Thailand may eventually purchase two submarines

What appears to be a commissioning ceremony for two of Thailand's Matchanu class submarine in 1938. They were 370 tons surfaced.

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Model of a Matchanu class submarine (courtesy thaigunship). Submarines, up to 1945, carried many objects on the hull and often had upturned bows - all leading to slow submerged speeds.

For the latest on Thailand's on-again, off-again interest in submarines see Submarine Matters Does Thailand Need Submarines At All? August 12, 2015.

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On March 25, 2015 the Bangkok Post reported a rise in Thai interest in submarines: "A plan to buy submarines for the Royal Thai Navy is on again with strong backing from Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon who wants Thailand’s fleet to be on par with neighbouring countries. [The Thai Navy may want] two diesel-powered submarines with displacement of 2,400-3,000 tonnes. The source said the Chinese-made Yuan class is favoured by the committee due to its specifications. The "U-class" [do they mean U-209 class?] from South Korea and Germany also pinged the sonar screen." 

Comment - the possible budget reported elsewhere equal to US$1.1 Billion would indicate a total  upfront price for two modern medium sized submarines. 

BACKGROUND

Japan sold four Matchanu class submarines to Thailand in 1938. Thailand decommissioned these submarines in 1951. The early decommissioning was due to the Thai Government's reaction to a failed coup in 1951. The Government dismantled Navy influence - in part by stripping the Navy of its submarines.

In recent years Thailand has been evaluating several small-medium submarine types with a view to restarting a submarine service that actually operates submarines. An interesting entry in http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/thailand/ssk.htm states:

"It has been standard practice with the Thai submarine program ever since it was originally floated in 1959, proposals are floated and subsequently suspended and revived several times until cancelled. It was revived (and canceled again) in 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2003, and 2009."

Thailand has several reasons for its current evaluation of submarines. The reasons include the growth and modernisation of navies surrounding Thailand. Nearby countries have developed submarine services, including India, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and China. 

Bangladesh recently ordering two submarines from China and possible Burmese interest in Chinese submarines provide additional reasons for Thailand to buy submarines. Submarines provide a potent asymmetric defensive weapon for countries with small navies. Submarines also contribute to a country's and its Navy's prestige. The Royal Thai Navy has apparently established a submarine squadron at Sattahip naval base which has  a German-made Rheinmetall submarine simulator, staffed by RTN officers who have received submarine training in Germany, as well as South Korea, over the past two years.

Most submarine building countries have offered to sell two or three submarines to Thailand, including:

- France-DCNS (Scorpene?)

- South Korea-DSME (Chang Bogo class, Type 209 derivative) or alternatively the unbuilt "HDS-500RTN" based on the unbuilt "KSS-500A" (510 tons, crew of 10) which is in-turn a descendant of Germany's HDW Type 207 (Kobben) small defensive submarines.

- China - the "S-26T" which may be a version of China's Yuan class or used Romeo-Ming class?

- Germany-TKMS-HDW Type 209/1400mod and also the Type 210mod 
  
- Russia's improved Kilo class (Project 636)

- Sweden? (mysteriously silent). Perhaps two (further) refitted Sodermanland class? (currently Sweden's HMS Södermanland and HMS Östergötland?).

COMMENT

Thailand has been hesitant in acquiring submarines possibly seeking leases, used subs or good credit terms. This is in a business environment where the Thai economy is growing more slowly than anticipated. 

Thailand appears to be seeking smaller than standard submarines. If used submarines are considered the remaining German built Type 207s (Kobben class) and Chinese Romeo-Ming class are likely to be obsolete and rusty as they have passed or are nearing their 30 year use-buy dates. Design and construction of modern 500 ton submarines are likely to be expensive as they are smaller than standard - requiring higher than usual design costs for low production numbers. As Thailand has had no submarines for more than 60 years there is no easy answer to what Thailand needs - no simple replacement program. The German simulator may increase the chances that Germany or South Korea (using German designs) might eventually win any Thai order. 

I'm wondering about the silence on Sweden. With Sweden's recently announced pre-order of two A26s this may free-up Sweden's two Sodermanland class (currently Sweden's HMS Södermanland and HMS Östergötland) for further refitting and sale to Thailand. This is noting there is a historical precedent where Sweden effectively created Singapore's submarine service using 4 Challenger class (refitted Swedish) submarines. 

