Japanese Concerns Over Any Soryu Sale to Australia

Prime Ministers Abbott and Abe, on April 7, 2014, when they concluded a framework agreement for co-operation on defence equipment and technology (including submarine hydrodynamics). This is/was a preliminary to any Soryu sale. Abbott's political position is now threatened. 
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As Prime Minister Abbott - the main Australian advocate for a Soryu deal  steadily weakens politically it is valuable to consider possible Japanese concerns and misgivings over a Soryu sale.

Several days ago an Anonymous commenter said [retired Admiral]"Kobayashi is not arrogant, he just does not want to sell sub tech, that’s all. Australian thinks that Japan wants to sell her subs like Germany, Sweden or France. But this idea is perfectly wrong and huge misunderstanding, Japan does not want at all. Soryu’s secret is more important and valuable than money which Australia will pay Japan." 

Enlarging on possible Japanese concerns yields the following possibilities.

Unlike other western countries involved in Australia's submarine selection - Japan is the only country actually in danger of conflict - with North Korea and to a lesser extent with Russia and China. Other contenders - Germany, France and Sweden - are not at risk. For these latter three countries the submarine selection is only a commercial-trade matter - while for Japan it is most importantly a strategic alliance, national security matter.

A sale of Soryus to Australia may weaken Japan's national security:

Selling to Australia would involve a major diversion of Japanese industrial and submarine corps resources to plan, train and generally liase with Australian industry and Australian submariners. Japan's limited resources might be better focussed monitoring or more active measures against Japan's potential enemies.

Sales to Australia might disrupt Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) submarine production lines to supply the Japanese submarine corps. This particularly in view of Japan's goal of expanding its submarine corps from the current 16 operational submarine to the goal of 22 submarines. More specifically there may be strategic pressure for a Soryu earmarked (by contract) for Australia on a production line to be diverted to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) instead. Such a diversion might raise political and contractual difficulties for Japan.

The prospect of sales to Australia may encourage the Soryu's submarine builders (MHI and KHI) to modify the Soryus to a standard configuration that does not suit JMSDF requirements. For example it is possible that two reasons for Japan's decision to delete Stirling air independent propulsion (AIP)  from the future batch of Soryus were:
- Australia's assessment, since the 1980s, that AIP is problematic, involving negative trade-offs, that  do not meet Australia's needs, and
- for legal property right reasons Japan could not sell Swedish Stirling engine AIP technology to third countries, including Australia.

It is also possible the future batch of Soryu will have much longer range, to suit Australia's operational requirements but this longer range might not be ideal for the JMSDF's needs.

Due to China's trade value to Australia Japan cannot rely on Australia to support Japan in any confrontation or outright conflict with China (eg. arising from East China or South China Sea matters). Australains see the islands in the East China and South China Seas as more to do with current opportunistic economic claims than national historical claims. This means that in any conflict in those seas Australia may support the claims of its major trade partner - which is China.

Australia's security laws and rules may be detrimental to Japan's security overall. Part of the weakness would stem from Chinese government and corporate  influence over Australia. For example Australia's China situation may result in Australian steel-making companies inadvertently sharing newly acquired Japanese steel secrets with Chinese steelmaking business partners.

Australia's laws overall make racial discrimination illegal in employment - particularly for government jobs, including the submarine corps. A main area of Japanese concern might be Australian tolerance of former Chinese citizens, or ethnic Chinese generally, being inducted as Australian submariners or into broader Australian government or submarine-shipbuilding industry positions. China has a reputation for pressuring ethnic Chinese in the West - even if they have only distant cousins or elderly grandparents still living in China. The Chinese government can deny Chinese citizens careers, lose jobs, lose pensions or worse if their Australia based relatives are not cooperative. Australia cannot match Japan's ability to control the ethnic security of submarine crews or such security in the broader submarine industry.

Second Swedish sighting of Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV - UUV - Malsten

Location of the publically known (Swedish website) Malsten (Island) Station (with observable facilities) which operated  undersea cables joining SOSUS and magnetic anomaly sensors. Now modernised?

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See Malsten Station (blue arrow) in relation to Stockholm. Malsten's Cold War vintage equipment may have been replaced by a much more extensive wireless  "SeaWeb" style anti-submarine network in the Swedish archipelago. A modern SeaWeb network would rapidly detect and track any Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV.

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This is a continuation of my October 25, 2014 article on Sweden's first sighting (and sonaring) of a suspected Russian mini-submarine just off Stockholm in mid October 2014. That article theorised that the suspected Russian mini-submarine's close proximity to Stockholm may have indicated its mission was for a Russian agent's drop-off or pick-up or interception of telecommunications signals emanating from Stockholm. In retrospect this seems unlikely and unnecessarily complicated as any agent could cross land borders, go by air or just transmit. Interception might be more efficient within Stockholm - say equipment in the Russian Embassy there.

More likely activity in October 2014 is Russian electronic monitoring of nearby Swedish and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) naval exercises. The submarine may not have been in authentic "distress" rather it used distress messages as a ruse intended to draw "trip" more Swedish and/or NATO sensor "interrogations".

