about DRASS producing the DG-160 midget submarine. So DG-160s are actually built at two Romanian factories - at Giurgiu and 500km away at Timisoara. The Timisoara Romanian factory also produces hyperbaric chambers, diving bells and swimmer delivery vehicles. 

In a 2019 article published by European Defense Review Magazine, a prototype of the DG-160 was designed at DRASS's Livorno, Italy HQ. Actual production commenced into 2021 at Timisoara, Romania after a 2 year COVID delay.

The technical achievement of producing DG-160 subs in Romania was leveraged patriotically by the Romanian Defense Minister in the face of Romanian concern about Russia's February 2022 Ukraine invasion. The Minister envisaged exporting DG-160s as well as supplying them to the Romanian Navy.

Would 6 x DG-160s meet Romania's needs for the Black Sea? possibly. DRASS claims 6 could be bought for the price of a single modern SSK (presumably implying a Scorpene - see below) and they can provide a long-range delivery means for combat divers.

Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey has the right to block warships (including submarines) attempting to enter the Black Sea via Turkey's Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. At Ukraine's request Turkey exercised this right by blocking all warships on February 27, 2022. This resulted in the blocking of Russian Kilo submarines in mid 2022 and later two large Russian warships. Even two small Ukrainian warships (minehunters) were blocked in January 2024.

Under the Montreux Convention Turkey could even decide to block future imports of submarines to Bulgaria and Romania as both countries border the Black Sea. The Bulgarians have been looking for second-hand subs (likely Turkish Type 209s). Romania in July 2022 signed a letter of intent with Naval Group for 2 new Scorpenes. The possibility of a Turkish blockage could particularly be felt if the Ukraine-Russia War drags on through to the time that French built Scorpenes for Romania are ready. Even France shipping sections for assembly in Romania could be blocked.

Turkey attempting to use its Montreux Convention power to make itself a monopoly supplier of submarines to Romania, might make Turkey unpopular in international legal circles. Perhaps less so to Bulgaria if other submarine exporting countries accepted Bulgaria already wanted to buy Turkish submarines.

The Turkish Navy operates Type 209 class SSKs, as well as Reis-class (Type 214TNs) all located at Turkey's Black Sea Bartin Naval Base which features Submarine Shelters. As the Type 209s are already in the Black Sea Turkey could claim it is not breaking the Montreux Convention by supplying them to other Black Sea countries.

Romania supplying 'home' built DRASS DG-160s for its own navy and for possible export to other Black Sea countries (Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine) could be seen as a hedge. That is a hedge against Turkey conferring upon itself monopoly supplier of submarine status under the Montreux Convention.