Showing posts with label Admiral Kobayashi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Admiral Kobayashi. Show all posts

March 24, 2015

MHI and KHI not at Australia's Future Submarine Summit, Adelaide, March 24-26, 2015

Australia's Future Submarine Summit is being held in Adelaide, South Australia on March 24-26, 2015. There are many Australian politicians, military officers and officials due to speak as well as foreign industry representatives.  

The content carried in an article of March 22, 2015 from the Reuters Tokyo office has been reproduced in the Australia media. The Reuters article reported: “The no-show by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries [MHI] and Kawasaki Heavy Industries [KHI] at an event called Australia's Future Submarine Summit, held amid intensifying competition for the deal, exposes a potential weak link in Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's more muscular security agenda: Japan Inc.”

It is significant that two retired Japanese Vice Admirals, Masao Kobayashi and Yoji Koda (details of each below) are attending the Summit and are due to speak on March 26, 2015 - both are advisers to Japan's National Security Council. Some Australian newspapers (such as the Herald Sun drawing on The Adelaide Advertiser) did mention the Japanese Admiral’s attending. 

Perhaps officers from the Japanese Consulate, Adelaide and Japanese Embassy, Australia will also attend? The presence of the retired Japanese admirals who still advise the Japanese Government clearly indicates that Japanese bilateral relationship-alliance with Australia is Japan’s main submarine sale strength. Japan's approach at present seems to rely less on commercial approaches given the absence of MHI and KHI. This is in contrast to France and Germany’s more commercial approach – though German government representatives will also be present in Adelaide.

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF THE RETIRED JAPANESE ADMIRALS


 Vice Admiral Masao KOBAYASHI, JMSDF (Retd) photo (above) courtesy Sub Summit

Maseo is now an adviser to Japan's National Security CouncilBiodata: "Masao graduated from the Japanese Defense Academy in 1973 and commenced a career in the JMSDF submarine service. He had held many posts in the submarine force. Shore billets included Submarine Branch Head in the Ship Systems Section in the Maritime Staff Office and Operations Officer in the Fleet Submarine Force. He has commanded TAKASHIO SS-571, (Uzushio class), and has been the Commander of Submarine Division Two. In 2001/2 he was the Commander of Submarine Flotilla One, and was Coordinator of Exercise at sea for Pacific Reach 2002. Masao’s last post was as Commander of the Fleet Submarine Force. He retired from the MSDF in 2009. Vice Admiral KOBAYASHI served with distinction in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and is well regarded as an authourity in the submariner community." See Kobayashi's comments on submarines to the Japanese press - reported January 18, 2015.
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Vice Admiral Yoji KODA, JMSDF (Retd) - photo (above) courtesy Sub Summit

Yoji is Maseo is also an adviser to Japan's National Security Council. Biodata: "Yoji is a graduate of the Japanese Defense Academy in 1972, the JMSDF Staff College, and the US Naval War College. As a Surface Warfare Officer, he has commanded JS SAWAYUKI (DD-125), Flotilla Three and Fleet Escort Force at sea. Yoji’s shore duties include tours as Director General (DG) for Plans and Operations, Maritime Staff and Director-General of the Joint Staff. He retired from the JMSDF as Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet, in 2008. Following retirement from active duty, he was invited to join the Asia-Center, Harvard University as a research fellow researching the US-Japan Alliance and the Chinese Navy during 2009/11. Yoji is a prolific writer on maritime and strategic subjects in both Japanese and English, and his most recent articles include “A new Carrier Race [large PDF file]” and “The Russo-Japanese War” published by the US Naval War College. He contributed to “Refighting the Pacific War (an Alternative History of World War II)” published by the US Naval Institute in 2011. He is currently an advisor to National Security Agency. Vice Admiral Koda served with distinction in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and his body of academic subject matter speaks for itself."

