Ways for Marles out of the submarine mess are presented in PETE COMMENTS below:
Brisbane Times Article
Anthony Galloway, foreign affairs and national security correspondent for The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, has written an excellent article for The Brisbane Times, dated June 6, 2022. Galloway states in part:
"Expect submarine
delays, Marles says, as he plans for defence capability gap
Defence Minister
Richard Marles says he doubts Australia will be able to build its first nuclear
submarine by the previous government’s deadline of 2038, accepting an interim
fleet of conventional boats may be needed to avoid a serious capability gap in the
nation’s defences.
“…The former
government last year controversially dumped a $90 billion deal with France to
build a conventional fleet of submarines in favour of building nuclear-powered
submarines under a deal with the US and Britain, but it meant the timeline for
the delivery blew out by years.
Former defence minister Peter Dutton maintained that the first of the nuclear
submarines under the AUKUS agreement would likely arrive before 2038 when
Australia’s Collins-class submarines are expected to start being taken out of
service.
But [Marles] the defence
minister and deputy prime minister suggested that timeline wasn’t a realistic
expectation.
“I think in reality as the former government left office, the projection
of most was that [delivery] was more likely to be in the mid-2040s,” Marles
told The
Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, which could leave a major capability gap.
Asked whether he would order Defence to look
into building a conventional fleet of submarines, Marles said: “We need to look
at how we bridge the gap. That’s all I can say. And my mind is open about how
we do that.”
“I think that the failure of the former
government in managing submarines was unforgivable and is really one of the
worst procurement issues that we have seen in our country’s history,” he said.
“The challenge we
now face is how we deal with them. There is no more important priority for me
coming into this portfolio than this question.”…
“I think that
the failure of the former government in managing submarines was unforgivable.” [said] Defence Minister Richard Marles…”
SEE THE WHOLE BRISBANE TIMES ARTICLE BY ANTHONY GALLOWAY
++++++++++++++++++
PETE COMMENTS
You'll note I wrote on June 4, 2022:
"...If we want 2 SSNs fast that means GD EB or HII
Newport News Shipbuilding built Virginias
[This is] rather than stretching the much smaller UK
industry resources which, for the next 10 years are concentrating on
Dreadnought-class SSBNs.
The UK will suffer a no SSN Completion Gap between
about 2027 and about 2044."
It seems clear Australia is being driven by UK Astute successor SSN(R) timelines, which are:
"The new class of submarine is expected to replace the Astute-class during the 2040s.[24]"
Regarding conventional submarines to fill any Australian submarine gap the already in train Collins Life of Type Extention (LOTE) Program should fill the gap. Note that Sweden has been successfully undertaking a defacto LOTE of its Gotland class subs.
The "alternative"? There are no off the (mythical) "shelf" very large conventional submarines with the large crew, speed, range and 20+ heavyweight shot characteristics that Australia needs. One would need to be specially designed - which was the Attack-class subs which we dumped in September 2021.
To design and build:
- "Attack-class 2.0" (from France, Germany, Japan)
- South Korea's KSS-III (maybe ticking the most boxes already) or
- "Collins 2.0" (Swedish help)
all might take 10 years, ie. 2032 at a minimum, to bring them into RAN service.
An alternative SSN? As the US and UK seem unable to provide SSNs for Australian within a reasonable timeframe, France seems to be floating the option of Barracuda SSNs for Australia. Maybe French designed SSNs are a serious option if they can begin to enter Australian service in the 2030s.
Defence Minister Richard Marles says he doubts Australia will be able to build its first nuclear submarine by the previous government’s deadline of 2038, accepting an interim fleet of conventional boats may be needed to avoid a serious capability gap in the nation’s defences.
“…The former
government last year controversially dumped a $90 billion deal with France to
build a conventional fleet of submarines in favour of building nuclear-powered
submarines under a deal with the US and Britain, but it meant the timeline for
the delivery blew out by years.
Former defence minister Peter Dutton maintained that the first of the nuclear submarines under the AUKUS agreement would likely arrive before 2038 when Australia’s Collins-class submarines are expected to start being taken out of service.
But [Marles] the defence minister and deputy prime minister suggested that timeline wasn’t a realistic expectation.
“I think in reality as the former government left office, the projection of most was that [delivery] was more likely to be in the mid-2040s,” Marles told The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, which could leave a major capability gap.
Asked whether he would order Defence to look into building a conventional fleet of submarines, Marles said: “We need to look at how we bridge the gap. That’s all I can say. And my mind is open about how we do that.”
“I think that the failure of the former government in managing submarines was unforgivable and is really one of the worst procurement issues that we have seen in our country’s history,” he said.
“The challenge we now face is how we deal with them. There is no more important priority for me coming into this portfolio than this question.”…
“I think that the failure of the former government in managing submarines was unforgivable.” [said] Defence Minister Richard Marles…”
SEE THE WHOLE BRISBANE TIMES ARTICLE BY ANTHONY GALLOWAY
++++++++++++++++++
PETE COMMENTS
You'll note I wrote on June 4, 2022:
"...If we want 2 SSNs fast that means GD EB or HII Newport News Shipbuilding built Virginias
[This is] rather than stretching the much smaller UK
industry resources which, for the next 10 years are concentrating on
Dreadnought-class SSBNs.
