One could be forgiven for thinking the Quad Security Dialogue Foreign Ministers meeting, Melbourne Australia, February 11, 2022, is a Pre-Australian Election Bilateral Meeting.
With considerable fanfare the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is visiting. He is being described as the "most senior Biden Administration official to visit Australia". Thus anointing, with reflected glory, the Australian L/NP Party-in-Power just weeks before the next Australian Election is called.
Australia's Prime Minister "Holy Scomo" Scott Morrison has also not missed an opportunity to be photo opped with the Blinken and the Quads today.
The latest pre-Election "Essential" Survey, for 2-6 February 2022, suggests that on a 2 party preferred ("2pp") basis, the Election will be
extremely close. The ruling L/NP is listed as 46%, ALP Opposition 47% and UNDecided
(like Pete) 8%.
Returning to the Quad The Australian Financial Review (AFR), unlike many media outlets, has gone further than only reporting Mr Blinken's presence and that of Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne. AFR also reports the presence of India’s External Affairs Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Japan’s Foreign Minister, Yoshimasa Hayashi,
AFR reports Mr Hayashi as saying: “Given the severe security environment in the Indo-Pacific region I wish to have a frank discussion on the regional situation as well,” he told a press briefing."..."A Japanese Foreign Ministry official said the stand-off over Ukraine, repeated missile launches by North Korea, attempts to “change the status quo” in the East and China Sea and Myanmar would also dominate the Quad agenda."
Pete Comment
So Quad participants are increasingly admitting their hard power strategic worries. Their banding together in some sort of Quad alliance structure is still a future hope.
9 comments:
Hi Pete, posting here after quite a while, hope you're doing well!
I don't have much to add regarding the potential effect of the meeting on Australia's political environment, other than the plausible idea that a meeting of Presidents/Prime Ministers would have had a much greater effect than one of Foreign Ministers but as it happens the next Heads of State/Heads of Government-level QUAD meeting may only happen after the Australian federal elections are over.
Coming back to the meeting itself, it appears the general scope of the agenda (to include the now oft-repeated "Free & Open Indo-Pacific", maritime security, vaccine partnership, cyberspace & emerging technologies regulation, space, etc.) has largely remained on the same track as it was left by the meeting of national Leaders in Washington DC last year...
...but of note is the fact that while the American, Japanese & Australian representatives have each independently voiced their concerns about the Russia-Ukraine situation, the notable exception was India which refrained from touching the subject - being the only QUAD member country that abstained from voting against Russia at the UN and the only one that enjoys generally good strategic & economic relations with the Russian state...and it reflects in the fact that while the individual sound-bytes provided by the three other member-states all mention Ukraine, the official Joint Statement (which understandably has to be signed off by all parties) makes no mention of Ukraine at all:
https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-quad-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/
To put it in the words of the Indian External Affairs Minister (responding to a question about his position on the Ukraine situation):
“This meeting is focused on the Indo-Pacific, so I think you should figure out the geography there.”
From: https://thewire.in/diplomacy/in-first-physical-meeting-in-two-years-quad-foreign-ministers-discuss-ukraine-myanmar
...its quite evident that India will try its best to keep the QUAD's focus on the Indo-Pacific, for both its own interests and, perhaps in India's view, that of the other QUAD members**. In many ways that echoes the thought process & statements made by the German Navy Chief in New Delhi recently which can be concisely summarized as "Forget Russia, focus on China" (statements which incidentally got him fired because apparently that sort of stuff wasn't meant to be said out loud...even though anyone looking at German policy with regard to the Ukraine situation would have figured that one out quite easily).
Topic marked with ** will be continued in a follow-up post (thanks to character limit).
** Expanding on that bit - this can be seen in two ways. On the one hand, it can be seen as a lack of unity or cohesion due to differing strategic viewpoints. On the other it can be seen as a much-needed anchor that keeps the QUAD's strategic focus on China, which arguably is a much bigger threat not only to the immediate safety & security of the QUAD member-states but also to the entire rules-based global order shaped by the United States since the collapse of the USSR. Simply put, the greatest threat to US/Western/Democratically-governed world order in more ways than one (military, economic, social).
Not to mention - sound foreign policy, especially as practiced at one point (and hopefully will be again) by Cold War US diplomats with regard to 'divide-and-rule' would have QUAD governments do anything in order to NOT face down a Coalition of enemy states. The Coalition should only be made by the 'good guys', the bad guys should be made to fight alone.
Simply put - Pick your main enemy, work with everyone, even your other enemies, to take him down. It was this thought-process that allowed likes of Henry Kissinger to exploit the Sino-Soviet schism of the 60s & 70s. At that point the diplomatic efforts were enabled by Pakistan which in many ways set up the thaw in US-China relations, the thaw that succeeded in depriving the Soviets of an important ally right up till Tiananmen Square 1989.