Admiral Koda, in late March 2015, raised the possibility that most of Australia's possible Soryus might be built in Australia. However there has been little or no discernable support in the Japanese government, military, MHI or KHI for this approach.

Pete

February 20, 2015

Possible Japanese Submarine Deployment Area


Differing submarine patrol areas strung along China's First Island Chain. Japan's submarine patrol area may be from Kyushu, along the Ryukyu island chain (which includes Okinawa), south to Taiwan, then across the Bashi Channel (Luzon Strait) down to Luzon Island, Philippines.
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Part of the "First Island Chain" is what Japan calls the Senkaku Islands. A potential China-Japan-(maybe)Taiwan flashpoint due to undersea oil deposits. These deposits may become economically extractable as oil prices rise and technology permits. 
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Below is an interesting snippet which may reflect how Japan's submarine fleet is deployed:

Tetsuo Kotani, U.S.-Japan Allied Maritime Strategy: Balancing the Rise of Maritime China, (Strategic Japan, Japan Chair) Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC, April 2014, pp. 1-15. http://csis.org/files/publication/140422_Kotani_USJapanAlliance.pdf wrote on page 12:

"In addition, the submarine fleet will be increased from 16 to 22. Due to the lack of Chinese ASW capabilities, the expansion of the submarine fleet enhances sea-denial capability vis-à-vis the PLAN. To patrol the waters along southwestern Japan, it is estimated that at least eight submarines are necessary (six for the Okinawa island chain [Japan to Taiwan] and two for the Bashi Channel [also called (Luzon StraitTaiwan to Luzon island, Philippines]. Typically, a [submarine] requires two backups for training and maintenance. Thus a submarine fleet of 24 is ideal, but a fleet of 22 provides more operational flexibility than the current fleet of 16. [35] On the other hand, for the effective use of the reinforced submarine fleet, the JMSDF needs to recruit and train more submariners." 

[35] =  [retired Vice Admiral] Masao Kobayashi, “Sensuikan 22 sekitaiseino Kaijoboei” [Maritime Defense under a 22-Submarine Force], Gunji Kenkyu [Japan Military Review], December 2011. http://gunken.jp/blog/archives/2011/11/10_0000.php

COMMENTS

Page 1, 2nd paragraph indicates Japan's submarine deployments may, in part, respond to "Beijing’s attempts to deny access by other maritime powers to its Near Seas (the Yellow Sea and the East and South China Seas), which are enclosed by the first island chain (a chain of islands from Kyushu, Okinawa, to Taiwan and Borneo)." 

Japanese strategy using all forces, including submarines, is partly to provide a blockading force (in time of conflict) to keep China forces and trade bottled up in China's near seas. Japan, its SSK owning allies, and the US SSN force could also block Chinese naval vessels and supplies (such as oil) from reaching China. 

As the CSIS excerpt above indicates Japan's main submarine patrol area would be from the the southern home island of Kyushu, along the Ryukyu island chain (which includes Okinawa), south to Taiwan, then across the Bashi Channel (Luzon Strait) down to Luzon Island, Philippines. 

Countries in the region may make frequent use of undersea arrays (along with future use of UUVs (including wavegliders)), particularly in narrow straits and harbour mouths. Such use would diminish reliance on virtually stationary submarines guarding critical straits and harbour mouths. 

South Korea would monitor movements in all the congested seas and straits near South Korea. In those seas are threats or possible competitors North Korea, China, Russia and Japan itself.

The US with its wide ranging SSNs may guard some straits and narrows but the speed and range of its SSNs allow open ocean (blue water) coverage throughout the Pacific, Indian Oceans and under receding Arctic ice to the Atlantic Ocean. US SSNs can act as backup to the SSK navies (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia) particularly against Russian and Chinese SSNs. All of the allies would directly or indirectly (via the US as the common ally) work together under the blanket term SeaWeb.