The UK will suffer a no SSN Completion Gap between
about 2027 and about 2044."
It seems clear Australia is being driven by UK Astute successor SSN(R) timelines, which are:
"The new class of submarine is expected to replace the Astute-class during the 2040s.[24]"
Regarding conventional submarines to fill any Australian submarine gap the already in train Collins Life of Type Extention (LOTE) Program should fill the gap. Note that Sweden has been successfully undertaking a defacto LOTE of its Gotland class subs.
The "alternative"? There are no off the (mythical) "shelf" very large conventional submarines with the large crew, speed, range and 20+ heavyweight shot characteristics that Australia needs. One would need to be specially designed - which was the Attack-class subs which we dumped in September 2021.
To design and build:
- "Attack-class 2.0" (from France, Germany, Japan)
- South Korea's KSS-III (maybe ticking the most boxes already) or
- "Collins 2.0" (Swedish help)
all might take 10 years, ie. 2032 at a minimum, to bring them into RAN service.
An alternative SSN? As the US and UK seem unable to provide SSNs for Australian within a reasonable timeframe, France seems to be floating the option of Barracuda SSNs for Australia. Maybe French designed SSNs are a serious option if they can begin to enter Australian service in the 2030s.
9 comments:
Thanks Pete, very interesting subtleties in Marles' words. They are significant more for what they did not say than what they did say. He hasn't ruled out an offshore SSN build for Australia (good), or said that he is dropping the local SSN build (good but long term).
In the short term a few SSNs built overseas would solve many problems. Whether the first RAN SSN is a Barracuda or a Virginia BkIV it will still be a huge step forward over the Collins or having a 20 year capability gap. They are also both clearly superior to any current Chinese SSK or SSN, which is the real objective. Given the urgency I'd be delighted with this outcome.
It also stops wasting time with various SSK options. As you say Pete, when you add in design finalisation time any "interim" SSK that is a new design will be post 2032.
Financially, the French Barracuda SSN costs 2.1 billion Euro each or $3 billion Aus, including reactor, as supplied to the French navy. So for the $2.5 billion (extra) we are paying to finalise the Attack contract, we could almost buy one. For $10 billion Aus we could buy three. If they can be built immediately, why not? That would go some way to replacing the six Collins Class. There would be a cost to upgrade ASC Osborne to maintain SSNs but that has to be spent anyway to build SSNs there following.
Marles is correct about the timeline. A 20 year delay is unacceptable in the current climate.
Hi Pete
(comments to anonymous at 4.44pm)
There is no way Naval could deliver additional Barracuda SSN
The yard is full for at least 10/15 years (SNLE 3 G (4)an the completion of the current SSN Suffren series (with rumours the serie moving from 6 to 8 units with the Ukr novel situation).Naval is inlikely to invest further
The French model is usually to develop a "second source" (as in Brazil for sub or for helo) or India (for sub and probably soon for aerospace..) in order to spread the R§D cost (the critical and very large part ) and to lower the cost due to very high mfg cost in Fr
of additionnal units. Brazilian suppliers (special steel) for instance are Naval suppliers for the French Yard. Dassault is already sourcing parts in India
(Response to anonymous Jun 8, 2022, 6:24:00 AM)
Well that rather presents an opportunity. In times of war Australia can source parts from an ally that isn't entire oceans away from. Australia and or NG would be able to access parts quicker for constructions and or repairs. Essentially access to a global supply chain, rather than waiting months for parts to arrive from UK or the US. Should Indonesia or Philippines finalise their deals for the latest models of the scorpene 2000 (which the latest model has large portions of tech transferred from the barracuda class), Australia would have access to support from the front lines in times of war. Doesn't Australia have a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines?
As much as AUKUS plays strongly in Australia's geopolitical and cultural DNA, in times of War Australia must operate as the ASIAN nation that it is, and needs more partners that are like minded at the frontlines. India, Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia are at the front lines, and Australia's security is rested on these frontlines and thus should partner with France and its strong ties with ASEAN.
Lets face it. In a war with China, Australia doesn't even take 5th precedence amongst US allies when it comes to support. Japan, Korea and Taiwan take an obvious top 3, and Philippines with its MDT and key geostrategic position comes 4th. While the US partnership is key, it can't only rely on them.
Hi Anonymous [at Jun 7, 2022, 4:44:00 PM] and
And thanks for the Barracuda info Anonymous at Jun 8, 2022, 6:24:00 AM
French Barracuda SSNs built in France for Australia do not appear to be an option as Naval Group's (NG's) nuclear submarine shipyard space (and I venture NG's workforce, designers and managers) appears committed building:
- France's remaining 5 to 7 Barracuda's for the French Navy
and
- Frances 4 new generation SSBNs (aka SNLE 3G) for the French Navy.
France has been helping Brazil build the Non-Reactor aspects of an SSN * since 2008 on the basis Brazil develops its own reactor. Brazil has been working on a submarine reactor for something like 43 years **.
