SSNs: Can the UK or US Really Help Australia?

Dutton's opportunism is damaging Australian negotiations with its AUKUS allies.

Part of Dutton's outbursts on June 8/9, 2022 were to cause divisions amongst Labor Party decision-makers. See "The Enemy" in my June 3, 2022 article.

Apart from Dutton's "help", UK and US SSN provision for Australia is already looking very problematic. 

1.  SSN Batch building by the UK is of no help to Australia's SSN aspirations.

A "batch"? The UK is Commissioning the 7 Astutes as a batch, from 2010 to 2026.

Then, for Australia, there is the very unhelpful gap between UK batches with the UK only commissioning Astute successors SSN(R)s from the mid 2040s.

The UK batch builds SSNs for its own navy because it doesn't have the requirement for the large number of SSNs that would be produced by a Continuous build (of 1 or more SSNs every year).

Only the US (with Virginias) and China (probably with the future Type 095s) have the will, competitive need, industrial capacity and defence budget for Continuous build of SSNs.

Nuclear threats by Putin, in the context of the war in Ukraine, may well have unnerved the UK and US, increasing the chances that they won't lease or sell SSNs to Australia early.

2.  From all I've read the US appears to have delegated to the UK the task of assisting Australia build AUKUS SSNs.

Otherwise it would be much more logical that constantly inter-operating Pacific and Indian Ocean allies (Australia and the US) formed an A-US SSN building alliance rather than AUKUS. The UK, most of the time, is a far off North Atlantic power these days.

Reasons for the US delegation to the UK seem to be based on a US expectation that the US will never deliver its own world's best SSNs to Australia. Here are five reasons:

- the US sees it as essential that all Virginia SSNs produced go to its own navy. Total US SSN numbers will soon decline while threats/commitments for US SSNs increase. The US largely built its SSN force to face the Russian threat but added to that the China threat is even greater.

- the US's "F-22 like" national security tradition of not exporting its complete-most-sensitive weapons. Yes Australia now has some US reactor tech, but is the US offering whole of Virginia tech?

- US SSN building companies, GD-EB and HII, have never exported whole SSN tech, because that may eventually boost international SSN building commercial competition against them.

- Also GD-EB or HII providing Australia with SSNs or overseeing Virginia construction in Adelaide is a very inefficient Contractural, Administrative and Training process. GD-EB and HII don't have the time or resources to do this while they are fully committed building Virginia SSNs and Columbia SSBNs.

and

- delivery of Virginias to Australia is politically and financially risky (for GD-EB and HII and Australia) due to the unpredictability of the Next US President and the fickleness of US Congressional export permissions. Australia is caught between perhaps one-term, "lame duck" US President Biden and the far worse prospect of the return of Trump. Trump, with no sense of alliance loyalty, could consider AUKUS "Biden's Deal to be broken".

Re Congressional stability: the Republicans are strongly favoured to win the November 8, 2022 Midterm Elections in both the Senate and House. This may tend to hobble Biden AUKUS initiatives. 

Trump is currently odds on favourite to win the November 2024 Presidential Election.

The Collins Life of Type Extension (LOTE), providing some Collins subs to the mid 2040s, gives Australia some time to acquire new submarines, but not much time. 

Mainly China's Cambodian Ream Naval Base

https://www.9news.com.au/national/china-news-australia-prime-minister-albanese-calls-for-transparency-on-chinas-plans-for-cambodian-military-base/8d7f5fa1-8c04-4216-9800-865554aa504d

For readers with access to The Diplomat paysite note:

https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/what-the-cambodian-naval-base-brouhaha-overlooks/ 

which questions what May be a US scare campaign. 

Marles' Options: Sooner than SSN Delivery "Mid 2040s"

Ways for Marles out of the submarine mess are presented in PETE COMMENTS below:

Brisbane Times Article

Anthony Galloway, foreign affairs and national security correspondent for The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, has written an excellent article for The Brisbane Times, dated June 6, 2022. Galloway states in part: 

"Expect submarine delays, Marles says, as he plans for defence capability gap

Defence Minister Richard Marles says he doubts Australia will be able to build its first nuclear submarine by the previous government’s deadline of 2038, accepting an interim fleet of conventional boats may be needed to avoid a serious capability gap in the nation’s defences.

“…The former government last year controversially dumped a $90 billion deal with France to build a conventional fleet of submarines in favour of building nuclear-powered submarines under a deal with the US and Britain, but it meant the timeline for the delivery blew out by years.

Former defence minister Peter Dutton maintained that the first of the nuclear submarines under the AUKUS agreement would likely arrive before 2038 when Australia’s Collins-class submarines are expected to start being taken out of service.

But [Marles] the defence minister and deputy prime minister suggested that timeline wasn’t a realistic expectation. 