If the time comes to work with Russia in certain areas in order to address the bigger threat - the enabling environment may well have to be facilitated by a country that maintains cordial relations with both sides. If one were to view the QUAD as sort of a multi-faceted grouping or bulwark that seeks to address/contain/resolve the Chinese threat in all the domains where it manifests itself, then in that grouping, India is gonna have to be that country.
Because let's face it, Vladimir Putin may rule Russia for a long time, but it won't be forever. And any Russian leader in the coming decades is going to have to be increasingly apprehensive of China's potential designs & intent on the vast, sparsely-populated & resource-rich Siberian hinterlands & the Russian Far-East. And if this new Cold War 2.0 is gonna be anything like the last one, the Chinese threat is gonna be around for at least as long as the Soviet one did, if not more.
Cheers!
Hi Pete
Is coalition with ALP and Greens possible? Radical ecologists do not seem to accept nuclear submarine.
US and Europe concentrate Ukraine issues, but military operations by China in the East China Sea after the Olympic games should be highly cautious. I wonder how serious Foreign Minister Hayashi, a famous pro-China politician is at work against invasive China/Russia [1, 2].
[1] https://www.sankei.com/article/20220209-GO6SA4PPA5KUFJXI6KQQPPEUNY/ (2022/2/9)
Masahisa Sato (Director, Foreign Affairs Division of Liberal Democrat Party) pointed out that "only Japan in the G7 (seven major countries) does not say that if Russia invades Ukraine, it will impose economic sanctions." Regarding coordination with G7 countries, he said, "Foreign Minister Hayashi refuses to meet me and does not answer the question of whether He should hold telephone talks with foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany."
[2] https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/20211124-OYT1T50166/ (2021/11/24)
Masahisa Sato complained on TV on the 27th that Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi had been invited to visit China by China's State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. He said, "I'm feeling a bit angry. It's different from the opinions of many members of the diplomatic committee."
Regards
Hi Gessler [at Feb 12, 2022, 6:54:00 AM and Feb 12, 2022, 6:55:00 AM]
Thanks for your Quad comments.
I'll turn them into an article soon.
The Quad seems to becoming more overtly strategic on some topics and in sideline/corridor statements.
This is useful as possible China/PRC action on Taiwan MAY be drawing closer.
Regards
Pete
Hi Anonymous [at Feb 12, 2022, 12:50:00 PM]
Thanks for your comments.
See my response at article https://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2022/02/australian-2022-election-and-aukus-subs.html of Feb 13, 2022.
Regards
Pete
Hi Pete, in response to your Feb 13 reply:
Indeed - as far as I'm aware, the Chinese Communist Party has a self-declared goal of seeking reunification with Taiwan, by hook or by crook, before 2049 - the 100th Anniversary of the People's Republic. Which means that, all things being as they are, one would be well served to expect a kinetic conflict across the Taiwan Strait at some point, any point, within the next 27 years.
Speaking of QUAD & the Indo-Pacific in general, there were other important developments within the US coinciding with the summit in Australia. Namely, the release of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy document - as far as I'm aware, the first such region-specific strategy document released by the White House/National Security Council.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken tweeted it out DURING his visit to Australia, no doubt to underscore the QUAD's importance to the Strategy. The tweet in question:
https://twitter.com/SecBlinken/status/1492235106106359814
While the Secretary's tweet only contains the Fact Sheet which provides a quick, brief look at the points, the actual document itself (linked below) provides a lot more context, detail & nuance:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf
This one line from the Conclusion section says quite a lot:
"We have entered a consequential new period of American foreign policy that will demand more of the United States in the Indo-Pacific than has been asked of us since the Second World War"
Delving into some of the stated objectives & goals, each followed by a little bit of analysis on my part...
1) QUAD & Indo-Pacific
Statement: "The Quad...will advance work on critical and emerging technologies, driving supply-chain cooperation, joint technology deployments, and advancing common technology principles."
"...helping Indo-Pacific partners close the region’s infrastructure gap...As we do, we will promote resilient and secure global telecommunications, focusing on 5G vendor diversification and Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) technology..."
My take: Note how the part about QUAD talks about developing/deploying/setting the desired secure standards whereas the parts about the wider Indo-Pacific talk about the US 'promoting' the said secure standards. Simply put, the desired standards (which will likely underpin US strategic alignment with a given country) would be developed/determined by the QUAD countries and the rest of the Indo-Pacific will be expected to adopt them and them alone - edging out Chinese alternatives in the process which could compromise said efforts. I've previously talked about these standards on your blog before.