Reconnaissance aircraft indulge in a similar radar tripping activity by flying close to borders -  basically forcing a would-be adversary to turn-on its usually covert sensors. Russian Bear reconnaissance aircraft, under increasingly combative Putin, have stepped up activity against NATO allies partly for the intelligence take. It is unknown if Russian mini-submarines have been engaged in similar activities, but possible.

If such mini-subs have no crew (being large diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (LDUUVs)) the financial and political costs and risks are less. See my earlier post on LDUUVs and the discussion below.

"SECOND" SIGHTING OR LATER SIGHTING OF THE SAME SUBMARINE OR LDUUV

Subsequent (presumably) authorised leaks by Swedish and UK sources in mid January 2015 indicate that Swedish and NATO forces continued to look for suspected Russian submarine activity later in October 2014. UK concern about a suspected Russian submarine off the Scottish coast may be a totally separate (perhaps routine?) matter. A Russian attack submarine (SSK or SSN) may routinely station itself off the coast of northwest Scotland in order to intercept (or gain intelligence) concerning UK (and perhaps US) nuclear submarines entering and, more importantly, leaving UK naval base HMNB Clyde.at Faslane.

Having looked at US advances in large diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (LDUUV) technology I think that a crewed Russian mini-submarine is unnecessary and dangerous when a remotely controlled LDUUV could be used. This is assuming Russia is technically advanced enough to deploy developed LDUUVs? LDUUVs can include unmanned "conning towers" of the type photographed off Stockholm (see intentionally blurry image with little sense of size/scale). If Russia sent a LDUUV Russia could "trip" (activate) Swedish (and NATO?) fixed and mobile anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sensors. The Swedish reaction against a LDUUV (Swedish corvettes, smaller craft, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft) would be worth the Russian military intelligence "take" - even at the calculated risk of a LDUUV being destroyed or captured. 

Sweden alone has insufficient national power to threaten or more fully embarrass Russia. So Sweden likely feigned its inability to find the Russian LDUUV rather than admitting Sweden's limitations in exerting force on the Russian craft. The risk of a self-destruct mechanism in the Russian craft may also have played on Swedish minds. An enterprizing Russian controlled LDUUV may have also moved into the international waters or territorial waters of NATO allies in the Baltic or less likely (due to LDUUV range limitations) the North Sea. The more NATO reacts in military terms the more it reveals to Russian naval intelligence. 

Off Stockholm in 2014 the Russian submarine or LDUUV is likely to have also deployed antennas to send any vaunted "distress calls". The intelligence take (if necessary) could also be sent by UHF radio to Russian UHF receivers or by satellite relay to Russian naval intelligence. Alternatively the Russian craft could merely store the take for handing over once it reached a Russian port or mothership. 

MALSTEN STATION

In terms of Swedish fixed anti-submarine sensors Malsten Station SOSUS (and magnetic anomaly) sensors have been public knowledge in Sweden for decades. Malsten is a small island on which a small hut stands. The hut is (or was) used to power cables that carry sound (SOSUS) and magnetic anomaly sensors. The cables stretch out for a few 100 metres on two sides of Malsten island. The cables and sensors were originally decades old technology - perhaps 1950s vintage. The sensors presumably are (or were) sensitive enough to detect mini-subs or LDUUVs crossing over the cables - alerting the Swedish Navy of illegal entries into Swedish waters. Here is another link on the Malsten Station. With advances in electronics and communications there would no longer be a need for Malsten to be physically manned - other than for security. Sensor detections could (can?) be automatically relayed to Swedish naval bases or to a more centralised Swedish military HQ in Stockholm itself.

Malsten may have been modernised and re-activated (since the Cold War) to meet the resurgent Russian threat. Possibly Malsten and other Swedish SOSUS arrays have been replaced by a much broader undersea and islet-rock-mainland wireless network of the SeaWeb type that may cover much of the Swedish Archipelago. Whether Sweden would coordinate its network with any larger NATO "SeaWeb" network is unknown.

So in conclusion there is much (probably Russian) undersea activity in the Swedish archipelago. Much would happen that is not admitted publically by Sweden, NATO or Russia. When a member of the Swedish public spots a Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV there is some embarrassment in  Sweden. Sweden's defence efficiency is called into question (by Swedish politicians and the Press) due to an evident inability to stop encroachments or (in theory) identify who or what is encroaching.

The Swedish Government feels obliged to reveal some of what it knows - but only a small portion due to diplomatic and security reasons. The UK and NATO might reduce Swedish embarrassment, while increasing Russian embarrassment, by mixing in headlines about what is probably regular detection of Russian submarines off the Scottish coast. The press is happy. The public is reassured - perhaps, and specialist submarine blogger-journalists have more to write about :)

Pete

LDUUVs UUV AUVs and Undersea Cable Tapping?

US Navy image of a Penn State ARL developed Sea Stalker large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (LDUUV).

