India's 25 year old Project 75I is in limbo over AIP Intellectual Property (IP) tender rules.
In mid February 2022 it was reported Russia advised India Russia is withdrawing its Amur-1650 "paper" design from 75I contention. Instead Russia is offering the non-AIP, 25 year old, Improved Kilo "636" class.
Project 75I, for six future SSKs, is all about ambitious Indian demands for detailed, operational, Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) designs from contenders before India selects a winning contender. India also has liability demands which contenders consider onerous.
Another blockage is India offering insufficient money for an AIP submarine. India has quoted a "43,000 crore" equivalent to less than US$6 Billion, projects cost for six 75I submarines for years. That money is deemed insufficient, given India's intentions for the AIP technology.
Sweden (with its operational Stirling AIP) removed itself from the 75I contest around 2019. Although it is possible Sweden sold its Stirling AIP technology to China - for China's Yuan-class (suspected Stirling) AIP submarine project. Alternatively Chinese intelligence may have gathered some Stirling technology (from legal users Sweden, Japan and Singapore) and then China semi-parallel developed working Stirling.
The remaining 75I finalists/contenders who might meet India's 75I requirement for (at sea tested) operational AIP are Germany and South Korea. Both countries don't want to hand over their Fuel Cell AIP secrets before India pays a large amount of money for this AIP. Given this AIP technology was developed in Germany - Germany may hold enough IP rights to block South Korea selling this AIP to India.
This is within an environment that India is still struggling to develop its own operational AIP technology. With Fuel Cell technology in hand India may fulfil its long held intentions to retrofit working AIP to its six Kalvari-class French designed Scorpenes. France, also without at sea, operational, 2nd or 3rd generation AIP, would also gain from running this retrofitting process.
Another concern is that India always intended Russia (India's most important arms supplier) would win 75I. Russia has been attempting since the late 1940s to produce an efficient AIP system. Russia might even pay India for German/South Korean sourced Fuel Cell AIP technology. Russia would then place such AIP in its, thus far unsuccessful, Lada-class submarines and export such technology in its future Amur-class subs.
So Project 75I continues to struggle, stalled by its AIP, at low cost, ambitions.
14 comments:
Personally, I'd feel better if we just scrapped this program.
I feel that at its core, the P75I is seeking to address a requirement that is no longer entirely relevant. The original requirement (defined in the late-1990s if I recall correctly) called for procurement of 24 diesel submarines (including AIP & non-AIP ones). 12 of which were to be of a foreign design but constructed in India, and the remaining 12 of an indigenous design to be delivered after the first 12 were completed.
The P75 & P75I tenders were meant to deliver 6 boats each toward the first 12. The P75 (Kalvari-class/Scorpene) is mostly done, the 5th boat has just set out for sea trials earlier this month and the 6th & last one is under construction.
However we continue to wrestle with P75I, with no selection to be seen around the corner.
But the thing is, the 24 diesel sub plan has already been modified - the Indian Navy had informed the Govt that it seeks to ditch 6 of the 12 planned indigenous diesel subs, and replace them with 6 nuclear-powered boats instead (that's where the SSN program comes in, knows as P75A but also referred to by some as P76).
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/navy-seeks-amendment-to-30-year-submarine-plan-wants-six-nuclear-boats-101621307478586.html
Here's how I would rather have the submarine plan develop:
1) Scrap P75I, abandon plans for procurement of AIP+LIB submarines - they no longer can provide the Indian Navy with a decisive edge against regional adversaries, let alone Chinese expeditionary patrols in the Indian Ocean Region.
2) Make a follow-on order of 3-6 more boats of the Scorpene/Kalvari variety - with or without the indigenous DRDO-developed PAFC AIP (which is as yet unproven). The existing production line in Mumbai & clearly defined local industrial partners for the program which have already built 5 boats of the type will mean significant reduction in time & money required to get additional hulls in the water in time to replace the 8 Kilo-class (877EKM) and 4 Type-209 boats currently in service. Even though they've received significant upgrades, they remain old hulls, especially the 209s.
3) Make a bigger push to go nuclear. Back in the 90s when the 24-sub plan was devised, the construction of nuclear-powered submarines in India was but a risky pipedream, they had no idea if the ATV program would succeed or not, and as to what level of localization & design flexibility could be enabled down the line as a result of the Indian yards & engineering companies' ability to absorb the fundamentals of N-sub design & construction.