“I think in reality as the former government left office, the projection of most was that [delivery] was more likely to be in the mid-2040s,” Marles told The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, which could leave a major capability gap.

Asked whether he would order Defence to look into building a conventional fleet of submarines, Marles said: “We need to look at how we bridge the gap. That’s all I can say. And my mind is open about how we do that.”

“I think that the failure of the former government in managing submarines was unforgivable and is really one of the worst procurement issues that we have seen in our country’s history,” he said.

“The challenge we now face is how we deal with them. There is no more important priority for me coming into this portfolio than this question.”…

 “I think that the failure of the former government in managing submarines was unforgivable.” [said] Defence Minister Richard Marles…”

SEE THE WHOLE BRISBANE TIMES ARTICLE BY ANTHONY GALLOWAY 

++++++++++++++++++

PETE COMMENTS

You'll note I wrote on June 4, 2022:

"...If we want 2 SSNs fast that means GD EB or HII Newport News Shipbuilding built Virginias 

[This is] rather than stretching the much smaller UK industry resources which, for the next 10 years are concentrating on Dreadnought-class SSBNs. 

The UK will suffer a no SSN Completion Gap between about 2027 and about 2044."

It seems clear Australia is being driven by UK Astute successor SSN(R) timelines, which are:

"The new class of submarine is expected to replace the Astute-class during the 2040s.^[24]"

Regarding conventional submarines to fill any Australian submarine gap the already in train Collins Life of Type Extention (LOTE) Program should fill the gap. Note that Sweden has been successfully undertaking a defacto LOTE of its Gotland class subs.  

The "alternative"? There are no off the (mythical) "shelf" very large conventional submarines with the large crew, speed, range and 20+ heavyweight shot characteristics that Australia needs. One would need to be specially designed - which was the Attack-class subs which we dumped in September 2021. 

To design and build:

-  "Attack-class 2.0" (from France, Germany, Japan) 

-  South Korea's KSS-III (maybe ticking the most boxes already) or

-  "Collins 2.0" (Swedish help) 

all might take 10 years, ie. 2032 at a minimum, to bring them into RAN service.  

An alternative SSN? As the US and UK seem unable to provide SSNs for Australian within a reasonable timeframe, France seems to be floating the option of Barracuda SSNs for Australia. Maybe French designed SSNs are a serious option if they can begin to enter Australian service in the 2030s. 

EU Ban on MTUs in Chinese Subs for Export

 

In early 2022 the European Union (EU) banned China from exporting submarines that included Germany’s MTU diesels. China's Song and Yuan-class SSKs for its own navy each have used three or four MTU 396s for years. MTU has several diesel factories in China (eg. in Suzhou).

Quiet submarine diesels take decades to develop, putting countries like Germany, which has relied on diesel submarines since 1914, way ahead of competitors, like China. China only began building diesel subs in the 1960s.

The ban on MTUs for China’s new submarine exports became public in April 2022 when Thailand said it wouldn’t accept 3 Yuan-class subs if they don't include the MTU diesels that China promised under contract. This is still the situation in early June 2022.

China has asked Thailand to alter the contract to allow China to substitute the MTUs with Chinese-made (possibly reverse-engineered) MWM 620s which China claims are of comparable quality. But Thailand is sticking to the contract’s MTU delivery terms.

The EU has long officially banned weapons exports, including components like submarine diesels to China, but European exporters and China have worked together to find loopholes around such bans.

The EU clampdown on such exports might amount to secondary economic sanctions against China due to China’s unhelpfully neutral position to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Tied to that is growing EU awareness of ongoing Chinese threats against Taiwan and China’s aggressive stance in the South China Sea and Pacific.

European submarine exporters might also see China as unwanted competition for submarine markets like Thailand. As German made MTUs are the worlds most common, tried and tested submarine diesels their existence in Chinese submarines would assist China in beating Germany’s own submarine export activities.

Other European sub exporters like France, Sweden and soon Spain would also suffer. South Korea is another exporter and Japan a potential one that would both prefer China was not so competitive.

The US, concerned about Ukraine and Taiwan, may have pressed for the EU export bans against China be honoured by EU countries.

It remains to be seen whether China plans to put MTUs in the 8 Yuan class subs being built for Pakistan. If China is planning to use MTUs will the EU also ban such a move?

Labor's AUKUS Sub Economics and Politics

Part inspired by Anonymous’ May 27, 2022 comment: 

Economics

Australian Defence Spending is going to face close examination when the new Labor government runs its upcoming Force Posture Review.

Projects that Labor has made no promises about, are not Labors’ idea, involve minimal local employment, or cannot be linked easily to strategy will be vulnerable to cutting. On all those grounds projects like a range of light and heavy armour projects may be at risk. 

