March 17, 2021

Comments on Lack of Australian SSN Prospects

GhalibKabir, on March 8, 2021, made some interesting comments on future Australian submarine nuclear propulsion possibilities.

Nicole Brangwin, of the Australian Federal Parliament's Parliamentary Library Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section, wrote an excellent research paper:

"
Managing SEA 1000: Australia's Attack class submarines" of 26 February 2020 at

https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1920/AttackClassSubmarines

In the paper, Brangwin's included a "Nuclear option" section, at https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1920/AttackClassSubmarines#_Toc33537733 which includes the wording:

"Discussion around whether Australia should, or could, consider a nuclear powered submarine capability has been persistent in the future submarine context over the last decade.[284] These discussions have often called for a more serious consideration of the issue and this has only recently gained traction as part of a broader debate about Australia’s future energy sources. The main reason this issue has persisted is because nuclear powered submarines would meet Australia’s strategic requirements for the [Future Submarine Program] FSP.[285] But without a nuclear industrial base the discussion struggles to progress.

The 2009 and 2013 [Defence White Papers] DWPs categorically rejected the consideration of nuclear powered submarines, which aligns with the Australian Labor Party’s stated position opposing the use of nuclear power for military or civil purposes.[286] The Turnbull Government’s 2016 DWP did not rule it out.[287] However, Prime Minister Turnbull stated during a May 2016 press conference that ‘the issue of nuclear propulsion did not form any part of our consideration’.[288] The current Minister for Defence, Linda Reynolds, [right through to today, March 17, 2021] reaffirmed this point during a Senate Estimates hearing in November 2019 stating: ‘I can confirm that a nuclear powered submarine is not being considered as an option for the Attack class submarine’.[289]

The US option

[Discussion of some statements by some former defence officials (in 2011-2012) and a journalist, on leasing US Virginia SSNs. It is increasingly likely US would not lease their Virginia subs to Australia. [This is part due to a decline in numbers of US subs compared to new Chinese and Russian subs. Note Los Angeles class SSNs are being steadily retired (old reactors and pressure hulls reaching their maximum cycle lives.) with the last Los Angeles likely to be retired before the first Attack class is commissioned.]

[Nicole Brangwin continues "Further consideration

The second report (2014) of the Senate Committee inquiry into Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry noted that ‘both sides of politics have decided that they would not pursue a nuclear option’ for the FSP.[300] A Defence official advised the Committee that any decision to acquire nuclear powered submarines would attract an:

... enormous overhead. First of all, you have to change people's attitude towards nuclear power and then, beyond that, the industry behind it to sustain that capability and the cost of operating it. It is an interesting comparison that Japan, which has a nuclear industry and has a substantial nuclear base, chooses to operate conventional submarines.[301]

Professor Goran Roos (Adjunct Professor at a number of academic institutions) told the Senate Committee that a nuclear submarine capability would be ‘fantastic’ but Australia would need to have the right technology in-country to maintain it:

We do not have a nuclear capable industry within country; hence we cannot do it now. If you rephrased the question and said, 'How long would it take us to go to a level where we could procure a nuclear propulsion submarine?' I would say probably by submarine 6 to 7 in the new build program. That is roughly when you are looking at because that is the time line it is going to take us. You need six to seven conventional submarines, where you start to build up the capability to then have a nuclear system in this area, and you could then go. So you are looking at 10 to 20 years.[302]

In June 2017 former Prime Minister Tony Abbott [without many supporting him] suggested Australia should consider acquiring nine nuclear powered submarines from allies France, the UK or the US. Abbott lamented his biggest regret while Prime Minister was not ‘robustly challenging the nuclear no-go mindset...’. While Abbott was not asserting ‘that we must go nuclear’, he argued that Australia ‘should at least consider the option before the opportunity is lost for another several decades’. He suggested Australia should start the conversation by talking to the US about providing the RAN with nuclear powered submarines, which could be initially based at the US military base at Guam while Australia developed its domestic nuclear capabilities.[303]

[Rear Admiral Gregory Sammut - who retired from the RAN later in 2020 and now, in the Australian Public Service, is General Manager Submarines, earlier] stated in October 2017 that there is ‘no plan to switch to nuclear power. Before we can contemplate a nuclear-powered fleet, there’d need to be a much broader policy debate about nuclear power itself’.[304]

