Showing posts with label DCNS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DCNS. Show all posts

May 4, 2015

Defence Minister Kevin Andrews Apr 24, 2015 Visit to DCNS Cherbourg

The SSBN Le Terrible under construction at DCNS Cherbourg submarine yard before its launch in 2008. Note the "H" plane rudder arrangement (more obvious here).
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Artist's conception of a Barracuda SSN (Courtesy of naval-technology (nt)). The first Barracuda Suffren is expected to be launched in 2017. It has X plane rudders typical of many SSKs and SSNs. I have not seen any photo of a Barracuda under construction. Can anyone help?
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Submarine Matters has covered Soryu and German TKMS submarine issues much more than issues  concerning France's DCNS. Little is known about what future submarine DCNS is offering to Australian future submarine selectors.  The French submarine might be called "conventional Barracuda SSK" or "SMX Ocean" both presumably weighing the same as the Barracuda SSN - 4,700 tonnes (surfaced). Or perhaps DCNS is offering an enlarged Scorpene of 4,000 tonnes (submerged) - hence "Scorpene-4000". The following is a NewswireToday report of April 24, 2015 http://www.newswiretoday.com/news/152321/ :

"DCNS Welcomes Australian Defence Minister to Cherbourg Shipyards"

“Cherbourg, Manche, France, 2015/04/24 - , Hervé Guillou, chairman and chief executive of DCNS Group, welcomed the Australian Minister for Defence, Hon. Kevin Andrews MP, to the company’s shipyards in Cherbourg, France.The Minister was given a tour of DCNS’ shipyard and explanation was given to him on the overall SSN / SSK capability and expertise of the site.

Cherbourg is the industrial base for DCNS and the heart of the company’s submarine capability. The city’s port has a long military history and has specialised in the construction of submarines since the late 19th century. From this date, 107 submarines have been built in Cherbourg, including 16 nuclear powered submarines. Currently, four Barracuda SSN are under construction in the shipyard. The first of class will be delivered to the French Navy in 2017.

DCNS has established a subsidiary company, DCNS Australia, in order to support its business operations in Australia.

“DCNS, in cooperation with the French Government, is supporting the Australian Government’s Competitive Evaluation Process for the Future Submarine program,” Mr Guillou said. “In coming months, DCNS will provide a total solution that meets all of the Royal Australian Navy’s needs”."


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Media Release: Minister for Defence – Ministerial visit to France – 24 April 2015 
http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/04/24/minister-for-defence-ministerial-visit-to-france-24-april-2015/

Pete

April 15, 2015

Minister Andrews' overseas visit to submarine competitors.

Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews
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I originally wrote  on April 15(using a report of April 10 in the Kieler Nachrichten) concerning Minister Andrews meeting the German and French Defence Ministers and visiting Kiel and Cherbourg. Now there is ministerial confirmation (April 21).

Minister Andrews' itinerary:

April 23, 2015 - Meeting German Defence Minister Dr Ursula von der Leyen, then Visiting TKMS-HDW submarine yard at Kiel, Germany. 
Confirmed in Kiel's newspaper, 
-  Kieler Nachrichten, article of April 10 (Windows 7 or 8 or right-clicking mouse can translate into English). and
-  Kieler Nachrichten April 23 indicated Ministers Andrews, when at TKMS-Kiel, was given a presentation on the HDW 216. He was also given information on submarines TKMS has been constructing for Israel (which are Dolphin 1s and 2s) and Egypt (which are Type 209s]

April 24, 2015 – Meeting French Defence Minister Jean-YvesLe Drian and DCNS senior executives. .  
-  French website of April 21 reporting Minister Andrews visit to Chsubmarine . 
-  Kieler Nachrichten April 23 reported Minister Andrews was to be given a presentation by DCNS, Cherbourg shipyard on the "Scorpene." This may suggest DCNS is not calling its offer to Australia the "SMX Ocean" of "conventional Barracuda" but Scorpene-4000 (probably 4,000 ton (submerged?).

Ministerial Confirmation:

Ministerial Media Release on all this came on April 21.
Ministerial Media Release of April 23 of April 23 visit to German Defence Minister then TKMS-HDW at Kiel
Ministerial Media Release on April 24 of April 24 visit to  French Defence Minister and to DCNS at Cherbourg.

