June 14, 2022

Ukraine War Depleting Russian Power in China's Favour

Even if Russia eventually "wins" the Ukraine War Russia's economic and military power will have declined compared to China’s.

China is not in political, economic or military alliance with Russia. Their relationship is centred more on self-interest than shared values. They are united though in an attitude that the US is the main enemy.

Russia’s inability to quickly beat Ukraine has lowered Russian morale and demonstrated to China that Russia’s conventional military is not as formidable as previously assumed. Russia’s tanks were previously seen as high quality but this has been disproven by the rapidity of their destruction by merely shoulder fired Ukrainian missiles.

China resents some of the border arrangements coerced by Russia over a century agoIn 1858 (Treaty of Aigun) Russia annexed the land north of the Amur River and in 1860 (Treaty of Beijing) annexed Chinese coastal territory down to Vladivostok.

Military Balance

Major conventional military and nuclear enmity was underlined by the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict which almost escalated to a nuclear exchange

In comparing China with Russia China has more than 5 times Russia's national GDP, more than 3 times Russia's military spending covering fewer threats than Russia's. Russia’s main advantage is in nuclear warheads, 6,257 compared to 350 in 2018. 

China has embarked on a major drive to install more ICBMs in Western China which in the long term may translate to parity with Russia's warhead numbers.

The Russian defence-strategic budgets must balance nuclear and conventional military spending. The sharp rise in Russian conventional military spending and weapon losses in Ukraine mean less Russian defence spending available for Russian nuclear weapons. Russia’s nuclear weapon arsenal is a very high cost for the relatively small Russian economy. 

Russia would be mindful that China is a rising nuclear competitor. Russia's nuclear weapons include Russian nuclear submarine (SSBN and SSGN) platforms, nuclear armed jet bombers, ICBMs and smaller tactical nukes. Over a standard 30 year life cycle Russian nuclear weapons and their platforms are not a static cost. Platforms and weapons need constant protection, maintenance, development and replacement to remain competitive.

Economic Decline

China, has more often been in economic competition with Russia than a subsidizer of the Russian economy. A prolonged Russian invasion of Ukraine, win or loose, would be a win-win situation for China. The economic and conventional military costs for Russia would fall in China’s favour in the short-medium and long term.

Russia is gradually losing its pre-war level of trade in gas and oil exports to West Europe and to Japan. This will place largely capitalist China in a stronger bargaining position over Russian gas and oil and the Russian economy generally.

The war is also causing a “brain drain” of middle class Russians leaving the country impacted by financial hardship,  uncertainty and fear of being called up to fight in Ukraine. They may be taking money with them by such unofficial means as cryptocurrencies.  Immigration from Russia has increased to places such as Finland and Bali - destinations with more stable economic conditions and a more predictable lifestyle. This Russian brain drain is making China comparatively stronger economically. 

China's Comparative Power Growing

Fewer Russian economic levers and military resources are available on the China-Russia border and in contested central Asian ‘stans and Mongolian buffer zones.

This would put China in a stronger position to, at a minimum, press for better terms of trade, lower oil/gas prices, maybe even joint developments rights of Far Eastern Siberian oil/gas fields including those in the Sea of Okhotsk.

Longer term Russian economic and military declines may see increasing Chinese submarine, surface ship and airbase visiting rights to East Siberian Russian bases. This includes Russia's Pacific Fleet bases at Vladivostok (SSKs and ships) and more advantageously Russia’s northeast Siberian Rybachiy (nuclear submarine) bases. For the latter see "Across Avacha Bay from the city in Vilyuchinsk is Russia's largest submarine base, the Rybachiy Nuclear Submarine Base relies on icebreakers, established during the Soviet period and still used by the Russian Navy." Over the medium-long term global warming's depletion of Arctic ice may eventually make Rybachiy an ice free base. Importantly the Rybachiy Base would permit China’s navy to operate outside first island chain restrictions.

Chinese visiting rights to Russian bases may be upgraded to joint ownership in future in a similar way to the US and Japanese navies having ownership of Yokosuka Naval Base.
 
Russia high tech weapon exports to China may one day extend to trade in Russian nuclear submarine hull and reactor technology to improve China's nuclear submarine arm. This would improve China's power projection internationally, especially in the Indo-Pacific.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is proving beneficial to China in ways unexpected. Even if Russia wins, the longer the war lasts the better for China.

11 comments:

Nicky said...

Hi Pete,
what do you think of the South Koreans offering this submarine to them
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cuO4JNKuR98

Pete said...

Hi Nicky

South Korea's DSME is clearly trying hard extending finance to the Philippines to sell 2 or 3 DSME 1400PNs to the Philippine Navy. This is in competition with France trying to sell small Scorpenes.

These South Korean subs are likely to be Type 209 variant Jang or Chang Bogos, probably with a surfaced displacement of 1,400 tonnes.

