About subs, military/naval, missiles, nuclear weapons & politics. New Aussie subs have been just talk since 2009. Collins upgrades of partial help. UUVs help more. POTUS may cancel AUKUS Virginias in 2031 as the USN needs all SSNs to the 2040s. Australian Gov ignores US higher priority Columbia SSBNs (one/year being commissioned 2029-2041). Meaning no new Virginias 2030-41? Shawn C and Gessler are excellent authors. Pete.
This concerns the 408.6kg of
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) enriched up to 60% Uranium 235, reported
by the IAEA in the Al Jazeera article above.
A further small non-linear Iranian
enrichment effort would bring the 60% HEU up to 95% optimal bomb grade.
About 40kg of 95% HEU is enough to
produce a Hiroshima sized bomb atomic bomb. This would give Iran enough for 10
bombs. Israeli intelligence calculates 9.
Here and below is an 8 month old account of Israel's illegal nuclear weapons development and 13:10 into the video, possible South African-Israeli nuclear weapons cooperation.
The AUKUS Review announced June 11, 2025 is
likely to produce an ambiguous finding leaning on Australia to increase its non-refundable
AUKUS payments (currently A$5 Billion) to the US. The 30 day Review is being led
by AUKUS Virginia sceptic US Defense Under Secretary for Policy Elbridge Colby.
The overall America First objective of the Review
is to force Australia to pay more to America's military-industrial-political
complex. A secondary objective is to force an agreement (overt or secret) out
of Australia to make available any AUKUS Virginias for US objectives, like defending
Taiwan.
America is pressuring Australia to raise our
Defense Budget up from 2% to 5% GDP to pay more for AUKUS, more for other US
built weapons, and more for Australian weapons built under expensive US licenses.
The shortage of SSNs for the US Navy, leaving no Virginias to spare for Australia, continues. No matter how many $Billions the US Government throws at the problem, SSN production is not increasing, nor SSN availability improving. US website AOL carries
the Fox News article, of June 11, 2025, below. Within the article text see:
"The [US] Navy currently operates under 50 attack submarines, well below the long-term requirement of 66 boats, as outlined by recent Navy force structure assessments."
"Top House Democrat grills Hegseth on submarine spending plans: 'Give us the details'
Morgan Phillips
Rep. Rosa DeLauro, D-Conn., confronted Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth during a heated House Appropriations Committee hearing Tuesday over years-long lags in the nation’s shipbuilding capacity.
The top Appropriations Democrat accused the Defense Department (DOD) of failing to present a clear, transparent plan to ramp up production at a time when China’s shipbuilding capabilities are estimated to be 230 times greater than the U.S.’s. She said the Biden administration had been similarly opaque.
DeLauro zeroed in on what she characterized as a troubling shortfall between the Navy’s current production capacity and future strategic needs.
"Do you know where our submarine production currently stands and whether current production is sufficient to bridge the gap between current fleet size and projected need?" she asked.
Rep. Rosa DeLauro [different bio - photo above] confronted Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth during a heated House Appropriations Committee hearing Tuesday [June 10, 2025] over years-long lags in the nation’s shipbuilding capacity.
"There is a gap," Hegseth admitted, "but we believe we are closing it."
But DeLauro wasn’t satisfied, demanding detailed data to back up that claim.
"We do not have any information or data that can substantiate what you’re saying," she shot back. "Give us the details."
"We've had difficulty with the prior administration, and I don't mind calling them out. What is your plan for the future?"
Asked what the status is of the department’s investment in submarine programs, Hegseth boasted of a 14% increase in funding in the fiscal year 2026 budget request for the Columbia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and a "substantial increase" in the Virginia-class fast-attack submarines as well.
But the congresswoman raised concerns about reports that the Pentagon plans to shift $3.1 billion in funding for the Columbia-class submarine program from FY2026 to FY2027 and FY2028.
"This creates a serious problem for industry in the short term and hampers shipbuilders’ ability to reach an adequate production rate," DeLauro warned. "Have you been in contact with Electric Boat or Huntington Ingalls about your plans?"
Hegseth pushed back, saying top Pentagon officials were in regular communication with shipyards.
"Almost every day," he said. "We’re actively engaged… to make sure their needs are being met and their shortfalls are being addressed so we can close that gap in real time."
DeLauro pointed to a missed deadline for placing key submarine contracts authorized under the December continuing resolution. Congress had approved $5.7 billion for two Block IV and oneBlock V Virginia-class submarines, with the understanding that contracts would be in place by February 2025. The Defense Department did not finalize the contracts until April 30.
"We have made a serious investment," DeLauro said. "Now we want to know where that is going and what your plan is."
When pressed for specifics, Hegseth thanked the committee for its flexibility and acknowledged prior mismanagement under previous administrations. But DeLauro cut him off.
"I want your plan," she said. "Can we get that in writing and on paper? Because we don’t have anything today. We have zip, nada."
Hegseth promised to provide the committee with written details of the department’s submarine production plan.
"We have the details, and we will provide them," he said.
DeLauro insisted she wanted the information before the committee's markup later the same day.
The U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding capacity has been on the decline since the Cold War. In the 1980s, the U.S. aimed for a 600-ship fleet; today, it struggles to maintain 300 operational vessels.
The [US] Navy currently operates under 50 attack submarines, well below the long-term requirement of 66 boats, as outlined by recent Navy force structure assessments.
Shipyards like Electric Boat (General Dynamics) in Connecticut and Huntington Ingalls Industries in Virginia and Mississippi are the primary builders of nuclear submarines—but both are operating near maximum capacity and face major workforce and supply chain challenges.
