Showing posts with label Thailand. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Thailand. Show all posts

March 25, 2015

Thailand may eventually purchase two submarines

What appears to be a commissioning ceremony for two of Thailand's Matchanu class submarine in 1938. They were 370 tons surfaced.
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Model of a Matchanu class submarine (courtesy thaigunship). Submarines, up to 1945, carried many objects on the hull and often had upturned bows - all leading to slow submerged speeds.

For the latest on Thailand's on-again, off-again interest in submarines see Submarine Matters Does Thailand Need Submarines At All? August 12, 2015.

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On March 25, 2015 the Bangkok Post reported a rise in Thai interest in submarines: "A plan to buy submarines for the Royal Thai Navy is on again with strong backing from Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon who wants Thailand’s fleet to be on par with neighbouring countries. [The Thai Navy may wanttwo diesel-powered submarines with displacement of 2,400-3,000 tonnes. The source said the Chinese-made Yuan class is favoured by the committee due to its specifications. The "U-class" [do they mean U-209 class?] from South Korea and Germany also pinged the sonar screen.

Comment - the possible budget reported elsewhere equal to US$1.1 Billion would indicate a total  upfront price for two modern medium sized submarines. 

BACKGROUND

Japan sold four Matchanu class submarines to Thailand in 1938. Thailand decommissioned these submarines in 1951. The early decommissioning was due to the Thai Government's reaction to a failed coup in 1951. The Government dismantled Navy influence - in part by stripping the Navy of its submarines.

In recent years Thailand has been evaluating several small-medium submarine types with a view to restarting a submarine service that actually operates submarines. An interesting entry in http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/thailand/ssk.htm states:

"It has been standard practice with the Thai submarine program ever since it was originally floated in 1959, proposals are floated and subsequently suspended and revived several times until cancelled. It was revived (and canceled again) in 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2003, and 2009."

Thailand has several reasons for its current evaluation of submarines. The reasons include the growth and modernisation of navies surrounding Thailand. Nearby countries have developed submarine services, including India, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and China. 

Bangladesh recently ordering two submarines from China and possible Burmese interest in Chinese submarines provide additional reasons for Thailand to buy submarines. Submarines provide a potent asymmetric defensive weapon for countries with small navies. Submarines also contribute to a country's and its Navy's prestige. The Royal Thai Navy has apparently established a submarine squadron at Sattahip naval base which has  a German-made Rheinmetall submarine simulator, staffed by RTN officers who have received submarine training in Germany, as well as South Korea, over the past two years.

Most submarine building countries have offered to sell two or three submarines to Thailand, including:

- France-DCNS (Scorpene?)

- South Korea-DSME (Chang Bogo class, Type 209 derivative) or alternatively the unbuilt "HDS-500RTN" based on the unbuilt "KSS-500A" (510 tons, crew of 10) which is in-turn a descendant of Germany's HDW Type 207 (Kobben) small defensive submarines.

- China - the "S-26T" which may be a version of China's Yuan class or used Romeo-Ming class?

- Germany-TKMS-HDW Type 209/1400mod and also the Type 210mod 
  
Russia's improved Kilo class (Project 636)

- Sweden? (mysteriously silent). Perhaps two (further) refitted Sodermanland class? (currently Sweden's HMS Södermanland and HMS Östergötland?).

COMMENT

Thailand has been hesitant in acquiring submarines possibly seeking leases, used subs or good credit terms. This is in a business environment where the Thai economy is growing more slowly than anticipated

Thailand appears to be seeking smaller than standard submarines. If used submarines are considered the remaining German built Type 207s (Kobben class) and Chinese Romeo-Ming class are likely to be obsolete and rusty as they have passed or are nearing their 30 year use-buy dates. Design and construction of modern 500 ton submarines are likely to be expensive as they are smaller than standard - requiring higher than usual design costs for low production numbers. As Thailand has had no submarines for more than 60 years there is no easy answer to what Thailand needs - no simple replacement program. The German simulator may increase the chances that Germany or South Korea (using German designs) might eventually win any Thai order. 


