Any decision to build Australian subs overseas unlikely until late 2016

The likely mild nature of Australia's next Tuesday May 12, 2015 Federal Budget will prove an indicator that the Abbott Government wishes to avoid decisions that might alienate voters. Abbott's idea to "Build submarines overseas" will  increasingly become a decision to be delayed.

The Abbott Government originally planned to make a decision in early 2016  on who (Japan, France or Germany) would build Australia's future submarine and where (mainly in Australia or mainly overseas). Early 2016 was the earliest period after the stages of the Competitive Evaluation Process (and see) were completed and also after part publications of the 2015 Defence White Paper and associated Force Structure Review.

It is likely that the Abbott Government will only make a decision AFTER the next Federal Election (likely in late 2016) that the submarines will be built overseas. 

Considerations are:

- The May 12, 2015 Federal Budget [watch this space] is already shaping up to be mild, risk averse and sensitive not to alienate too many of Australia's 16 million voters. This is because the Coalition Government's austere May 2014 Budget made the Government rapidly unpopular with  average voters. If Abbott were to declare a submarine policy that effectively meant that $20 Billion of Australia's declining revenue would be sent to Japan to buy Soryus this would be very unpopular. 

- The next Election by law must be held on or before January 14, 2017. However Governments rarely call elections in December or January as this causes voter resentment (too close to the major holiday period in Australia). An election in the southern hemisphere Spring ie. September, October or November 2016, is more likely.

- South Australian voters will become increasingly sensitive about shipbuilding job losses (or lack of growth) prior car factory job losses fully impacting. South Australian car factories have closed in the last few years including 1,000 job losses from the Mitsubishi factory closure in 2008 and General Motors Holden in South Australia is due to close by late 2017 with 1,600 job losses. 

Abbott would be mindful that a decision to build the submarines overseas might just lose him the 2016 Federal Election. Not only the Navy, workers and unions but many business leaders in Australia’s manufacturing sector prefer “Build in Australia”. Meanwhile, the submarine issue may influence votes definitly in South Australia but also in Victoria and NSW (both are also involved in submarine builds). The Labor Party Opposition's “Build Submarines in Australia” may prove increasingly attractive.

Hence, only after a September 2016 or October 2016 Election, is a definite Federal Government decision on any overseas build likely.

Pete

Minister Andrews' overseas visit to submarine competitors.

Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews

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I originally wrote  on April 15(using a report of April 10 in the Kieler Nachrichten) concerning Minister Andrews meeting the German and French Defence Ministers and visiting Kiel and Cherbourg. Now there is ministerial confirmation (April 21).

Minister Andrews' itinerary:

April 23, 2015 - Meeting German Defence Minister Dr Ursula von der Leyen, then Visiting TKMS-HDW submarine yard at Kiel, Germany. 
Confirmed in Kiel's newspaper, 
-  Kieler Nachrichten, article of April 10 (Windows 7 or 8 or right-clicking mouse can translate into English). and
-  Kieler Nachrichten April 23 indicated Ministers Andrews, when at TKMS-Kiel, was given a presentation on the HDW 216. He was also given information on submarines TKMS has been constructing for Israel (which are Dolphin 1s and 2s) and Egypt (which are Type 209s]

April 24, 2015 – Meeting French Defence Minister Jean-YvesLe Drian and DCNS senior executives. .  
-  French website of April 21 reporting Minister Andrews visit to Chsubmarine . 
-  Kieler Nachrichten April 23 reported Minister Andrews was to be given a presentation by DCNS, Cherbourg shipyard on the "Scorpene." This may suggest DCNS is not calling its offer to Australia the "SMX Ocean" of "conventional Barracuda" but Scorpene-4000 (probably 4,000 ton (submerged?).

Ministerial Confirmation:

Ministerial Media Release on all this came on April 21.
Ministerial Media Release of April 23 of April 23 visit to German Defence Minister then TKMS-HDW at Kiel
Ministerial Media Release on April 24 of April 24 visit to  French Defence Minister and to DCNS at Cherbourg.

The Ministerial Media releases were all informative and signify that Minister Andrews is serious about finding out what Germany-TKMS and France-DCNS have to offer in Australia's future submarine competition. This systematic openness is a welcome change compared to the  practice of Ministers prior to 2015.  

Minister Andrews spent ANZAC Day (April 25) at commemoration services in France and Belgium.

Still unknown if/when Minister Andrews is visiting Japan, including Tokyo to meet Defence Minister Nakatani then KHI and MHI submarine yards at Kobe, Japan

Accompanying Minister Andrews may be the Australian Navy, Head Future Submarine Program, a senior executive of Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and perhaps a senior executive of ASC.

Pete

Abbott's February 2015 Submarine Promise Juggling Again Controversial

Australian Prime Minister Abbott's juggling of promises on the new submarine selection has again become controversial. Most of this controversy is old however what is new is:

- the lack of communication and joint decision-making between Abbott and his Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop (and presumably with her Department (DFAT)).

- that the Australian "Cabinet's top secret National Security Committee (NSC) met in October [2014] and supported a move that would allow the bulk of Australia's submarine fleet to be built offshore."

Abbott has made two conflicting promises:  :

1.  in 2013 - mid 2014 to South Australia that 12 new submarines would be built in South Australia, and

2. Abbott's request-promise in mid 2014 with Japanese Prime Minister Abe that Australia wishes to buy 6-12 new submarines from Japan (and built in Japan).

When Abbott's position as Prime Minister is threatened (as in February 2015) he quickly needs to juggle Promises 1 and 2. This juggling may occur again.

On March 16, 2015 Australia's ABC aired a 4 Corners program called "House of Cards" (video and transcript here) that recalled Abbott's juggling of Promises 1 and 2. See shorter report of ABC program (below). This juggling occurred on February 8-10, 2015 when Abbott told Liberal-National Party Coalition politicians that he would allow ASC to participate in an "open tender". This appeared to be a decision moving in the direction of Promise 1, as it would make it possible for Germany, France and Sweden to win and then "build in Australia".