The question "what does Thailand want?" remains. Thailand may need small submarines for shallow, littoral waters in the Gulf of Thailand and Andaman Sea yet Thailand may also need medium sized submarines for longer range/endurance. Subs with AIP may be on Thailand's list of needs.

SOURCES 

My earlier article Bangladesh, Philippine, Burma and Thailand Submarine Issues, January 2, 2015.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/thailand/ssk.htm 

http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/thailand-eyes-submarine-fleet/

http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150115000149&cid=1101

http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/2015/03/hyundai-offers-submarine-hds-500rtn-to-thailand.html

http://www.janes.com/article/48467/tkms-offers-type-209-and-type-210-submarines-to-royal-thai-navy

Pete

Sweden announces pending order for two A26 submarines

Japan, France and Germany are the last three contenders for Australia's future submarine (SEA 1000) competion. The specifications of Swedens A26 (above) have not been made public. The A26 figures may be accurate with suppoting information of a displacement around 2,000 tons. (Diagram courtesy The Australian)

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COMMENT

Good news from Sweden of (pending) production orders for two A26 middle size conventional submarines for Sweden’s submarine assembly line. Australia-Sweden submarine relations have been under stain over the last few weeks due to another of Abbott’s undiplomatic statements – that Sweden cannot build modern submarines. This was in the context of Australia's removal, in February 2015, of Sweden as a contender in Australia’s submarine competition.

Swedish made submarines are not at all out of date. What may have concerned the Australian government more was Saab's (perhaps too strongly) politically insistent campaign alongside South Australian interests for "build in Australia". This may have been understandably prompted by Sweden's deep experience of building the Collins in Australia. Whatever the merits of the Collins build the Collins experience causes caution in politicians. Politicians, most of the public and fair-minded people are almost all outside of the professional inner circle and other interested parties who see/saw virtually no problems with the Collins build.

Under the, perhaps already decided "one horse race" called the “competitive evaluation process” DCNS’s position is not secure either. If Japan dropped out, for whatever reasons and/or the Australian Coalition Government fell, the possibility of returning Sweden to the selection process migh be more favourable.  

Anyway Sweden has made a positive announcement below, which should reassure potential customers that Saab-Kockums are a going submarine concern. I’m wondering whether there will be further announcements on 2 to 3 additional A26s for a total of 4 or 5 A26s to replace the 5  submarines currently in Sweden's submarine service ("flotilla"). An added concern is the emerging Russian threat in the Baltic Sea. Sweden might also wish to build 2 to 4 replacement submarines for the Netherlands although the Netherlands has not yet released details of what it wants. In that regard please connect with http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/02/sweden-and-netherlands-replacement.html of February 19, 2015.

ARTICLE

Marine Technology News, March 18, 2015 reports http://www.marinetechnologynews.com/news/sweden-orders-submarines-510865 :

"Sweden Orders New Submarines

By Aiswarya Lakshmi [and Saab, Peter Hultqvist, Sweden?]

Sweden is to buy two new submarines from constructors Saab Kockums. The A26 subs are to be delivered by 2022 and will cost up to SEK 8.2 billion ($945 million).

"This is the biggest single decision when it comes to economic investments that we will make during this parliament. The decision, to be formally made by the cabinet on Thursday, is to ensure Swedish submarine capability past 2030", stated Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist.

"These are the next generation of submarine. These submarines will be very hi-tech", he added.

The government will on Thursday authorize the armed forces to order two submarines, defense ministry spokeswoman Marinette Nyh Radebo said.

The Swedish government is increasing its defense spending over the coming years, citing a worsening security situation, particularly Russian activity in and around the Baltic Sea.

Defence and security company Saab welcomes the Swedish Minister of Defence, Peter Hultqvist’s, announcement to invest in two submarines of the next generation, A26.

[Acquistions are a multi-stage process, hence not finally signed yet.]

Saab has not received any order on production of the new submarine but Saab looks forward to the discussions, which will lead to an agreement and order for A26. This will be a part of an earlier signed Letter of Intent. 