Naturally submarines are not the only blockers or monitors and don't work alone. Other platforms (surface warships, surveillance satellites, UAVs, UUVs, patrol aircraft including helicopters, land based missiles and ground stations (deploying radar, intercept and other arrays)) can work with submarines in the whole defence mix

Pete

February 4, 2015

Australia - the future junior ally of Japan - revised


Most of the following article was also publised at Australia's On Line Opinion news http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=17065

The revision is at FURTHER COMMENT below.

As the political reputation of Australia's Prime Minister, currently Tony Abbott, plummets, some of his more outlandish foreign policy ideas are being seen for what they are. This article doesn’t raise the bright ideas of rushing Australian troops to Ukraine, presumably to hold back Russian tanks, or to rush Australian troops to the Middle East, where those troops waited for an Iraqi invitation for two months, but the policy of buying into an alliance with Japan.

News.com.au reported on July 9, 2014 that: “AUSTRALIA and Japan have become partners in a “special relationship” that will see both countries join with the US in a powerful military alliance aimed at curbing China’s influence in the region. During an extraordinary day in the long Australia-Japan relationship, yesterday in Canberra both Prime Minister Tony Abbott and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe pledged to create a partnership for “peace, prosperity and the rule of law”. Fresh from reversing almost 70 years of pacifism embedded in his nation’s post-World War 2 constitution, Mr Abe placed Australia alongside the US at the forefront of Japan’s future defence strategy.”

Alliance maintenance through weapon system purchases has long been a factor in Australia’s relationship with the US. However, as the US has no conventional submarines to sell, there is a joint US-Japanese scheme to sell Japanese submarines to Australia. The purchase price for Australia to secure this alliance with Japan is now around $25Billion (with the recent depreciation of the Australian dollar compared to the US dollar). This is specifically for 12 Made in Japan submarines. Abbott’s budgetary ideas have skimped on health, education and welfare but money is no object when paying for a military alliance from Abbott’s friend, the like-minded conservative Japanese Prime Minister Abe. 

[Note this Submarine Matters article, of February 4, 2015, appears to have triggered a subsequent  article of February 7 in The Australian http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/japan-fears-25bn-submarine-deal-at-risk-in-tony-abbott-crisis/story-e6frg8yo-1227211135322  :-]

By having Japan build our submarines Abbott can also run down Australia’s ship and submarine-building industry, which he sees as a hotbed of Labor, leftwing, union interests anyway.

So what’s in it for Japan? Well the money helps. Japan also frets about what it sees as rising threats from China, North Korea and increasingly Russia. However Japan is mainly thinking about the potential economic benefits of contested islands in the South China and East China Seas.

Few Australians know or care about several disputes in the East China Sea involving China, Taiwan, Japan and others. Possibly the most dangerous Japan versus China dispute is over a small island chain - which is known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, the Diaoyu Islands in China and the Diaoyutai Islands in Taiwan. The importance of the Senkakus are that great unmentionable factor - oil. Oil draws military forces – be they Australian forces in the Middle East or future Australian forces in Northeast Asia.

The US, for its part, is worried about the cost of keeping the world’s oceans open for trade, including oil. Although the US, in the next 12 months, will be spending many extra $Billions to maintain the Asia-Pacific “pivot” against China the US increasingly wants Japan to spend more on defence. Japan’s current defence spending is only about 1% of its GDP. The US also wants Japan to secure military alliances – that is with the few countries interested – not South Korea or most Southeast Asian countries - after Japan’s horrific conduct in World War Two.

The US and Japan are quite explicit in seeing a submarine sale as Australia-Japan strategic alliance cement. A US Admiral has condescended to interpret what an Australian Defence Minister really wanted. The Japan Times of January 18, 2015 reports: "Vice Adm. Robert Thomas, commander of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, reportedly said Oct. 24 [2014] in Tokyo that then-Australian Defense Minister David Johnston was very interested in Japan’s Soryu-class subs. “I talked to him about it four years ago and I said: ‘You want to find the finest diesel-electric submarine made on the planet — it’s made at Kobe works in Japan,’…”

Also in that Japan Times article retired Japanese submarine admiral Masao Kobayashi said."The U.S., which has close but separate security pacts with Japan and Australia, probably wants Australia to buy Japanese submarines because it would greatly strengthen their strategic military ties.”