By February 10, 2015 Abbott had apparently forgotten the "open tender" promise and had replaced it (or returned it) to "competitive evaluation proces" generally assumed to mean ASC could play a small part of "build in Japan". "Despite press speculation at the time, the [Australia's National Security Committee (NSC)] did not make any final decision to build the submarines in Japan." However it was assumed by many in the Federal Government and the South Australian Government that the build would occur in Japan (see article below).

This is a March 17, 2015 ABC article about the submarine issues that were brought to the surface in "House of Cards" (March 16, 2015) http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-17/tony-abbott-changed-submarine-tender-policy-leadership-spill/6324620 : 

"Tony Abbott changed submarine tender policy overnight when faced with leadership spill

Four Corners 

By Marian Wilkinson, Karen Michelmore and Mario Christodoulou

PHOTO: One of Australia's current fleet of Collins class submarines, patrolling ocean waters. (courtesy Defence Department)

Prime Minister Tony Abbott took less than 24 hours to agree to re-examine the Government's policy on the $20 billion future submarine project, in an effort to shore up votes against a leadership spill last month.

The ABC's Four Corners program can reveal that Cabinet's top secret National Security Committee (NSC) met in October last year and supported a move that would allow the bulk of Australia's submarine fleet to be built offshore.

The sensitive decision was not announced at the time, although a press release had been drawn up for then defence minister David Johnston.

In February, the weekend before the spill motion, South Australian senator Sean Edwards told Mr Abbott his vote would depend on whether local shipbuilders, including the Australian Submarine Corporation [ASC], would be given the opportunity to participate in a tender for the contract.

"He rang me at 6.30 on Saturday night and I heard from him at ten past three the following Sunday, the next day," Senator Edwards told Four Corners.

"He said he'd had a discussion with the defence minister and they'd come to a position on this, which obviously I was seeking."

Policy change not discussed with Bishop

Mr Abbott did not raise the submarine discussions that weekend with Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, a spokeswoman for Ms Bishop told the program.

This was despite Ms Bishop being a member of the NSC.

Mr Abbott's agreement with Senator Edwards again revisited the previous outcome of the October NSC meeting, which had broken an election promise to construct the submarines in South Australia.

Details of the highly confidential October [2014] NSC meeting were based on accounts from sources closely involved in the submarine project.

Despite press speculation at the time, the NSC did not make any final decision to build the submarines in Japan.

However, it did decide to open the way for their construction overseas because of time and cost constraints.

South Australia's Minister for Defence Industries, Martin Hamilton-Smith, told [ABC's 4 Corners] his State Government "kept receiving feedback ... that the Japan option was very much the option".

"In fact, I was told we may as well give up," Mr Hamilton-Smith said.

Following the leadership spill, Mr Abbott reconvened the NSC and Defence Minister Kevin Andrews announced on February 20 that the Future Submarines Project would involve a "competitive evaluation process".

Under that process, the Minister said the Defence Department would seek proposals from partners that included "options for design and build" of the submarines "overseas, in Australia and/or a hybrid approach" ENDS

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COMMENT

In my article of September 8, 2014 "Australia's Future Sub Likely to be Japan's Soryu, outsider is Germany" I indicated that it was likely Abbott had decided on buying Soryus built in Japan. I felt then and feel now that a foreign build is advisable. In that article I also raised some risks of Australia being Japan's first major defence customer as well as the Soryu's short range compared to what Australia wants.

The US may have put pressure on Japan and Australia to rush a Soryu deal but many details and issues (including substantial Australian participation) need to be ironed out first.   

Pete

Australian Defence Department's requirements for Submarine Bidders

Defence Minister Kevin Andrews successfully asserting himself. Graphics courtesy julian winter.

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Andrews finding it is better to publish strategy papers than respond to media scrums. Photo courtesy Adelaide Advertiser.

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The high level of controversy regarding Australia's future submarine selection has died down over  the past three weeks due to what I see as:

- Prime Minister Abbott's position is now less threatened. He has not needed to reiterate his "build in Japan" preference. Abbott has also withdrawn himself from other submarine comments and public appearances.

- the removal of Sweden's Saab-Kockums from the submarine competition. Saab's business model appeared to be very much "build in Australia" - a campaign Saab was understandably running in  Adelaide ship building circles. "Build in Australia" was facilitated by Saab having no functioning production line for new submarines in Sweden. In terms of production line the Archer class (RSS Swordsman) was re-launched in 2010 leaving a gap until a build date for the A26s becomes public. Potential customers would be reassured when Saab-Kockums's A26 production plans become known. [Stop Press - since I wrote these A26 comments 24 hours ago - Sweden has published a decision Sweden Orders [A26s] "Sweden is to buy two new submarines from constructors Saab Kockums. The A26 subs are to be delivered by 2022 and will cost up to SEK 8.2 billion ($945 million)" ]

- perhaps the main debate reducer was new Defence Minister Kevin Andrews decision to be  assertive and his issuing of the Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program (see  below).

The submarine controversy will of course resurface in acrimony but it is quiet at present. Submarine problems effecting relations with Japan will recur when Abbott's popularity in his Party and in public again slides. Doubts about Andrews may start again once the cost overruns and lateness of the Air War Destroyer and other defence embarrassments again hit the news.

A defence novice but with years of experience in several ministries Andrews is much wedded to defining the strategy and policy environment of major policy initiatives and programs. Hence he  delegated the task of writing a major paper Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program for publication. This task probably fell to the Australia Department of Defence, the Navy and probably the Expert Panel writing the Defence White Paper 2015. It is important that the Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program is consistent with the Defence White Paper (perhaps published around September 2015).

Publishing strategy papers avoids the tendency towards "policy on the run" with many voices issuing  fragmentary and conflicting statements. Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program below was issued as a Minister for Defence Media Release. It is well worth reading in full - as every part is significant and hopefully well thought out http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/02/20/minister-for-defence-strategic-direction-of-the-future-submarine-program/ :

"Minister for Defence – Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program

20 February 2015

Today the Government announces the acquisition strategy for the Future Submarine Program. This announcement sets out further details of the competitive evaluation process that will be undertaken by the Department of Defence.

Submarines are an essential component of Australia’s naval capability and the Government will ensure that the future submarine provides the best possible capability and value for money for Australian taxpayers while maximising the involvement of Australian industry.