The Ministerial Media releases were all informative and signify that Minister Andrews is serious about finding out what Germany-TKMS and France-DCNS have to offer in Australia's future submarine competition. This systematic openness is a welcome change compared to the  practice of Ministers prior to 2015.  

Minister Andrews spent ANZAC Day (April 25) at commemoration services in France and Belgium.

Still unknown if/when Minister Andrews is visiting Japan, including Tokyo to meet Defence Minister Nakatani then KHI and MHI submarine yards at Kobe, Japan

Accompanying Minister Andrews may be the Australian Navy, Head Future Submarine Program, a senior executive of Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and perhaps a senior executive of ASC.

Pete

March 29, 2015

Kevin Andrews' speech prompts questions of evaluation process fairness

 It is difficult to find a photograph of Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews letting himself be filmed with a submarine. Here's the next best thing - reflections of what looks to be a submarine in Andrew's binoculars (Photo courtesy thevine.com).
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The following are the portions of a speech most relevant to submarines made by Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews on March 25, 2015 at Australia's Future Submarine Summit (“Sub Summit”) Adelaide, South Australia, March 24-26, 2015, http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/03/25/speech-rusi-submarine-summit-25-march-2015/ :


COMMENT

The Andrews speech and other statements made by Australian government officers and officials at the Summit appeared to confirm a growing belief the evaluation process may not be truly competitive. This is due to what appears to be an unequal match between the official competitors, which are:

- the Government of Japan (including Prime Minister Abe and the Japanese Ministry of Defence (JMD) in part drawing advice from MHI and KHI). Significantly Japan is backed by overt US Government support *

versus 

- only companies: TKMS from Germany and DCNS from France. 

European company representatives at the Summit questioned this mismatch and many wondered how the evaluation process could possibly be fair when Japan was being dealt with on a government-to-government basis while the German and French builders were on a commercial level. “It looks to me like the decision might already have been made,” said one CEO who asked to remain anonymous. “This whole process clearly favours Japan.”

* US Support for Japan's Bid

The Japan Times reported: "Vice Adm. Robert Thomas, commander of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, reportedly said Oct. 24 [2014]  in Tokyo that then-Australian Defense Minister David Johnston was very interested in Japan’s Soryu-class subs.
“I talked to him about it four years ago and I said: ‘You want to find the finest diesel-electric submarine made on the planet — it’s made at Kobe works in Japan,’ Thomas was quoted as saying by Bloomberg News."
PORTIONS OF SPEECH