When anyone bothers to ask ordinary Australians whether Australia should be drawn into a conflict by an additional senior ally (Japan) the response appears encouragingly negative. ABC News (online), January 6, 2015, reported the results of a Survey of over 1,000 Australians, which indicated “Australians would overwhelmingly reject siding with close ally Japan against top-trade partner China over a dispute in the East China Sea and prefer to remain neutral.” In the article Australia's former Foreign Minister Bob Carr said “…as far as the public was concerned, Australia was not obliged under the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) treaty to make a commitment…".

Now it needs to be explained that the Survey, Australian Attitudes on ANZUS and the East China Sea , was commissioned by the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) . ACRI was established in December 2013 with a grant of $1.8 million from a citizen of China. Bob Carr is the Director of ACRI.

Before one writes off ACRI as a support system for Chinese interests and for Bob Carr it must be said that ACRI was officially launched on May 16, 2014 by Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. Given the Coalition’s declining fortunes Bob may be a “former Foreign Minister” for a very short time. He may again be Foreign Minister after the next Federal Election.

If Abbott has his way Australia will be junior ally not only of the US but of Japan with either of those two drawing Australia into their wars. It must be asked “If or when Abbott stands down as Prime Minister would a Coalition Government still pursue an alliance with Japan?”

If Labor wins in the next election would Bill Shorten (who agrees with Abbott’s Middle East policies) pursue an alliance with Japan?

Is a survey a genuine gauge of what Australians’ want? How else can we, the public, influence basic foreign and defence policy changes - including multi $Billion defence alliances with “friends” likely to draw Australia into wars?

FURTHER COMMENT


US Admiral Thomas (mentioned above) might be right that the Soryu might be the closest approximation of what the Australian Government thinks it wants in a submarine. I disagree and think a modified HDW Dolphin 2 or 214, enlarged DCNS Scorpene or Saab-Kockums A26 part or mostly built in Australia, would be more reasonable on military, technical, cost, Australian industrial and political grounds. Regarding Admiral Thomas's public advice to Australia - in the Australian system of values serving military men should not get involved in what are key issues between other countries (in this case Australia and Japan). If the current US Defence Secretary (still Chuck Hagel?) wants to offer advice, then that is his legitimate multi-lateral right and responsibility.

The main problem with the Soryu, apart from "Build in Japan only", is that selection of that submarine brings grave strategic, political and economic risks for Australia. 

That risk centers on being drawn into Japan's battles involving Australia's main trading partner (China). Such Japanese battles may not even relate to Japan's national survival but to sometimes slender Japanese claims to undersea oil resources.

Japan appears immature. Japan is unwilling to introduce peaceful precedent solutions such as those that occured in Northwestern Europe six decades ago. The Western European solution of sharing the oil and profits for "North Sea Oil" is what mature, peaceful countries should be doing in Northeast Asia.

Admittedly politics encouraged Australia from the 1960s to choose then operate the British built Oberon submarines. But Britain by then was not expecting Australia to get involved in Britain's battles. Britain like the US was a long term friend and mentor of Australia - Japan isn't.
Life would be so much easier if the US had conventional submarines to sell to Australia or if Australia took up the US offer in early 2012 for Australia to buy or lease Virginia SSNs.

It is a political and economic necessity that some or most of a conventional submarine build take place in Australia. Australia has the capacity to build conventional submarines but not nuclear submarines. 

These are all things for embattled Prime Minister Tony Abbott to work through - in his relations with Coalition Backbenchers and some Coalition Frontbenchers from Australia's submarine states of Victoria, NSW, Western Australia and South Australia.