Submarines are the most complex, sensitive and expensive Defence capability acquisition a Government can make.

Australia’s national security and $1.6 trillion economy depend on secure sea lanes. We need the best possible submarine to protect our trade and support our maritime security.

It must be delivered in time to avoid a capability gap in the mid-2020s when the Collins Class submarine is scheduled to be retired from service. The decisions we make on the Future Submarine Program will determine what kind of capability we have to defend Australia and Australian interests into the 2040s and beyond.

The process outlined by the Government today provides a pathway for Australian industry to maximise its involvement in the program, whilst not compromising capability, cost, program schedule or risk.

The Government expects that significant work will be undertaken in Australia during the build phase of the future submarine including combat system integration, design assurance and land based testing. This will result in the creation at least 500 new high-skill jobs in Australia, the majority of which will be based in South Australia.

The Future Submarine Program is the largest Defence procurement program in Australia’s history and represents an investment in the order of $50 billion in Australia’s security. These costs will be subject to refinement through the competitive evaluation process. A significant proportion of this investment will be spent in Australia during the lifetime of the future submarine.

Successive governments have used various kinds of competitive evaluation processes for major Defence capability procurements.

As part of this competitive evaluation process, the Department of Defence will seek proposals from potential partners for:
a) Pre-concept designs based on meeting Australian capability criteria;
b) Options for design and build overseas, in Australia, and/or a hybrid approach;
c) Rough order of magnitude (ROM) costs and schedule for each option; and
d) Positions on key commercial issues, for example intellectual property rights and the ability to use and disclose technical data.

In addition to this – and on the advice of Defence – the Government has endorsed a set of key strategic requirements for our future submarines:
a) Range and endurance similar to the Collins Class submarine;
b) Sensor performance and stealth characteristics that are superior to the Collins Class submarine; and
c) The combat system and heavyweight torpedo jointly developed between the United States and Australia as the preferred combat system and main armament.

Defence advises that for Australian industry to have the best opportunity to maximise their involvement in the Future Submarine Program, it needs to work with an international partner.
Based on work completed by Defence, France, Germany, and Japan have emerged as potential international partners. All three countries have proven submarine design and build capabilities and are currently producing submarines.

France, Germany and Japan will be invited to participate in this competitive evaluation process that will assess their ability to partner with Australia to develop a Future Submarine that meets our capability requirements.

The Department of Defence will invite potential international partners to seek opportunities for Australian industry participation in the Future Submarine Program.

The competitive evaluation process will help the Government balance important considerations including capability, cost, schedule, and risk. Interoperability with our alliance partner, the United States, will also be a fundamental consideration.

The competitive evaluation process will take around ten months, after which an international partner will be selected for Australia’s Future Submarine Program. Further details about Australian industry involvement are also expected to be known at that point.

The competitive evaluation process will ensure that capability, cost, schedule, and key strategic considerations, along with Australian industry involvement, are carefully and methodically considered, and avoid unnecessary delays to the Future Submarine Program.

The Department of Defence will soon be holding industry briefings to inform Australian industry about the process and how they can engage with potential international partners.

An expert advisory panel will also be appointed to oversee the competitive evaluation process. Further details about this will be announced once individual appointments are confirmed." ENDS

Pete

Abbott's "Open Tender" Future Submarine Call Doesn't Go Far Enough

Prime Minister Abbott seems to be the main advocate for "Buy Soryu and Built it in Japan" however his hold on the position of Prime Minister (PM) is still threatened. Yesterday (February 8, 2015) PM Abbott appeared to say that the future submarine issue should go to open tender.  But Abbott was not definite in stating what he meant. He did not say "Build the submarines in Adelaide". It was unclear whether the government owned Australian Submarine Corporations (ASC) would be ordered to ally itself with the Japanese Soryu (KHI and MHI) "bid". It remains likely the Soryus would mostly be built in Japan but as is already anticipated the US-Australian developed combat system might be mostly fitted in Adelaide by ASC.
- The extract in that article "It is understood that France, Germany, Sweden and Japan were to be named in a selective tender process that would allow Australia to solicit bids from other governments, rather than just corporations."  is ambiguous. It may be aimed at the US Government providing the combat system. It may also suggest there will be much weight given in choosing the winning "bid" on what bidding governments have to offer. This would favor Japan in the context of the Japan-Australia free trade agreement . The Japan-Australia strategic alliance issue I wrote about in my previous article would also favor Japan. The other contenders (Germany, France, Sweden) do not bring such economic and strategic benefits to the table.

On February 8, rather than making a serious effort to plan the future submarine build Abbott appeared to be just securing votes from Federal Liberal Party politicians from South Australia to support him in a No-confidence meeting on February 9, 2015.

Although Abbott won enough votes (at the 9am February 9, 2015 meeting in Canberra) from his Liberal Party to stay PM Abbott's survival as PM remains unresolved. This is because there was a split vote, 61 votes he should stay on and a substantial minority of 39 votes that he should stand down. This reflects continuing unhappiness at Abbott's non-consultative leadership style. More no-confidence votes are likely in the months to come.

Now that the immediatte threat to Abbott's PM job is over continuing submarine discontent of politicians in Adelaide is being heard. This more recent article (February 9, 2015) from Australia's ABC indicates: The South Australia State Defence Minister, Martin Hamilton-Smith, believes the newly promised shift to an open tender process for future submarines falls short of the Federal Government's promise that ASC would build the submarines in Adelaide. He believed the open tender process could still result in the ships being built overseas. So he believes that Build 12 submarines in Adelaide should be a definite condition of the tender.

- Independent Federal Senator Nick Xenophon said he was also deeply sceptical about Mr Abbott's new promise for an open tender process. Mr Xenophon said the PM should have announced that the tender process would lead to the subs being built in Australia.

- Federal Defence Minister Kevin Andrews urges caution and patience

Overall Abbott needs to be more explicit that he now supports a truly open tender with most of the build in Adelaide - not a rigged tender that favors a build in Japan. If Abbott remains vague, without Prime Ministerial OR Defence Ministerial Media Releases, Abbott may easily renege-backtrack as his 2014 broken promise of "Build in South Australia". 