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As well as looking at submarines this blog looks at many related hardware and software issues. To that end unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are an increasingly interesting topic. The Sea Stalker provides an example of a large-diameter UUV (LDUUV). The sophistication of the latest LDUUVs make them closer to the ideal od autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). For undersea cable tapping a more highly developed, specialised and deeper diving LDUUV is a possibility.

The current status of UUVs in the US Navy paints a confusing picture. Perhaps such confusion is  intentional for security and commercial competition reasons. There are small UUVs, medium size torpedo tube fitting UUVs (like the Bluefin-21 deployed by the US Navy in search of Malaysian Airlines MH370 off Western Australia). Then there are LDUUVs. The US Navy is learning what to ask for in LDUUV requirements by simultaneously testing LDUUVs like the Sea Stalker.

There may be widely varying degrees of remote control and autonomy of LDUUVs. LDUUVs might increasingly be used in littoral waters too shallow for full sized submarines or full sized high value warships. LDUUVs might also be used for missions too dangerous due to high possibilities of detection by anti-submarine or anti-shipping forces (eg. defending foreign submarines, ships, aircraft, anti-ship missiles etc).

The ability of a surface ship to deploy a LDUUV potentially permits that ship to have some of the intelligence gathering and weapons capabilities of a submarine. By weapons that might mean an LDUUV attaching small limpet mines to ships in harbour or an entire LDUUV exploding under a high value ship in harbour or other chokepoint.

LDUUVs as CABLE TAPPERS

The following is a logical outgrowth of the publication decades ago of undersea cable tapping under  Operation Ivy Bells http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ivy_Bells  Also see the Wikipedia entry on modified Seawolf-class SSN USS Jimmy Carter "Past submarines outfitted this way were used to tap undersea cables, to intercept communications of foreign countries."  It is therefore assumed undersea cable tapping remains a reality.

For the delicate task of tapping undersea fibre-optic cables LDUUV's offer advantages over medium-large submarines (close to cables) or divers.

LDUUVs:

-  being without a crew are semi-deniable (unlike manned submarine crews and divers they cannot be questioned in front of the world media)
-  do not involve friendly deaths or risk of injury
-  may be capable of far deeper operation (1,000s meters?) than manned submarines and divers. LDUUVs could operate at or beyond estimated "crush depth" as there is no crew at risk
-  if the capture of a LDUUV is imminent remotely initiated or autonomous destruction could take place (of electronics, including hard-disc records and other high technology). The whole LDUUV could also self-destruct (preferably keeping would-be capturers at a safe distance)
-  are potentially of shallow water tapping in the littorals (too shallow)
-  can operate in areas too dangerous or too politically sensitive for manned submarines
-  would present a far lower sonic, visual and magnetic signature (and other emissions) than a manned submarine (thus reducing detectability)
-  can utilise their thrusters and specialised splicing technology for tapping or other work
-  are less likely to damage or break a cable, by mistake, than a much larger submarine attempting to work on a cable directly
-   not only submarines could operate, release and retrieve LDUUVs but mine-sweepers on up in a navy or more delicately large "trawlers" on up in commercial shipping terms
-   are not restricted to the US Navy or other agencies but LDUUVs may be possessed by foreign navies and agencies such as those of Russia (near Stockholm in late 2014?) and China.

SEA STALKER LDUUV DETAIL

The US Navy appears to be sponsoring the development of LDUUVs by private companies and academic institutions while it sets requirements for upgraded LDUUV technology. The Navy's approach is pragmatic. It is difficult to set requirement for a technology if one does not have some idea of its ever greater practical capabilities.

Since conducting a 2006 study, the US Navy has been developing requirements for submarine-deployable LDUUVs with payload capabilities much greater than the limitations posed by medium sized UUVs (that can fit in 533mm (21 inch) diameter torpedo tube). Examples of medium sized UUVs are the Bluefin-21 (hence 21 inch - which transmits data to the mother ship or sub) or upgraded Mark 48 torpedos (which carry sensors for data transmission). 

The Sea Stalker is a 38-inch (0.97m) diameter platform with a speed of nearly 5 knots. The US Navy has conducted some experimentation with the Sea Stalker UUV, a development of the Sea Horse UUV built by the Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory (ARL).

In August 2014, the Sea Stalker was delivered to Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport, Washington state (northwestern USA) to be employed by Commander, Submarine Development Squadron FIVE, Detachment UUV for capabilities testing and proficiency training in preparation for the delivery of future large diameter UUVs. 

On November 25, 2014 US Naval Sea Systems Command (with Sea Stalker, other public LDUUVs and covert LDUUVs in mind) released a refined draft of top-level requirements. The requirements or instructions were: 

"The Increment 1 LDUUV will have mission capabilities to include Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and below-water Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance to improve battlespace awareness. [Increment 1] will be capable of launch and recovery by...Virginia-class submarines [by] Virginia Payload Modules or Modernized-Dry Deck Shelter." 

The Sea Stalker may already have been tested  (as Large Training Vehicle 38) including:

-  launched and recovery from the USS Bainbridge (DDG-96), and
-  launch and retrieval using the dry-deck shelter of an Ohio-class SSGN submarine and modified SSN USS Jimmy Carter?. 