2) Australia & AUKUS
Statement: "Through the AUKUS partnership, we will identify the optimal pathway to deliver nuclear-powered submarines to the Royal Australian Navy at the earliest achievable date"
My take: Nothing new on this front, but then again it hasn't been that long since the initial AUKUS announcement. I don't expect a lot of new information to go on at least until after the 18-month assessment period is over - and to an extent after the federal elections, because I'd reckon it'll be interesting to see how the new government (assuming it won't be another term of the incumbent dispensation) looks at AUKUS.
(Continued...)
Continued from above...
3) Japan & South Korea
Statement: "Nearly every major Indo-Pacific challenge requires close cooperation among the United States’ allies and partners, particularly Japan and the ROK...Increasingly, we will seek to coordinate our regional strategies in a trilateral context."
My take: At some level, I believe the US is concerned about the possibility of fractures developing along the Japan-South Korea relationship, especially should one of them choose to equip themselves with nuclear weapons in this decade or the next. The US seems to be more interested than ever in making sure any differences are addressed and any fears are allayed - whilst keeping both of these industrialized powers focused on the common threat of DPRK & China.
(Continued...)
Continued from above...
4) India
Statement: "Support India's Continued Rise & Regional Leadership"
"We will continue to build a strategic partnership in which the United States and India work together and through regional groupings to promote stability in South Asia; collaborate in new domains, such as health, space, and cyber space; deepen our economic and technology cooperation; and contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific"
"...Steadily advance our Major Defense Partnership with India and support its role as a net security provider"
"We recognize that India is a like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active in and connected to Southeast Asia, a driving force of the Quad and other regional fora, and an engine for regional growth and development."
My take: Lots of interesting stuff here. I don't know if that's only because I'm from India, or because its the only big country in the region which still has a very evolving relationship with the US, as opposed to Alliance partners like Australia, ROK or Japan which have been on more or less the same footing with the US for the better part of the last half-century.
Firstly "Major Defence Partner" was a designation created by the Obama administration and continued by Trump & now Biden. It was created as a means of getting India on equal footing with Alliance partners of the US in terms of accessing & purchasing defence technologies, despite India still remaining officially a non-Ally. In more common parlance over the years it has often meant "Ally but not on paper".
Secondly, going over the wording of these statements, it would appear that India would continue maintaining an independent defence & nuclear weapons posture, but with strategic convergence of goals between itself & the US and its Allies. The US expresses no concerns regarding India's increasing ways & means of deploying nuclear weapons on far-off targets as part of its efforts to build a full spectrum of deterrence against China, including survivable means like SSBNs, and in fact appears to support it - in stark contrast to the open demand contained within the same document toward the complete de-nuclearization of North Korea, though on paper both India & DPRK are non-signatories to the NPT and by definition 'illegitimate' nuclear powers.
Thirdly, the repeated statement of phrases such as "Regional Leadership" and more importantly "Net security Provider" - terms not used (at least in this document) to describe any of the Alliance partners of the US are interesting for two reasons: A) it signals a willingness on the part of US leadership to let India function as what has been oft described by strategic policy watchers as the US' "Deputy Sheriff" in the Indian Ocean Region, and perhaps beyond in future (South China Sea). B) It indicates India has been more or less successful in convincing the US to give it a free hand in dealing with threats that more directly concern its immediate neighbourhood (like Myanmar) in a way that's more amicable to India's interests...such as continuing to work with the Military junta that toppled Suu Kyi's democratic government in that country.
All in all, it will be interesting to see how the US-India defence/strategic relationship develops in the coming decades.
That said - this document puts to rest any fears anyone may have regarding the US' lack of interest in the region, or desire to seek a more isolationist foreign policy...at least until the next US Presidential election cycle.
Cheers!
An Addendum to the India section of my above posts:
Considering this policy document specifically talks about the Indo-Pacific, several other matters are left out. What would also be interesting is how the US-India relationship interfaces with the 'Mid-East Quad' that's developing with Israel & the UAE joining the common core of US & India - in an apparent bid to shape events in the Middle Eastern region in the coming decades.
India lies at the geographical inflection point between the areas of responsibility of the US INDOPACOM and US CENTCOM. Plus has considerable interests in the GCC and an interest in continuing a deep strategic relation with Israel. So that's one more thing to watch - could this Mid-East Quad take on a more or less similar strategic role as the Indo-Pacific one?
Who could be the target or common foe of such a grouping? Iran? Perhaps in future, Turkey which might want to revive its past Ottoman glory?
On that note, the UAE's Ambassador to India recently had this to say:
https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-israel-us-uae-west-asian-quad-crucial-to-address-complex-global-threats-says-uae-envoy/827242/
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