Clearly Australia is unable to and doesan't want to develop a submarine reactor this side of 2060. Australia would need to contruct all the elements of its own nuclear industrial base including enrichment to do so.
1. Maybe the AUKUS decision has removed the political/legal taboo of delivering all SSN tech (including the reactor) to Brazil and Australia?
2. But unless France offers to deliver all SSN tech to Australia and closely managers Australia to build 8 SSNs in Adelaide France appears no help.
3. Anonymous Naval Group commenters are invited to correct me on the above.
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_submarine_%C3%81lvaro_Alberto
** https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_submarine_%C3%81lvaro_Alberto#Fuel_cycle_domain
Regards Pete
Hi Pete
The LEU refueling « à la Barracuda » can be done anywhere in a matters of a few weeks if the infrastructure (robot,spent fuel intermediate storage,most important training and security are in place.This is the critical issue,Much more political and public acceptance than economical which is small compared to the total
Replacement fuel can be purchased ahead of time and do not degrade .
Is 3 loads of LEU more expensive than 1 load of HEU ? Not obvious..and nobody knows...
In many countries spent fuel is stored in power station adjacent pools
Nice try Anonymous [at Jun 8, 2022, 5:52:00 PM]
So I'll repeat:
Thanks to the Barracuda info from Anonymous at Jun 8, 2022, 6:24:00 AM
French Barracuda SSNs built in France for Australia do not appear to be an option as Naval Group's (NG's) nuclear submarine shipyard space (and I venture NG's workforce, designers and managers) appears committed building:
- France's remaining 5 to 7 Barracuda's for the French Navy
and
- Frances 4 new generation SSBNs (aka SNLE 3G) for the French Navy.
France has been helping Brazil build the Non-Reactor aspects of an SSN * since 2008 on the basis Brazil develops its own reactor. Brazil has been working on a submarine reactor for something like 43 years **.
Clearly Australia is unable to and doesan't want to develop a submarine reactor this side of 2060. Australia would need to contruct all the elements of its own nuclear industrial base including enrichment to do so.
1. Maybe the AUKUS decision has removed the political/legal taboo of delivering all SSN tech (including the reactor) to Brazil and Australia?
2. But unless France offers to deliver all SSN tech to Australia and closely managers Australia to build 8 SSNs in Adelaide France appears no help.
3. Anonymous Naval Group commenters are invited to correct me on the above.
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_submarine_%C3%81lvaro_Alberto
** https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_submarine_%C3%81lvaro_Alberto#Fuel_cycle_domain
Regards Pete
Nice try Anonymous [at Jun 8, 2022, 4:57:00 PM]
Trying to sell Scorpenes to Australia fails.
1. ASEAN countries have long realised that they are not a defence alliance because they have too many centuries of distrust and ongoing land and sea territorial disputes between them.
The only ASEAN member Australia seriously semi-allies itself with is Singapore (which relies on superior to Scorpenes, AIP Swedish subs. Soon Singapore will be using the German Type 218SGs, a generation more advanced than the Scorpenes.
2. In submarine selections in the 1970s/80s and in 2016 Australia rejected Scorpene size subs as being too small for Australia's 5,000km transit to/from before "front line" operations.
In the 1970s/80s and in 2016 Australia selected and still needs 3,000+ tonne submarines to meet our extended range, at faster speed, with larger crew, and 20+ heavyweight shot needs
which are all entirely different from the 1,500 to 2,000 tonne submarine needs of ASEAN members.
Regards
Pete
Hi Pete. Thank you for the response.
My inclusion of the scorpene was not to suggest that than RAN purchases them but rather for Australia to integrate with the naval group sub network of immediate and potential users in the indo pacific. Actually Australia has a Status of Forces Agreement with Malaysia too and a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines (in effect since 2012) as well so I wouldn't rule them out as a semi alliance. Indonesia openly shared its concerns and reservations regarding the news of AUKUS nuke subs. And with many ASEAN nations becoming increasingly wary of China and thus redeveloping ties with the US should attract interest in developing stronger defense ties. ASEAN Sans Singapore and the Philippines rejects formal alliances, but even China becomes increasingly aggressive, these attitudes will surely change.
And thus Australia can use these formal instruments of defence cooperation to support its sub fleet of needed french parts that have commonality with Barracudas.
Australia is quite involved in the Philippines particularly in counte insurgency operations like its fight against ISIS in the battle of Marawi and Australia routinely participates in large to small scale naval exercises with the Philippines in tandem with the US.
The only suitable design other than from Japan, is the SAAB entry for the Dutch replacement submarine. According to SAAB it is a new design using A26 & Collins as design references. There are even ASC engineers working on the project. Netherlands current Walrus class is the nearest European submarine to match Collins in performance & size. This new design is a modernised Collins or a Collins with A26 features if you prefer. This is the nearest to a Collins 2.0 design out there. Restarting Australian Collins design efforts (that should never have been stopped) will take too long. The similarities with Collins & the fact that ASC is already involved would make this a front runner in my opinion.
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