Saab and FMV (The Swedish Defence Material Administration) signed a Letter of Intent in June 2014 regarding the Swedish Armed Forces’ underwater capability for the period 2015-2024. The Letter of Intent comprises support, development, design and production of submarines and other underwater systems, corresponding to potential orders of approximately SEK 11.2 billion [US$1.3 Billion], provided that necessary decisions are made." ENDS

Pete

Australian Defence Department's requirements for Submarine Bidders

Defence Minister Kevin Andrews successfully asserting himself. Graphics courtesy julian winter.

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Andrews finding it is better to publish strategy papers than respond to media scrums. Photo courtesy Adelaide Advertiser.

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The high level of controversy regarding Australia's future submarine selection has died down over  the past three weeks due to what I see as:

- Prime Minister Abbott's position is now less threatened. He has not needed to reiterate his "build in Japan" preference. Abbott has also withdrawn himself from other submarine comments and public appearances.

- the removal of Sweden's Saab-Kockums from the submarine competition. Saab's business model appeared to be very much "build in Australia" - a campaign Saab was understandably running in  Adelaide ship building circles. "Build in Australia" was facilitated by Saab having no functioning production line for new submarines in Sweden. In terms of production line the Archer class (RSS Swordsman) was re-launched in 2010 leaving a gap until a build date for the A26s becomes public. Potential customers would be reassured when Saab-Kockums's A26 production plans become known. [Stop Press - since I wrote these A26 comments 24 hours ago - Sweden has published a decision Sweden Orders [A26s] "Sweden is to buy two new submarines from constructors Saab Kockums. The A26 subs are to be delivered by 2022 and will cost up to SEK 8.2 billion ($945 million)" ]

- perhaps the main debate reducer was new Defence Minister Kevin Andrews decision to be  assertive and his issuing of the Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program (see  below).

The submarine controversy will of course resurface in acrimony but it is quiet at present. Submarine problems effecting relations with Japan will recur when Abbott's popularity in his Party and in public again slides. Doubts about Andrews may start again once the cost overruns and lateness of the Air War Destroyer and other defence embarrassments again hit the news.

A defence novice but with years of experience in several ministries Andrews is much wedded to defining the strategy and policy environment of major policy initiatives and programs. Hence he  delegated the task of writing a major paper Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program for publication. This task probably fell to the Australia Department of Defence, the Navy and probably the Expert Panel writing the Defence White Paper 2015. It is important that the Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program is consistent with the Defence White Paper (perhaps published around September 2015).

Publishing strategy papers avoids the tendency towards "policy on the run" with many voices issuing  fragmentary and conflicting statements. Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program below was issued as a Minister for Defence Media Release. It is well worth reading in full - as every part is significant and hopefully well thought out http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/02/20/minister-for-defence-strategic-direction-of-the-future-submarine-program/ :

"Minister for Defence – Strategic direction of the Future Submarine Program

20 February 2015

Today the Government announces the acquisition strategy for the Future Submarine Program. This announcement sets out further details of the competitive evaluation process that will be undertaken by the Department of Defence.

Submarines are an essential component of Australia’s naval capability and the Government will ensure that the future submarine provides the best possible capability and value for money for Australian taxpayers while maximising the involvement of Australian industry.

Submarines are the most complex, sensitive and expensive Defence capability acquisition a Government can make.

Australia’s national security and $1.6 trillion economy depend on secure sea lanes. We need the best possible submarine to protect our trade and support our maritime security.

It must be delivered in time to avoid a capability gap in the mid-2020s when the Collins Class submarine is scheduled to be retired from service. The decisions we make on the Future Submarine Program will determine what kind of capability we have to defend Australia and Australian interests into the 2040s and beyond.

The process outlined by the Government today provides a pathway for Australian industry to maximise its involvement in the program, whilst not compromising capability, cost, program schedule or risk.

The Government expects that significant work will be undertaken in Australia during the build phase of the future submarine including combat system integration, design assurance and land based testing. This will result in the creation at least 500 new high-skill jobs in Australia, the majority of which will be based in South Australia.

The Future Submarine Program is the largest Defence procurement program in Australia’s history and represents an investment in the order of $50 billion in Australia’s security. These costs will be subject to refinement through the competitive evaluation process. A significant proportion of this investment will be spent in Australia during the lifetime of the future submarine.

Successive governments have used various kinds of competitive evaluation processes for major Defence capability procurements.