In terms of what submarines should be built I think the cost of a totally new or heavily modified 3,000-4,000 ton (surfaced) submarines would be too expensive and involve overly long lead-times. Also since the end of Australia's mining boom, 2 years ago, Australia doesn't have the $20-$25 Billions for 10 to 12 large, possibly orphan, subs. More money towards other voter-popular causes (health, education, welfare) would keep Abbott in his job as PM and the Coalition in power.

Large, heavily modified submarines, built in Australia or overseas, are such a tough choice I think Abbott would describe it as a lose-lose decision. 

If I had my way I'd just buy 6 medium size (Scorpene, HDW 214, Dolphin 2, or Kockums A26) from France, Germany or Sweden for $5 Billion TOTAL price (ie. just over A$800 million per submarine).

Odds on Abbott makes no major decision till 2017 - that is AFTER the next election. - even if the US is applying pressure. Regarding US pressure, note this timely scholarly comment of MIT’s Jonathan D. Caverley “The thumb on the scales that has Australia leaning towards Japan for its submarines has an American fingerprint.” (page 19 of Running Faster to Stay in Place: U.S. Defence Exports in 2030 within RSIS’s  http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/the-global-arms-industry-in-2030-and-beyond/#.VNhLU_mUen8 )

Pete

Australia - the future junior ally of Japan - revised

Most of the following article was also publised at Australia's On Line Opinion news http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=17065

The revision is at FURTHER COMMENT below.

As the political reputation of Australia's Prime Minister, currently Tony Abbott, plummets, some of his more outlandish foreign policy ideas are being seen for what they are. This article doesn’t raise the bright ideas of rushing Australian troops to Ukraine, presumably to hold back Russian tanks, or to rush Australian troops to the Middle East, where those troops waited for an Iraqi invitation for two months, but the policy of buying into an alliance with Japan.

News.com.au reported on July 9, 2014 that: “AUSTRALIA and Japan have become partners in a “special relationship” that will see both countries join with the US in a powerful military alliance aimed at curbing China’s influence in the region. During an extraordinary day in the long Australia-Japan relationship, yesterday in Canberra both Prime Minister Tony Abbott and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe pledged to create a partnership for “peace, prosperity and the rule of law”. Fresh from reversing almost 70 years of pacifism embedded in his nation’s post-World War 2 constitution, Mr Abe placed Australia alongside the US at the forefront of Japan’s future defence strategy.”

Alliance maintenance through weapon system purchases has long been a factor in Australia’s relationship with the US. However, as the US has no conventional submarines to sell, there is a joint US-Japanese scheme to sell Japanese submarines to Australia. The purchase price for Australia to secure this alliance with Japan is now around $25Billion (with the recent depreciation of the Australian dollar compared to the US dollar). This is specifically for 12 Made in Japan submarines. Abbott’s budgetary ideas have skimped on health, education and welfare but money is no object when paying for a military alliance from Abbott’s friend, the like-minded conservative Japanese Prime Minister Abe. 

[Note this Submarine Matters article, of February 4, 2015, appears to have triggered a subsequent  article of February 7 in The Australian http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/japan-fears-25bn-submarine-deal-at-risk-in-tony-abbott-crisis/story-e6frg8yo-1227211135322  :-]

By having Japan build our submarines Abbott can also run down Australia’s ship and submarine-building industry, which he sees as a hotbed of Labor, leftwing, union interests anyway.

So what’s in it for Japan? Well the money helps. Japan also frets about what it sees as rising threats from China, North Korea and increasingly Russia. However Japan is mainly thinking about the potential economic benefits of contested islands in the South China and East China Seas.

Few Australians know or care about several disputes in the East China Sea involving China, Taiwan, Japan and others. Possibly the most dangerous Japan versus China dispute is over a small island chain - which is known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, the Diaoyu Islands in China and the Diaoyutai Islands in Taiwan. The importance of the Senkakus are that great unmentionable factor - oil. Oil draws military forces – be they Australian forces in the Middle East or future Australian forces in Northeast Asia.

The US, for its part, is worried about the cost of keeping the world’s oceans open for trade, including oil. Although the US, in the next 12 months, will be spending many extra $Billions to maintain the Asia-Pacific “pivot” against China the US increasingly wants Japan to spend more on defence. Japan’s current defence spending is only about 1% of its GDP. The US also wants Japan to secure military alliances – that is with the few countries interested – not South Korea or most Southeast Asian countries - after Japan’s horrific conduct in World War Two.

The US and Japan are quite explicit in seeing a submarine sale as Australia-Japan strategic alliance cement. A US Admiral has condescended to interpret what an Australian Defence Minister really wanted. The Japan Times of January 18, 2015 reports: "Vice Adm. Robert Thomas, commander of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, reportedly said Oct. 24 [2014] in Tokyo that then-Australian Defense Minister David Johnston was very interested in Japan’s Soryu-class subs. “I talked to him about it four years ago and I said: ‘You want to find the finest diesel-electric submarine made on the planet — it’s made at Kobe works in Japan,’…”

Also in that Japan Times article retired Japanese submarine admiral Masao Kobayashi said."The U.S., which has close but separate security pacts with Japan and Australia, probably wants Australia to buy Japanese submarines because it would greatly strengthen their strategic military ties.”

When anyone bothers to ask ordinary Australians whether Australia should be drawn into a conflict by an additional senior ally (Japan) the response appears encouragingly negative. ABC News (online), January 6, 2015, reported the results of a Survey of over 1,000 Australians, which indicated “Australians would overwhelmingly reject siding with close ally Japan against top-trade partner China over a dispute in the East China Sea and prefer to remain neutral.” In the article Australia's former Foreign Minister Bob Carr said “…as far as the public was concerned, Australia was not obliged under the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) treaty to make a commitment…".

Now it needs to be explained that the Survey, Australian Attitudes on ANZUS and the East China Sea , was commissioned by the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) . ACRI was established in December 2013 with a grant of $1.8 million from a citizen of China. Bob Carr is the Director of ACRI.

