Indians duped by Pakistani Rumour of Sale of 8 Submarines from China?

As Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Pakistan today and tomorrow an 8 submarines for Pakistan deal is supposed to be signed. I suspect no firm deal will be signed because expectations in the Indian and international press are based on a Pakistani rumour campaign.

Pakistan has been trying to extract free or reduced price submarines from China for years. Pakistan has used an information loop rumour strategy over the last few weeks to try to pressure China to sell. 

How can Pakistan, with a naval budget of around $750 million(?) per year afford to buy, crew and maintain the 8 for wildly different amounts:
- $250 million to $325 million each to 
- equivalent of $500 million to 625 million each?

The specific aim is to pressure Chinese President Xi Jinping to sign a deal when he visits Pakistan April 20 and 21, 2015. If Pakistan claims a deal has been made then it would need to prove it with details, including:
- numbers of subs sold?
- type of subs? (ie. old Ming or newer Yuan class submarines, not vague "Project" "S-26" of "S-30" designations)
- delivery or building schedule? (when is the first submarine and last to be delivered?)
- are the submarines used or new-build according to Pakistani specifications?

HISTORY OF RUMOURS

- March 9, 2011 The Hindu “Pak plans to acquire 6 submarines from China” Obviously didn’t happen.

- March 1, 2014  Times of India story  - quoting a Pakistani official proved groundless with no deal made "by end 2014." - China didn't sign.

Pakistan times its latest rumour campaign in preparation for President Xi vist:

- March 31, 2015 Dawn article  "ISLAMABAD:  [Pakistani] Naval officials informed the Standing Committee on Defence Monday that the federal government has endorsed a summary to get eight submarines from China." -No Chinese promise.

- April 2, 2015  Discussion board insert - referring to speculative Dawn article - No Chinese promise. 

- April 2, 2015 Reuters article  - - Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has approved a deal "years in the making" [but has China approved?] to buy eight submarines from China, a Pakistani government official said on Thursday, in what could be one of China's largest overseas weapons sales once it is signed. The [Pakistani] official...said the deal to buy the diesel-electric submarines would likely be signed by Chinese President Xi Jinping when he visits, "but that is still not final".
"...Asked about the submarines, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying [only said] China and Pakistan were friendly neighbors and that the two sides had normal military exchanges. "I can tell you, relevant cooperation does not violate international convention and accords with China's three principles on military exports," she told a daily news briefing." - No Chinese promise.

APRIL 22, 2015 UPDATE AND COMMENT

President Xi has now departed Pakistan and, in line, with my earlier prediction there has been no Chinese mention (that I've seen) of Chinese submarines for Pakistan http://tribune.com.pk/story/873354/chienese-president-xi-jinping-to-address-joint-session/ . The usual Pakistani speculation remains.

Pakistan’s has five medium sized submarines but needs newer submarines to counter India. Pakistan’s flotilla is:

- two Agosta 70s (PNS Hashmat and PNS Hurmat) completed in 1979-1980 – past the usual 30 year in water use-by date - hence probably semi or non-operational, and

- three Agosta 90Bs with completion dates (PNS Khalid (1999), Saad (2002) and Hamza (2006)) As they are AIP, Exocet capable/equipped and the last two built in Pakistan this is quite an achievement.

As Pakistan is more than $60 Billion in debt and has a naval budget of around just $750 million it may not even be able to crew or maintain 4 to 8 extra submarine even if China donated them.

Pakistan has been talking about converting Babur cruise missiles for submarine use but China already has small SLBMs like the JL-1  that might be more appropriate.  

Pakistan may be able to put nuclear warheads on its Exocets.

I think China considers Pakistan too unstable, and uneconomic to give it second strike submarine platforms. Pakistan is also a source of Islamic militancy but China has Islamic terrorism problems. They are not natural allies other than in their joint effort to partially surround India.

Pete

Australian Naval Shipbuilding 30-40% pricier. Submarines Unmentionable.