Today, with 3 nuclear-powered boats in the water, the first of which (Arihant S-2) having already performed its first deterrence patrols (2018-19), plus as the extended S-4 shows, a significant level of design flexibility having been absorbed - they are now in a position to approach N-sub construction (and the investment in them) with a greater degree of confidence.
I would prefer it if the plan for the second batch of 12 diesel subs (which is now reduced to 6) were to be abandoned in their entirety and replaced with an additional 6 SSNs (for a total of 12).
The way I see it, 6 SSNs are simply not enough for the needs & emerging requirements of the Indian Navy.
If we think with the assumption that the SSNs will have the exact same reactors with the same level of Uranium fuel enrichment (around 40% average) as the existing Arihant-class (which may or may not be the case but for sake of argument let's say it is)...it would imply a similar refuel time period.
Meaning that in order to provide each of the 4 planned SSBNs (S2, S3, S4 & S4*) with an SSN for protection & escort, 4 corresponding SSN hulls will be necessary. If the Indian Navy does not go toward a Bastion concept of deterrence posture and instead chooses to make use of the vast underwater trenches of the Indian Ocean Basin as their preferred lurking areas for SSBNs (which I think will become a given as soon as the SLBMs with sufficient range envelop become operational**), these 'escort' boats will become necessary.
On top of that, the Indian Navy wants to possess 3 Carrier Strike Groups (first, centered on the Russian-built INS Vikramaditya is operational while the second, centered on the indigenously-built INS Vikrant/IAC-1 is in sea trials and the third, IAC-2, is being conceptualized), so that at least 1 carrier group is available for operational tasking at any given time.
With the current plan, the 3 carrier groups will have to rotate the 2 remaining SSNs between them as their main underwater escort.
This leaves no SSNs which can be tasked at any given time to carry out independent Hunter-Killer/Intelligence-gathering patrols across the Indian Ocean Region & into the South China Sea. Any such mission tasking is likely to require months if not years of advance planning.
As you can see, the 6 boats are barely enough for the purely defensive needs necessitated by the wide frontage of roles performed by the Indian Navy (carrier groups + strategic deterrence posture). This is in stark contrast to the RAN where every single SSN can theoretically be available for such 'offensive' taskings due to lack of aforementioned defensive needs (no carrier groups, sharing of US nuclear defence umbrella).
At a time when China did not have any Carriers (which wasn't that long ago), they actually had a lot more flexibility with regard to SSN deployments, plus their adoption of a Bastion concept for SSBN operations...but with PLAN expanding its frontage with Carrier groups, we'll have to see how their deployments change. I still tend to think PLAN's carriers are more for show & propaganda purposes and do not serve much of a role in the Chinese war doctrine...as opposed to the Indian Navy where the Carrier Group is central to the naval warfighting posture.
** You will note that India went to great lengths to never portray the Agni-5 as an ICBM, officially capping its 'known' range at 5,000-km, just 500-km short of officially being an ICBM. But when it comes to SLBMs, they were more open to marketing it with a 6,000-km range (refer to the slides shown at IIT-Bombay uni I posted on your blog before)...in my opinion, the extra press (and possible pressure) received when testing what the wider world officially considers an ICBM was deemed to be worth it - as long as it shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the major cities of the Chinese Mainland as within reach from the deeper locations of the Indian Ocean Basin (say, Chagos Trench).
You will note that a 6,000-km ICBM is only required if such a posture is to be adopted...as otherwise even a 3500-4000-km IRBM (like existing K-4) would be sufficient if employed from within the Bay of Bengal.
Hi Pete
It is clear that AIP is a significant advantage over classical LAB SSK by allowing to move from days to weeks (to oversimplify) endurance (at very low speed /limited range however)which for many geographies is highly compelling (Baltic,Israel , Singapour..) and justify the complexities on board , refueling not possible at sea..ect due to LOX and/or H2 supply and storage.
However these technologies were designed in the 1990 /2000 before the maturation of LiB various batteries technologies
The real question is how LAB only, LAB +AIP,LiB+AIP and LiB only(however with all the AIP space and storage taken by more LiB batteries capacity) stack up vs each other.What is the value of faster charge at sea of LiB?