Before one writes off ACRI as a support system for Chinese interests and for Bob Carr it must be said that ACRI was officially launched on May 16, 2014 by Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. Given the Coalition’s declining fortunes Bob may be a “former Foreign Minister” for a very short time. He may again be Foreign Minister after the next Federal Election.

If Abbott has his way Australia will be junior ally not only of the US but of Japan with either of those two drawing Australia into their wars. It must be asked “If or when Abbott stands down as Prime Minister would a Coalition Government still pursue an alliance with Japan?”

If Labor wins in the next election would Bill Shorten (who agrees with Abbott’s Middle East policies) pursue an alliance with Japan?

Is a survey a genuine gauge of what Australians’ want? How else can we, the public, influence basic foreign and defence policy changes - including multi $Billion defence alliances with “friends” likely to draw Australia into wars?

FURTHER COMMENT

US Admiral Thomas (mentioned above) might be right that the Soryu might be the closest approximation of what the Australian Government thinks it wants in a submarine. I disagree and think a modified HDW Dolphin 2 or 214, enlarged DCNS Scorpene or Saab-Kockums A26 part or mostly built in Australia, would be more reasonable on military, technical, cost, Australian industrial and political grounds. Regarding Admiral Thomas's public advice to Australia - in the Australian system of values serving military men should not get involved in what are key issues between other countries (in this case Australia and Japan). If the current US Defence Secretary (still Chuck Hagel?) wants to offer advice, then that is his legitimate multi-lateral right and responsibility.

The main problem with the Soryu, apart from "Build in Japan only", is that selection of that submarine brings grave strategic, political and economic risks for Australia. 

That risk centers on being drawn into Japan's battles involving Australia's main trading partner (China). Such Japanese battles may not even relate to Japan's national survival but to sometimes slender Japanese claims to undersea oil resources.

Japan appears immature. Japan is unwilling to introduce peaceful precedent solutions such as those that occured in Northwestern Europe six decades ago. The Western European solution of sharing the oil and profits for "North Sea Oil" is what mature, peaceful countries should be doing in Northeast Asia.

Admittedly politics encouraged Australia from the 1960s to choose then operate the British built Oberon submarines. But Britain by then was not expecting Australia to get involved in Britain's battles. Britain like the US was a long term friend and mentor of Australia - Japan isn't.

Life would be so much easier if the US had conventional submarines to sell to Australia or if Australia took up the US offer in early 2012 for Australia to buy or lease Virginia SSNs.

It is a political and economic necessity that some or most of a conventional submarine build take place in Australia. Australia has the capacity to build conventional submarines but not nuclear submarines. 

These are all things for embattled Prime Minister Tony Abbott to work through - in his relations with Coalition Backbenchers and some Coalition Frontbenchers from Australia's submarine states of Victoria, NSW, Western Australia and South Australia.

BACKGROUND

Note that two senior Australian defence commentators are saying the same thing as me - see:

http://www.theage.com.au/comment/defence-should-not-swing-on-abbotts-whimsy-20150202-133mfj.html, and

http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/574/The-consequences-of-capricious-decision-making

Pete

Balance of Power Senator Lambie AND Limited Submarine Competition?

Senator Nick Xenophon (left) and Senator Jacqui Lambie (right) 

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Balance of Power Senator Lambie

See February 1, 2015 revisions in Red.

The intervention on January 30, 2015 (see ABC article) of Australian Senator Jacqui Lambie in favour of Build the Future Submarine in Australia is of major significance. On that date Senator Lambie and Senator Nick Xenophon visited ASC in Adelaide, South Australia. The significance of the visit and statements by Lambie and Xenophon have been basically ignored by the international submarine industry and commentariat.

Senator Lambie does not tick all the superficial boxes considered important in the industry. She is not a tall, alpha male in a suit, with long experience as a senior politician or a retired senior military commander. She is relatively new to the Australian Parliament and rose to the rank of Corporal in the Army Reserve (however a certain German, who became powerful, rose to Corporal 100 years ago :)

Independent Senator Lambie, however, is one of the major holders of the balance of power in the Australian Federal Parliament with a record of threatening to block - or actually blocking - major $Billion dollar bills (also called "legislation"). Lambie, with other Senators, could potentially block or hinder the Abbott Government's pro-Soryu policy. 

Balance of power comes by way of the governing Liberal/National Coalition not having a majority of seats in the Australian Parliament’s Upper House – the Senate. There are 76 Senators, including:

- Liberal/National Coalition - 33 seats

- Australian Labor Party the main opposition party - 25 seats

The Minor Parties are:

- Greens (who often vote with Labor) - 10 seats

- Palmer United Party 2 seats

- Australian Motoring Enthusiast Party – 1 seat

- Liberal Democrats – 1 seat

- Family First Party – 1 seat

The Independents are:

- John Madigan – 1 seat

- Nick Xenophon – 1 seat, and

- Jacqui Lambie – 1 seat.

The Coalition requires 6 non-Coalition Senators to pass bills. Labor and the Greens regularly vote against the Coalition. This often leaves a Balance of Power situation where the governing Coalition needs 4 Senators from the other Minor Parties and/or Independents to vote with the Coalition. 

Jacqui Lambie has been the most recent Senator to become an Independent and she is the most unpredictable Senator.

Before voting the Coalition Government often has to "horse trade" on issues to avoid the embarrassing situation of having legislation blocked in the Senate because there are too many Senator votes against the Coalition's piece of legislation.

Senator Lambie is highly principled and represents Australia's smallest State, Tasmania. She might  expect some components for any new submarine would be made in Tasmania.

Senator Nick Xenophon from the submarine building and sustainment State of South Australia is coordinating efforts with Senator Lambie to potentially threaten to block any Submarine Made in Japan moves.

They admit they are coordinating efforts because Prime Minister Abbott's power is declining - making more amenable to the idea of Build in Australia. They recognise the major push for Soryu Made in Japan comes from Abbott's parliamentary office not Defence Minister Andrews' office.

The fall of the Coalition State Government in Queensland on the night of January 31, 2015 has further weakened Abbott's position.

Limited Submarine Competition

Separately in the ABC article is the prediction that: The Abbott government "is expected to announce a limited competition for the new generation submarine project involving firms from Japan, Germany and France in a matter of weeks." 