Shipbuilders report significant difficulties in hiring, training and retaining welders, pipefitters, engineers and designers. Shipbuilding’s highly specialized supply chain was hit especially hard by the Covid-19 pandemic and has been slow to recover.
Other than "up to" 12 SSN-AUKUS and a heroically ambitious 1 SSN every 18 months drumbeat, yesterday's UK SSN-AUKUS announcement [1a] is no change from the UK's 2021 SSN-AUKUS announcement. "Up to" 12 leaves scope for reduction to 7. In 2021 [2] there was no actual number put on how many SSN-AUKUS subs would be producedfor the UK Royal Navy and there is still no firm number. [1b]
Yesterday's announcement was a rather vacuous banner headline for the UK government's release of the broader Strategic Defence Review package.It was all the more vacuous because SSN-AUKUS production may end more than 20 years after the term of the current UK government ends.
The 12 SSN-AUKUS announcement is also heroic because SSN production [3] will compete for manpower, BAE corporate attention and space with Dreadnought SSBN production. [4] This competition will be most intense throughout the 2030s as it will make the Devonshire Dock Hall [5] rather crowded in the UK's Barrow-in-Furness submarine shipyard.
Also it is BAE, the UK's only submarine builder, that must handle this major spike in UK submarine production. BAE's cost overruns and delays record was not glowing producing just one class at one time, the Astute-class. [6].
Can the UK government afford to buy 2 classes of nuclear subs in the 2030s-2040s? That being 4 new SSBNs and the new class of SSN-AUKUSs.
Is the "up to 12" statement connected to the shortfall of SSNs for the USN? Up to 12 UK SSNs in the RN could reduce the negative impact of too few US SSNs for missions in the Arctic, Atlantic, Mediterranean and seas around North Africa-Middle East.
Judging by public sources and Fleet Base West's Indian Ocean positioning
Australia's SSKs rarely visit NZ or South West Pacific islands. Further north of the Sydney base may be more likely.
Due to differing SSK vs SSN electrical fitouts, differing balance/buoyancies and in fact
far differing internal arrangements retrofitting even a small reactor into an
operational SSK has never occurred, to my knowledge. I think a French Navy non-operational, Daphne-class SSK was used as a reactor testbed (?) in the 1960s-1970s prior to the launch of the first Rubis class SSN in 1979. https://www.lynceans.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Part-4_UK-France-Others-60-yrs-of-marine-nuc-power.pdfpage 56 onwards, may provide clues.
Retrofitting an intentionally small, hence low power, small modular reactor
(SMR) makes little sense particularly relying on an SMR with molten salt
coolant.
The US experimented with an earlier USS Seawolf (SSN-575) (built in the 1950s)
being the only US submarine built with a sodium-cooled reactor. That Seawolf's
S2G reactor was a liquid metal (sodium) cooled, beryllium-moderated nuclear
reactor. The Seawolf's sodium-cooled reactor faced challenges, including leaks
in the steam generators and performance issues. Its was later replaced with a
standard PWR. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Seawolf_(SSN-575)#Comparison_to_Nautilus
The USSR also attempted molten salt in its Alfa-class SSNs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfa-class_submarine#Propulsionwith negative results. In emergency shut
downs molten salt reactors freeze - preventing restarts - requiring reactor
replacements. Pier side heating was essential.
I regrettably reckon there is little SSK to SSN retrofit or alternative reactor
coolant flexibility. Otherwise someone would have tried retrofitting SSK to
SSN.
To hedge against the likely non-delivery in the 2030s of Virginias under AUKUS and the only temporary fix of the LOTE of Collins conventional subs (SSKs), some suggest weekly:
"Why doesn't Australia buy interim submarines, that are off the shelf, to bridge the submarine availability gap until Virginias or SSN-AUKUS's arrive in the 2040s (or don't arrive at all)?"
Increasingly the suggested SSKs are South Korea's KSS-III or Japan's Taigei.
Logic, productivity and efficiency since the
beginning of Collins, through to today, have been usurped by South Australian
state, more Australia wide, RAN and Federal Government
financial-POLITICAL-electoral priorities.
Basically ASC, the unions, South Australian
Government and supply chain companies from all over Australia, require the LOTE then possible new SSK building to only be at Osborne, not overseas.
Reasons
Australia's SSK building tradition always involves the highest possible infusions of Federal Government funds into South Australia.
Without the car factories it used to have, South Australia relies on warship and
submarine building federal money. All these industrial-political realities
double the building time for triple the money of a sub built overseas.
What do Federal governments (be they Labor and/or
Coalition) get out of this? They buy critical Federal Election votes from electoral swing state South Australia. A textbook example being then Prime Minister Turnbull
winning the July 2, 2016 Election by rushing the selection, on April 26, 2016, of the Attack class
submarine to be built at Osborne. Turnbull won enough federal seats in South
Australia to win that Election.If Australia had waited it may have been able to bargain Barracuda-Suffren SSNs out of France.
"Off the shelf" in terms of stocks of completed subs sitting at foreign warehouses, or a design meeting the needs of all customers, simply don't exist. As with the Collins the
RAN has special high speed, very long range, long endurance, very large SSK requirements. South Korean,
Japanese and German built subs (in response to their customer requirements)
have different speed-range qualities that do not match the RAN's genuine need
for long transit range missions at speed.
Singapore's Type 218 Invincibles were not off the
shelf but tailor made to Singapore's requirements using a mixture of Type 214
and Type 212CD characteristics. Every submarine customer requires some tailoring.
Between what I call the Osborne
"inefficiency" curse and necessary RAN tailoring any "Interim - Off the Shelf" SSK built at Osborne would take 15 years from 2026 = first sub commissioned in 2041, for
triple the price than if it were built overseas (eg. in South Korea, the most efficient Western SSK builder).