The current debates over Australia’s future energy sources have created an opportunity for a broader discussion about nuclear issues. This resulted in the establishment of a Parliamentary Committee inquiry into the prerequisites for nuclear energy in Australia. The terms of reference for this inquiry were relatively broad as the committee considered a range of issues including ‘security implications’ and ‘any other relevant matter’.[305] The Committee also considered previous inquiries such as the South Australian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission from 2016 and the Switkowski nuclear energy review from 2006.[306] The Committee’s final report was released in December 2019 making three recommendations for the Australian Government to consider nuclear energy technology in the future.[307] Although the inquiry prompted a broader discussion about potential submarine capabilities in the future, the issue appears to have been sidelined for now."
--------------------------------------------

Separately there may be a review in the late 2020s:

If Australia reviews the nuclear propulsion option that would likely be no earlier than the late 2020s. See Australia's 2016 Defence White Paper [ a long 191 page 20MB .pdf ] paragraph 4.29

"During the long life of the new submarines, the rapid rate of technological change and ongoing evolution of Australia’s strategic circumstances will continue. As part of the rolling acquisition program, a review based on strategic circumstances at the time, and developments in submarine technology, will be conducted in the late 2020s to consider whether the configuration of the submarines remains suitable or whether consideration of other specifications should commence."
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PETE COMMENT

Given all of the above, Australia’s has insufficient money, political momentum or nuclear expertise (especially on submarine reactors) to second guess or improve on the submarine reactor decisions or designs of remotely likely suppliers (France, the UK and the US).

Further discussion of a future Australian class of SSNs is better done in about 7 years time, while discussing Australian conventional subs is much more useful.

17 comments:

Anonymous said...

Pete
Completely agree that the discussion on N powered subs for Australia is for the time being a diversion.
The fact that Japan which is highly capable in civilian N technology did not look at N sub is a proof of the political issue.
A more meaningful issue is a discussion about LiB batteries replacing LaB in the futures australian class..The gains in autonomy, but also in term of power dynamics are such that the gap with N is somewhat reduced
I am quite convinced that the salesmen of the "usual suspects"(TKMS and NG) are pushing this option with the current prospects (India, Netherland,Philippines, Indonesia, Marocco..) although costs increases are to be expected)

subdriver said...

Given the developing geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific, and Australia's size and location, it is too premature to rule out the n-option. The lack of a nuclear ecosystem would be an inhibiting factor but the choice of the Short Fin Barracuda, a design not even on paper, but with the nuclear powered Barracuda pedigree would indicate that the possibility exists. Perhaps, a LiB-AIP combo would be a better choice. For the time being though I would agree with Pete that the option should not be closed.


GhalibKabir said...

SSK vs SSN: Part I of response

Japan is a totally different case due to historical reasons and the pacifist constitution forced upon it by the US owing to WW-II. Japan is a what we call 'a screwdriver away' from nuclear capability. SSN is well within their ability to do...so this is not comparable to Australia (also worth noting US nuclear umbrella and protection is much more explicit there).

In the last article an Anonymous had made some very good but incomplete points on SSK vs SSN arguing from 3 perspectives (some I had already addressed)

1. Lucas heights: ofcourse, that place supplies medical isotopes and all that because Hawke and co made a conscious decision to not develop the capability that Aus. had. It will be a 2-4 decade effort to create a nuclear ecosystem. I do not discount the effort needed at all. However, both the advantages of SSKs and the disadvantages of nuclear waste esp. decommissioning costs have been overstated imho...

2. SSK Ambush vs SSN: Yes, at choke points like Malacca Strait, persian gulf and East Timor, SSKs do afford advantages in terms of silence and size. However, this is overstated to a certain extent as SSNs like the Virginia class or the Shang class are already designed to operate in shallower waters. Also, AIP cannot be refilled at sea and that necessarily limits transit and deployment times. AIP use will likely be limited to emergencies..so to ensure equal 'on-station' times, one might need 2-3 SSKs for every SSN....we have not yet talked about weapons carrying ability or ability for constant high speeds say for a 6,000 km sprint from Melbourne to Malampitya oil field area in the SCS...

http://armedforcesjournal.com/projecting-power-2/

Forward basing SSKs or having more SSKs or any other combo also entails costs as if 'on-station' equivalent LCC or lifecycle costs are considered then an SSK fleet costs 1.5 to 2.0x an SSN fleet incl. all decommissioning costs included...it is not as cheap as it looks as the Aus. SSK, Indian SSK and Japanese SSK programs show..I am happy to be disproven or schooled...but I see no easy way to run away from the physics and arithmetic of it.

to be continued

GhalibKabir said...