Minister for Defence – Speech – RUSI Submarine Summit – 25 March 2015

Submarines are the most complicated, sensitive and expensive Defence capability acquisition a Government can make in meeting that responsibility.
An effective submarine capability plays a critical role in Australia’s defence in conjunction with all Australian Defence Force elements.
I have previously stated – as a Government and as a nation, we have one chance to get this decision right.
Because of the previous government’s refusal for 6 years to make a decision on the replacement for the Collins class submarines, we had a looming security and capability gap arriving in about ten years.
The process that I recently announced is the best way forward to ensure that such a gap will not occur, simultaneously delivering the best possible capability to the ADF and value for money to Australian taxpayers.
Geographically we are an island continent, the world’s sixth largest country by area. This unique geography means we have special requirements for Australia’s future submarines.
Australia’s national security and our $1.6 trillion dollar economy rely on the unencumbered use of the sea.
Seventy per cent of Australia’s exported goods and services, by value, travel by sea, an export trade worth more than $220 billion in 2012-13. We are a maritime nation and we need maritime security.
By 2030, half of the world’s submarines will be in Australia’s broader strategic region. The Indo-Pacific region has some of the fastest growing economies in the world and the demand for defence technology to safeguard the region’s prosperity and security is ever increasing.
The future submarine programme represent a $50 billion investment in Australia’s safety and security – the largest Defence procurement in Australia’s history – with up to two thirds of this investment being spent in Australia during the lifetime of the future submarine.
To the average Australian taxpayer this may seem to be a huge price to be paid for a capability that may never be used in anger.
But that cost also needs to be measured against the major investment that would need to be made by any adversary to counter the effect of our submarines.
The complexity of Australia’s strategic environment means our defence planning has to cater for a range of possible contingencies, but particularly focussed on maintaining stability in our region and ensuring that conflict doesn’t have the chance to start. So submarines remain a logical and necessary investment in Australia’s wider defence capability.
And for this reason, Australia’s future submarine must give us a significant capability edge in our region as well as meet our needs in respect of geography and strategic outlook.
We need submarines capable of operations at long range over extended periods because they defend our interests far from our shores. The range and endurance must be similar to that of the Collins class submarine.
They are an essential part of our national security capability.
Another key strategic requirement for our Future Submarines includes sensor performance and characteristics that are superior to that of the Collins class submarine.
We need the sovereign ability to maintain the future submarine over coming decades, including repairs, modifications and certifying it as safe for use.
AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY INVOLVEMENT
Now I acknowledge that – in recent times – there has been some anxiety about the future submarine programme.
This is why I announced the acquisition strategy in February – to provide a pathway for Australian industry to maximise its involvement in the program, whilst not compromising capability, cost, program schedule or risk.
The Government supports local industry and recognises how valuable it is to our nation. As Minister for Defence, I want to see a sustainable and viable industry better able to support Defence.
In 2014-15 financial year, Defence expects to spend $6.2 billion on equipment acquisition and support in Australia.
This equates to around 53 per cent of the military equipment acquisition and support expenditure this year, and is consistent with long-term averages of between 50 and 55 per cent being spent in Australia.
The Government does support local Defence industry.
When it comes to making decisions on Defence capability, the needs of the Australian Defence Force will – must – always come first.
The Government will acquire Defence capability that supports ADF requirements first and Australian industry can play a very significant role in this process.
Our sailors, soldiers or airmen and women need the right equipment and industry needs to demonstrate that they are world leaders, producing the best product at the best price.
SUBMARINES AND DEFENCE INDUSTRY
When it comes to Future Submarines, Australian industry will play an important role in delivering the best possible equipment at the best value for money.  
There will be many new high-skill jobs in Australia for the life of the Submarine program, decades into the future.
Significant work will be undertaken in Australia during the build phase. At a minimum, this includes combat system integration, design assurance and land-based testing.
There will be significant opportunities arising from the support and maintenance of the submarine for decades. In dollar terms, this often accounts for two-thirds of the investment.
All three potential international partners will require significant redesign work to be undertaken on their existing submarines. There are opportunities here for Australia.  
I want to make it clear – that maintenance can occur in Australia, even if there is an overseas build. The important consideration, and a lesson from Collins, is to ensure that maintenance and knowledge transfer are planned from the early stages of design.
As I mentioned previously, this is a busy time for Defence acquisition – and there are many exciting opportunities ahead for industry.  
Here in South Australia alone – over the next four years – subject to the outcomes of the Defence White Paper – there will be up to $4.4 billion in Defence spending for building and sustaining Defence materiel.
PROGRAMME OF ENGAGEMENT WITH DEFENCE INDUSTRY
As the competitive evaluation for the Future Submarine proceeds, Defence is engaging with a number of key industry representatives.
This includes engaging with Austrade and the Department of Industry and Science, along with engagement with State Governments, the Australian Industry Group, the Australian Industry Defence Network and the Australian Business Defence Industry Unit.
Here, in South Australia, Defence is consulting with Defence SA, the Defence Teaming Centre and, of course, ASC and other companies.
Importantly, the potential international partners that will deliver Australia’s Future Submarine fleet need to understand Australian industry’s capabilities and skill sets.
During a meeting yesterday between Defence and Department of Industry officials, State Government representatives, and defence industry groups, there was agreement to the SEA 1000 Industrial Engagement Strategy.  This included the formation of the State and Industry Association Consultative Group, comprising all attendees.
The SEA 1000 Industrial Engagement Strategy involves the members of this group working together with the common aim of providing competitive Australian companies with meaningful opportunities to demonstrate their capabilities and skills to international partners.
The strategy includes bimonthly meetings to monitor progress against planned activities that include preparation sessions for Australian industry, the development of company profiles to be provided to international partners, a schedule of interactions between the partners and state-based organisations, and visits by the partners to states across Australia to meet with company representatives and visit facilities.
These activities will commence in early April with briefings to major companies operating in Australia, and progress throughout the remainder of the year. 
The engagements between international partners and industry will be scheduled to complement the development their pre-concept designs, allowing timely judgments of how to best involve Australian capabilities and skills in their proposals.
Importantly, there is agreement on the need for a coordinated and consultative approach to the engagement, which offers international partners full visibility of how Australian industry can support the project and maximise Australian industrial involvement
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS
As the Government has announced, France, Germany and Japan have emerged as potential international partners. All three countries have proven submarine design and build capabilities and are producing submarines.
The competitive evaluation process will ensure that capability, cost, schedule and key strategic considerations, along with Australian industry involvement, are carefully and methodically considered, and avoid unnecessary delays to Australia’s future Submarine program.
As part of the competitive evaluation, Defence will seek proposals from potential partners for:
  • Pre-concept designs based on meeting our capability criteria;
  • Options for design and build overseas, in Australia, and/or a hybrid approach;
  • Rough costs and schedule for each option; and
  • Positions on key commercial issues, for example intellectual property rights and the ability to use and disclose technical data.
The level of Australian industry involvement will be a fundamental consideration, as will interoperability with our alliance partner, the US.
The competitive evaluation will take at least ten months, after which time Defence will bring advice to Government for consideration.
The Government will continue to ensure that a careful, considered and methodical approach is taken in making decision on the future submarine.
The opportunity is now there for industry to engage with international partners and to demonstrate that maximum Australian involvement can deliver an affordable and quality submarine such that this vision can become a reality. 
EXPERT ADVISORY PANEL
As part of the Government’s commitment to a robust and transparent competitive evaluation, we will soon be announcing the appointments to an Expert Advisory Panel to oversee the competitive evaluation process.
This panel will oversee the conduct of the process, including ensuring its probity, managing any conflicts of interest, and ensuring that confidentiality is maintained in relation to all sensitive information received during the process.
This oversight will provide the Government and the public with confidence that the evaluation process not only is, but is seen to be, fair and defensible, and that the will robustly address all relevant factors, allowing Government to balance importance considerations, for acquisition and through life support, including capability, cost, schedule, and risk.
In closing, as you know, the first priority of government is the safety and security of its citizens.
As the newly appointed Defence Minister, I ask that we work together to bring this about." ENDS
Pete