Any dimensions such as geography, size of boats , tactical prevalent situations..that would also modulate the comparison
Do we have data on these comparisons, especially at low speed (4 to 5 knots)?
After all many navies ,Japanese, Brazilian,RAN in the Attack selection(that was offered the TKMS options in the initial bidding process.) do not go for AIP
Thanks Gessler
I'll turn your Indian SSK and SSN projects comments into an article next week. Meanwhile:
1. what happens if India takes 20 years to commission the first Alpha https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_75_Alpha. Considering:
15 years (for new submarine class)
+ 5 years (first Alpha-class indigenous SSN)
and
2. that India's highest level SSN priority champion, Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat, died in a helicopter crash on Dec 8, 2021 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Indian_Air_Force_Mil_Mi-17_crash
Pete
Hi Anonymous [at Feb 17, 2022, 8:53:00 PM]
All true on AIP, LABs LIBs and countries involved. Also noting Japan graduated from:
- LABs only up to Oyashios,
- LABs + AIP in Soryu Mk.1s,
- to LIBs only in Soryu Mk.2s and Taigeis
Yes, Submarine Matters has "data on these comparisons, especially at low cruising speeds.
All revealed thrrough judicious use of top, left search box. eg: AIP LIBs
But to give you a leg up see:
https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2017/04/submarine-electricity-discharge.html (click on "here, here and here" within that article)
and see http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2017/04/part-2-fc-aip-is-added-to-labs-used-in.html
Cheers Pete
Hi Pete, in response to your questions:
1) Firstly, I have no idea as to what level the design/development work on the SSN program has been completed, but like I said previously on your blog much will depend on which way they choose to go (Arihant without silos, or a completely new design).
Either way, once construction starts I'd estimate a minimum of 8 and maximum of 11 years for the first-of-class boat to be commissioned. So if the keel is laid by around 2025, a mid-2030s date for the first boat to be handed over to the Navy. Again, the time will be hugely dependent on how different the boat is compared to the Arihant. If its like the aforementioned "Arihant without Silos" with only minor changes/modifications, the build time is likely to be relatively short, especially if its coming off the same production line that's been building the Arihant-class (which will be free after S4* is done, which is more than likely well into construction).
Speaking of not knowing the stage of construction, you will see that all nuclear submarine development efforts in India are about as secretive as the Chinese ones are, only exception was the SSN program due to the funding issue (explained below). For example nobody knows what's the status of the next-gen SSBN program (S-5)...which is an example of a program where the funding modalities were already worked out (carried over from Arihant's methodology)...
...out of the blue, it was 'leaked' that hydrodynamic testing of S-5 designs was going on at least as of 2019:
http://www.hisutton.com/S-5_SSBN.html
https://ibb.co/zfFhx6v
...and what appears (to my untrained eye) to be a new, larger building dock (actually two docks side by side) well into construction beside the existing one at SBC Vizag which popped out the S2, S3 & S4 - both the new docks are large enough (about 185 meters long) to accommodate even Ohio-sized vessels (170 meters), so likely intended for S-5 construction, though one of the two could be earmarked for SSNs:
https://ibb.co/Hhg2ryZ
The point being, while we can observe from the public domain the tussle over who's going to pay for the construction, there's no real way to know the exact status of the design & development work (which understandably has to be in place & has to be binding before construction starts) surrounding any of India's N-sub programs.
2) I'm pretty sure the General's unfortunate death will negatively effect several aspects of the plan for Theaterization of Combatant Commands - however I doubt it will have a noticeable effect on the SSN program itself, because as far as I can tell, consensus on the program & its funding was already reached prior to the General's passing.
That said, the issue was never that the Indian Navy did not want SSNs, it was regarding who would fund the said program - whether the funds will come out of the Navy's own capital outlay (which would require them to prioritize/cut down on programs like IAC-2), or would the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) directly requisition the funds from its Cabinet/Finance Ministry for the program (as was the case for funding of the 'stratgic' Arihant-class SSBNs). Till recently the Navy wanted the PMO to foot the bill for the SSN program, and as such every single public/media interaction with Navy leadership would have the Admirals referring to the SSBN & SSN programs as being under the same 'strategic gamut' - even though in all likelihood the SSNs will not be carrying any nuclear weapons.