SSK vs SSN Part 2 of response

3. Nuclear waste: This is yet another thought that is still holding on to a frame of reference still set in the 1970s. Over a dozen Los Angeles class subs have been disposed off safely. The physics and engineering aspects are quite clear. Waste does not occupy a lot of land and while effort/resource intensive to an extent, it is nothing that cannot be surmounted. US, Russia have regularly shown...the UK unfortunately transitioned too fast to second tier economic status especially in the late 1990s early 2000s as the last benefits of 'empire' died out..leaving the RN and HRMG very less in terms of funds to defuel and dismantle...Even then, RN subs are being dismantled...

https://www.navylookout.com/the-painfully-slow-process-of-dismantling-ex-royal-navy-nuclear-submarines/

Ultimately it is not an either or question. If the US is going to keep withdrawing as has been evident now for a few years then having an SSN program becomes critical. Both SSKs and SSNs have their roles. It tends to be more complementary than a substitute. of course allies like the US need to be a bit more pragmatic and help with facilities and knowledge to dispose old subs safely just like they have done....

Bleeding AUD 200 bil plus for 10-12 SSKs vs a suffren class SSN that only exceeded its budget modestly at 18 billion AUD for 6 boats (so even at 1 billion AUD running cost each for 6 subs which is quite high to assume for 30 years) implies 198 billion AUD at the higher end while AUD 200 bil is now a low-mid end estimate for 12 SSKs... if the 'on-station' standard is used then we are looking at bigger costs of 2x SSN costs for an equivalent SSK fleet...ultimately Canberra will need to locate its political cojones to make that call to develop an ecosystem....or make the Ozzie tax payer a milch cow instead..if do insist on the easier route...

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1018536.pdf
(look at table 1)
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-04/55032-Submarine_Maintenance_Costs.pdf

Anonymous said...

GhalibKabir

It appears that Australia is not looking at AIP for the Attack class & is instead looking to battery technology with a change in battery type likely at some point (either Lithium-Ion or Nickel-Zinc from PMB being most likely).

The biggest blockage to Australian SSN's is the general public. Despite Australia's massive physical size, they couldn't even get agreement on a site to build a nuclear waste facility til 2020(the dangerous stuff is currently stored at Lucas Heights). At present, any government that tried to build a nuclear power plant would find itself out of government before the the first sod was turned.

The only option I can see with any hope of getting past the voter is Thorium - maybe. Either that or find a way to run SSN's without a nuclear power industry or stay with all SSK's. The voter & arithmetic don't always compute.

Pete said...

Hi Anonymous [at Mar 17, 2021, 11:01:00 PM]

Yes instead of nuclear subs it would far more frutful to hear about the SSK mission sets and LIBs technology.

The Japanese realise that given Japan's aggression in East Asia 1894 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Sino-Japanese_War to 1945, a nuclear propelled or even armed Japan would raise regional tensions dangerously.

China, NK and even SK wouldn't stand for a nuclear armed Japan. Much better the US (not nationally in the region) has the nuclear umbrella.

Yes LIB batteries (once proven efficient + safe on the final 2 Soryus and first Taigei onwards) would be a good fit for first or secondd batches of 4 Attack class.

NG would need to buy Japanese LIB tech now for it to be in the first batch of 4 Attack class. More reasonably NG and Australia would want to assess J-LIBs efficiency and safety meaning a more conservative NG purchase of J-LIBs tech in the late 2020s in time for the second batch Attack class.

Regards

Pete

Pete said...

Hi subdriver [at Mar 18, 2021, 3:56:00 PM]

Given France can only afford 6 SSNs and UK 7 and half of the job of their SSNs is to defend their SSBNs.

Then Aus would need to upend its Defence budget only being able to afford 4 SSNs - still more expensive than the 12 SSK plan.

As well as cost, there is the extra necessary time delay of 10-15 years for training sufficient numbers of Australian nuclear propulsion reactor engineers. US, UK France would not surrender such rare skill engineers to the RAN.

Only Italy's future Type 212 NFS and I think KSS-III Batch II will have mature "LiB-AIP". Australia would need to wait its turn till the early 2030s to begin building LiB-AIP.

and thats after trashing the current Naval Group (non-AIP, non-LIBs Batch 1) contract.