March 25, 2015

Thailand may eventually purchase two submarines

What appears to be a commissioning ceremony for two of Thailand's Matchanu class submarine in 1938. They were 370 tons surfaced.
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Model of a Matchanu class submarine (courtesy thaigunship). Submarines, up to 1945, carried many objects on the hull and often had upturned bows - all leading to slow submerged speeds.

For the latest on Thailand's on-again, off-again interest in submarines see Submarine Matters Does Thailand Need Submarines At All? August 12, 2015.

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On March 25, 2015 the Bangkok Post reported a rise in Thai interest in submarines: "A plan to buy submarines for the Royal Thai Navy is on again with strong backing from Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon who wants Thailand’s fleet to be on par with neighbouring countries. [The Thai Navy may wanttwo diesel-powered submarines with displacement of 2,400-3,000 tonnes. The source said the Chinese-made Yuan class is favoured by the committee due to its specifications. The "U-class" [do they mean U-209 class?] from South Korea and Germany also pinged the sonar screen.

Comment - the possible budget reported elsewhere equal to US$1.1 Billion would indicate a total  upfront price for two modern medium sized submarines. 

BACKGROUND

Japan sold four Matchanu class submarines to Thailand in 1938. Thailand decommissioned these submarines in 1951. The early decommissioning was due to the Thai Government's reaction to a failed coup in 1951. The Government dismantled Navy influence - in part by stripping the Navy of its submarines.

In recent years Thailand has been evaluating several small-medium submarine types with a view to restarting a submarine service that actually operates submarines. An interesting entry in http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/thailand/ssk.htm states:

"It has been standard practice with the Thai submarine program ever since it was originally floated in 1959, proposals are floated and subsequently suspended and revived several times until cancelled. It was revived (and canceled again) in 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2003, and 2009."

Thailand has several reasons for its current evaluation of submarines. The reasons include the growth and modernisation of navies surrounding Thailand. Nearby countries have developed submarine services, including India, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and China. 