Sea Stalker can be powered by a lithium battery when operated from US surface ships with an endurance of seven to 10 days. On submarines it may currently only use alkaline (D-Cell) batteries (for safety reasons?) in which case its endurance may only be three days. It can loiter offshore, [and in-harbour (etc?)] collecting intelligence with two antenna masts, transmit and receive information via an Iridium satellite or (presumably) other US satellites. It is also useful for command and control [of what? special forces? other LDUUVs?].

SOURCES

(Sea Stalker) AUV System Spec Sheet

Autonomous Underwater Vehicles Application Center (AUVAC) reports http://auvac.org/people-organizations/view/244 

On requirements and some physical realities SEAPOWER Magazine, December 1,   2014 reports http://www.seapowermagazine.org/stories/20141201-lduuv.html:

navaldrones.com reports http://www.navaldrones.com/Sea-Stalker-UUV.html:

Pete

Bangladesh, Philippine, Burma and Thailand Submarine Issues

One of China's remaining Type 035 Ming-class conventional submarine soon to be scrapped or sold off to Bangladesh (and other small nations?).

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A Russian built Kilo conventional submarine - main users are Russia, India and China. Vietnam is a growing operator (having bought 6).

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India feels threatened by the prospect of increasing Chinese submarine proliferation in the Indian Ocean. Such proliferation comes through such means as:

-  Chinese anti-piracy conventional and nuclear propelled subs moving across the Indian Ocean for operations off the Horn of Africa,

-  submarine visits to such ports as Columbo, Sri Lanka, and

-  sale of Chinese subs to such Indian neighbours as Bangladesh (around 2019) and perhaps in future to Burma and Pakistan (see India's "West Coast Worries").

For more than a year there have been reports of a pending sale of obsolescent Chinese Ming-class submarines to Bangladesh. See my article http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/china-selling-two-type-035-ming-class.html of December 24, 2013. It is highly likely that, after expected delivery of the Mings in 2019, part of a Bangladesh Ming crew and on-shore maintainers would be Chinese for a transition period. This would cause a range of anxieties in India.

In late 2014 Indian intelligence and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs have pushed the possibility (or for India a hope) that Bangladesh might buy Russian submarines instead.

It is unclear whether these "Russian" Submarines would be:

- new build Kilos (surely too expensive for Bangladesh without credit-finance)

- used Kilos from Russia (cheaper but probably unreliable with a short remaining service life) or

- ex-Indian Kilos (cheaper but probably unreliable with a short remaining service life).

Two nations that probably will not buy submarines in the short to medium term are:

- the Philippines (it usually receives low-or-no cost used naval and coastguard vessels) - see http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-philippine-navys-submarine-quest/  December 31, 2013, 

- Thailand - http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/thailand-eyes-submarine-fleet/, January 4, 2015,
  Pete's Comment: If Thailand bought used Ming subs from China Thailand might receive them in 2019 - depending on Chinese modifications. Used Kilos are harder to estimate. If Thailand prefered 2 or 3 new submarines costs would be much higher and involve:
- significant lead times for negotiating, ordering and building submarines - generally around 6 years for a new customer like Thailand
- in the case of South Korea as a supplier a backlog of pre-existing orders might perhaps cause delays. This may mean a minimum delivery year of 2020 for Thailand to receive the first sub then add 3 years for commissioning (tests, trials and training) the sub into the Thai Navy ie. 2023.

Pete

Russia's GRU (military intelligence) and MH17 Shootdown

Pictured is Lieutenant Colonel Igor Bezler of the Russian military intelligence directorate GRU, who commanded the separatists who shot down MH17. He has probably been recalled to Russia in the last few days - to a quiet desk job or shoveling snow, in Siberia?

Where MH17 was shot down. (Diagram credit). Also see http://www.flightradar24.com/data/airplanes/9m-mrd/#3d6095b .

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The "Buk" SA-11 [other synonyms "Gadfly" 9K37] surface to air missile (SAM) system that was very likely used by the Russian military directed separatists. It shows the 25 km ceiling-altitude of the missile - which was more than enough to shoot down MH17 - hence murdering those aboard.
(Diagram credit )

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Thanks MHalblaub for providing many of the links, some comments, in the hours immediately after the shootdown. 

Note that it is a Russian News Agency that reported the capture of a Buk missile system by pro-Russian separatists just less than 3 weeks before the shootdown. That short training period would have given the Russian rebel Buk missile operators sufficient time to learn how to fire the missiles - but, as it transpires, insufficient time to learn the procedures for identifying targets - like MH17.

JUNE 29, 2014 - LESS THAN 3 WEEKS BEFORE THE SHOOTDOWN

Russian News Agency ITAR-TASS reported June 29, 2014 http://en.itar-tass.com/world/738262 :

"Donetsk defence forces take control of army unit equipped with missile defence systems"

"World  June 29, [2014] 19:30 UTC+4"

"No details are available about the number and condition of the missile systems taken over by the self-defence forces."