Pete

Pete said...

Hi GhalibKabir
@ Mar 18, 2021, 4:07:00 PM

Re SSK vs SSN: Part I of response

Yes J nuke industrial complex vastly more developed than Aus. And J suffers a vastly higher threat to from neighbouring PRC, NK and Russian subs.

Indeed Aus would need a 2-4 decade effort (like India) to create a nuclear ecosystem. See my response to subdriver (above) on 4 Aus SSNs, in a Aus DoD budget shock, likely costing more than 12 SSKs and a 15 year (at a minimum) delay to train up SSN reactor engineers.

1. Unlike India which can point to intense Pak and PRC (existential) nuclear threats Aus can’t. All means nuclear in any form is opposed by about 75% of the Aus public. Thus foiling all Aus Gov efforts (over the last 50 years) to plan-build of nuclear waste dumps or nuclear power reactors . eg. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_Australia#Unsuccessful_nuclear_power_station_concepts_and_proposals

2. Cost of Aus SSNs too high no matter their mission flexibility into brown-green water SSK roles. Also Virginia’s may have the highest SSN brown-green ability but they would also cost the most and most 95+% U235 reactor core proliferation concerns.

Thanks for http://armedforcesjournal.com/projecting-power-2/ though unfortunatel a bit old (2011) seen in its claim Collins heaviest SSKs when Soryus have been since 2012 or so.

SSN decommissioning a huge cost http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2021/03/huge-training-decommissiong-costs-of.html INGNORED IN AUS SSN DEBATE noting UK SSN supporters didn’t factor that in (in the 1960s) when they were just talking SSN building running costs.

Regards

Pete

Pete said...

Hi GhalibKabir
@Mar 18, 2021, 4:10:00 PM

Re “SSK vs SSN Part 2 of response”

US’s vastly higher defence budget, need for 60 nuke subs, bringing ECONOMIES OF SCALE

means US experiences, at all stages of SSN, U235 enrichment, reactor development, commissioning or all aspects and decommissioning

has been VASTLY DIFFERENT from lower UK and French experienced inefficiencies.

US has in fact found nuclear waste disposal a frustrating and HUGELY EXPENSIVE matter. One need point to YUCCA Mountain nuclear waste repository https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yucca_Mountain_nuclear_waste_repository

“The project was approved in 2002, but federal funding for the site ended in 2011. The project has encountered many difficulties and was highly contested by the public, the Western Shoshone peoples, and many politicians.[4] The project also faces strong state and regional opposition.[5] The Government Accountability Office stated that the closure was for political, not technical or safety reasons.

... Lacking an operating repository, the federal government initially paid utility companies somewhere between $300 and $500 million per year in compensation for failing to comply with the contract it signed to take the spent nuclear fuel by 1998.[26] For the ten years after 2015 it is estimated to cost taxpayers $24 BILLION

in payments from the Judgment Fund.[27] The Judgment Fund is not subject to budget rules and allows Congress to ignore the nuclear waste issue since payments therefrom do not have any impact on yearly spending for other programs.

Yes US has supported much of the Combat System aspects of Australia’s SSKs (sensor, signal databases supplied by US naval intelligence and all) because

AUS SSK’s capability/roles COMPLIMENT the roles of US SSNs. Meanwhile US hasn’t tangibly supported a Aus (or for that matter Canadian) SSN acquisition ideas.

Quoted cost of SSN sub builds for a parent navy is more a public relations ART than non-government agency assessed accounting science.

The very low cost US and especially French claims of what it cost to build their SSNs relies on such assumption as:

- low commercial risk building subs for their 100+ year old parent navy customer.

- No/little technology transfer costs.

AND

- most significantly, no PROFIT MARGIN expected of a FOREIGN buyer .

Also some costs are in often secret programs like

- 40 years of developing/improving the K15 reactor,

- cost of enriching the U235 fuel, and

- cost of training French Navy nuclear reactor Engineers etc.

Furthermore most SSN nations would oppose having their high national security SSN designs being built in Australia – but home build is an Aus Gov Promised to Unions and ASC non-negotiable necessity for Any Australian submarine program.

Regards

Pete

Pete said...

Hi Anonymous [at Mar 19, 2021, 11:00:00 PM]

Interesting. What you say on advanced batteries is true.