Bangladesh recently ordering two submarines from China and possible Burmese interest in Chinese submarines provide additional reasons for Thailand to buy submarines. Submarines provide a potent asymmetric defensive weapon for countries with small navies. Submarines also contribute to a country's and its Navy's prestige. The Royal Thai Navy has apparently established a submarine squadron at Sattahip naval base which has  a German-made Rheinmetall submarine simulator, staffed by RTN officers who have received submarine training in Germany, as well as South Korea, over the past two years.

Most submarine building countries have offered to sell two or three submarines to Thailand, including:

- France-DCNS (Scorpene?)

- South Korea-DSME (Chang Bogo class, Type 209 derivative) or alternatively the unbuilt "HDS-500RTN" based on the unbuilt "KSS-500A" (510 tons, crew of 10) which is in-turn a descendant of Germany's HDW Type 207 (Kobben) small defensive submarines.

- China - the "S-26T" which may be a version of China's Yuan class or used Romeo-Ming class?

- Germany-TKMS-HDW Type 209/1400mod and also the Type 210mod 
  
Russia's improved Kilo class (Project 636)

- Sweden? (mysteriously silent). Perhaps two (further) refitted Sodermanland class? (currently Sweden's HMS Södermanland and HMS Östergötland?).

COMMENT

Thailand has been hesitant in acquiring submarines possibly seeking leases, used subs or good credit terms. This is in a business environment where the Thai economy is growing more slowly than anticipated

Thailand appears to be seeking smaller than standard submarines. If used submarines are considered the remaining German built Type 207s (Kobben class) and Chinese Romeo-Ming class are likely to be obsolete and rusty as they have passed or are nearing their 30 year use-buy dates. Design and construction of modern 500 ton submarines are likely to be expensive as they are smaller than standard - requiring higher than usual design costs for low production numbers. As Thailand has had no submarines for more than 60 years there is no easy answer to what Thailand needs - no simple replacement program. The German simulator may increase the chances that Germany or South Korea (using German designs) might eventually win any Thai order. 


I'm wondering about the silence on Sweden. With Sweden's recently announced pre-order of two A26s this may free-up Sweden's two Sodermanland class (currently Sweden's HMS Södermanland and HMS Östergötland) for further refitting and sale to Thailand. This is noting there is a historical precedent where Sweden effectively created Singapore's submarine service using 4 Challenger class (refitted Swedish) submarines. 


The question "what does Thailand want?" remains. Thailand may need small submarines for shallow, littoral waters in the Gulf of Thailand and Andaman Sea yet Thailand may also need medium sized submarines for longer range/endurance. Subs with AIP may be on Thailand's list of needs.


SOURCES 

March 10, 2015

Brazil's New Submarine Program (ProSub) and Australia - March 2015 Update

https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiZc8LOc_tOOboyweeKfDWZOfj04bSik93grzzDe0zebwN9nJ49O5jPgHnHTFUPL1dWp6L7ovd60a6Gvo6hEcXgpaD8FsM1irYIr8AczbS___hM4F2RJ8WBFs25EetLKpBNBMQf/s1600/Itaguia2.jpg
See Guanabara Bay (Baia de Guanabara) to the right of central Rio. Guanabara Bay is the home of Brazil's current submarine base. To the left of Rio is Sepetiba Bay (Baia de Sepetiba). Brazil's new submarine base-shipyard complex at Port Itaguaí, 80 km west of Rio. The creation of the new base is due to base growth, environmental and population concerns including dangers from stored ammunition and the remote possibility of nuclear reactor leakage.
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Please link with: Brazil's Future SSN -DCNS Assistance - Australian Interest? of January 5, 2014.


Brazil's Future Submarine Program (ProSub) Comparison with Australia's

Brazil's decision to build its own submarines is, of course, relevant to the submarine building aspirations of many in Australia. Australia's experience in the 1980s and 90s was similar in that it built its current submarines, the Collins, in Australia just as Brazil built its current Tupi class, in Brazil. A difference now is that Australia aims to have its new submarines built overseas while Brazil is building its Scorpenes in Brazil.