A Virginia SSN being completed in a massive Newport News shed. Will Australia ever build such submarines efficiently?

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On April 16, 2015 Australia's Minister for Defence [Media Released] a RAND Corporation Report Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise – preparing for the 21st century. Probably the most significant finding is that “The cost of building naval ships in Australia is 30-40 per cent greater than United States benchmarks,…”. In contrast to South Korea's shipbuilding success Australia's shipbuilding industry has long been afflicted with the higly unionised British disease. Responsibility averse government and private sector management is another major failing.

Even with this defacto 40% tariff protection Australia cannot compete because ships and submarines  routinely completed 1 or 2 years late - often with subsequent modifications necessary. 

For Submarine Matters the absence of any discussion of Australia’s future submarine build in the Report compromises the whole report. It is akin to taking Future Frigates out of the equation.

The RAND Report, in part, found that:

·     "Australia could sustain a naval ship building industrial base by carefully managing a continuous ship building strategy in the longer–term, with a regular pace of delivering the new ships. But this would need to be premised on reform of the Australian naval ship building industry and significant improvement in productivity.

·       Australian naval ship builders can sustain an 18-24 month pace of large ship construction starts if Defence carefully manages its acquisition program and keeps the Future Frigates operational for 25 to 30 years [ie. needlessly shorter period than usual].

·       The gap between the completion of the Air Warfare Destroyer project and the start of the Future Frigate – Labor’s valley of death – cannot be overcome, but the impact could be lessened.

·       The cost of building naval ships in Australia is 30-40 per cent greater than United States benchmarks, and even greater against some other naval ship building nations. Australia is currently one the most expensive places to build naval vessels. This premium can be reduced by improved productivity through:

o  -  Establishing a consistent production and build demand.

o  -  Selecting a mature design at the start of the build and limiting the amount of changes once production begins.

o  -  The necessity of ensuring a well-integrated designer, builder and supplier team.

o  -  Matching the industrial base structure to demand.

o  -  Ensuring there is visionary leadership provided by company management.

The RAND report is a critical input into the Defence White Paper and the Naval Shipbuilding Plan. The Government will now carefully consider the report’s analysis and findings in preparation for the release of these documents later this year."

SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (SMH) COMMENT

On April 16, 2015 David Wroe http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/major-local-shipbuilding-report-excludes-submarine-costings-20150416-1mmed1.html reported:

“But the report strikingly left the future submarine project out of its calculations, concentrating instead on surface warship such as new frigates and patrol boats.

When asked why, lead researcher John Birkler told reporters submarines had been "specifically excluded" from RAND's terms of reference by the Abbott government. "We were asked not to include submarines," he said.

Mr Birkler went on to indicate that RAND had been told by the government last year that Australia planned to build its submarines offshore.” “His remarks, backed up by a table in the report that places the future submarine project in the "build offshore" column, is clearly at odds with the government's repeated insistence that it had at no point decided to have Japan build the new fleet of up to 12 submarines.”

[In unconvincing contradiction] “A spokesman for Mr Andrews said that at "no stage were RAND Corporation informed by the government or the Department of Defence that an offshore submarine build was the only option being considered".” See WHOLE SMH ARTICLE

MY COMMENT

The Report's productivity improvement recommendations are US best practice. This is understandable given the US authorship. The recommendations, however, appear to be technologically and economically unsustainable for Australia. Australia cannot cover all the design and development functions unlike the output of Soryus at the MHI-KHI shipyards and unlike output of the Virginia class at Newport News and General Dynamics Electric Boat.

Pete

South Korean Submarines, 3,000+ ton KSS-III, Nuclear Potential

See detail on possible South Korean nuclear submarine technology in redded KSS-N sub-heading below.

One of South Korea's (international convention of just "Korea" now used) nine Chang Bogo class (KSS-Is). Korea is completing a sale of three to Indonesia.