BACKGROUND

Note that two senior Australian defence commentators are saying the same thing as me - see:



http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/574/The-consequences-of-capricious-decision-making

Pete

January 25, 2015

Japanese Concerns Over Any Soryu Sale to Australia

Prime Ministers Abbott and Abe, on April 7, 2014, when they concluded a framework agreement for co-operation on defence equipment and technology (including submarine hydrodynamics). This is/was a preliminary to any Soryu sale. Abbott's political position is now threatened. 
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As Prime Minister Abbott - the main Australian advocate for a Soryu deal  steadily weakens politically it is valuable to consider possible Japanese concerns and misgivings over a Soryu sale.

Several days ago an Anonymous commenter said [retired Admiral]"Kobayashi is not arrogant, he just does not want to sell sub tech, that’s all. Australian thinks that Japan wants to sell her subs like Germany, Sweden or France. But this idea is perfectly wrong and huge misunderstanding, Japan does not want at all. Soryu’s secret is more important and valuable than money which Australia will pay Japan." 

Enlarging on possible Japanese concerns yields the following possibilities.

Unlike other western countries involved in Australia's submarine selection - Japan is the only country actually in danger of conflict - with North Korea and to a lesser extent with Russia and China. Other contenders - Germany, France and Sweden - are not at risk. For these latter three countries the submarine selection is only a commercial-trade matter - while for Japan it is most importantly a strategic alliance, national security matter.

A sale of Soryus to Australia may weaken Japan's national security:

Selling to Australia would involve a major diversion of Japanese industrial and submarine corps resources to plan, train and generally liase with Australian industry and Australian submariners. Japan's limited resources might be better focussed monitoring or more active measures against Japan's potential enemies.

Sales to Australia might disrupt Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) submarine production lines to supply the Japanese submarine corps. This particularly in view of Japan's goal of expanding its submarine corps from the current 16 operational submarine to the goal of 22 submarines. More specifically there may be strategic pressure for a Soryu earmarked (by contract) for Australia on a production line to be diverted to thJapan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) instead. Such a diversion might raise political and contractual difficulties for Japan.

The prospect of sales to Australia may encourage the Soryu's submarine builders (MHI and KHI) to modify the Soryus to a standard configuration that does not suit JMSDF requirements. For example it is possible that two reasons for Japan's decision to delete Stirling air independent propulsion (AIP)  from the future batch of Soryus were:
- Australia's assessment, since the 1980s, that AIP is problematic, involving negative trade-offs, that  do not meet Australia's needs, and
- for legal property right reasons Japan could not sell Swedish Stirling engine AIP technology to third countries, including Australia.

It is also possible the future batch of Soryu will have much longer range, to suit Australia's operational requirements but this longer range might not be ideal for the JMSDF's needs.

Due to China's trade value to Australia Japan cannot rely on Australia to support Japan in any confrontation or outright conflict with China (eg. arising from East China or South China Sea matters). Australains see the islands in the East China and South China Seas as more to do with current opportunistic economic claims than national historical claims. This means that in any conflict in those seas Australia may support the claims of its major trade partner - which is China.

Australia's security laws and rules may be detrimental to Japan's security overall. Part of the weakness would stem from Chinese government and corporate  influence over Australia. For example Australia's China situation may result in Australian steel-making companies inadvertently sharing newly acquired Japanese steel secrets with Chinese steelmaking business partners.

Australia's laws overall make racial discrimination illegal in employment - particularly for government jobs, including the submarine corps. A main area of Japanese concern might be Australian tolerance of former Chinese citizens, or ethnic Chinese generally, being inducted as Australian submariners or into broader Australian government or submarine-shipbuilding industry positions. China has a reputation for pressuring ethnic Chinese in the West - even if they have only distant cousins or elderly grandparents still living in China. The Chinese government can deny Chinese citizens careers, lose jobs, lose pensions or worse if their Australia based relatives are not cooperative. Australia cannot match Japan's ability to control the ethnic security of submarine crews or such security in the broader submarine industry.