I'm wondering about the silence on Sweden. With Sweden's recently announced pre-order of two A26s this may free-up Sweden's two Sodermanland class (currently Sweden's HMS Södermanland and HMS Östergötland) for further refitting and sale to Thailand. This is noting there is a historical precedent where Sweden effectively created Singapore's submarine service using 4 Challenger class (refitted Swedish) submarines. 


The question "what does Thailand want?" remains. Thailand may need small submarines for shallow, littoral waters in the Gulf of Thailand and Andaman Sea yet Thailand may also need medium sized submarines for longer range/endurance. Subs with AIP may be on Thailand's list of needs.


SOURCES 

February 17, 2015

Costs for the Soryu - As there is no Competition

Pricing is a major part of selection. But what if there is no competition to the Soryu? Diagram courtesy of The Australian.

INFORMATION

When researching the Saab-Damen submarine development  agreement two interesting bits of information on Australia future submarine selection came to light. Marc Brandt, a Brussels-based industry analyst made two significant comments, probably in late January 2015 -  http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/submarines/2015/02/01/damen-saab-sweden-subs-deal/22535665/ : 

1.  "…I understand that there is a general acceptance within Saab, and government circles in Sweden, that Australia's preference for the Japanese Soryu-class sub has put this program effectively out of reach..."

2.  "...the AUS $17 billion (US $13.7 billion) Collins-class submarine replacement program..." .

COMMENT

The first statement supports the increasing belief that Australia's Federal (Abbott) Government has chosen Japan's Soryu. If Saab believes the Soryu is a done deal then the Australian Government's claim that there is genuine "Competitive Evaluation Process" is not being accepted by key players.

The second statement supports indications that Australia is no longer after 12 submarines - just 6, 7 or 8. Choosing as little as 6 submarines is a wise move considering the serious limitations of available Australian funds. Six is also a recognition that Australia has only been able to crew about 2.5 existing Collins at most.

Australia's previous submarine purchases also show a steady reduction in numbers. The numbers of UK built Oberon class submarines (in the Australian Navy 1967-1999) proposed for Australia shrank from 8 to 6 The proposed number of the Collins (operating 1996 – present) went from 10, to 8, to 6). 

The cost of 6, 7 or 8 may be for a "discount" of around US $14 Billion, ie. "discounted" from the original figures of US$20 to 30 Billion. Of course figures are academic until the last submarine has been launched, commissioned and paid for.

Japan's pricing for Australia, which will be Japan's first major defence customer in 77 years, will be a highly political matter. Japan sold 4 Matchanu class submarines to Thailand in 1938 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matchanu-class_submarine .

Part of Japan's estimate might take into account:

1. how much is Australia (as a new junior ally to Japan) prepared to pay? and

2. how much of the cost of Japan's decade's old submarine development program, including the new  Lithium-ion battery (LIB) Soryu, can be transferred to Australia?

Japan, can only transfer some of its submarines development costs to one country, Australia. This is unlike Germany's TKMS which can, and has, spread the development cost load among 17 customer countries.

Pete

January 2, 2015

Bangladesh, Philippine, Burma and Thailand Submarine Issues

One of China's remaining Type 035 Ming-class conventional submarine soon to be scrapped or sold off to Bangladesh (and other small nations?).
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A Russian built Kilo conventional submarine - main users are Russia, India and China. Vietnam is a growing operator (having bought 6).
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India feels threatened by the prospect of increasing Chinese submarine proliferation in the Indian Ocean. Such proliferation comes through such means as:

-  Chinese anti-piracy conventional and nuclear propelled subs moving across the Indian Ocean for operations off the Horn of Africa,
-  submarine visits to such ports as Columbo, Sri Lanka, and
-  sale of Chinese subs to such Indian neighbours as Bangladesh (around 2019) and perhaps in future to Burma and Pakistan (see India's "West Coast Worries").

For more than a year there have been reports of a pending sale of obsolescent Chinese Ming-class submarines to Bangladesh. See my article http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/china-selling-two-type-035-ming-class.html of December 24, 2013. It is highly likely that, after expected delivery of the Mings in 2019, part of a Bangladesh Ming crew and on-shore maintainers would be Chinese for a transition period. This would cause a range of anxieties in India.

In late 2014 Indian intelligence and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs have pushed the possibility (or for India a hope) that Bangladesh might buy Russian submarines instead.