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One of Korea's four Son Won-Il class (KSS-IIs) in commision - five to go. Larger than the KSS-I and AIP equipped. Looks like a pre-launch ceremony. 

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With the KSS-III being described as a "3,000 tonne submarine" for a decade the above dimensions (very similar to the single hull Collins) may be accurate. The "3,000 t" would be surfaced displacement.

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A larger KSS-III? If its length is really 83.5 m and breadth/beam 7.7 m, then compared with the Collins (77.4 m, 7.8 m) the KSS-III's displacement appears to be around 3,400 tonnes (surfaced) and 3,800 tonnes (submerged). There are many other variables in estimating displacement of course! Other possibilities are that the above is a "4,000 t" nuclear KSS-N? or 83.5 is propaganda to equal the Soryu's 84 m length.

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Another model of what the KSS-III may turn out like. It appears to have 6 VLS hatches but a 6 missile Vertical Multi Purpose Lock (VMPL) is more likely.
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South Korea (international convention of just "Korea" now used) has a long and competitive ship-building tradition. Korea has the world's largest ship-building industry - with 41% of world market share (in first quarter 2015). This has put Korea in a good position to build German TKMS-HDW designed submarines (from kits?) since 1990. Korea has also has submarine export success and is perhaps well prepared to develop a 3,000-4,000 tonne conventional submarine. It faces threats even greater than Japan does - having a land border with North Korea and in much closer proximity to China. The Korean Navy has publicised its creation of a Submarine Command for reasons difficult to discern but perhaps to suggest an eventual capability of a pre-emptive or second strike nuclear deterrent.

South Korea's KSS-I, KSS-II and KSS-III building program suggest a goal of having a rolling average of at least 18 submarines operational and perhaps 22 to match Japan's medium term goal. The so-called "indigenous" submarine (KSS-III) project may still draw heavily on TKMS-HDW technology but "indigenous" also provides ambiguity if Korea needs to develop KSS-III into a nuclear propelled submarine "KSS-N" possibly nuclear armed. 

South Korea's strategy includes the creation of a pre-emptive strike "kill chain" (of threat detection, decision making-authorisation and (mainly missile) pre-emptive strike) against North Korea. Submarines would be a (or the) principal pre-emptive strike and counter-strike platform. Subsonic cruise missiles are generally too slow for these roles - making supersonic+ cruise and ballistic missiles the logical solution.

Used South Korean has two Dolgorae class mini submarines (above) launched 1990 and 1991, 175 tons, with two small 410mm torpedo tubes. They have crews of 14 and may be used for surveillance and perhaps special forces. They were acquired by South Korea to obtain initial experience with the basics of operating a submarine force and to train surface ASW ships in the detection of subs.

In 2011 South Korea indicated it would be building new mini-subs, known as KSS-500As, weighing 510 tons. They may operate only on Lithium-ion Batteries and diesel engines. 

KSS-Is and KSS-IIs

Korea's navy operates:

- 9 Chang Bogo class (KSS-I), a variant of the TKMS-HDW type 209/1200. In 2011 Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) won a contract to supply Indonesia with two pre-assembled Chang Bogos (to be delivered probably in 2016-2017) with a third Chang Bogo to be assembled in Indonesia (perhaps the beginning of an indigenous Indonesian production line!). The 9 KSS-Is have been regularly upgraded which may extend their service life past the usual 30 years. A major future upgrade may be Lithium-ion batteries fully or partly replacing lead-acid batteries - although such a retrofit may be very difficult. See NTI document for names of specific, commissioned KSS-Is and KSS-IIs up to 2011.