"DONETSK, June 29, /ITAR-TASS/. Self-defence forces [pro-Russian separatists] of the Donetsk People’s Republic have taken control over a missile defence army unit equipped with Buk missile defence systems, the press service of the Donetsk People’s Republic told Itar-Tass on Sunday.

So far, no details are available about the number and condition of the missile systems taken over by the self-defence forces. The press service refused to comment.

The Buk missile defence system is a mobile medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system designed to defend field troops and logistics installations against air threats in conditions of heavy electronic countermeasures and intense enemy fire." ENDS

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JULY 15, 2014 - THE FSB WILL SOON PURGE THE GRU 

On July 15, 2014 I, using my pseudonym "plantagenet" on On Line Opinion wrote http://forum.onlineopinion.com.au/thread.asp?article=16493&page=0#288071 :

" - Crimea and now eastern Ukraine . I hear the FSB will soon purge the GRU itself because the GRU is doing too well in terms of oppression. See "Crimea crisis brings Russian military spies back in the game" http://intelnews.org/2014/07/09/01-1510/ 
Cheers
Pete
Posted by plantagenet, Tuesday, 15 July 2014 8:41:04 PM "

It was just an educated hunch. The GRU had risen too quickly in the Russian intelligence pecking order, due to its early-mid 2014 successes in collecting intelligence in Crimea-Ukraine and in deploying special forces troops in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Internally, Putin will blame the GRU for the shootdown mistake - a grievous public relations disaster for Russia. Putin will use his main enforcer and old workplace, FSB, to punish the GRU. 
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JULY 17, 2014 - HOURS AFTER THE SHOOTDOWN

Robert Beckhusen and Matthew Gault wrote on War is Boring, July 17, 2014. that https://medium.com/war-is-boring/when-you-mess-with-civilian-airliners-you-mess-with-the-world-82285f15cc5a:

"When You Mess With Civilian Airliners, You Mess With the World: MH17 shootdown takes the war beyond Ukraine

On July 17, someone shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine, killing 298 people.

Ukraine blames Russia. Russia blames Ukraine. No one is sure yet exactlywhat happened. But the available facts point to pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine as being responsible.

It’s the latest tragedy in a conflict the international community can no longer contain with sanctions and rhetoric.

Minutes after the crash of MH17, a popular Russian social media page bearing the name of the seperatists’ military commander bragged about downing an aircraft near the village of Torez. The post was later deleted and the site now claims to have received the information from forums and notofficial channels.

“It does seem pretty conclusive that Strelkov did comment about shooting down a plane,” Mark Galeotti, a Russia expert at New York University, told War is Boring via email. “That fits with my working assumption, which is that this was an insurgent missile—provided by the Russians—launched at what they thought was a Ukrainian government aircraft.”

The rebels do have the weapons to take down an airliner like MH17. We know because they told us. On June 29, the press office of the separatists reported they had taken control of a 9K37 Buk anti-air missile system.

The Buk is a medium-range, surface-to-air missile system developed by the Soviet Union in the 1970s. It’s a popular export—both Ukraine and the rebels are using the missiles.

This is the context of an escalating air war in eastern Ukraine. On June 17, Kiev claimed a Russian jet shot down a Ukrainian fighter plane. On Monday, a separatist missile downed a Ukrainian An-26 transport plane. Earlier in the month, separatists downed an An-30. On June 13, the rebels shot down an Il-76 transport.

The rebels are working hard to control the airspace above eastern Ukraine, but these were low-flying planes and the Buk missile can travel to as high as [25 km]. MH17 flew at [10 km], well within the Buk’s range.

YouTube videos go up and come down. Some claim to show the crash while others show the Buk missile system moving through areas near Torez."

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JULY 18, 2014 - ONE DAY AFTER THE SHOOTDOWN

RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CONTROLLED THOSE WHO SHOT DOWN MH17

The Kyiv [Kiev] Post, July 18, 2014 reported, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/separatists-admit-downing-a-civilian-plane-in-tapped-conversation-full-transcript-356545.html :

"The Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-200[ER] flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was allegedly shot down [on July 17, 2014] by a group of Russian-backed Cossack militants near the village of Chornukhine, Luhansk Oblast, some 80 kilometers north-west of Donetsk, [in eastern Ukraine very near the border with Russia - see map above] according to recordings of intercepted phone calls between Russian military intelligence [GRU] officers and members of terrorist groups, released by the country’s security agency (SBU).

One phone call apparently was made at 4:40 p.m. Kyiv time, or 20 minutes after the plane crash, by Igor Bezler, who the [Security Service of Ukraine] SBU says is a Russian military intelligence officer and leading commander of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic. He reports to a person identified by Ukraine’s SBU as a [Colonel in Russian GRU military intelligence] Vasili Geranin [on Geranin see last paragraph of text on the Bezler Wikipedia article] regarding the shot down plane, which is about to be examined by the militants.

The second intercepted conversation released by [SBU] was apparently between militants nicknamed “Major” and "Greek" immediately upon inspection of the crash site. 

“It’s 100 percent a passenger (civilian) aircraft,” Major is recorded as saying, as he admitted to seeing no weapons on site. “Absolutely nothing. Civilian items, medicinal stuff, towels, toilet paper.” 