It is unclear whether these "Russian" Submarines would be:
- new build Kilos (surely too expensive for Bangladesh without credit-finance)
- used Kilos from Russia (cheaper but probably unreliable with a short remaining service life) or
- ex-Indian Kilos (cheaper but probably unreliable with a short remaining service life).

Two nations that probably will not buy submarines in the short to medium term are:

- the Philippines (it usually receives low-or-no cost used naval and coastguard vessels) - see http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-philippine-navys-submarine-quest/  December 31, 2013

- Thailandhttp://thediplomat.com/2015/01/thailand-eyes-submarine-fleet/, January 4, 2015,
  Pete's Comment: If Thailand bought used Ming subs from China Thailand might receive them in 2019 - depending on Chinese modifications. Used Kilos are harder to estimate. If Thailand prefered 2 or 3 new submarines costs would be much higher and involve:
- significant lead times for negotiating, ordering and building submarines - generally around 6 years for a new customer like Thailand
- in the case of South Korea as a supplier a backlog of pre-existing orders might perhaps cause delays. This may mean a minimum delivery year of 2020 for Thailand to receive the first sub then add 3 years for commissioning (tests, trials and training) the sub into the Thai Navy ie. 2023.

Pete

April 21, 2014

Cyber Warfare, Sigint "Maturity" in Some Asia-Pacific Countries


To an extent Chinese state media revealed some of the PLA's cyber warfare capabilities. Its unlikely the cyber warriors depicted above would regularly wear their helmets to work. China may have the 2nd to 4th largest cyber warfare capability in the world.
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In pursuit of Australia by the Indian Ocean’s (a non-profit nor revenue, educational site’s) interest in  non-“Five Eyes” sigint-cyber issues the following is of interest.

On April 15, 2014, ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre released its inaugural Cyber Maturity in the Asia-Pacific Region 2014 report (PDF). To read the complete ASPI Report see https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/cyber-maturity-in-the-asia-pacific-region-2014/ASPI_cyber_maturity_2014.pdf  

This Report analyses the ‘cyber maturity’ of some countries in the Asia–Pacific region. Cyber indicators cover whole-of-government policy and legislative structures, military organisation, business and digital economic strength and levels of cyber social awareness. The research base underpinning each of these indicator groups has collated exclusively from information in the public domain and as such this report’s conclusions are based solely on open-source material.

Page 9 of the report explains: “Military uses of cyberspace, particularly national capabilities, are a sensitive topic for all regional states, and this area requires careful consideration before engagement is sought or agreed to. What is the military’s role in cyberspace, cyber policy and cybersecurity?

Under the section What is the military’s role in cyberspace, cyber policy  and cybersecurity? for each country area the Report’s descriptions are as follows:

(page 19) Cambodia
While it appears that the Cambodian Armed Forces have at least a superficial involvement with cyber policy and security, the extent and detail of that involvement remain unclear in open-source material. Regardless of the level of defence force involvement, it’s understood that Cambodia has a ‘very limited’ capability to defend against cyberattacks.
  
(page 22) China
Open-source reporting indicates that the PLA has several bureaus that actively conduct cyber-espionage operations. The PLA has also published several doctrinal information and development articles and monographs on information warfare and the role of cyber capabilities in military operations. China’s score is reduced by the apparent lack of coordination of these activities within the PLA.

[For a long Australia by the Indian Ocean article concerning China's sigint-cyber capabilities see New US Paper on China's Defence Sigint and Infosec Service (aka PLA GSD Third Department), July 16, 2012 at http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2011/11/new-us-paper-on-chinas-defence-sigint.html ]

(page 22) India
The Indian military is aware of cyber threats and has established several organs to address them, including Defence CERT, the Army Cyber Security Establishment, the Defence Information Warfare Agency, the Cyber Security Laboratory and the Military College of Telecommunication Engineering. The establishment of a Cyber Command has also been announced, although it’s unclear whether this has been implemented. India’s score reflects the Indian Defence Force’s awareness of cyber threats, but also its slow implementation and a lack of stated policy direction for military cyber capabilities.