-  4 Son Won-Il class (KSS-II) as at April 2015. Five more are due to be commissioned by 2020. These are variants of the TKMS-HDW Type 214 submarines. Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) built the first three (commissioned 2007-2009). DSME, HHI and STX Offshore & Shipbuilding are alternately building the second batch of six with one of the six commissioned in December 2014 and the final one due to be commissioned in 2018. Like the KSS-Is the KSS-IIs carry some US built Harpoon missiles for anti-ship and possibly land attack. Like the KSS-Is the KSS-IIs are orientated to a surveillance, anti-shipping, anti-submarine and (a short range) land attack capability. 

KSS-III, 3,000-4,000 tonne Design - Conventional and Potentially Nuclear  

There will be eventually 9 (KSS-III) 3,000-4,000 tonne submarines.  See the 3rd and 4th pictues above that contain varying dimentions attributed to the KSS-III (also called "DSX-3000") which indicate its surfaced displacement may be anywhere between 3,000 and 3,400 tonnes. DSME will be the main designer. The lead KSS-III boat began development in November 2014 at DSME's submarine yard at Okpo. It my be a major step forward in utilising Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs). The second batch of KSS-IIIs (especially if they use new technology LIBs) may take 8 years to build and launch (2024) and then 3 years to commission (about 2027). 

The larger size of the KSS-III will permit it to include some of the latest submarine technologies, including:

- large diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (LDUUVs)
- Seal/diver delivery vehicles (SDVs)
- dry-wet cells for special forces in dinghies/divers/Seals
- VLS or more probably the major advance of Vertical Multi Purpose Lock (VMPL) capable of launching 1,500+ km cruise and Harpoon missiles,, VMPLs are also capable of launching LDUUVs and SDVs. 

As well as retaining fuel cell (or less likely Stirling) AIP, KSS-IIIs could also incorporate features from the TKMS-HDW Dolphin 2 including the large rudder system and reinforced hull bottom which allow such a large SSK to operate in shallow, littoral waters. Also Germany's TKMS-HDW could provide assistance using features from the so-far drawing board only HDW 216 (intended to be a 3,000+ tonne design). 

One additional reason Korea is going the indigenously developed submarine route is that international political pressure on Germany would probably prevent Germany from openly assisting South Korea to develop the KSS-III in the medium-long term into a nuclear propelled KSS-N submarine, possibly armed with nuclear weapons.

The capability to use Tomahawk or indigenous Hyunmoo-3 series cruise missiles of 1,500+ km (far longer than the 140 km range KSS-I/KSS-IIs UGM-84 Harpoons) potentially makes the KSS-III much more effective against such additional threats as China and Russia. The future KSS-IIIs may also be capable of firing ballastic missiles.

The US may have been politically unwilling to supply the Tomahawk to Korea. Instead Korea appears to have incorporated many of Tomahawk's features into the Hyunmoo-3 series. By building an indigenous missile, warhead ambiguity is introduced. Korea is one of those countries (like Japan) that could develop a nuclear weapon in less than a year. Miniaturisation may be a major hurdle but a Hyunmoo-3 (or other cruise missiles) could trade range to achieve a heavier warhead than 500 kg.

KSS-III could best be described as multi-purpose. For a medium sized navy like Korea's KSS-IIIs (or KSS-Ns) could combine some of the capabilities that larger navies cover more comprehensively with distinctly different types, such as SSKs, SSNs, SSGNs and SSBNs. 

KSS-N, a Nuclear Development of the KSS-III? 

Korea appears to have long maintained an option of a KSS-N (also called KSSX-N and SSX) a 4,000+ ton nuclear propelled development of the KSS-III. On past plans see Globalsecurity.com report. However to date any plan has not occurred due to pressure from all of Korea's neighbours, US opposition and the necessity of building an indigenous submarine rather than a submarine that heavily relies on a foreign country (Germany). Also a nuclear propelled Korean submarine would diminish any chance that North Korea would remove/destroy its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Korea might develop the KSS-N submarine if threats against it sufficiently increase and/or US military support diminishes.