Australia's (Current) Defence Minister Reynold's Media Release 13 Mar 2020 https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/media-releases/subcontracts-signed-attack-class-submarine-main-storage-batteries indicates:

"Already, Defence has engaged PMB to explore a new battery technology that could offer significantly improved performance and may prove a suitable replacement for lead-acid batteries over the life of the Attack class submarine."

Although the first batch of 4 Attack class (built 2024-2034) would likely be on lead-ACID as Naval Group is not up there with Japan in LIBs development.

Very true your "At present, any government that tried to build a nuclear power plant would find itself out of government before the the first sod was turned."

The Australian public would need to assess an enemy (mostly China) as a huge threat before positive public feeling about nuclear propulsion see the light of day.

Australia doesn't have the money or nuclear industrial base to go anywhere near developing Thorium reactors (let alone sharply miniaturising them for submarine use). That would be a big league challenge: US, China then Russia (in that order) I'd say.

Abbott's idea of operating an Aus SSN base (out of Aus) eg. from Guam, hasn't been treated seriously by experts, to my knowledge.

Regards

Pete

GhalibKabir said...

Hi Anonymous and Pete,

Part 1: Challenges with Thorium

Thorium will also need necessarily the presence of Pu and U as a MOX fuel bundle surrounding it...plus Thorium reactors are not easy to design as India's AHWR 300 MWe project and experiments in the PFBR (Prototype FBR), 3 other reactors have shown...

Here, the Indian government's agency BARC's own words

https://indico.cern.ch/event/222140/contributions/1528881/attachments/363066/505406/Th-2013_OCt_27.pdf

As of 2021 January, the AHWR is probably still in very advanced design stage or probably in early prototype fabrication stage (me thinks unlikely, the Th-U233 fuel fabrication has been quite challenging for a Thorium AHWR)..this is despite 25 years of good success using U233 as a fuel... also Plutonium is a necessary component of the Th-MOX fuel blanket...

I am not sure denizens of Ozzie land will be exactly thrilled if they hear this and who will provide Australia with reprocessed Pu? I am afraid after reading both your views, SSNs and associated land nuclear infra are as likely as a gelding fathering a foal next year.
(Big sigh!)

Plus considering the extent of irrational skittishness in Ozzie land about nukes precluding any sane discussion, I must admit a LiB-SSK ala Soryu type is probably a much better alternative....

end of part 1

GhalibKabir said...

Part 2: Choice of AIP-LiB and all that...

first off, LiBs are certainly way better than LABs... though I suspect a number of naval tactics based choices and trade-offs will need to be made..

and those are very interesting trade-offs to make...Sprint speed or a combo of Sprint and Ambush? Is the extra space going to store diesel? or more LiBs or a small Stirling AIP+LiB+Permasyn Diesel-Electric? Also the Diesels powering and charging the LiBs will need to be more powerful too.. a top of the line MAN Pielstick Kawasaki derivative (4 diesels at ~7 MWe) with a permasyn motor and LiB might make for a good but still range limited SSK

The Kawasakis powering the Soryus can put out 6 to 8 MW worth power, IIRC...

to sum it up, choosing to avoid SSNs is similar to choosing prefer another 'opening' to use a chess equivalent and if so, then Australia might need to have mini-CBGs led by HMAS Canberra type ships with flotilla of AAW and ASW ships with adequate air support as you can be sure the Chinese CBGs with their 128 VLS type-55 renhai ships and formidable over and surface assets will come very well prepared.. and of course, americans stopping behaving like pinheaded nitwits would be of enormous help too...

(More to the point, I feel despondent as the current bunch of bunglers in-charge in Canberra couldn't organize a piss-up at Sydney's Toohey's brewery if needed. so inept are they...can they make the trade-offs? evidence suggests optimism to the point of foolishness.)

PS:

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196043/Submarine-options.pdf

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/405/192/meredith.pdf

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-future-submarine-the-great-battery-debate/

https://www.udt-global.com/__media/libraries/sensors-and-processing/76---Anders-Wikstrom-Slides.pdf

Anonymous said...

Pete / GhalibKabir

Re batteries. I did mention two alternatives being looked at by PMB. They seem to be suggesting that new Nickel-Zinc tech may be an easier & more straightforward upgrade to existing LAB systems unlike LIB & without LIB safety concerns.

https://pmbdefence.com.au/services/engineering/new-technology/

Pete said...

Hi GhalibKabir
@Mar 22, 2021, 4:39:00 PM and Mar 22, 2021, 5:01:00 PM

Yes I realise developing land based Thorium power reactor, let alone submarine reactor (small enough and fuel load long enough) is difficult technically.