(page 28) Indonesia
The Indonesian Defence Minister has announced the planned establishment of the Cyber Defence Operations Centre to coordinate national cybersecurity efforts, including service-specific work by the Indonesian military on cybersecurity. The centre is also slated to draft a national doctrine on cybersecurity and conduct implementation strategies across defence and other departments. The creation of a dedicated ‘cyber army’ has also been proposed. The Defence Minister explained that the force would consist of elite membership embedded in the various branches of the Indonesian military to protect domestic networks against cyberattack. It’s unclear what progress has been made on this initiative. This announcement shows that there’s awareness of cyber threats in the Indonesian military, but the response is unclear.

(page 31) Japan
The recent Japanese National Security Strategy clearly outlines Japan’s interests in cyberspace, including means to address current limitations in Japanese cyber capabilities. The Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Command is charged with the development of national cyberdefence capabilities. Under the command, the JSDF established a Cyber Defense Unit. The defence force is seen to have the necessary structures in place for cyber operations. The JSDF is working to improve its capability, especially through cooperation with the US, but a shortage of qualified personnel, an inability to respond to attacks, weak capabilities and problems in information sharing within the force remain areas of concern.

(page 34) Malaysia
Reports indicate that the Malaysian Armed Forces have begun to develop capabilities to protect national assets, including from cyber threats, and the Malaysian Defence Minister has publicly supported the development of an ASEAN master plan for Southeast Asia’s cybersecurity. Malaysia’s score reflects an awareness of cyber risks within the armed forces, but is reduced by the lack of clear policy direction for the development of cyber capabilities.

(page 37) Myanmar-Burma
The Defence Services Computer Directorate, under the Army Chief of Staff, encompasses network centric warfare, military-oriented cyber capabilities and electronic warfare. The Army’s military strategy has been expanded to include cyberwarfare as part of ‘people’s war under modern conditions’. Military Affairs Security (formerly the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence) also possesses a cyber unit, but is more politically focused, carrying out monitoring both domestically and internationally. There are suggestions that the unit’s capability has grown exponentially in recent years with the assistance of other countries in the region. Russia and China have provided training to officers, and Singapore and China have both provided physical infrastructure support.

 (page 40) North Korea
The North Korean military is believed to have highly developed cyber capabilities and a well-organised and extensive education and research program to support future operations. Unit 121 is believed to be its primary offensive cyber force; personnel estimates range from 300 to  3,000 people. It’s believed that North Korea’s military has successfully infiltrated South Korean government and private sector systems, but  there’s little understanding of the military’s defensive capabilities.

(page 43) PNG
Despite recent attempts to bolster the strength of the PNG Defence Force, which has limited capabilities and resources, cyber issues have traditionally not been a priority for the country. The 2013 Defence White Paper made reference to establishing a defensive ‘Cyber Cell’ to protect a yet to be developed ‘Integrated ICT Network’, but outlined no timelines or implementation strategies. Clear evidence of military cyber policy and capacity in cyber operations remains limited.

(page 46) Philippines
The Armed Forces of the Philippines have created a Security Operation Center with a primarily defensive role, protecting military systems. However, a higher score wasn’t given because it’s unclear to what extent the centre has been implemented.

(page 49) Singapore
The Singaporean Armed Forces have established a Cyber Defence Operations Hub, aimed at protecting domestic military networks. This indicates that there’s an awareness of cyber risks and that work is underway to address them. Singapore’s score would be higher if there were a publicly available Singaporean Armed Forces strategy or policy on how the armed forces will engage with cyber threats.

(page 52) South Korea
South Korea has a capable military cyber capacity. The Defense Information Warfare Response Center of the Defense Security Command protects military networks, while the Cyber Command unit handles wider online security. South Korea has both defensive and offensive capabilities and in February 2014 announced its intention to develop offensive cyber capabilities specifically to target North Korea’s nuclear program. However, recent allegations of military cyber unit interference in national elections reduce the country’s score for this indicator. A new Cyber Defence Department, set to be launched in May 2014, aims to halt these domestic interference issues. The new command is to be established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with responsibility for all cyberwarfare missions. It will also include an oversight committee and a whistleblower program.

(page 55) Thailand
The Thai military currently has limited capability and authority on cyber issues, but its leadership has expressed an interest in developing legislation to legalise the operation of a cyber army. Thailand hosted the 2013 USPACOM Cyber Endeavour program, which focused on communications and IT interoperability."


Pete