Korea has long and extensive experience building nuclear power reactors - mostly large but still useful in any future development of submarine reactors. Interestingly DSME (as at April 2015) appears to be designing a "nuclear propulsion [surface] ship". This would have the legitimate purpose of meeting market demand for nuclear propelled, very large, ice-breaking, oil and LNG tankers. This activity also provides dual-use potential for submerged nuclear propulsion. 

In terms of an actual reactor technology path the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is also operating and further developing a small 100 MW ("SMART") pressurised water reactor with a output (at least) that may suite a 4,000 ton KSS-N. The SMART reactor's main current weakness is that it uses 5% enriched Uranium (U) 235 providing a poor power to size/weight ratio. 5% means SMART presently needs three year (overly frequent) refueling. Korea probably could legitimately develop the SMART at a higher (ice breaker surface ship) U enrichment percentage to make it much more useful as a submarine reactor. Korea has been seeking IAEA-US permission to develop a greater U enrichment capability but has been blocked. Although at a small amount-laboratory level Korea has a proven Uranium enrichment ability.

So Korea's indigenous submarine (KSS-III) program is well worth watching for its potential.

I'll do an article on North Korea's submarine situation in the future.

More Sources

http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/south-korea-submarine-capabilities/

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-daily/sea-air-space/2015/04/12/korea-south-north-navy-modernize-coastal-scandal-sub-helicopter-frigate/25512681/

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/kss-n.htm

Pete

Minister Andrews' overseas visit to submarine competitors.

Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews

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I originally wrote  on April 15(using a report of April 10 in the Kieler Nachrichten) concerning Minister Andrews meeting the German and French Defence Ministers and visiting Kiel and Cherbourg. Now there is ministerial confirmation (April 21).

Minister Andrews' itinerary:

April 23, 2015 - Meeting German Defence Minister Dr Ursula von der Leyen, then Visiting TKMS-HDW submarine yard at Kiel, Germany. 
Confirmed in Kiel's newspaper, 
-  Kieler Nachrichten, article of April 10 (Windows 7 or 8 or right-clicking mouse can translate into English). and
-  Kieler Nachrichten April 23 indicated Ministers Andrews, when at TKMS-Kiel, was given a presentation on the HDW 216. He was also given information on submarines TKMS has been constructing for Israel (which are Dolphin 1s and 2s) and Egypt (which are Type 209s]

April 24, 2015 – Meeting French Defence Minister Jean-YvesLe Drian and DCNS senior executives. .  
-  French website of April 21 reporting Minister Andrews visit to Chsubmarine . 
-  Kieler Nachrichten April 23 reported Minister Andrews was to be given a presentation by DCNS, Cherbourg shipyard on the "Scorpene." This may suggest DCNS is not calling its offer to Australia the "SMX Ocean" of "conventional Barracuda" but Scorpene-4000 (probably 4,000 ton (submerged?).

Ministerial Confirmation:

Ministerial Media Release on all this came on April 21.
Ministerial Media Release of April 23 of April 23 visit to German Defence Minister then TKMS-HDW at Kiel
Ministerial Media Release on April 24 of April 24 visit to  French Defence Minister and to DCNS at Cherbourg.

The Ministerial Media releases were all informative and signify that Minister Andrews is serious about finding out what Germany-TKMS and France-DCNS have to offer in Australia's future submarine competition. This systematic openness is a welcome change compared to the  practice of Ministers prior to 2015.  

Minister Andrews spent ANZAC Day (April 25) at commemoration services in France and Belgium.

Still unknown if/when Minister Andrews is visiting Japan, including Tokyo to meet Defence Minister Nakatani then KHI and MHI submarine yards at Kobe, Japan

Accompanying Minister Andrews may be the Australian Navy, Head Future Submarine Program, a senior executive of Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and perhaps a senior executive of ASC.