A limited competition is quite possible, but given a submarine purchase may cost $20+ Billions, the competition and the bids (or re-bids) from Japan, Germany and France would probably be long and comprehensive. The "competition" may also be used by Abbott and Andrews as a false exercise in "due diligence" to confirm that the current choice - the Soryu - has "won" the "competition". Choice of the Soryu, after all, is heavily about alliances - about alliance obligations to the US and by extension Japan - not only about the usual tender technical parameteres.

Pete

Australian Prime Minister's Decline Weakening "Buy Soryu"

Are the sinking fortunes of Prime Minister Abbott also sinking the Soryu?

The last week has presented a further example of Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott's  lamentable political  judgement. Abbott is weakening his influence in his own Liberal Party and in Australia generally.

Regarding Australia's biggest future defence purchase - Abbott has frustrated many in his Party by going beyond the normal prime ministerial role. This is in terms of Abbott going over the heads of his former Defence Minister and perhaps his current Defence Minister Kevin Andrews in unilaterally(?) selecting a specific high cost weapons system - the Soryu submarine. If Abbott is doing this to please the US, and/or to build a special relationship with like-minded conservative politician Abe, then Abbott might want to reconsider. A proper tender for the future submarine is needed.

The future submarine (Soryu or not) may be with Australia for 45 years (selection, production, then in-service) perhaps long after Abbott and Abe are forgotten.

Abbott's support for the Soryu has always been opposed by most in his own Party, by many in the Australian Navy and probably most defence civilians in Canberra and Adelaide. With Abbott's decline the Soryu's chances of selection has declined. If or when Abbott is removed by his Party from the Prime Ministerial position it is not clear whether Abbott's policy of "buy Soryu and build in Japan" will be maintained.

Japan may not always be an ally but even a problem for Australia - as has happened before. At a minimum Japan may want Australia to join Japan in armed confrontation against China. Abe and new Defence Minister Nakatani are a rightwing departure from Japan's usual pacifist defence policies. They may change the defence complexion of Japan - not necessarily in line with Australian interests.

Abbott may have a conservative ally and loyal supporter in new Defence Minister Kevin Andrews. However Kevin Andrews is too new to the Defence portfolio, with no track record on defence issues, to have his own base of power to support a Soryu purchase - yet. Like earlier Defence Minister Dr Brendan Nelson Andrews may make a good Defence Minister in the near future.

There is powerful support in Abbott's own Party, the Navy and the Defence Department for the build of part or all of the future submarine in Australia. Germany's TKMS, France's DCNS and Sweden's Saab have made strong bids that support "Build in Australia." This means that if Abbott goes these other bids may win. Japan may need to be flexible enough to counter with a genuine "part or fully build in Australia".

No commentators or politicians are recognising the early January 2015 "Manufacture Soryu submarine steel in Australia" offer as genuine "Build in Australia". This is partly because this Australian steel will just be thrown on Japan's existing submarine steel stockpile. No-one expects Japan to be dependent on Australia for strategically vital submarine steel.

Background

Details on Prime Minister Abbott's latest political mistake, particularly in not consulting his Party, are:

AsiaOne, January 28, 2015 reported http://news.asiaone.com/news/world/australian-pm-abbott-stands-move-knight-prince-philip-takes-criticism-chin :

MELBOURNE Australia - "Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott said on Wednesday he stood by his controversial decision to award Britain's Prince Philip a knighthood and was taking the firestorm of criticism "on the chin".  Several ministers [also called "frontbenchers"] have walked away from Mr Abbott's appointment of the nonagenarian Duke of Edinburgh to the ranks of the Order of Australia, MPs on all sides have mocked the move and the media condemned it severely."

The Australian, a major newspaper from Rupert Murdoch's powerful media empire, ran a highly critical editorial asking: "Tony Abbott is in office but is he prime minister?" http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/editorials/tony-abbott-is-in-office-but-is-he-prime-minister/story-e6frg71x-1227198890579 : 

"The decision to turn a distant duke into a knight Down Under suggests a prime minister who is tone deaf or, worse, complacent in his power to push through a personal preference indifferent to the fact that it is bound to enrage and bewilder many," it said."

Pete

Japanese Concerns Over Any Soryu Sale to Australia

Prime Ministers Abbott and Abe, on April 7, 2014, when they concluded a framework agreement for co-operation on defence equipment and technology (including submarine hydrodynamics). This is/was a preliminary to any Soryu sale. Abbott's political position is now threatened. 
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As Prime Minister Abbott - the main Australian advocate for a Soryu deal  steadily weakens politically it is valuable to consider possible Japanese concerns and misgivings over a Soryu sale.

Several days ago an Anonymous commenter said [retired Admiral]"Kobayashi is not arrogant, he just does not want to sell sub tech, that’s all. Australian thinks that Japan wants to sell her subs like Germany, Sweden or France. But this idea is perfectly wrong and huge misunderstanding, Japan does not want at all. Soryu’s secret is more important and valuable than money which Australia will pay Japan." 

Enlarging on possible Japanese concerns yields the following possibilities.

Unlike other western countries involved in Australia's submarine selection - Japan is the only country actually in danger of conflict - with North Korea and to a lesser extent with Russia and China. Other contenders - Germany, France and Sweden - are not at risk. For these latter three countries the submarine selection is only a commercial-trade matter - while for Japan it is most importantly a strategic alliance, national security matter.

A sale of Soryus to Australia may weaken Japan's national security:

Selling to Australia would involve a major diversion of Japanese industrial and submarine corps resources to plan, train and generally liase with Australian industry and Australian submariners. Japan's limited resources might be better focussed monitoring or more active measures against Japan's potential enemies.

Sales to Australia might disrupt Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) submarine production lines to supply the Japanese submarine corps. This particularly in view of Japan's goal of expanding its submarine corps from the current 16 operational submarine to the goal of 22 submarines. More specifically there may be strategic pressure for a Soryu earmarked (by contract) for Australia on a production line to be diverted to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) instead. Such a diversion might raise political and contractual difficulties for Japan.