Also Thorium reactor, U power reactor and submarine reactor development is irrelevant to Australia’s miniscule Nuclear techno-industrial, and no-funding, base.

WATCH THIS PAGE FOR MEANINGFUL AUS REACTOR DISCUSSION IN 6 - 7 YEARS. Meanwhile “as likely as a gelding fathering a foal next year” is spot on.
--------------------------

Better potential for LiBs, other advanced battery tech, and/or AIP for 2nd Attack class Batch (building 2034-40).

Need to collect open-source info (data may be concrete from 2023) on performance and any safety problems of Soryu Mk.2 and Taigei class LIBs. Euro-submarine builders (including NG), advanced battery companies and their governments may be the most determined collectors of info – as its very high $$value economic-intel.

Yes many mission state combinations (eg. “Sprint speed or a combo of Sprint and Ambush?”)

CANBERRA CLASS LHDS

F-35Bs, helicopters and UAVs operating off or small carriers likely inadequate to protect carrier group from air threats – so mainly of amphibious landing value. Canberra LHDs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canberra-class_landing_helicopter_dock only have around 17kn cruising speed so 32kn SSNs have a lot of wasted extra escort performance. Canberras (with low defensive missile armament) also not made for medium level confrontations with Chinese destroyers or carriers.

Canberra – as intended – are good enough for intended South Pac Island amphibious missions and didn’t cost the extra $2 Billion each to make them medium carriers for high end conventional warfare.

CANADA https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/405/192/meredith.pdf the idea and cost of new submarines are even more unpopular in Canada than Australia. A LIB + AIP SSK Under The Ice would need a foolhardy captain.

Thanks for https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-future-submarine-the-great-battery-debate/ A new LIB Media Release “article” is coming up today or tomorrow.

Thanks also for Saab Article https://www.udt-global.com/__media/libraries/sensors-and-processing/76---Anders-Wikstrom-Slides.pdf noting Australia’s PMB Defence
is mentioned page 12 and in more detail page 14.

Regards

Pete

Pete said...

Hi Anonymous [at Mar 23, 2021, 10:12:00 PM]

Thanks PMB Defence’s Media Release on LIBs and Nickel-Zinc submarine batteries is short enough to republish below.

https://pmbdefence.com.au/services/engineering/new-technology/ Undated.

“NEW TECHNOLOGY

Lithium-ion

Is the peak performing technology for some submarine applications. PMB is working with international partners and customers for the development of next generation lithium-ion submarine main storage batteries. Our design offers high performance whilst minimising major platform changes for safety and with a supply chain model designed to support the extended timeframes of the submarine life-cycle. Specialised packaging and controls, will offer lower integration cost over competitor designs to provide a superior performing battery, with improved safety and system controls over competitor products.

Nickel-Zinc

PMB is working to integrate partner technology with our own IP to produce a submarine-dedicated main battery product that:

• provides good performance gains over lead-acid, with a reasonable cost profile.

• exceeds lithium-ion performance in many aspects for submarine applications without the cost and risks.

Unrivalled high-power performance, excellent charging characteristics and unlimited operation at any state of charge provides operators with performance and operational freedom of use, previously thought available only with lithium-ion technology. Major reduction in indiscretion ratio and near zero maintenance are also key benefits. This requires minimal integration effort to the platform structure and systems to give acquisition and upgrade Program Managers a low risk approach with much lower cost and schedule impacts than lithium-ion. The sealed cells are outstandingly robust and superior system safety characteristics allow installation without requiring any major upgrades to platform structure or systems. “Upgrade” outcomes for “update” investment!”

Anonymous said...

Pete

In case you missed it, PMB also scored a research contract re Nickel-Zinc submarine batteries from UK MOD for the Astute class in 2019 (still ongoing). Many don’t realise that nuke subs still have diesels & batteries (backup).

So add that to the Au MOD research contract & you start to think LIB is not the only game in town.

Regards

Pete said...

Hi Anonymous [at Mar 24, 2021, 10:09:00 PM]

As with Japanese Sub-LIBs that likely took 10+ years and AU$Billion+ to research and mature for large scale, operational use.

...a similar timeline and determined funding effort would be required for Nickel-Zinc.

We don't want a situation where Aus's Attack class is the only Nickel-Zinc SSK in the world, even if it is good business for one Australian company.

Regards

Pete