Pete

Australian government sends ASC confusing instructions

Adelaide's Independent News (IN)Daily, April 14, 2015 reported on the confusing instructions the Federal Government has been sending government owned Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC). The relevant parts of the article http://indaily.com.au/news/2015/04/14/asc-agnostic-on-subs-contract/

 are:

"ASC “agnostic” on subs contract

TOM RICHARDSON 

ADELAIDE | The Defence Department has issued an edict to Government-owned shipbuilder ASC that it must deal “fairly and equally” with all prospective international contractors for the lucrative future submarines project.

The missive, revealed today by SA Senator Nick Xenophon during a Senate committee hearing in Adelaide, belies the Abbott Government’s public rhetoric that the Osborne-based shipbuilder should pick an international partner with which to put forward a joint bid.

Defence Minister Kevin Andrews announced in February that the contract would be determined by a “competitive evaluation process”, saying “for the best opportunity to maximise their involvement in the program (ASC) needs to work with an international partner”.

Just last week, SA-based Liberal heavyweight Christopher Pyne urged Xenophon to “assist ASC in putting together a competitive bid for the new submarine project as part of a joint venture with another submarine builder”.

Xenophon today quizzed ASC representatives to the Senate inquiry into the future submarine project whether such a joint venture was actually allowed, “given your instruction from defence”.

“You can’t act on that on the basis that you’ve received quite reasonable instructions from defence to deal with prospective international bidders in an even-handed manner,” asserted Xenophon.

ASC’s chief operating officer Martin Edwards said the company’s “role at the moment is to help those potential partners understand the skills capability and where we can assist, particularly because we’ve had many decades of shipbuilding in Australia”.

He said a potential design partner would not be known until the evaluation process was completed.

“From as ASC perspective, we’re agnostic in relation to whether it’s Japan or Germany or France – we’ll work with any one of those,” Edwards said." See WHOLE ARTICLE.

COMMENT

It appears that as the German (TKMS) and French (DCNS) competitors have much greater experience than Japan in participating in major defence consortiums the Australian Government does not want to put Japan at the disadvantage of facing actual competition. Put another way the Government does not want ASC to choose an international partner on that partner's merits. The Government wants Japan's special position in the so-called "competitive" evaluation maintained.

Of course the Australia Government's hands are tied. The US has already selected Japan to win the "competitive evaluation process" and what the US says goes.

Pete

Pace of India's nuclear submarine program, Arihant, Chakra.

Perhaps a minimally doctored August 2014 photo of INS Arihant. It shares similarities with Russia's latest, minimally humped, Borei class SSBN and the preceding very humped, sail planed, Russian Delta SSBN.

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Minimally humped, Borei class SSBN 

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A very humped Delta II class SSBN with sail planes like Arihant.

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MISSION

On April 5, 2015 I was tasked by "lachit" to assess India's nuclear submarine state of play:

"India needs to get her nuclear subs SSBN & SSN & SSGN up running pronto. Can you guess which subs will ultimately take over the role of SSGN? I would surely like to know your personal opinion on the capabilities of Arihant sub. Thanks

On April 8, 2015 (and in the same thread) Biswajit Pattanaik augmented my tasking with the preamble:

@"lachit" my bet will be on S2/ARIHANT,S3 &S4 SSBNs that they will be converted into SSGNs. This will happen when in the future the better & the bigger SSBNs i.e. S5,S6 & S7 comes into service.

Hi Pete,

Just want to add something about Future Indian SSNs. According to me either Indian Navy could go with a Barracuda based SSN or even a Scorpene based SSN just like the Brazilians Sn-BR SSN. What's your take on this?"

RESPONSE

To which I respond:

You entrust me with grave responsibilities :) My personal response, is:

I've followed INS Arihant's publically available information since it was launched in June 2009. At the launch ceremony (then) Prime Minister Singh thanked the Russians implicitly for their ongoing assistance on the submarine reactors on "S-1" and S-2.