The prospect of sales to Australia may encourage the Soryu's submarine builders (MHI and KHI) to modify the Soryus to a standard configuration that does not suit JMSDF requirements. For example it is possible that two reasons for Japan's decision to delete Stirling air independent propulsion (AIP)  from the future batch of Soryus were:
- Australia's assessment, since the 1980s, that AIP is problematic, involving negative trade-offs, that  do not meet Australia's needs, and
- for legal property right reasons Japan could not sell Swedish Stirling engine AIP technology to third countries, including Australia.

It is also possible the future batch of Soryu will have much longer range, to suit Australia's operational requirements but this longer range might not be ideal for the JMSDF's needs.

Due to China's trade value to Australia Japan cannot rely on Australia to support Japan in any confrontation or outright conflict with China (eg. arising from East China or South China Sea matters). Australains see the islands in the East China and South China Seas as more to do with current opportunistic economic claims than national historical claims. This means that in any conflict in those seas Australia may support the claims of its major trade partner - which is China.

Australia's security laws and rules may be detrimental to Japan's security overall. Part of the weakness would stem from Chinese government and corporate  influence over Australia. For example Australia's China situation may result in Australian steel-making companies inadvertently sharing newly acquired Japanese steel secrets with Chinese steelmaking business partners.

Australia's laws overall make racial discrimination illegal in employment - particularly for government jobs, including the submarine corps. A main area of Japanese concern might be Australian tolerance of former Chinese citizens, or ethnic Chinese generally, being inducted as Australian submariners or into broader Australian government or submarine-shipbuilding industry positions. China has a reputation for pressuring ethnic Chinese in the West - even if they have only distant cousins or elderly grandparents still living in China. The Chinese government can deny Chinese citizens careers, lose jobs, lose pensions or worse if their Australia based relatives are not cooperative. Australia cannot match Japan's ability to control the ethnic security of submarine crews or such security in the broader submarine industry.

Soryu Submarine Steel Details - Japan Offer to Australia

A highly automated welding setup for a submarine's pressure hull. In this case a TKMS Type 214 - probably using HY-100 steel.

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For Comments of the Arrium issue see the April 8 2016 Submarine Matters article 
Arrium - Pyne's Submarine Steel Claims Don't Stack Up.


Please connect this Submarine Matters post with subsequent post Submarine Steel Strength, China and Japan, April 8, 2015.

It seemed on January 5, 2015 Japanese government and industry tried to strengthen the Soryu (build in Japan) campaign by taking the extra-ordinary step of publicising what was before a confidential negotiating point - that is Japan would assist Australian steel makers in making the steel for any Australian Soryus that are built in Japan. This may mean 10,000 tons to 20,000 tons of special submarine steel made in Australia.

Japan's Naval Steel (NS) Proof Stress Measure

A slight aside - European submarine makers may use an "EN" measure. I am advised by an Anonymous commenter that TKMS-HDW 214 hull is made of "EN" or "WL" 1.3964 (correspond to HY-80) non-magnetic steel. "EN" may mean European Naval while "WL" in German means "Werkstoff Leistungsblatt" (Material Performance Sheet of VG Standard) - see http://www.gl-group.com/infoServices/rules/pdfs/gl_ii-1-6_e.pdf .  The US uses a High Yield (HY) unit of measure. Shows how confusing and complex steel measures are! On topic - the Japanese Ministry of Defence uses a "Naval Steel (NS) measure for steel proof stress.

An excellent Japanese document http://www3.ocn.ne.jp/~y.hirama/yh_e_papers_sub_f.html  

"History of the Japanese Submarine (After WWII)" indicates the Japanese submarine steel used for the Japanese Oyashio submarine class that preceded the Soryu class. Perhaps the Soryus use the same steel as the Oyashios. The Japanese Ministry of Defence designation for the Oyashio-Soryu(?) steel is  "NS80" and also NS110. NS80 means a proof stress of 80kgf/mm2 (indicated in Japanese language document http://www.mod.go.jp/trdi/data/pdf/G/G3111C.pdf , page 4, table 4.2.1 left column, with "耐力" meaning "proof stress") NS80 converts to 113,760 lbf/in2 or HY-114. 

If also used in the Oyashios and Soryus NS110 means 110kgf/mm2 proof stress converting to 156,414 lbf/in2 or HY-156.

How this "Combination" of steels are configured is unknown. It may (?) mean:

- each hull of a double hull uses NS80 and/or NS110

- different parts along the the hull use those different grades, or

- perhaps there is a "sandwich" of the two grades.

Language and conceptual difficulties seem considerable with Australian (DSTO or Bisalloy?)  metallurgists perhaps having to frequently make NS to HY conversions using http://www.endmemo.com/sconvert/kgf_mm2ksi.php ?

In terms of depth HY-156 for the Soryu may indicate an operating depth of just over 600 metres (2,000 feet) with a "crush depth" much deeper than that.

On Materials (“HY-80” and “HY-100”, "maraging" and "composites) see BACKGROUND below.

Submarine Steel in Australia

In contrast to Oyashio-Soryu "NS" Steel the Collins class “hull is constructed from a high-tensile micro-alloy steel, developed by Swedish steel manufacturer SSAB, and improved by BHP of Australia, which was lighter and easier to weld than the HY-80 or HY-100 nickel-alloy steel used in contemporary submarine construction projects, while providing better results in explosion bulge testing" [see Yule & Woolner, The Collins Class Submarine Story, pp. 165–174].

So Japan’s (and perhaps Australia’s) future Soryus (the yet to be launched "Soryu 2s") use a steel  combination apparently beyond the capabilities of HY-80 or HY-100 used in the Collins. 

It is likely that an Australian steel maker will only contribute a portion of the steel tonnage to a pre-existing stockpile in Japan of submarine grade steel. It is highly unlikely that Japan would rely on Australia to be the sole/only source of submarine grade steel for the Soryu. Unsurprisingly Japan values its national autonomy in materials for Japanese developed weapons like the Soryu.

Australian companies approached by Japan may include BHP-Billiton and BlueScope Steel. However the main company Japan approaches is likely to be current naval steelmaker Bisalloy Steels Pty Ltd based in Port Kembla-Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia. 