As part of this competitive evaluation process, the Department of Defence will seek proposals from potential partners for:
a) Pre-concept designs based on meeting Australian capability criteria;
b) Options for design and build overseas, in Australia, and/or a hybrid approach;
c) Rough order of magnitude (ROM) costs and schedule for each option; and
d) Positions on key commercial issues, for example intellectual property rights and the ability to use and disclose technical data.

In addition to this – and on the advice of Defence – the Government has endorsed a set of key strategic requirements for our future submarines:
a) Range and endurance similar to the Collins Class submarine;
b) Sensor performance and stealth characteristics that are superior to the Collins Class submarine; and
c) The combat system and heavyweight torpedo jointly developed between the United States and Australia as the preferred combat system and main armament.

Defence advises that for Australian industry to have the best opportunity to maximise their involvement in the Future Submarine Program, it needs to work with an international partner.
Based on work completed by Defence, France, Germany, and Japan have emerged as potential international partners. All three countries have proven submarine design and build capabilities and are currently producing submarines.

France, Germany and Japan will be invited to participate in this competitive evaluation process that will assess their ability to partner with Australia to develop a Future Submarine that meets our capability requirements.

The Department of Defence will invite potential international partners to seek opportunities for Australian industry participation in the Future Submarine Program.

The competitive evaluation process will help the Government balance important considerations including capability, cost, schedule, and risk. Interoperability with our alliance partner, the United States, will also be a fundamental consideration.

The competitive evaluation process will take around ten months, after which an international partner will be selected for Australia’s Future Submarine Program. Further details about Australian industry involvement are also expected to be known at that point.

The competitive evaluation process will ensure that capability, cost, schedule, and key strategic considerations, along with Australian industry involvement, are carefully and methodically considered, and avoid unnecessary delays to the Future Submarine Program.

The Department of Defence will soon be holding industry briefings to inform Australian industry about the process and how they can engage with potential international partners.

An expert advisory panel will also be appointed to oversee the competitive evaluation process. Further details about this will be announced once individual appointments are confirmed." ENDS

Pete

Sweden and the Netherlands Replacement Submarine Needs

A Dutch Walrus class submarine. Note the serrated fin - probably for quieting and/or improved hydro-dynamic efficiency.
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The issues of the Dutch Walrus class submarine replacement and the future Swedish Saab-Kockums A26 development-construction are relevant to Australia's future submarine selection. This would become more important if the Soryu is not selected for whatever reason, forcing Australia to seriously consider European submarine designs. 

Saab-Damen Agreement

Since mid-late January 2015 there have been several reports that Saab and Dutch shipbuilder Damen Shipyards Group have signed an exclusive teaming agreement. This is  to:

- explore future opportunities in the international submarine market including bidding jointly on submarine procurement programmes, and

- explore development of a potential Walrus-class submarine replacement for the Netherlands. 

Netherlands' Situation

The Netherlands operates 4 teardrop hulled Walrus class submarines which are a development of the Dutch Zwaardvis class (2 Zwaardvis were sold to Taiwan). The Zwaadvis was based on the US teardrop hulled Barbel class (the US's last conventional subs).

Walrus specifications:

- 4 launched 1989-1992

- displacement 2,350 tons (surfaced)

- range 18,500 km at 9 knots (snorting) vs Collins 17,000 km at 10 knots (snorting)

- 20 US weapons Mark 48 torpedos and Harpoon missiles (weapons the same as the Collins. Collins has 22 torpedos) which suggest part use of a US combat system already.

- US heritage

- no reliance (like the Collins) on AIP

- like the Collins it has four combined rudders and diving planes in an "X" configuration

- with most NATO submarine being either nuclear or brown water Baltic the Walrus are considered blue water submarines. 

The Netherlands envisages acquiring just 2 submarines to replace the 4 Walruses. Just 2 may mean the Netherlands might want to use/select a common-overlapping design with Sweden. Maybe the Netherlands may settle for modified A26s. 

[As at mid March 2015 the Netherlands' requirements remain unknown.] 

Possible Swedish Role

While Sweden is building its own two A26s Sweden might build the two to four Walrus replacements or at least supply the components for assembly in the Netherlands. 

Sweden's 3 Gotland Class submarines  (launched 1995-96) need replacing by 2025 and 2 Sodermanland class (relaunched 2003) for replacement by 2035(?).