In the third part of conversation Cossack commander Nikolay Kozitsin talking to an unidentified militant cynically suggests that the Malaysia Airlines airplane could've been carrying spies, as, otherwise, it would have no business flying in that area.

Read the full transcript of an intercepted phone call below: 

Igor Bezler: We have just shot down a plane. Group Minera. It fell down beyond Yenakievo (Donetsk Oblast).

Vasili Geranin on Geranin see last paragraph of text on the Bezler Wikipedia article]: Pilots. Where are the pilots?

Igor Bezler: Gone to search for and photograph the plane. Its smoking.

Vasili Geranin: How many minutes ago?

Igor Bezler: About 30 minutes ago.

SBU comment: After examining the site of the plane the terrorists come to the conclusion that they have shot down a civilian plane. The next part of the conversation took place about 40 minutes later

40 minutes later.

“Major”: These are Chernukhin folks who shot down the plane. From the Chernukhin check point. Those cossacks who are based in Chernukhino.

"Greek": Yes, Major.

"Major": The plane fell apart in the air. In the area of Petropavlovskaya mine. The first “200” (code word for dead person). We have found the first “200”. A Civilian.

"Greek": Well, what do you have there?

“Major”: In short, it was 100 percent a passenger (civilian) aircraft.

"Greek": Are many people there?

“Major”: Holy sh__t! The debris fell right into the yards (of homes).

"Greek": What kind of aircraft?

“Major”: I haven’t ascertained this. I haven’t been to the main sight. I am only surveying the scene where the first bodies fell. There are the remains of internal brackets, seats and bodies.

"Greek": Is there anything left of the weapon?

“Major”: Absolutely nothing. Civilian items, medicinal stuff, towels, toilet paper.

"Greek": Are there documents?

“Major”: Yes, of one Indonesian student. From a university in Thompson. 

Militant: Regarding the plane shot down in the area of Snizhne-Torez. It’s a civilian one. Fell down near Grabove. There are lots of corpses of women and children. The Cossacks are out there looking at all this.

They say on TV it’s AN-26 transport plane, but they say it’s written Malaysia Airlines on the plane. What was it doing on Ukraine’s territory?

Nikolay Kozitsin: That means they were carrying spies. They shouldn’t be f…cking flying. There is a war going on" ENDS

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COMMENTS

I'm sure Putin's propaganda mill will persuade the chatterati (known as "useful idiots" in Russia) that it was the fault of Ukraine and the victim (MH17) for being "raped".

Unfortunately captured or bought small and medium SAMs may become more commonly used by insurgents-terrorists elsewhere - especially in the Middle East (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq) and Afghanistan-Pakistan, also several countries in Africa.

Israel has already developed an anti-missile laser system for fitting to airliners http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/02/27/israel-to-outfit-passenger-planes-with-laser-anti-missile-defense-system/ .

See also http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-23/mh17-how-can-airlines-defend-against-missile-attacks/5616674 which ends "Professor Theodore Postal, professor of science technology and security at [MIT indicated] that defending civilian airliners against such attacks "is extremely difficult to do". After all, "combat aircraft have pretty sophisticated electronic countermeasures," Professor Postal said. "And they get shot down all the time."

MHalblaub has indicated: The last position of the aircraft was just 10 km away from the Russian border. The US or some other NATO members probably did detect the search radar of the Buk missile system that shot down MH17. An E-3 AWACS and E-8 Joint STAR had eastern Ukrainian airspace under surveillance. Even some infrared tracks were recognized. Therefore it is likely the military and top politicians knew exactly where the missile was fired from.

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OTHER INTERESTING LINKS

http://intelnews.org/2014/07/24/01-1520/ "US spies say incriminating flight MA17 recordings are genuine"

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-24/mh17-sanctions-threatened-by-russian-arms-deals/5621992

http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/mh17-china-defends-russia-criticizes-the-west/

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-24/mh17-ukraine-rebel-commander-acknowledges-fighters-had-buk/5619520 

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-24/ukraine-says-pro-russia-rebels-shot-down-two-fighter-jets/5619440 

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2696847/They-shouldnt-f-g-flying-There-war-going-Ukraine-intelligence-officials-release-phone-calls-claim-PROVES-Russia-shot-Flight-MH17.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/world/europe/rebels-in-ukraine-crowed-of-past-attacks-but-deny-this-one.html?_r=0

http://intelnews.org/2014/07/18/01-1517/ Ukraine rebels ‘admit downing Malaysia plane’ in phone intercepts
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Pete

Indonesia revisits buying Kilo submarines.

Several countries operate Kilos - main users being India (pictured), China, Iran and of course Russia.