South Korea has successfully exported (in whole or parts) 3 Nagapasa-class Chang Bogos to nearby Indonesia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jang_Bogo-class_submarine#Boats_in_class

The Philippine Navy has only recently (in the last decade) added new missile firing warships (see frigates and corvettes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_Navy#Ships ) to its fleet. The Philippines is now wealthy enough to buy new vessels rather than the secondhand US coastguard cutters of old.

Due to the onerous nature of operating submarines the Philippine Navy will probably need to lift its command, control and safety requirements to operate submarines.

Regards Pete

Nicky said...

Hi Pete,
Do you think the Philippines have the ability to operate, maintain and deploy Submarines. Also do you think the Philippines have the education and skill sets to even complete submarine school in South Korea or France.

Pete said...

Hi Nicky [at Jun 16, 2022, 8:52:00 AM]

Yes to all.

But like every Submarine Service the Philippine Navy will need to remember safety and secrecy are key.

Pete

Anonymous said...

Nicky/Pete

One thing Australia could usefully offer the Phillipines to gain a SSK capability is training in sub operations with english language instructors. This might actually give RAN submariners something useful to do while waiting for whatever the RAN eventually decides to build.

Pete

I agree with your comments on Russian power. I cannot help thinking back to the days of the first Gulf War in 1991/2 when US forces easily destroyed Iraqi T72s. This was followed with the explanation that the Iraqi tanks were lower tech "export models" with inferior technology to the Soviet tanks back in Europe. Looking at the performance of Russian forces in Ukraine, this looks like a myth. The T72 hulls have been just as easily penetrated whether in Iraqi or Russian hands.

Pete said...

Hi Anonymous [at Jun 16, 2022, 1:05:00 PM]

1. I differ on "One thing Australia could usefully offer the Phillipines..."

RAN submarine experts are already more than fully engaged:

- serving on Collins operations, on-sub and on-shore
- serving on the Taskforce https://www.defence.gov.au/about/taskforces/nuclear-powered-submarine-task-force
- intensively briefing our Defence Minister and Cabinet every day on future submarine options
- not helped by all the issues Dutton is leaking, and
- preparing for the LOTE.

Its up to submarine sellers South Korea and France to use the English common language to engage with the Philippine without Australia complicating things by sticking our noses in.

The Philippine Naval Attache, Canberra, already should be a two-way information conduit.

2. Very true on Russian crewed, Russian tanks, proving low quality. Also shows the high quality of Western shoulder fired anti-tank missiles.

Russian draftees, forced to serve, against fellow Slavs in Ukraine, on the orders of neo-Stalinist Putin, are already suffering enough crewing the tracked-coffin Russian tanks, and equally explosive Russian diesel and ammo supply trucks.

Meanwhile their kin are suffering in Russia while Russia's real future enemy, China, is gaining in power, largely at Russia's expense.

Regards Pete

Nicky said...

Hi Pete,
My take is that I know the Jang Bogo's are getting old and I think for South Korea, it would great for the Philippines to learn from while waiting for their newer South Korean subs. That's because the KSS-III's are coming online and I suspect South Korean could loan them one or two Jang bogo's as training platforms for their newer subs with South Korean officers providing guidance to the Philippines. But as for training, I wonder if South Korea has the capacity to include the Philippines in Submarine training.

Anonymous said...

Pete

Australia has all the facilities for submarine crew training in Perth near HMAS Stirling. I was assuming the Philippine crew could go there.

That being said, I agree with Nicky that South Korea could also train the Phillipine crew. They have all the facilities too.

Pete said...

Yes Anonymous [at Jun 17, 2022, 11:04:00 AM]

Its the submarine selling country (be it S Korea or France) that is required, and has a cash incentive, to train Philippine crews.

It is not for Australia out of regional niceness to do so. Training submarine crews can never and should never by part of an aid package.

Thats not how the hard nosed submarine business works.

Pete

Pete said...

Hi Nicky

KSS-IIIs are specialised ballistic missile submarines (SSBs), likely costing 3 times more than what the Philippines wants, which is small attack submarines like the Jang Bogo SSKs (Type 209 variants).

Submarine building countries very rarely "loan" out dissimilar submarines for training. This might only happen with established customers in the context of $multi-billion deals.

Once the Philippines signs a contract with South Korea (for Jang Bogos) or France (for Scorpenes) or some other builder, it will take about 10 years to train Filipino crews in South Korea or France. Submarine training facilities are expensive to build (eg. submarine simulators) and operate.

Meanwhile it will take the same 10 years or more to build the 2 or 3 subs the Philippines wants.

Regards Pete

Nicky said...

Hi Pete,
I know the Jang bogo's are getting older and I suspect South Korea could loan them one or two of them while they are waiting for their newer build subs. It would give them something to learn and train on while south korea is building their newer submarines.

Also, Check this out from Covert Shores
http://www.hisutton.com/Russian-Navy-Building-2-Lada-Class-Submarines.html