Some extra issues/questions are:

1. How many A26s does Sweden intend to build? Two or five (?) - given the rising Russian threat and the Gotland-Sodermanland two tiered "gap".

2. Will the A26 have the same specifications as provided on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A26_submarine (1900 tons surfaced? A mixture of regular 533mm torpedo tubes and unique 400mm tubes?). Saab-Kockums' own website does not give specifications of diplacement or range. 

3. Will the A26 be built with Lithium-ion batteries?

4. Would there be some technical, industrial and political overlap in the Walrus-class submarine replacement and development and construction of Sweden's future submarine A26?

5. Would the Netherlands find only 2 Walrus replacement submarines an effective number, given the "rule" of three and usefulness to the US alliance experience with the 4 Walruses. 

6. Could the Netherlands continue to justify unusually large SSKs or scale down to the usual European country own use maximum of around 1,900 tons surfaced?

Pete

Costs for the Soryu - As there is no Competition

Pricing is a major part of selection. But what if there is no competition to the Soryu? Diagram courtesy of The Australian.

INFORMATION

When researching the Saab-Damen submarine development  agreement two interesting bits of information on Australia future submarine selection came to light. Marc Brandt, a Brussels-based industry analyst made two significant comments, probably in late January 2015 -  http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/submarines/2015/02/01/damen-saab-sweden-subs-deal/22535665/ : 

1.  "…I understand that there is a general acceptance within Saab, and government circles in Sweden, that Australia's preference for the Japanese Soryu-class sub has put this program effectively out of reach..."

2.  "...the AUS $17 billion (US $13.7 billion) Collins-class submarine replacement program..." .

COMMENT

The first statement supports the increasing belief that Australia's Federal (Abbott) Government has chosen Japan's Soryu. If Saab believes the Soryu is a done deal then the Australian Government's claim that there is genuine "Competitive Evaluation Process" is not being accepted by key players.

The second statement supports indications that Australia is no longer after 12 submarines - just 6, 7 or 8. Choosing as little as 6 submarines is a wise move considering the serious limitations of available Australian funds. Six is also a recognition that Australia has only been able to crew about 2.5 existing Collins at most.

Australia's previous submarine purchases also show a steady reduction in numbers. The numbers of UK built Oberon class submarines (in the Australian Navy 1967-1999) proposed for Australia shrank from 8 to 6.  The proposed number of the Collins (operating 1996 – present) went from 10, to 8, to 6). 

The cost of 6, 7 or 8 may be for a "discount" of around US $14 Billion, ie. "discounted" from the original figures of US$20 to 30 Billion. Of course figures are academic until the last submarine has been launched, commissioned and paid for.

Japan's pricing for Australia, which will be Japan's first major defence customer in 77 years, will be a highly political matter. Japan sold 4 Matchanu class submarines to Thailand in 1938 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matchanu-class_submarine .

Part of Japan's estimate might take into account:

1. how much is Australia (as a new junior ally to Japan) prepared to pay? and

2. how much of the cost of Japan's decade's old submarine development program, including the new  Lithium-ion battery (LIB) Soryu, can be transferred to Australia?

Japan, can only transfer some of its submarines development costs to one country, Australia. This is unlike Germany's TKMS which can, and has, spread the development cost load among 17 customer countries.

Pete

Second Swedish sighting of Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV - UUV - Malsten

Location of the publically known (Swedish website) Malsten (Island) Station (with observable facilities) which operated  undersea cables joining SOSUS and magnetic anomaly sensors. Now modernised?

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See Malsten Station (blue arrow) in relation to Stockholm. Malsten's Cold War vintage equipment may have been replaced by a much more extensive wireless  "SeaWeb" style anti-submarine network in the Swedish archipelago. A modern SeaWeb network would rapidly detect and track any Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV.

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This is a continuation of my October 25, 2014 article on Sweden's first sighting (and sonaring) of a suspected Russian mini-submarine just off Stockholm in mid October 2014. That article theorised that the suspected Russian mini-submarine's close proximity to Stockholm may have indicated its mission was for a Russian agent's drop-off or pick-up or interception of telecommunications signals emanating from Stockholm. In retrospect this seems unlikely and unnecessarily complicated as any agent could cross land borders, go by air or just transmit. Interception might be more efficient within Stockholm - say equipment in the Russian Embassy there.