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This website has looked at many Asia-Pacific submarine forces, including those of:
- Australia - http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/01/balanced-article-on-aus-future-sub.html
- Singapore - http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/singapore-buying-two-hdw-218sg.html, 
- Vietnam - http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/01/vietnams-first-kilo-submarine-arrives.html
 Malaysia - http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2009/09/malaysias-first-ever-submarine-scorpene.html

and http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2009/06/indonesia-gets-apology-from-malaysian.html

Indonesia currently has two Type 209 (Type 1300) submarines of the Cakra Class. These are KRI Cakra and KRI Nanggala, both were launched around 1977 and entered Indonesian service in 1981. Both boats have been non-operational for long periods since 1981. Both are recorded as being refurbished in South Korea by early 2012. The refurbishment included strengthening structures and steel sheets, modernization underwater weapons and sonar systems.

Though reportedly refurbished it is unclear whether KRI Cakra or Nanggala are operational. Submarines have a limited service life of usually 30 years or less. This is due to salt water induced corrosion, expansion/contraction causing metal fatigue, other technical problems and obsolescence compared to other submarines. The latter is particularly regarding stealthy characteristics (eg. acoustic noise). So Indonesia has been casting around for replacements for her 36 year old subs.

Indonesia's non-aligned status, experience receiving Russian arms in the 1960s and a low price offer in 2007 from Russia originally suggested Indonesia might acquire Russian Kilo submarine . Presumably Russia would recoup the low selling price by padding out the deep service, upgrade and spare part costs during the Kilo's service lives.

In 2007 Russia agreed at that time to extend a $1.2 Billion line of credit to Indonesia to buy Russian weapons including two Kilos. However this offer lapsed because Russia probably could not afford to extend the credit. The 2008-2009 GFC-subprime crisis and consequent drop in the price of oil (Russia's main export) moved Russia from being a cashed-up oil boom economy in 2007 to being cash-strapped.

A June 23, 2009 article by Richard A. Bitzinger (Air-Independent Powered Submarines in the Asia-Pacific: Proliferation and Repercussions, page 3, at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=102465 ) also indicates:

"Indonesia had once considered acquiring several Russian submarines, but this deal fell apart over infrastructure financing ([Indonesia] wanted to use Russian export credits to build a sub[marine] base, which [Russia] refused to fund)."

Note that in late 2011 it was apparent Russia had lost in Indonesia's selection process for three NEW submarines.  Indonesia announced it would buy three South Korean "Improved Chang Bogo Class" variants of the German HDW 209 design. One of the Chang Bogos would be built in Indonesia: see http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/02/indonesia-to-build-chang-bogo-submarine.html of February 18, 2014 and 

http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2011/12/indonesia-decides-to-buy-korean-made.html 

By late 2013 Indonesia was again considering whether to buy Kilos or a proposed-advanced Russian development of the Kilo called the Amur Class. On December 7, 2013 the Jakarta Post reported the following [I've bolded interesting parts]  http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/07/ri-looks-russia-submarines-with-multi-role-missile-systems.html :

"RI [Indonesia] looks to Russia for submarines with multi-role missile systems"
Indonesia is in talks with Russia on the purchase of a number of Kilo Class submarines, as the country expands its deterrent capabilities in anticipation of future regional disputes. 

Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro said on Friday that a team of officials, led by Navy chief of staff Adm. Marsetio, would head to Russia at the end of this month to initiate a deal and assess the technical capabilities of the arsenal. 

“There is a plan for a massive build-up of our submarine fleet,” Purnomo said in a press conference after an hour-long closed-door meeting with Russian Ambassador to Indonesia and ASEAN Mikhail Galuzin.

Purnomo said he could not provide more details as the ministry was still awaiting reports filed by Marsetio regarding his planned visit to Russia. “Further to his report, we can then decide whether to buy new submarines or modernize used ones.”

According to Marsetio, Indonesia required “at least one submarine to cover each sea choke point” (a strategic narrow point of passage). 

He said in total, the country needed a minimum of 12 submarines, as laid out in the Defense Ministry’s Minimum Essential Force strategy.

The ministry refused to detail the allocated budget for the submarines. 

Between 2008 and 2013, defense spending has increased by an average 22 percent to Rp 81.5 trillion this year, according to the Finance Ministry. The budget is slated to rise to Rp 83.5 trillion next year. 

The planned submarine purchase will be in addition to the three [Chang Bogo] U-209 submarines currently being built by South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) and state-owned shipyard PT PAL Indonesia.

The three submarines will be delivered between 2015 and 2016, and will add to the existing two [HDW 209 Class. Jakarta Post wrongly said the were "Kilo Class"] submarines procured in 1978 from the former West Germany.

Purnomo said the ministry’s interest in Russian submarines was based on their advanced cruise-missile system, with which they can accurately target an object at a range of 300 to 400 kilometers. 

Submarines are known to be effective war machines that can act as a deterrent because of their capacity for stealth. The ministry is also considering a number of weaponry options to be fitted on the existing submarines, such as procuring the Klub-S [or "Club S"  "SS-N-27A" with the NATO reporting name of "Sizzler"] missile system, as well as fitting them with the supersonic, anti-ship Yakhont missile [aka P-800 Oniks NATO reporting name "SS-N-26 Strobile" related to Indian-Russian BrahMos] .