Another difference from Australian is that the fifth and last Brazilian submarine will be nuclear propelled - known as SN-BR. Going nuclear propelled is a major financial and technical risk for Brazil. A roughly comparable case is India's development of its indigenously built INS Arihant. Arihant has been developed with probably closer Russian support than France intends for Brazil. Still India has found that Arihant's reactor has been more problematic than expected with consequent delays in fully running the reactor.

India's experience is also a reminder to Australia that if Australia wanted nuclear propulsion it is probably best for Australia to buy or "lease" complete SSNs from the US rather than evolving indigenous solutions. Arihant is unlikely to be India's last developmental submarine. SN-BR may not be Brazil's last. If SN-BR is based on France's Rubis-Amethyste class SSN that may save Brazil much time and cost. Still much depends on foreign policy outlook. Brazil and India are basically non-aligned while Australia is very dependent on and aligned with the US.

A further difference between Brazil and Australia is that Brazil is pursuing a lower (conventional Scorpene) and high (SN-BR) capability strategy while Australia has restricted itself to a "medium" strategy of an unusually capable conventional submarine.

A similarity between Australia and Brazil is the need to move the submarine base. Australia moved its submarines from (HMAS Platypus) in Sydney from the 1980s to HMAS Stirling (Rockingham, Western Australia). There were several reasons for Australia's decision including the desire to host nuclear submarines of Australia's allies away from a (or the) major city. Implicitly Rockingham also offered the option of being the base for Australian nuclear submarines.

Returning to Brazil - Port Itaguaí shipyard and base is being constructed by the Sociedade de Proposito Especifico (SPE) consortium, which includes Brazil’s Odebrecht (50%), France’s DCNS (49%) and the Brazilian Navy (1% “golden share,” with veto power).

There are many question marks (?) that follow due to language differences, repetition in official sources and much old information in secondary sources. In French and Portuguese Submarine Program is reversed to Program Submarine, hence ProSub. With base-shipbuilding facilities now (fully?) established actual submarine building has commenced.

Brazil's new Conventional Submarines

Four of the five new submarines will be enlarged (75 m long, 2000 tons displacement) Scorpenes of DCNS design "CM-2000" and ProSub designation "S-Br". Brazil's Scorpenes may well have a crew of up to 45 and 18 torpedos or missiles. It is unclear whether these Scorpenes will have AIP(?). The hull of the first Scorpene (Riachuelo) was laid down at Cherbourg, France on 27 May 2010 and flown in prefabricated sections ("jumboized") by Airbus to Brazil in late 2012. Sections (including steel fabrication) for the next three Scorpenes are being made in Brazil.

No.     Name            Laid down               Launched      Commissioned   Based

S40     Riachuelo       27 May 2010              maybe 2018      maybe 2019             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

S41     Humaitá         1 Sept 2013                 maybe 2020      maybe 2021             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

S42     Tonelero         maybe 2015                maybe 2021      maybe 2022             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

S43     Angostura       maybe 2017                maybe 2022      maybe 2023             Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

Brazilian Nuclear Submarine (SN-BR)

Due to non-proliferation and broader political sensitivities DCNS and Brazil claim that DCNS will not actually help Brazil place the reactor in SN-BR. This claim may be somewhat disputed due to the reactor being of partly French design and SN-BR perhaps being based on the French Barracuda SSN. Training of some Brazilian crew on French SSNs is likely - on Rubis-Amethyste SSNs and/or Barracudas.

No.        Name                  Laid down          Launched         Commissioned    Based 

SN10    Álvaro Alberto     maybe 2023        maybe 2030       maybe 2035         Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay

Brazil has medium-long term plans for 5-6 further SSNs if Álvaro Alberto is successful.  

There currently appears to be expectations that SN-BR will be around 100m long and 9m wide. This coincides with France's Barracuda SSN dimensions of: 99.5m long and beam: 8.8m. The Barracuda , when launched around 2018-19 will be 4,765 tons (surfaced) and 5,300 tons (submerged). Therefore the future SN-BR may have a similar displacement when launched around 2030. The broader Brazilian nuclear submarine program involves Brazil's aim to fully enrich and shaping uranium for placement in the submarine reactor.