January 21, 2015

Comments on What Appears to be a Soryu Sale Press Relaease

The Soryu lobby (Japan of course but to an extent the US) issued what amounts to a Soryu Press Release (see below) on January 20, 2015. This was possibly to influence any statements Australian Defence Minister Kevin Andrews was expected to make during his visit to the Australian Submarine Corporations (ASC) submarine facility in Adelaide on January 22, 2015. As it turns out Andrews said little memorable other than the Australian Government had made no submarine selection decision.

COMMENT

After some positive feedback (with pertinent information) from Japanese commenters I'm toning down the title and some of my comments in the post. The "Soryu Press Release" is a Japan Times article of January 20, 2015. The article/Press Release:

- would have been mostly written by and cleared by the Japan Ministry of Defence.
- there is the exaggerated implication that Australia is privileged to be allowed to receive such a Japanese technical achievement.
-  but nevertheless Japan may not carry out the standard industrial task of revealing to Australia key technical secrets. This withholding of secrets may include those behind the Soryu's  potentially dangerous Lithium-ion battery (LIB) see "Japan...has yet to decide which secrets to share".
- that the US is in favour of the Soryu export to Australia for the US's own strategic and financial reasons
- makes the standard claim that is Australia is happy to work in strategic alliance with Japan and the US over Japan's interest in contested islands in the East China and South China Seas. Australia has been very cautious in not being drawn into Japan-China cofrontations in those seas
- basically Japan's Soryu pitch is that Australia is strategically obligated to buy the Soryu..

There is some recognition by Japanese commentators that Australia will incur major economic costs by sacrificing much of its ship-submarine building industry. However these  commentators under-rate the opposition and rift in Prime Minister Abbott's own governing Party with increasing feeling against submarines being built in Japan. Instead there is increasing support across the` political spectrum and within Australia's Navy favouring construction of the submarines in Australia.

The risks for Australia of being Japan's first major defence customer are ignored.

An incentive for Japan is, of course, is Australia's money to offset Soryu 2 (Lithium battery) development costs.

 The article/pitch/Press Release is below - with string  http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/18/national/stealth-tech-no-given-in-japanese-sub-deal/#.VL3UDUeUen8 :