More likely activity in October 2014 is Russian electronic monitoring of nearby Swedish and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) naval exercises. The submarine may not have been in authentic "distress" rather it used distress messages as a ruse intended to draw "trip" more Swedish and/or NATO sensor "interrogations".

Reconnaissance aircraft indulge in a similar radar tripping activity by flying close to borders -  basically forcing a would-be adversary to turn-on its usually covert sensors. Russian Bear reconnaissance aircraft, under increasingly combative Putin, have stepped up activity against NATO allies partly for the intelligence take. It is unknown if Russian mini-submarines have been engaged in similar activities, but possible.

If such mini-subs have no crew (being large diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (LDUUVs)) the financial and political costs and risks are less. See my earlier post on LDUUVs and the discussion below.

"SECOND" SIGHTING OR LATER SIGHTING OF THE SAME SUBMARINE OR LDUUV

Subsequent (presumably) authorised leaks by Swedish and UK sources in mid January 2015 indicate that Swedish and NATO forces continued to look for suspected Russian submarine activity later in October 2014. UK concern about a suspected Russian submarine off the Scottish coast may be a totally separate (perhaps routine?) matter. A Russian attack submarine (SSK or SSN) may routinely station itself off the coast of northwest Scotland in order to intercept (or gain intelligence) concerning UK (and perhaps US) nuclear submarines entering and, more importantly, leaving UK naval base HMNB Clyde.at Faslane.

Having looked at US advances in large diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (LDUUV) technology I think that a crewed Russian mini-submarine is unnecessary and dangerous when a remotely controlled LDUUV could be used. This is assuming Russia is technically advanced enough to deploy developed LDUUVs? LDUUVs can include unmanned "conning towers" of the type photographed off Stockholm (see intentionally blurry image with little sense of size/scale). If Russia sent a LDUUV Russia could "trip" (activate) Swedish (and NATO?) fixed and mobile anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sensors. The Swedish reaction against a LDUUV (Swedish corvettes, smaller craft, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft) would be worth the Russian military intelligence "take" - even at the calculated risk of a LDUUV being destroyed or captured. 

Sweden alone has insufficient national power to threaten or more fully embarrass Russia. So Sweden likely feigned its inability to find the Russian LDUUV rather than admitting Sweden's limitations in exerting force on the Russian craft. The risk of a self-destruct mechanism in the Russian craft may also have played on Swedish minds. An enterprizing Russian controlled LDUUV may have also moved into the international waters or territorial waters of NATO allies in the Baltic or less likely (due to LDUUV range limitations) the North Sea. The more NATO reacts in military terms the more it reveals to Russian naval intelligence. 

Off Stockholm in 2014 the Russian submarine or LDUUV is likely to have also deployed antennas to send any vaunted "distress calls". The intelligence take (if necessary) could also be sent by UHF radio to Russian UHF receivers or by satellite relay to Russian naval intelligence. Alternatively the Russian craft could merely store the take for handing over once it reached a Russian port or mothership. 

MALSTEN STATION

In terms of Swedish fixed anti-submarine sensors Malsten Station SOSUS (and magnetic anomaly) sensors have been public knowledge in Sweden for decades. Malsten is a small island on which a small hut stands. The hut is (or was) used to power cables that carry sound (SOSUS) and magnetic anomaly sensors. The cables stretch out for a few 100 metres on two sides of Malsten island. The cables and sensors were originally decades old technology - perhaps 1950s vintage. The sensors presumably are (or were) sensitive enough to detect mini-subs or LDUUVs crossing over the cables - alerting the Swedish Navy of illegal entries into Swedish waters. Here is another link on the Malsten Station. With advances in electronics and communications there would no longer be a need for Malsten to be physically manned - other than for security. Sensor detections could (can?) be automatically relayed to Swedish naval bases or to a more centralised Swedish military HQ in Stockholm itself.

Malsten may have been modernised and re-activated (since the Cold War) to meet the resurgent Russian threat. Possibly Malsten and other Swedish SOSUS arrays have been replaced by a much broader undersea and islet-rock-mainland wireless network of the SeaWeb type that may cover much of the Swedish Archipelago. Whether Sweden would coordinate its network with any larger NATO "SeaWeb" network is unknown.