In 1979 the Brazilian military government of the day created a secret program to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle outside international safeguards. Under the Brazilian navy’s special projects commission (COPESP), the program initially focused on developing a small light-water reactor for submarine propulsion and an indigenous uranium-enrichment capability using gas centrifuges. COPESP began construction of a pilot enrichment plant at the Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó (São Paulo state) in 1987. At the inauguration of the plant, authorities said the facility would produce low-enriched uranium (5 percent enrichment) for existing power and research reactors and for nuclear submarine reactors. [Pete's Comment - 5% enriched Uranium seems very low energy intensity for a submarine reactor. 5% may have been a notional figure to satisfy non-proliferation regulators if the program was exposed.]


Under the 1991 Brazilian-Argentine peaceful use of nuclear energy "Guadalajara" AgreementArticle III states that “none of the provisions of the present Agreement shall limit the right of the Parties to use nuclear energy for the propulsion of any type of vehicle, including submarines, since propulsion is a peaceful application of nuclear energy."

From around 2010 the currently proposed(?) reactor is known as  2131-R Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). France assisted in the reactor design, but the reactor itself will be built in Brazil (?). An earlier NTI article (first paragraph) talked of  land-based test reactor RENAP-11 (of 11 MW), which may not yet have been developed. The submarine reactor itself may be of 48 MW noting that the French Rubis-Amethyste class SSN used PWR reactor known as the K48 with an output of 48 MW. The Rubis weighs 2,400 tons (surfaced). At the upper end of the French scale the Barracuda SSN of 5,000 tons will have a 150 MW reactor. 150 MW would be very ambitious for a first generation indigenous submarine - noting India's INS Arihant publically relies on a 83 MW reactor.

Brazil has probably gone beyond the following description. Currently, Brazil mines and perhaps buys some uranium, converts it into yellowcake. The yellowcake is shipped from Brazil to Canada for enrichment using the hexafluoride gas method. The gas (?) is then shipped to Europe for enrichment by the US-UK-Dutch-German Urenco Group.

In December 2014 it was reported "A demonstration plant was built at the Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó (São Paulo state), which remains a naval facility to provide fuel enriched [by hexafluoride gas cascade] to less than 20% for the submarine program. Currently enrichment here is reported to be to 5% U-235." "less than 20%" enriched is stated because more than 20% enriched is considered Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) which is considered a heightened nuclear proliferation concern. Brazil and France do not want to push things by venturing into political pressures from non-nuclear neighbours or from legal nuclear weapon states like Russia and the US.

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Artist's impression of Brazil's new Submarine Program (ProSub) Base and Shipbuilding facility at Port Itaguai, Sepetiba Bay. Brazil's decision to build its own submarines of French-DCNS designs is, of course relevant, to the submarine building aspirations of many in Australia. 

Current Brazilian Submarines

Brazil's currently has five TKMS Type 209s commissioned 1989-2006 and designated the Tupi Class. Four were built in Brazil. It is unclear whether the first of class, BNS Tupi (commissioned 1989) is still active(?). They are based at Guanabara Bay, Rio Base Naval Almirante Castro e Silva (see first NTI paragraph).

Value to Brazil of Submarines

Brazil’s submarines are seen as a key part of the country’s national defence strategy which includes protection of Brazil’s offshore energy reserves, protecting the Amazon's fresh water and countering great power nuclear submarine supremacy (including that of the US). Nuclear submarine supremacy became a major issue when Britain's SSNs totally dominated (Brazil's neighbour) Argentina's Navy in the 1982 Falklands War. SN-BR can more effectively monitor (remaining submerged longer) and neutralize naval forces - as it can patrol a wider area more quickly.
The nuclear submarine project, because of the dual-use nature of its reactor development and uranium enrichment, has been touted as holding the promise of enhancing both civilian and military exports.
Nuclear propulsion also contributes to Brazil's great power aspirations - short of actually building nuclear weapons.


Sources 

The following sources are useful although there is much repetition and it is unclear what is old and what is current information. Therefore there are many question marks (?).  Comments from Brazilian readers are welcome to fill in the blanks :) 

The website http://www.defesanet.com.br/prosub/ contains a wealth of updates on ProSub.  

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-france-in-deal-for-ssks-ssn-05217/  


For the World Nuclear Association's report, updated March 2015, see “Nuclear Power in Brazil” http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Brazil/

Drawn from USNI http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-06/why-does-brazil-need-nuclear-submarines

Pete