An expanded submarine force for Australia under Program SEA 1000 was an idea of former Labor Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, so should be safer and the AUKUS alliance is valued by Labor. 

But cuts in scope and cost of Defence Projects have to be a real risk. This is with the Australian Government’s deficit nearing A$1 Trillion. This is no time for Defence to trot out its wish list of high priced sub options when the Australian public value cost of living, health and welfare more highly. 

A$170 Billion has been informally quoted for the AUKUS SSN Program, although rounding it up to A$200 Billion might prove more accurate in 2023.

It is still important to keep SSN program costs in perspective compared to the Australian Government's A$667.3 billion in the 2020-21 Annual budget. See Page 159 of the 2021-22 Budget. Defence accounted for A$34.5 Billion 2020-21 in "Estimates" on Page 161. 

Politics

Despite all the rhetoric about savings, Labor and Coalition governments always find money for projects they care about, even if very costly (like the Coalition purchasing F-35As). The Coalition fund projects their big donors like. Labor funds projects that big unions and major employers of unionists like. In this case, if the AUKUS subs are built at Osborne, Adelaide’s ASC Ltd. Large unions (like the CFMEU) benefit.

Also important is Labor's wish to fill the component order books of broader Australian equipment suppliers. This is for the AUKUS SSNs and preceding that, the Hunter-class Future Frigates, all to be built in Osborne, Adelaide, South Australia.

Labor’s high ranking Deputy Leader and Defence Minister Richard Marles will spread the benefits of sub and ship building right across the Australian economy. Marles is from the Right faction of the Labor Party and thus could have easily felt at home in the Coalition. He represents continuity in supporting AUKUS.

Balancing Marles, to a degree, is Minister for Defence Industry, Pat Conroy at “Outer” (non Cabinet) Minister level. Conroy, from the Labor Left, may have been selected (in part) to liaise with the Unions and reassure anti-nuclear ideological elements in the Labor Party and in the crossbench (including Greens).

Labor is fully aware substantial AUKUS sub building work in Adelaide is essential because Adelaide is a new Labor heartland. Labor won all (but one) Federal seats on offer in Adelaide at the May 21, 2022 Election. Labor doesn’t want to lose any of these seats.

Also Labor, earlier in 2022, resoundingly won the South Australian State Election. The new Labor Premier Peter Malinauskas probably has a big future if /when he moves to Federal politics. He might be a future Labor Prime Minister one day. 

The Enemy

Against Labor is the Liberals' new Leader, Peter Dutton, the Coalition’s former Defence Minister. Dutton might pursue the line that the AUKUS subs should be fully built overseas to have any chance of taking on China’s encroachments in a timely manner. 

If this plays out Dutton could calculate that “Build AUKUS subs in Adelaide or not?” could split the Labor Party, between Right-Center Naval Strategic and Left Shipbuilding Industry wings.

Watch this space. These are early days for Labor working on SSNs and AUKUS generally. Surprises are likely.

Lucas Heights Emergency Subplan: East Coast Base

Given Lucas Heights aka Barden Ridge boasts a research, medical isotope production reactor:

Here's the "LUCAS HEIGHTS EMERGENCY SUBPLAN" dated June 2019,

at https://www.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-04/emergency-management-subplan-lucas-heights.pdf

in which Page 6 states: "Critical decisions regarding response and health strategies will be required as early as possible, with consideration of sheltering in place, relocation/evacuation and a range of health options including IODINE thyroid blocking and medical assessment/treatment, both short and longer term. 

Any of these decisions is likely to have significant resource implications that will require support at Regional and/or State and/or Commonwealth levels."

Page 8 "- If warranted, issue stable iodine to on-site personnel, onsite childcare and emergency responders." 

Page 12 "NSW Health is responsible for coordinating and controlling the mobilisation of all health responses to accidents or incidents when this Plan is activated. This includes authorising, where necessary, the distribution of stable IODINE tablets...and Provide iodine as required at evacuation centres..."

Page 18 "NSW Health is responsible for assessing the need for ongoing maintenance of iodine thyroid blocking agents and ensuring that it is appropriately stored and replaced when SHELF LIFE is exceeded. See further in ‘Response Strategies’."

and Control F for many more "iodine" references.

COMMENTS ON AN EAST COAST NUCLEAR SUBMARINE BASE

A major point is: if Port Kembla, Newcastle or Brisbane win the East Coast Nuclear Submarine Base (also see) competition, then Iodine Tablets will need to be stockpiled on a much larger scale than for Lucas Heights. 

Contenders Newcastle and Brisbane, in particular, have packed population suburbs very close to where a base would be built. Port Kembla seems to have a lower population close to any base site. Also Port Kembla's harbour facilities seem better laid out for a base.