"Stealth tech no given in Japanese sub deal

BY REIJI YOSHIDA

Retired Vice Admiral Masao Kobayashi commanded Japan’s submarine fleet from 2007 to 2009. In a recent interview in Tokyo with The Japan Times, when asked to explain one of the country’s most tightly guarded military secrets, he seemed reflective.
Kobayashi pointed to the ceiling lights in the quiet interview room and said: “Take those fluorescent lights, for example. Any fluorescent light generates sound.”
Other than our voices, there were no other sounds in the room.
“Fluorescent lights generate extremely small vibrations. We take anti-vibration measures for every single light in a submarine,” he said.
Japan’s engineers have painstakingly worked to minimize the vibrations given off by the multitude of components in submarines to prevent even those undetectable by the human ear from being picked up by the super-sensitive sonars of enemy subs and sonobuoys from anti-submarine aircraft, Kobayashi said.
Noisy components include fans, pumps, motors and fluorescent lights. Some are carefully muted with vibration-damping rubber, he said.
“The quiet submarines we have today are the result of numerous long, patient efforts,” Kobayashi said.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force’s submarines are not nuclear-powered but have a reputation for being ultra-quiet.
Now Australia, seeking to build a new fleet of large, long-range submarines, seems keen on acquiring Japan’s latest Soryu-class subs, or at least their technology.
If the deal goes through, the top-secret submarines will become the first major pieces of military hardware Japan has authorized for export since the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe lifted the decades-long blanket ban on arms sales last year.
Vice Adm. Robert Thomas, commander of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, reportedly said Oct. 24 in Tokyo that then-Australian Defense Minister David Johnston was very interested in Japan’s Soryu-class subs.
“I talked to him about it four years ago and I said: ‘You want to find the finest diesel-electric submarine made on the planet — it’s made at Kobe works in Japan,’ Thomas was quoted as saying by Bloomberg News.
The U.S., which has close but separate security pacts with Japan and Australia, probably wants Australia to buy Japanese submarines because it would greatly strengthen their strategic military ties, Kobayashi said.
Deeper Japan-Australia military cooperation would help ease the heavy burden on the U.S. fleet, which is busy decommissioning many of the nuclear-powered attack submarines it built during the Cold War, he said.
“The U.S. rapidly built many Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines during the Cold War. Many of them are being decommissioned now,” Kobayashi said.
“I think the U.S. wants to create a strategic triangle of Japan, Australia and the United States. That’s probably a factor behind” the apparent U.S. nod to Australia’s proposal to Japan, he added.
Japanese defense officials are thought to be pleased for the same reason Washington is. They want to deepen strategic military ties with Australia.
“Australia would make a good partner for cooperation. There are no major diplomatic problems between the two countries other than whaling,” a senior Defense Ministry official said on condition anonymity. Australia opposes Japan’s annual whaling expeditions.
Japan has just started receiving the submarine specifications sought by Australia but has yet to decide which secrets to share, two senior defense officials said.
Japan soon plans to use lithium-ion batteries to drive the motors in its latest Soryu sub, making them even quieter. Australia is believed to be interested in this advance, the officials said.
But advanced lithium-ion batteries are one of Japan’s top military secrets, one warned.
“(Exporting) them would be a rather sensitive issue. We’d need to study if it’s really appropriate for an outside party (to have that technology),” the Defense Ministry official said.
In Australia meanwhile, opposition lawmakers and trade unions are strongly opposed to procuring Japanese submarines because it could considerably undermine the domestic defense industry and reduce jobs in South Australia.
Joint development might be an option, the two Japanese officials said, noting that nothing concrete has been officially proposed.
Teruhiko Fukushima, a professor at the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, who is an expert on Australia, said Prime Minister Tony Abbott seems eager to procure the subs to bolster Canberra’s military ties with Japan and the United States.
“Abbott should be considering a Japan-U.S.-Australian alliance as a kind of insurance” against the recent rise of China’s powerful military, Fukushima said.
“The introduction of Soryu-class submarines would be a plus to strengthen that alliance,” he added.
“If the Abbott administration survives the next election and wins a second term, there will be a greater chance that Soryu-class submarines will be introduced in Australia,” he said.
Last June, Australia and Japan conducted “two-plus-two” talks between their foreign and defense ministers.
In the joint statement that followed, Australia expressed “strong opposition to the use of force or coercion to unilaterally alter the status quo in the East China Sea and the South China Sea,” an apparent warning to China to not aggressively press its territorial claims in those areas, which include the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands, which China and Taiwan also claim. China calls the uninhabited islets Diaoyu and Taiwan calls them Tiaoyutai.
Fukushima also said that on Nov. 26, 2013, only three days after Beijing declared the establishment of an air defense identification zone over the East China Sea that included the Senkakus, the Abbott administration summoned the Chinese ambassador in Canberra to express its concerns after the ADIZ drew strong protests from Tokyo and Washington.
“There is no doubt Abbott puts great emphasis on the relationship shared by Japan, the U.S. and Australia,” Fukushima said.
But he also noted that China is Australia’s No. 1 trade partner and that the public would never approve of political actions that could seriously damage those economic ties.
“The best way for Abbott is to strengthen the Japan-U.S.-Australian relationship while maintaining good economic ties with China at the same time. Australia would never turn its back on the Chinese market,” he said." ENDS

Pete