In the 1980s-1990s Bisalloy supplied 8,000 tonnes of hardened steel for the Collins submarine program with research and development involvement of BHP and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO).

Bisalloy Steels Pty Ltd (company website) has connections to Indonesia (PT Bima Bisalloy), Thailand (Bisalloy Thailand) and from July 2011 investment in the Chinese CJV - Bisalloy Jigang (Shandong) Steel Plate Co. Ltd. It would be crucial that Japanese-Australian submarine steel technology does not find its way to foreign affiliates - particularly China.

The DSTO connection is interesting because in July 2014 it was announced that Australia and Japan had agreed to jointly carry out submarine related defence research under an Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology (text of the Agreement as provided by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)).

As well as the publically stated Marine Hydrodynamics Project this Agreement may involve submarine steel and the DSTO Maritime Division. See DSTO Maritime Division Naval Architecture Project: “Structural materials and fabrication systems - Our Structural Materials and Fabrication Systems group encompasses the performance and assessment of structural materials and fabrication methodologies that may be used in naval structures or critical components within a naval platform. This includes metallurgical assessments and material assessment technologies for both initial selection as well as ensuring through life performance for fatigue.”

BACKGROUND

WHAT DO “HY-80”, “HY-100”, "Maraging" and Composite Use mean?

The English speaking world is more accustomed to talking about HY units of measure. I originally was going to limited this section to HY (high yield steel) issues - the "Harish" (on maraging) and Anonomous (on Composites) asked timely questions in Comments.

HY-80 and HY-100

See http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/deep.htm:

"A submarine's hull is normally constructed of steel, or exceptionally of titanium. Special High Yield [HY] steel alloys have been developed to increase the diving depth of submarines, although the improved depth performance of these alloys imposes a price of increased fabrication challenges. These special steels are denominated by their yield stress in thousands of pounds per square inch -- thus HY-80 steel has a yield stress of 80,000 pounds per square inch [called 80 kpsi or more usually 80 ksi] [corresponding to a depth of 1,800 feet], HY-100 a a yield stress of 100,000 pounds per square inch [100 ksi][corresponding to a depth of 2,250 feet], and so on.

During World War II, American fleet submarines normally operated at a depth of 200 feet, though in emergencies they would dive to a depth of 400 feet.

Post-War American submarines, both conventional and nuclear, had improved designs and were constructed of improved materials [the equivalent of "HY-42"]. These boats had normal operating depths of some 700 feet, and a crush depth of 1100 feet.

The Thresher, the first American submarine constructed of HY-80 steel, reportedly had a normal operating depth of 1,300 feet, roughly two-thirds the crush depth limit imposed by the HY-80 steel.

The Seawolf, the first American submarine constructed of HY-100 steel, is officially claimed by the Navy to have a normal operating depth of "greater than 800 feet," and estimated here as 1,300 feet (400 metres). If there is a linear increase then the possible HY-156 for the Soryu may indicate an operating depth of just over 600 metres that is 2,000 feet.

The Soviet Alfa submarines, constructed of titanium, reportedly had an operating depth of nearly 4,000 feet.” 

An interesting February 2008 discussion of the tradeoffs of HY and other materials is here: http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/navy-maritime/steel-alloy-modern-cold-war-subs-7346/ : "I am wondering why in the newest American Seawolf Subs only HY-100 steel (Yield of 100,000 psi) is used, while there were rescue Subs in the 1960s (!) that already had HY-140 steel. Los-Angeles-Subs only have HY-80 steel alloys, what technichal reason is there to use not steel with higher yield?..."

Maraging?

See http://www.keytometals.com/page.aspx?ID=CheckArticle&site=kts&NM=99 . This paper is highly complex. Here is a conversion website for 1,000 pounds per square inch (ksi) and Mega Pascals (Mpa) http://www.convertunits.com/from/ksi/to/Mpa
Under sub-hearding "Medium-Alloy Hardenable Steels"
"There is another type of steel in this general class which is a medium-alloy quenched and tempered steel known as high-yield or HY 130/150. This type of steel is used for submarines, aerospace applications, and pressure vessels, and is normally available as plate. This steel has good notch toughness properties at 0°C and below. These types of steels have much lower carbon than the grades mentioned previously."
Under sub-heading "High-Nickel Maraging Steels" 
"This type of steel has relatively high nickel, and low carbon content. It obtains its high strength from a special heat treatment called maraging. These steels possess an extraordinary combination of ultra-high-strength and fracture toughness and at the same time are formable, weldable, and easy to heat treat. There are three basic types: the steels with 18% nickel, 20% nickel, and 25% nickel. These steels are available in sheet, forging billets, bars, strip, and plate. Some are available as tubing."

Pete's Comment - It seems HY steel (alloy) has toughness but is flexible enough to frequently experience the contractions and expansions of a submarine operating under different pressures-depths. The maraging process meanwhile provides very hard steel (alloy) but that steel is brittle. That steel is not flexible enough for multi-depth expansion and contraction. Maraging steel is particularly useful for tolerating rapid heat changes, making it useful in a submarine's engine but not for a submarine's hull.

Composite Use in Submarines

It seems that in parts of submarine exteriors, and I imagine even more so inside the sub, composities are increasingly used, to save weight and for other benefits. The pressure hulls may remain mainly HY steel or titanium (in some Russian subs?). Areas that heat up greatly may also remain steel.

A statement that probably applies more widely to other submarine makers and nuclear subs is  https://www.thyssenkrupp-marinesystems.com/en/composite-materials.html:

"Constant evolution of [TKMS-HDW subs] allowed for the intensified application of composites. Today for both HDW Class 212A and HDW Class 214 designs beside the traditional Glass-fibre Reinforced Plastics (GRP) also Carbon-Fibre Reinforced Plastics (CFRP) are used. These are used in particular when it comes to the design of large three-dimensional shapes or when outstanding transparency is required, e.g. to cover specific sonar windows."

Pete's Comment - This composite use over sonars may be to avoid steel obscuring too much of the sonar signal spectrum-spread. Also sonars are usually/always? outside the pressure hull - so steel to handle pressure is not required.

Pete