So in conclusion there is much (probably Russian) undersea activity in the Swedish archipelago. Much would happen that is not admitted publically by Sweden, NATO or Russia. When a member of the Swedish public spots a Russian mini-submarine or LDUUV there is some embarrassment in  Sweden. Sweden's defence efficiency is called into question (by Swedish politicians and the Press) due to an evident inability to stop encroachments or (in theory) identify who or what is encroaching.

The Swedish Government feels obliged to reveal some of what it knows - but only a small portion due to diplomatic and security reasons. The UK and NATO might reduce Swedish embarrassment, while increasing Russian embarrassment, by mixing in headlines about what is probably regular detection of Russian submarines off the Scottish coast. The press is happy. The public is reassured - perhaps, and specialist submarine blogger-journalists have more to write about :)

Pete

Corporate Battle Between SAAB and TKMS Over Kockums

The reality of corporate battles (Cartoon courtesy of CartoonStock.com).
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For the latest on this issue see June 11, 2014’s Australia's Future Submarine - Swedish vs German Claims http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/06/australias-future-submarine-swedish-vs.html . It is unclear whether Germany or Sweden hold the strongest intellectual property rights to the Stirling AIP.

The current corporate confrontation between SAAB and TKMS underlines the need for Australia future submarine project (SEA 1000) to be (reasonably) technically self reliant and flexible enough to tolerate changes in the threat-strategic environment, corporate and broader international economic environment. Australia needs as much autonomy as possible in intellectual property, spare parts and test facilities. 

Connect the current escalation in corporate conflict between SAAB and TKMS over Kockums with:

- Kockums loss of its traditional Singapore customer to HDW – see Singapore Buying Two HDW 218SG Submarines – Sweden’s Loss of December 3, 2013http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/singapore-buying-two-hdw-218sg.html , and

- German’s Sinking Kockum’s Swedish Sub-Maker of November 13, 2013 http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/germans-sinking-kockums-swedish-sub.html .

ARTICLE

Birgitta Forsberg of affars Valdern (translated from Swedish) of March 12, 2014 reports http://www.affarsvarlden.se/hem/nyheter/article3811470.ece :

"Thyssen Krupp ask FMV stop Saab"

"Kockums German owners ThyssenKrupp ask FMV stopping Saab from recruiting top people from Kockums.

n a letter to Lena Erixon, Director General for Defence Materiel Administration, [known as]  FMV, asking the head of the German Thyssen Krupp Marine Division, Dr. Hans Atzpodien FMV stopping Saab from recruiting key personnel from Kockums.

Thyssen Krupp wholly owns Kockums but has for years thwarted Kockums from exporting submarines because the Germans also owns the German shipyard HDW where they would rather control the business. Recently, FMV enough of the Germans' delaying tactics when it came to ordering a Swedish Kockums and instead asked Saab to do a feasibility study on Sweden's future submarines.As a result of the Saab has recently recruited top people from Kockums and also went yesterday, Tuesday, issued a press release that the company seeking employees for its shipping division.

The letter writing Atzpodien addition to the Thyssen-Krupp

§  - will support the export of the planned Swedish submarine A26

§  - is willing to negotiate a contract to sell the A26 to Sweden

§  - is willing to offer Swedish authorities influence at board level in Kockums or at least greater  transparency in company

§  - want to invest in to let Kockums produce a small submarine (up to thousand tons)

§  is willing to develop Kockums

§  - wants Kockums and HDW cooperate closer without infringing on the patents FMV own

His Atzpodien and Lena Erixon has a meeting scheduled for 18 March and it's ahead of the meeting that Atzpodien written the letter.

But the offer of influence has come before, and that the Germans want the Swedes to focus on small submarines, while the German shipyard HDW may take the major orders, are also known. According to a source, who sees the whole thing as a way to get Kockums out of the way as a competitor, there is no bigger market for small submarines. In other words, it is doubtful whether FMV soothed by letter. 

The whole thing is complicated by other agreements between Kockums and FMV, including for servicing submarines." ENDS

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COMMENT

Joakim Wohlfeil on March 14, 2014 sent the following comment to Australia by the Indian Ocean:

"Breaking news update ;-) The Submarine war between Sweden and Germany escalates !!