Indonesia has a long history of operating submarines from the former Soviet Union, now Russia. In 1967, it acquired 12 Whiskey Class submarines from the Soviet Union. 

The new submarines may well be housed at a newly established naval base in Palu, Central Sulawesi, of which only 2.8 hectares of its total 13 hectares have so far been developed.

Natural protection against extreme ocean currents is also considered to be a necessary requirement for a submarine base.

The Palu Naval Base will in the future not only serve as a forward base but also a main naval base [see more information on Palu Naval Base at http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/01/southeast-asian-states-buying.html ]..." ENDS

COMMENT 

In any submarine purchase the cost of training and maintaining multiple crews is high. The program cost of maintenance, basing, spares and upgrades, over and above upfront purchase price, must also be considered. Some Indonesians may have visions of an Indonesian Navy operating more than 10 submarines. This may be unrealistic given the problems Indonesia has had fully utilising and maintaining the current two submarines (Cakra Class).

A similar situation exists in Australia. We can only man around three submarines of six available - but our Admirals and Defence Department wish to expand the fleet to a (probably unrealistic) twelve subs.

Indonesia increasing to three submarines from the current two sounds more likely in terms of naval budget and Indonesia's economic growth.

BACKGROUND
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Submarines provide a relatively inexpensive (asymmetric) way to undertake blue water tasks. Their stealth makes up for the raw combat power of more numerous blue water surface ships (which are greater in tonnage and cost). Indonesia's submarines would represent the major means to wage medium intensity (conventional) war at sea - as well as peacetime intelligence gathering/counter-piracy/counter-terrorism.

The Indonesian Navy became a separate service in 1946, after the Indonesian National Revolution (ejecting the Dutch) began. The Navy was initially stocked primarily with craft once operated by European or the Australian navies. Beginning in 1959, the navy began to acquire a large number of craft from the Soviet Union and East European nations.

In the aftermath of the abortive 1965 coup, however, the navy suffered a decline in influence within the armed forces and the nation because of suspected involvement in the coup attempt (particularly by the marine corps) and because of the navy's small size in comparison with the army.

A large portion of its vessels of Soviet or East European origin were quickly rendered non-operational owing to a lack of spare parts and lack of maintenance expertise. Until the late 1970s, the only major replacements were four frigates acquired from the United States Navy in 1974.

Since that time, the navy has embarked on an upgrading program designed to develop a balanced fleet suited to operations in archipelagic waters. The navy's mission was to act as a territorial force responsible for the patrol of Indonesia's immense coastline. The vast majority of operational ships are stationed at the main naval base at Surabaya, East Java. Whereas the 1970s saw an increase in the fleet's ship inventory, the 1980s witnessed a major effort to improve the navy's armament posture through the purchase of the Harpoon weapons system and the MK-46 torpedo. Purchase of Russian missiles would not come with the political restrictions that come with US weapons.

Structurally, the navy comprises the headquarters staff at Jakarta under the overall command of the navy chief of staff, two fleet commands (the Eastern Fleet in Surabaya, the Western Fleet in Jakarta), the marine corps, a small air arm, and a military sealift command.

In the early 1990s, naval warships generally were not deployed to a particular region but were grouped in mobile flotillas, to be dispatched where needed. One mission concerned patrolling the strategic straits through which foreign ships enter and exit the Indian Ocean, particularly the Strait of Malacca. The other mission centered on halting smuggling and illegal fishing, considered to be problems particularly in the areas near the Natuna Islands and in the seas between Kalimantan and Irian Jaya. In support of the second mission, the navy announced plans to construct a number of limited-role bases in isolated areas in the eastern and western sections of the national territory. Patrol activity also increased in connection with the flow of refugees from Southeast Asia, particularly in the area near the Natuna Islands.

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Indonesia's main naval priorities are probably anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, refugee boat interception, and protecting territorial boundaries and undersea oil claims (eg. Ambalat) against neighbours like Malaysia. This suggests low intensity conflict patrol boats of 100 to 500 tons should represent the vast bulk of surface ships.

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This list of Indonesia Navy vessels is useful. 

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The most recent surface ships acquired by the Indonesian Navy appear to be:

- the Bung Tomo class corvettes - built in 2001-2002 and commissioned into the Indonesian Navy in 2014.

- the four Diponegoro class corvettes commissioned between July 2007 and March 2009, modified versions of the Dutch Sigma class.

- the six Ahmad Yani class frigates were originally launched in Dutch service in the 1960s and commissioned in the Indonesian Navy in 1986.

- four Makassar class landing platform dock ships each displacing around 11,000 tons full load and able to take 5 helicopters.

- Dated but also significant was the Indonesian purchase in 1992 of 16 ex East German Parchims anti-submarine corvettes now given the Indonesia classification Kapitan Patimura Class.


Under Indonesia's new President Joko Widodo (appointed October 2014) Indonesia is also commissioning stealth trimaran patrol craft KCR-60/KCR-40 missile attack craft also at - see August 7, 2015 update) and AS565 Panther helicopters with anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.

Also see Indonesian Navy Submarine details here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Current_Indonesian_Navy_ships#Submarines

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Pete