S-1 is the half submarine reactor test rig at Kalpakkam (India's southeast coast, just south of Chennai)

S-2 is INS Arihant itself (undergoing trials - may never be operational).
S-3 is INS Aridhaman (under construction at the Shipbuilding Centre Visakhapatnam (India's east coast)) probable launch perhaps late 2015 or in 2016 - will be the defacto first of class SSBN initially with K-15s.
S-4 no name yet (under construction Shipbuilding Centre Vadodara prior to launch perhaps in 2017)

Arihant was/is only intended as a technology demonstrator (particularly for the reactor) a bit like the USS Nautilus rather than a serious first of class. Unlike the Nautilus there has been no list of Arihant's nuclear sub achievements eg. long submerged range or endurance. This makes me suspicious that Arihant has had major problems with its reactor functioning - the major new piece of technology. The need for security - away from prying Pak or Chinese craft - may be another reason for avoiding long semi-public sea voyages.

The delays in Arihant seem to have increased unrealistic expectations that it could be an operational submarine design.

The distinction between SSN's and new-build SSGN's (G for guided missile) is largely historical and decidedly Russian. The distinction mainly rested on the first SSN's being only horizontal torpedo tube armed and very much orientated to torpedos and mines with few or no missiles. 

Over the last 20 years SSN-SSGN distinctions have become clouded  as horizontally launched missiles have become a major component of an SSN's armament. An even more fundamental structural change has been Vertical Launch Systems for most new build SSNs (be they Akulas, Yasens, later Los Angeles and Virginia class). Therefore new build SSGN's have been merged into "SSN" or in the case of the Yasen "multi-purpose". I think India will be building "multi-purpose SSNs" in the direction of the Chakra class (Akula II) rather than separate SSN and SSGN designations. However, Arihant may evolve into the only SSGN and specialising in missile tests, rather than being an actual new build SSGN.

Advances in missiles' range mean that even SSN fired cruise missile have (or will have) the range to hit anywhere in Pakistan while land launched Agni IIIs (with a light warhead load) can hit anywhere in China. Agni III's will be supplemented by K-4 SLBMs in around a decade. 

It would be tidy for India to have a firm build schedule for nuclear subs S3 through S7 but I think India's build schedule is still under development and heavily dependent on Russian advice - in exchange for India paying excessive amounts for Russian arms (effectively subsidization). Also India has unique geography and needs that submarine types can be iteratively evolved around. India is not the US or Russia than can afford 10 new SSBNs and 20-40 new missile armed SSNs. Multi purpose Indian designs may become a substantial component.

The initial Indian SSNs, if they stay at the Arihant class' displacement of 6,000 tons (surfaced) will be underpowered unless they have an uprated reactor (maybe 130 MW). This may take some years to achieve. The reactor in the Chakra/Akula is an obvious item to study. As the study of reactor safety takes decades I suspect that Russian advisers are on hand towards the rear of the Chakra and Arihant.

An SSBN version of the Arihant appears to have the right sized reactor if the speed specifications are accurate.

Rather than Arihant and follow on subs being influenced by French nuclear submarines (like the Barracuda) I think Russia's Delta class and Borei subs are already a strong influence. India was, and I assume still is, extraordinarily committed to two Chakra/Akula IIs. India appeared to cross subsidise Russia nuclear sub building program in the long years Chakra/Akula was being built when Russia was crying out for defence money.

Much patience is needed tracking India's nuclear sub program. Unlike the 10+% of Russian and US GDP's that resulted in rapid nuclear sub program gains in the 1950s-60s India is only spending around 2.5% GDP on defence (according to Stockholm SIPRI stats). This is not a breakout amount for rapid increases in numbers or models. India's nuclear sub program also faces competition from the probably highest priority Agni IRBM-ICBM program and from India's conventional military priorities.

The launch of INS Aridhaman, perhaps later this year, will be the next major step.

Please connect with India's Rising Nuclear and Conventional Submarine Force, May 21, 2015 http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2015/05/indias-rising-nuclear-and-conventional.html .

Pete