SAAB has succeeded to recruit the full technical management team at Kockum, including the manager for the submarine division Per Nilsson and are now actively seeking to recruit the remaining ca. 230 engineers. (http://www.affarsvarlden.se/hem/nyheter/article3811470.ece ["Thyssen Krupp ask FMV stop Saab" see above].

According to local press in Malmö the engineers being feed up with ThyssenKrupp are joining SAAB en masse. As the Swedish government are the formal owners of the construction patent and drawings of all Swedish submarines SAAB could actually perform a hostile take-over without paying anything to ThyssenKrupp. (and this seems to happened with the blessing of the Swedish government).

2 days ago, ThyssenKrupp formally protested to the Swedish government ([the Defence Materiel Administration known as] FMV) and demanded they should stop SAAB´s hostile recruitment campaign.

In return Thyssen Krupp has offered.

- ThyssenKrupp will not block the procurement process of A26 and approve that it will be built in Sweden

- Thyssen Krupp will allow Kockums to market A26 for export (however it´s not said if the condition that HDW can see and approve Kockums export offerings will be lifted)

- Repeating the offer Sweden besides of A26 will be the new centre for small submarines (an offer that has earlier been rejected by Kockums employees and the Swedish government).

However, if Sweden suddenly seems to sit on the upside, ThyssenKrupp can answer with obstructing the upgrades and service of Swedish naval crafts that is contracted to the still ThyssenKrupp owned Kockums industriers (TKMD)"

Pete

Saab Being Subsidized To Buy Back Kockums?

A possible design for Kockums' A26. Will it ever be built? (Courtesy of Kockums' website ) 

Christopher Harress of International Business Times, March 3, 2014 reports http://www.ibtimes.com/saab-angling-take-control-thyssenkrupp-submarine-yard-sweden-1559035

:
"Saab Is Angling To Take Control Of ThyssenKrupp Submarine Yard In Sweden"

Three years ago, Kockums, the Swedish national submarine manufacturer was sold by the Swedish government to Germany’s ThyssenKrupp, but after uncertainty over jobs and boat building guarantees, it appears the Swedish government is angling for Saab to take control of the Malmo-based ship-building yard.

In a clear statement of intent, Sweden’s procurement agency FMV announced on Feb. 27 that it was allocating $3.84 million to test whether or not Saab had the ability to design and build the next generation of Swedish submarine.

The move was spawned by disappointment coming from the Swedish Defense Ministry that Thyssen wouldn’t give guarantees that ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, what Thyssen renamed the old Kockums yard in Malmo, would continue to be a large-vessel producer in the region. Additionally, the ministry was concerned because Thyssen hadn’t provided fixed prices for the delivery of two new A26 generation subs and mid-life refits for the Gotland-class submarine.

That said, the failure for TKMS to get finalize those contracts has put jobs in jeopardy, says Thyssen. But Saab’s emergence as a possible buyer for the yard, according to the Swedish Defense Ministry, is because it’s believed that Thyssen is going to reorganize the 1000 unionized workers in Malmo and is to begin the manufacturing of small-sized subs and surface vessels up to 1000 tons. The New A26 class boats and those awaiting refit are around 1900 tons.

The Swedish government procurement agency has said that Thyssen’s reluctance to ioffer fixed prices for the new boats and upgrades means it is currently not possible to move forward to the build stage as it is not practical, sustainable or best use of taxpayer’s money.

Saab has contended that it could meet the needs to design, build and refit submarines, however, it has declined to comment suggestions that it might take control of the TKMS yard." 

ENDS 

COMMENT

Please connect with Singapore's December 2, 2013, decision to buy two HDW 218SG subs instead of the  purchasing Kockums' submarines  http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/singapore-buying-two-hdw-218sg.html and  http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/germans-sinking-kockums-swedish-sub.html 

This development begs questions. Why did the Swedish Government sell Kockums to its German competitors in the first place? Swedes may also want to know how much government money will be required to fund the buyback of Kockums? Also how much government money will Kockums need to build two new A26 generation submarines and for the mid-life refits for the Gotland-class submarines (two or all three)? 

Meanwhile US company DefenseNews reported on the same matter, but failed its geography test - by placing Helsinki in Sweden - see http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140302/DEFREG01/303020012/Saab-Maneuvers-Buy-Swedish-Submarine-Maker?odyssey=mod_sectionstories naughty!

Pete