Now that the matter has been settled (that the funding for SSN will come from Navy's own budget), I doubt the Admirals have much wiggle room left as doing so would certainly not earn them any favours from either the PMO or the NSA Ajit Doval's office and/or National Security Council.
In trrms of geography and threat location I would have thought it makes sense for India to have both SSNs and SSKs. Across the Indian Ocean of course SSNs will be useful. However unlike Australia, the Indian Navy has some potential enemies at close range across shallow seas. These include Pakistan bordering to the west, already possessing SSKs, Myanmar to the east, also with Chinese SSKs, and the shallow water in the Andaman Islands and Straits of Malacca. SSKs could be useful in each. So India could use both SSNs and SsKs, whereas Australia needs SSN type range even to get to Indonesia from FBW or FBE.
SSK for India is the "Dakar"- class. Join the programme of Israel and Germany. (smiley)
Have a good weekend and Shabbat Shalom!
Hi Oleg7700
If India was offering enough cash for Project-75I then a TKMS "Dakar" AIP variant may be possible.
Past joint Israeli-India submarine land attack missile tests in the Indian Ocean and the Dakar design's modification path to a Popeye Turbo nuclear missile capability might be enticing for Indian buyers.
Cheers Pete
Hi Anonymous [at Feb 18, 2022, 8:31:00 PM]
Yes SSNs and SSKs for India certainly make sense on cost, geography (including Andaman, Nicobar Islands and Malacca Strait).
This is also in responce to main enemies:
- China with increasingly capable and numerous SSNs and SSKs that can reach the Indian Ocean
and
- Pakistan with improved AIP Yuans being built and nuclear tipped Babur-3 SLCMs that might be fitted to any Pakistani sub https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babur_(cruise_missile)#Babur-3
Meanwhile Australia needs SSNs - from the near Perth base to move quickly to defend east coast Australia (Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne), anywhere of interest north. Also in alliance with US, UK, India and Japan in the further reaches of the Indian and Pacific oceans.
Regards
Pete
Fang.מנהל בפורום צבא וביטחון (Director of the Army and Security Forum. Ministry of Defense Press Pool member)
(google) "Suppose for the sake of argument that all the recent experiments in the "מה"ר" of the Jericho missiles were actually for the submarine version of the missile (SLBM) and not for the terrestrial version (ICBM)
Suppose also that the stabber submarines can be armed with these ballistic missiles (5000/5000+ km), cruise missiles (1500 km), GNA missiles and advanced torpedoes.
This does not mean that from that moment on Israel will only use submarines to attack or defend in this arena, but it does mean that if it wants it can use a plane or a submarine or land missiles or a combination of all of them together.
This is called deterrence". Regards, good week.
Hi Oleg7700 [at Feb 23, 2022, 1:19:00 AM]
You have provided no proof of a Jericho derived SLBM idea. Unsupported fantasies.
Please provide the link to what you are attempting to say rather than obscurely expecting readers to "(google)" in 2 different languages.
Pete
https://www.fresh.co.il/vBulletin/showpost.php?p=4728889&postcount=55 Of course, this is just conjecture, as everything else. Sadly, only Hebrew. This is a more competent version of it...Regards.
Thanks Oleg7700 [at Feb 23, 2022, 7:58:00 PM]
For identifying the link https://www.fresh.co.il/vBulletin/showpost.php?p=4728889&postcount=55
A heavily modified Jericho might one day form the basis of an SLBM.
The small diameter of a Dolphin 3 might not be a limitation if, say, 3 SLBMs (each with 3 MIRVs) were mounted in a long sail. That solution used by the SSB SSKs of the Soviets and now by the North Korean.
Looking at the specs of the Polaris A-1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UGM-27_Polaris#Polaris_A-1 8.7m long, body diameter 1.4m, 2,600 km range
A miniaturised Jericho II https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jericho_(missile)#Jericho_II solid fuel, two shorter stages, might work with just a 500kg payload instead of the current 1,000kg.
South Korea, Japan and Australia might find themselves, long term, in such a quiet "Baby Boomer" solution.
Regards Pete
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